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INTRODUCTION
The Three Faces of Bankruptcy Law
Bankruptcy law is an ancient, peculiar feature of our legal landscape.
Historically, it has existed from time to time as a collection of extraordinary remedies
assembled to address three basic questions: (1) what is to be done with the person of an
insolvent debtor, (2) what is to be done with the insolvent debtor’s property, and (3) what
is to be done with the insolvent debtor’s liabilities?1 It is peculiar for several reasons.
First, the need for a special collection of bankruptcy procedures is not so obvious.
Non-bankruptcy law already provides vast mechanisms for collecting debts, distributing
1 As used throughout, the term “debtor” refers to a person who owes unpaid debt
obligations. A debtor may be either an individual or a firm. The term “insolvent” refers
to a debtor’s general inability (or in some cases unwillingness) to satisfy existing
obligations, either as they mature (“equity insolvency”) or because they exceed the value
of the debtor’s assets (“balance-sheet insolvency”). In contrast, the term “bankrupt”
refers to the status of an insolvent debtor who has become caught up in a legal
bankruptcy proceeding of some kind. It is worth noting that not all insolvent debtors will
or should seek formal bankruptcy relief. See Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Workouts and
Debt Contracts, 36 J.L. & ECON. 595, 595 (1993) [hereinafter Schwartz, Bankruptcy
Workouts] (observing that many firms that experience financial distress restructure their
affairs without resort to bankruptcy); see also Joseph E. Stiglitz, Some Aspects of the
Pure Theory of Corporate Finance: Bankruptcies and Take-overs, 3 BELL. J. ECON.
MGMT. SCI. 458, 480 (1972) (noting that firms approaching insolvency may consider
takeovers and mergers rather than bankruptcy). For example, some debtors experience
insolvency as purely a temporary phenomenon—including most college students
immediately upon graduation and many start-up firms. For these debtors, resort to
bankruptcy is not typically warranted. Similarly, not all debtors experiencing financial
distress are or will become insolvent, either in the equity-insolvency sense or the balance-
sheet-insolvency sense. The concept of financial distress is thus not synonymous with
insolvency.
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property, and sorting the rights of competing claimants against a common obligor. One
might well ask: why have yet another mechanism for doing so simply because one of the
parties in interest—the debtor—has become insolvent? For much of United States
history, the nation had no formal bankruptcy law,2 and thus one potential answer to this
question (albeit an incorrect one) is that there is no particular need for a distinct
bankruptcy regime.
Second, few areas of the law have been the subject of such rancorous
experimentation. In both England and the United States, bankruptcy law evolved in fits
and starts, sparking controversy at every turn. As Justice Cardozo aptly remarked in his
dissent in Ashton v. Cameron County Water District, the history is one “of an expanding
concept . . . that has had to fight its way. Almost every change has been hotly denounced
in its beginnings as a usurpation of power.”3 Although the details of these controversies
have evolved over time, bankruptcy law remains a hotly polarizing topic.4
2 See infra note 370 (discussing the absence of a national bankruptcy law for much of the
nineteenth century).
3 298 U.S. 513, 535 (1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
4 Relevant aspects of the evolution of Anglo-American bankruptcy law and how it has
responded to the questions outlined above are referenced in Chapter 3. In brief, historical
responses to the first question—what is to be done with the person of an insolvent
debtor—have ranged from the extremes of (1) hanging or mutilating the debtor to (2)
releasing him from his debts. Responses to the second question—what is to be done with
the insolvent debtor’s property—have ranged from (1) violently seizing the debtor’s
assets for the benefit of his creditors to (2) permitting him to retain at least some items
free from the creditors’ reach. Responses to the third question—what is to be done with
the insolvent debtor’s liabilities—have ranged from (1) prescribing fairly strict ratable
treatment in the payment of the creditors’ claims to (2) ranking the claims according to a
priority scheme that permits a single creditor in some cases to recover ahead of all others.
Given the broad variability of bankruptcy law’s historic responses to these basic
questions, together with the controversies that have followed whatever path the law has
taken, the subject has long confounded debtors, creditors, legislators, jurists,
commentators, and scholars alike.
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Third, few areas of the law are so poorly understood and theorized, and the
relevant deficiencies include (1) the absence of a satisfactory account of the need for a
distinct body of bankruptcy remedies, and (2) the lack of an adequate theory explaining
how bankruptcy law ought to respond to that need.5 The first deficiency is foundational,
the second is ordinal, and they should be addressed in the order stated. From a normative
perspective, if there is no particular reason for having a bankruptcy law, then there is no
particular reason to consider how it should be arranged.6 Conversely, until the reasons
for having a bankruptcy law are fully understood, discussions of its normative content are
likely simply to “float . . . in the air.”7
5 In comparison, a comprehensive and robust discourse has long existed, for example, on
both the essential purposes of tort law and how it should be designed in light of those
purposes, encompassing diverse economic, philosophical, and other perspectives. See,
e.g., JOHN F. WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC 43-70 (2004); OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR.,
THE COMMON LAW 76-129 (1881) [hereinafter HOLMES, COMMON LAW]; Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695 (2003); Martin Stone,
The Significance of Doing and Suffering, published in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF
TORTS 131 (G.J. Postema ed. 2001); Jules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and
Misfortune, 41 MCGILL L.J. 91 (1995) [hereinafter Coleman & Ripstein, Mischief]; Tony
Honore, Responsibility and Luck: The Moral Basis of Strict Liability, 104 L.Q.R. 530
(1988); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973)
[hereinafter Epstein, Theory]; George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85
HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972); Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View from the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089
(1971) [hereinafter Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules]; Leon Green, The Duty
Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1015 (1928).
6 The term “normative” is used throughout in the sense of “ought” or “should” or “ideal.”
Thus, the “normative” content of bankruptcy law means the content that bankruptcy law
ought ideally to have. See, e.g., MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 793
(10th ed.) (listing the third definition of normative as “prescribing norms”). In contrast,
the “positive” or “descriptive” content of bankruptcy law means simply a description of
the content of bankruptcy law as it is, rather than as it ought to be.
7 RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 28 (1988) [hereinafter
COASE, FIRM]. Before conceptualizing a solution to any problem, it is useful first to
understand the nature of the problem one is attempting to address. Cf. Vanston
Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 170 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,
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In academic circles, it is fashionable to conceive of bankruptcy law in one of three
competing ways: (1) as a special debt-collection device that exists to address an
insolvency-related problem known as the “collective-action dilemma” and that, as a
substantive matter, properly mirrors the kinds of remedies creditors would bargain for if
only they could negotiate collectively before extending credit (the “collective-action”
approach);8 (2) as a special debt-collection mechanism amenable to actual contractual
ordering and justifiable as a way of reducing borrowing costs (the “contracting”
approach);9 and (3) as a set of alternative remedial loss-spreading rules superimposed on
ordinary non-bankruptcy debt-collection structures and animated pragmatically by an
assortment of historically competing and conflicting policy considerations (the “loss-
spreading” approach).10 This chapter summarizes these three approaches and explains
concurring) (“[p]utting the wrong questions is not likely to beget right answers even in
law”).
8 See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 10-13,
20-21 (1986) [hereinafter JACKSON, LOGIC]; see also Douglas G. Baird, Loss
Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
815, 827 (1987) [hereinafter Baird, Loss]. The collective-action dilemma is explained
infra at 24-25. The collective-action approach advocated by Jackson and similar theorists
is discussed infra at 24-27. The collective-action approach is a “debt-collection” theory
because it conceptualizes bankruptcy law as fundamentally a debt-collection device, at
least as applied to firms. See infra at 25.
9 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, A Normative Theory of Business Bankruptcy, 91 VA. L. REV.
1199, 1200 (2005) [hereinafter Schwartz, Normative Theory]; see also Robert K.
Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach for Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L.
REV. 51, 100-07 (1992) [hereinafter Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice]. The contracting
approach advocated by Schwartz and similar theorists is discussed infra at 57-84. Like
the collective-action approach, the contracting approach is also a debt-collection theory
because it conceptualizes business bankruptcy law as fundamentally a debt-collection
device. See infra at 54-57.
10 See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MICH.
L. REV. 336, 343-44 (1993) [hereinafter Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking]; Elizabeth
Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 776-77 (1987) [hereinafter Warren,
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why each is inadequate. It also outlines my own theoretical account of (1) the reasons for
having a remedial bankruptcy law, and (2) how bankruptcy law ought to be arranged in
light of the reasons that justify its existence. Both aspects of this account are then fleshed
out in greater detail in the chapters that follow.
Addressing the first question—the need for a distinct body of bankruptcy
remedies—I argue that bankruptcy law is necessary to address a group of insolvency-
related problems encompassing far more than simply the collective-action dilemma.
These include (1) special problems of claims mediation and payment discrimination; (2)
unique challenges of overinvestment, underinvestment, and other moral hazard; and (3)
unrecoverable collection, monitoring, and related costs associated with a debtor’s
financial ruin.11 As a group, these problems are worth remediating because they impair
the functioning of ordinary markets, produce unique externalities, and otherwise generate
waste, inefficiency, and unfairness. Bankruptcy law properly intervenes as a distinct
corrective measure to address them because it would make no sense to burden ordinary
non-bankruptcy markets with similar procedures; the need for a remedial bankruptcy
response arises only in the insolvency context. Although a number of scholars have
examined, or at least observed, various aspects of the problems of insolvency
Bankruptcy Policy]; see also Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Contracting Out of
Bankruptcy: An Empirical Intervention, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1200 (2005)
[hereinafter Warren & Westbrook, Contracting Out]. The loss-spreading approach
advocated by Warren and similar scholars is discussed infra at 101-05. In contrast to the
collective-action and contracting accounts, the loss-spreading approach is not strictly a
debt-collection theory because it conceptualizes bankruptcy law as fundamentally a
vehicle for pursuing a variety of goals including, but not limited to, the payment of
claims. See infra at 101-02.
11 Each of the insolvency-related problems categorized above is addressed in detail in
Chapter 2.
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summarized above, the novelty of my approach lies in considering them together as a
comprehensive justification for having a bankruptcy law in a manner that is
organizationally and substantively distinct.12
12 References to the work of other scholars who have observed or examined one or more
of the insolvency-related problems summarized above are included in the notes
accompanying Chapter 2, including the work of Thomas Jackson, Douglas Baird, and
others. It should be noted that one of Jackson’s significant contributions to the
theoretical literature is that, in crafting his particular theory of bankruptcy law, he begins
purposefully by examining as a threshold question the need for having a distinct body of
bankruptcy remedies, isolating the “collective-action dilemma” as the central
justification. See JACKSON, LOGIC, supra note 8 at 10-13. It is only after identifying the
collective-action problem as the basic justification for having a bankruptcy law that he
then proceeds to discuss how bankruptcy law ought to be crafted in response to it,
advocating his creditors’-bargain approach. Other scholars have tended to skip
addressing rigorously the threshold question as a preliminary inquiry, preferring instead
to examine bankruptcy law as a vehicle for the fulfillment of one set of policy objectives
or another and, in the process, eliding the need for bankruptcy law with the desirability of
the policies they identify, see, e.g., Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking, supra note 10 at
343-44, sparking a debate over methodology, compare Baird, Loss, supra note 8 at 824
(stating that “[t]he challenge facing anyone who wants to write about bankruptcy policy
is to explain why a distinct bankruptcy law exists at all”) with Warren, Bankruptcy
Policy, supra note 10 at 776-78 (acknowledging differences in methodology). For a
number of reasons, inadequate examination of the threshold question as a preliminary
matter has tended to obscure the analysis, in part because it tends to result in the
advocacy of solutions to problems that are themselves never clearly defined. See infra at
59, 116-17. Still other scholars have made claims about the normative value of
bankruptcy law in ways that at least imply the existence of a discrete “problem” in need
of some bankruptcy remedy. For example, Alan Schwartz contends that corporate
bankruptcy law properly exists to reduce the cost of capital for firms. See Schwartz,
Normative Theory, supra note 9 at 1200. Implicit in this approach is the idea that there is
a problem with current capital cost structures, namely that the cost of capital for firms is
too high, at least for the purposes Schwartz discusses—otherwise there would be no need
for a business bankruptcy law to reduce it. Also implicit in this approach is that a
properly crafted bankruptcy law might appreciably lower the cost of capital for firms—
otherwise business bankruptcy law would be a waste of time. As I explain in responding
to Schwartz’s arguments, there are reasons to doubt both assumptions and, regardless,
Schwartz’s perspective is too narrow because it ignores more important problems, costs,
and benefits that bankruptcy law does and should address. See infra at 95-101. In any
event, my approach on the threshold question is distinctive in that the problem set I
identify as justifying the need for a discrete bankruptcy law (1) is broader and more
comprehensive than Jackson’s collective-action explanation, (2) addresses an important
7
Turning to the second question—how bankruptcy law ought to respond to the
problems that explain its existence—I argue that it is a mistake to conceive of bankruptcy
law as merely a special type of debt-collection device or as an alternative loss-spreading
mechanism superimposed on existing non-bankruptcy debt-collection structures. Among
other reasons, these frames are inadequate to capture the subject’s proper remedial scope.
Rather, bankruptcy law is best conceptualized as creating and supporting a distinct
“bankruptcy market” in its own right. Further, the bankruptcy market is best
conceptualized as “corrective” in nature because its purpose is to remediate the problems
of insolvency so that, among other goals, insolvent debtors and their property may once
again return to, and participate fully in, ordinary non-bankruptcy markets unburdened by
the waste, inefficiency, and distorted decision-making incentives that insolvency
generates.
Operationally, the bankruptcy market properly performs its corrective function
through its unique features of debt collection, debt forgiveness, and debt adjustment—its
three distinct “faces”—that in combination orchestrate what is to be done with the
bankrupt debtor’s person, property, and liabilities. Specifically, the law’s debt-collection
remedies respond to certain of the problems of insolvency by directing the recognition
and enforcement of an insolvent debtor’s obligations in special ways. Its debt-
forgiveness provisions respond by relieving the bankrupt debtor and certain of the
debtor’s property from the burdens of existing indebtedness. Its debt-adjustment
mechanisms respond by realigning the creditors’ rights and priorities between them as a
threshold question that scholars such as Warren have tended to ignore or treat
inadequately, and (3) is entirely distinct from Schwartz’s approach.
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group.13 Among other things, these signature features of bankruptcy law aim to promote
improved decision making regarding the disposition of the debtor and the debtor’s assets,
enforce as a secondary matter the payment of claims to reduce the regime’s costs, and
prioritize the debtor’s liabilities. As I explain in Chapter 3, the solutions that these
mechanisms offer to the problems of insolvency are beneficial, whether evaluated in
terms of equity (fairness), efficiency (wealth maximization), or the preservation of
entitlements (protected interests).
Given the desirability of these key features of bankruptcy law, the corrective-
market approach is superior to the debt-collection and loss-spreading alternatives for a
number of reasons. As a descriptive matter, it more accurately captures what bankruptcy
law actually does and thus provides not only a better statement of the current regime
against which alternative proposals can be evaluated, but also a more appropriate
conceptual frame within which to evaluate its use and potential.14 For example, the U.S.
13 The debt-collection, debt-forgiveness, and debt-adjustment mechanisms of bankruptcy
law are discussed in Chapter 3. I also explain in Chapter 3 how each of these
mechanisms responds to different categories of the problems of insolvency. For example,
bankruptcy law’s debt-collection devices properly respond to the specific problems of
unrecoverable collection and monitoring costs, and its debt-adjustment mechanisms
properly respond to the problem of payment discrimination. See infra at 228, 300.
14 In offering this positive justification for the corrective-market account, I do not mean
to suggest that the normative justifications for responding to the problems of insolvency
can be derived merely from a descriptive statement of how the law currently functions.
See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, book III, part I, section I (1739)
[hereinafter HUME, TREATISE] (arguing that “ought” does not follow merely from a
description of what “is,” but “’tis necessary that . . . a reason should be given; for what
seems altogether inconceivable [is] how this new relation can be deduced from others,
which are entirely different from it”). These are separate inquiries, and the normative
question is discussed immediately below. Because the corrective-market approach
provides a better positive and normative description of bankruptcy law, it offers a better
conceptual frame within which to evaluate how it should operate, and I have chosen it at
least in part on the theory that it is both accurate and nontrivial. See RONALD M.
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 74 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE] (discussing
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Bankruptcy Code (codified as Title 11 of the United States Code)15 characteristically
provides that, upon the commencement of a bankruptcy case, the debtor’s property is
vested in a special “bankruptcy estate”; the claims of creditors are exchanged for
equitable shares in the estate (and are sometimes traded in a unique distressed-debt
submarket); most debt-collection activity is curtailed in favor of court-supervised
oversight of the debtor’s affairs; and the debtor’s liabilities are thereafter sorted, altered,
negotiated, and extinguished under the auspices of a special regulatory system that
effectively supplants non-bankruptcy mechanisms.16 In other words, bankruptcy law
establishes its own special forum and devices for addressing what is to be done with the
person, property, and liabilities of insolvent debtors in ways quite different from non-
bankruptcy markets.
More important, the corrective-market approach more appropriately accounts for
and accommodates what bankruptcy law should be doing. As a normative matter,
bankruptcy law’s creation of its own distinctive market in response to the problems of
insolvency is desirable because these problems are complex and, by their nature, require
the challenge of coming up with conceptual labels because “it is difficult to find a
statement of the concept at once sufficiently abstract to be uncontroversial . . . and
sufficiently concrete to be useful”).
15 11 U.S.C. § 101, et seq. (2000 & Supp. 2006).
16 By operation of law, the debtor’s filing of a bankruptcy petition creates a “bankruptcy
estate” consisting of all of the debtor’s non-exempt property, wherever located. 11
U.S.C. § 541 (2000 & Supp. 2006). Upon the commencement of the case, the “automatic
stay” enjoins most forms of debt-collection activity against the debtor and the estate. 11
U.S.C. § 362 (2000 & Supp. 2006). Thereafter, creditors are entitled to file “proofs of
claim” demonstrating their rights to payment from the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 501 (2000 &
Supp. 2006). Claims are subject to “disallowance,” “subordination,” “reaffirmation,”
“discharge,” and “impairment,” among other things, through a variety of devices. See,
e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 502, 510(c), 524(c), 727, 1123(b) (2000 & Supp. 2006); see also infra
notes 72-76 & 240-41 (discussing these and other aspects of the bankruptcy process).
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the power of a comprehensive and specially-tailored market regime to resolve them
adequately. In particular, the problems of insolvency warrant remediation through the
intervention of a corrective bankruptcy market of the kind the law currently supplies,
rather than through the more limited debt-collection alternatives some scholars have
offered (such as bankruptcy contracting and the like), because these alternatives are
comparatively inferior as vehicles to address the problems of insolvency.17 In addition,
although the loss-spreading approach is capacious enough to accommodate bankruptcy
law’s debt-collection, debt-forgiveness, and debt-adjustment functions, it lacks an
adequate conceptual means to define, limit, and coordinate their operation. The
corrective-market approach corrects this deficiency in two ways. First, it defines and
limits bankruptcy law’s debt-collection, debt-forgiveness, and debt-adjustment
mechanisms by tying them to the problems of insolvency. Second, it coordinates these
mechanisms by prioritizing them. Specifically, (1) the debt-collection functions of
bankruptcy law are subordinated to its debt-forgiveness features on the principle that the
proper allocation of assets is more important than the payment of claims, and (2)
obligations processed through bankruptcy’s debt-collection procedures are subject to
modification under its debt-adjustment mechanisms so that losses are channeled away
from those who are characteristically poor loss-spreaders and toward those who are the
cheapest avoiders of the costs of insolvency.18
Bankruptcy law properly privileges its debt-forgiveness and debt-adjustment
features over its debt-collection functions for a number of reasons, including the goal of
17 See infra at 57-95.
18 These features of the corrective-market approach, together with the normative
justifications for them, are discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
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ensuring appropriate asset dispositions in response to the problems of insolvency.19 This
does not mean, of course, that the payment of claims is unimportant in bankruptcy.
Treating the payment of claims as unimportant would make any bankruptcy system too
costly.20 Rather, the enforcement of debts is properly streamlined to reduce the costs of
enforcement and then relegated to secondary significance because ensuring the efficient
deployment of assets is more important than vindicating the pre-bankruptcy collection
rights of creditors per se.21
To be sure, many theorists conceptualize bankruptcy law in terms of its ability to
promote and accomplish beneficial results and effects, offering competing perspectives
on both (1) what constitute desirable outcomes in the insolvency context, and (2) how
bankruptcy law should go about achieving them.22 For example, scholars who
characterize bankruptcy law as primarily a debt-collection vehicle typically argue in
19 As indicated above, I evaluate the various mechanisms of bankruptcy law and the
solutions they offer to the problems of insolvency using three different standards: (1)
equity (fairness), (2) efficiency (wealth-maximization), and (3) entitlement (the
preservation of protected interests). I also use these standards to evaluate how
bankruptcy prioritizes its various debt-collection, debt-forgiveness, and debt-adjustment
mechanisms. I make use of these three different standards because none of them is
perfect and collectively they provide a fuller picture of the desirability of the different
functions of bankruptcy law. The relative merits and drawbacks of these standards are
addressed in Chapter 3.
20 See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1393, 1427 (1985) [hereinafter Jackson, Fresh-Start] (explaining that a discharge
mechanism that too generously extinguished debts at the creditors’ expense would be
disastrous for a credit-based economy such as ours); infra at 289.
21 These aspects of my theory are fleshed out in greater detail in Chapter 3.
22 The economic standard of “wealth maximization” is discussed in Chapter 3. Although
I make use of this standard in evaluating bankruptcy law, I also use the standards of
equity (fairness) and the preservation of entitlements (paramount interests protected by
rights) because wealth maximization, by itself, is an incomplete metric with important
limitations and drawbacks. See infra at 242-48.
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response to the “what” question that bankruptcy law is wealth maximizing to the extent it
“gets the creditors paid” at the lowest possible cost in accordance with their pre-
bankruptcy payment entitlements. This is so, they contend, because that is what
bankruptcy law is for, and a bankruptcy law that functions in this way is beneficial to the
extent it (1) reduces borrowing costs and/or (2) avoids the misuse of public resources
attendant in maintaining competing debt-collection systems (bankruptcy and non-
bankruptcy) that perform the same debt-collection function in different ways—a problem
of “forum shopping.”23
In contrast, scholars who emphasize bankruptcy law’s loss-spreading
capabilities—in particular its debt-forgiveness and debt-adjustment features—typically
argue in more eclectic fashion that, in addition to streamlining the recognition and
enforcement of claims more efficiently than non-bankruptcy systems, bankruptcy law is
ameliorative to the extent it relieves debtors from the burdens of excessive indebtedness
and adjusts the payment rights of creditors. This is so, they argue, because that is what
bankruptcy law is for on the theory that a bankruptcy law that functions in this way has
the effect of avoiding costly features of the non-bankruptcy system of debt enforcement
that fail adequately to protect the interests of debtors, creditors, and other constituents
affected by a debtor’s financial demise.24
23 See JACKSON, LOGIC supra note 8 at 3, 20-21; Schwartz, Normative Theory, supra note
9 at 1200; Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay
on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 155-56 (1989)
[hereinafter Jackson & Scott, Nature of Bankruptcy]; Baird, Loss, supra note 8 at 827;
Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 185-
86 (Spring 1987) [hereinafter Baird, World].
24 See, e.g., Warren & Westbrook, Contracting Out, supra note 10 at 1200-01; Warren,
Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 10 at 777, 779.
13
For a number of reasons, however, these competing responses to the “what”
question are inadequate. As a positive matter, the actual ambition of bankruptcy law is a
hybrid of the debt-collection and loss-spreading views—it expresses a dynamic
combination of debt-collection, debt-forgiveness, and debt-adjustment values that do not
single-mindedly pursue either the goal of reducing borrowing costs or the correction of
deficiencies in non-bankruptcy debt-collection regimes per se. Rather, bankruptcy law
pursues a variety of cost-reduction goals for a deeper and more comprehensive purpose:
to remedy the problems of insolvency. Although it is certainly true that bankruptcy law
may have the effect of reducing borrowing costs and/or correcting deficiencies in the
general debt-collection system, its actual beneficial purpose remains something distinctly
different, and it is important to avoid confusing purpose with effect. Similarly, the
forum-shopping concern is largely overblown because it assumes that bankruptcy and
non-bankruptcy markets perform the same debt-collection function when, in fact, they do
not.25 As a positive matter, the corrective-market approach offers a better response to the
“what” question because, in accounting more fully for the debt-collection, debt-
forgiveness, and debt-adjustment functions of bankruptcy as a coordinated response to
the multi-faceted problems of insolvency, it more accurately captures bankruptcy law’s
actual remedial ambitions and virtues.
Moreover, the debt-collection and loss-spreading perspectives are normatively
inadequate because they are alternatively too narrow and too broad. The debt-collection
view is too narrow because, among other things, it overstates the value of the debt-
collection function and correspondingly fails to account adequately for the beneficial
25 The forum-shopping problem is discussed in greater detail infra at 47-53.
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effects of bankruptcy law’s debt-forgiveness and debt-adjustment mechanisms. In turn,
the loss-spreading view is too free-floating because it is insufficiently anchored to the
reasons for having a bankruptcy law in the first place and lacks a means to organize and
limit the loss-spreading policies that scholars who advocate it have championed.26 In
contrast, the corrective-market approach occupies a distinct space between these
perspectives (although it is concededly closer to the views of the loss-spreading
advocates than it is to the views of the debt-collection enthusiasts), and offers a better
normative answer to the “what” question because it defines bankruptcy law’s remedial
goals in ways that are more directly responsive to the problems of insolvency and avoids
the under- and over-breadth defects of the debt-collection and loss-spreading theories. It
is likewise superior because it evaluates bankruptcy outcomes not only in terms of
whether they are wealth-maximizing in an economic sense, but also from the perspectives
26 For example, few would quarrel with Warren’s proposition that, as a general matter,
bankruptcy law properly serves to “enhance the value of the failing debtor,” but the real
question is why bankruptcy law does so (versus some other law), and correspondingly
what are the proper limits to the goal of enhancing the value of the failing debtor in
bankruptcy and how is this goal to be orchestrated in concert with the other values
Warren identifies. See infra at 102-09 (discussing Warren’s articulation of the goals of
bankruptcy law); Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking, supra note 10 at 343-44 (arguing
that bankruptcy law “aims, with greater or lesser efficacy, toward four principal goals:
(1) to enhance the value of the failing debtor; (2) to distribute value according to multiple
normative principles; (3) to internalize the costs of the business failures to the parties
dealing with the debtor; and (4) to create reliance on private monitoring”). Consistent
with his debt-collection focus, Jackson contends that bankruptcy law properly enhances
the debtor’s value for the benefit of creditors. See JACKSON, LOGIC, supra note 8 at 21
(“The key to effective implementation of [bankruptcy’s goal of ameliorating the
common-pool problem] is to trigger bankruptcy when, and only when, it is in the interests
of the creditors as a group.”). This view, however, is too narrow because, as discussed
infra, it fails to account adequately for the value of the debt-forgiveness aspects of
bankruptcy law that frequently override the collection of claims, and likewise takes
inadequate account of its debt-adjustment features. See infra at 31-34.
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of whether they are equitable (fair) and consistent with concepts of entitlement (protected
interests).
Scholars diverge even further on the “how” question—namely, how bankruptcy
law should go about achieving its goals. Those who focus on bankruptcy law as
primarily a debt-collection device favor a regime that, as noted, either (1) mirrors the
kinds of remedies creditors would bargain for if only they had the chance to do so before
extending credit (“conceptual contracting”), or (2) permits actual ex ante bankruptcy
contracting (“actual contracting”).27 As a group, these scholars are characteristically
skeptical of the value of any legal process that uses substantive rules or judicial decision
making to guide asset allocation issues or protect the interests of debtors or other
constituents “disadvantaged” by non-bankruptcy debt-collection procedures, particularly
rules that direct substantive outcomes different from those that would be achieved in
ordinary non-bankruptcy markets.28 They observe that, in the non-bankruptcy world,
debt obligations are typically creatures of contract and courts typically enforce those
contracts even though doing so may leave little or nothing for others. In response to the
“how” question, these scholars characteristically ask: why should things in bankruptcy
be different? They typically reply that things should not be different, other than as
minimally necessary to address the collective-action problem in ways that enhance the
27 See supra notes 8-10, 12. The concept of “ex ante” contracting refers to bargaining at
the time a creditor extends credit before the onset of insolvency. In contrast, the concept
of “ex post” contracting refers to bargaining after the onset of insolvency. The concept of
“ex ante effects” in bankruptcy refers to the impact of bankruptcy rules on behavior in
non-bankruptcy markets. See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108
YALE L.J. 573, 578-80 (1998) [hereinafter Baird, Uncontested Axioms] (discussing the
concept of “ex ante effects”).
28 See, e.g., id. at 587.
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creditors’ non-bankruptcy returns.29 In other words, they argue that bankruptcy law’s
response to the “how” question should be essentially procedural only,30 and should be
tailored narrowly to serve only the goals they identify in their response to the “what”
question (i.e., debt collection), with some of these scholars arguing that the best way to
address the “how” question, at least in part, is through actual enforceable bankruptcy
contracts.31
In contrast, scholars who focus on bankruptcy law’s loss-spreading capabilities
tend to favor a remedial system of the kind that currently exists—a court-supervised
bankruptcy process with a mixture of procedural and substantive rules that guide asset-
allocation issues and overtly protect the interests of a variety of constituents who would
otherwise lose out in the non-bankruptcy debt-collection game. They observe that
bankruptcy law properly deals with the totality of the legal obligations a debtor may owe,
many of which are not creatures of contract (e.g., tort and tax obligations), and that it
would make no sense to leave these and other obligations by the wayside simply because
financial creditors have negotiated privately with the debtor for preferential treatment and
have made no accommodation for the interests of others. They observe further that the
29 See, e.g., JACKSON, LOGIC, supra note 8 at 20-21; Jackson & Scott, Nature of
Bankruptcy, supra note 23 at 155-56; Baird, Loss, supra note 8 at 827.
30 See Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy As
(Is) Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931, 946-479 (2004) [hereinafter Mooney,
Normative Theory] (describing the collective-action account as fundamentally a
proceduralist approach); Baird, Uncontested Axioms, supra note 27 at 578-80
(characterizing the collective-action account as proceduralist in nature).
31 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Contracting Reviewed, 109 YALE L.J. 343, 346-
48 (1999) [hereinafter Schwartz, Contracting Reviewed]; Alan Schwartz, A Contract
Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807, 1821-22 (1998)
[hereinafter Schwartz, Contract Theory]; Schwartz, Bankruptcy Workouts, supra note 1
at 621-24.
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reason non-bankruptcy markets do not provide extensive protection for debtors and
constituents other than financial creditors is because that is the role of bankruptcy law—
to be invoked when needed.32 In response to the “how” question, they characteristically
ask: why should things in bankruptcy be the same? They typically reply that things
should not be the same, and that bankruptcy law may prescribe a broad assortment of
substantive and procedural protections that favor debtors and creditors who would
otherwise fare poorly if left to their own devices in the non-bankruptcy world.33 In other
words, they argue that bankruptcy law’s response to the “how” question is properly
procedural and substantive to achieve the goals they champion in their response to the
“what” question.
These competing responses to the “how” question, however, also exhibit both
positive and normative flaws. As a positive matter, the views of those who advocate
bankruptcy law as a debt-collection device are inadequate because the law does not
permit actual ex ante bankruptcy contracting of the kind they propose and likewise does
not operate exclusively as a procedural vehicle to enhance the return of creditors strictly
in accordance with their non-bankruptcy payment entitlements in the manner creditors
might bargain for ex ante if only they could negotiate collectively before extending
credit.34 Rather, as outlined above, bankruptcy law advances its debt-collection, debt-
32 See LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS
APPROACH 239 (4th ed. 2003) [hereinafter LOPUCKI & WARREN, SECURED CREDIT];
Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 10 at 779.
33 See id. at 777.
34 Current law does not permit parties to contract out of available bankruptcy procedures.
See Warren & Westbrook, Contracting Out, supra note 10 at 1199 (observing that
“[b]ankruptcy law, as currently formulated, is a mandatory system”); Lucian A. Bebchuk
& Andrew T. Guzman, An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies, 42 J.L. &
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forgiveness, and debt-adjustment goals through a complex combination of substantive
and procedural protocols. At the same time, bankruptcy law’s pursuit of its goals of debt
collection, debt forgiveness, and debt adjustment through its procedural and substantive
mechanisms is considerably constrained—more so than those who advocate bankruptcy
law as a loss-spreading vehicle would appear to advocate.
As a normative matter, this restraint is appropriate. Although those who focus on
bankruptcy law as a loss-spreading vehicle tend to favor a remedial system that
approximates in many respects the corrective-market approach, the approach remains
distinctive for two basic, inter-related reasons. First, rather than conceive of bankruptcy
law as an “overlay” on non-bankruptcy debt collection systems as though both systems
addressed essentially the same subject matter, it conceptualizes bankruptcy law as
creating a distinct marketplace for distinct purposes. Second, rather than conceive of
bankruptcy law as necessary to “fix” the debt-collection deficiencies of non-bankruptcy
systems, it conceptualizes bankruptcy law as responding only to the problems of
insolvency. As a result, it defines the mission of bankruptcy law more narrowly and
avoids overrunning non-bankruptcy procedures and markets.35
In turn, bankruptcy law properly rejects both actual and conceptual contracting as
a means to advance its goals because neither of these approaches is desirable in
ECON. 775, 801 (1999) (observing that “it is not possible to contract out of the
bankruptcy laws”).
35 For example, I am not nearly as sanguine as Warren and others on the desirability of
upending the priority of secured credit in bankruptcy. See infra at 108-09.
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responding to the problems of insolvency.36 As Ronald Coase has explained, “the reason
why some activities are not the subject of contracts is exactly the same as the reason why
some contracts are commonly unsatisfactory—it would cost too much to put the matter
right.”37 In the bankruptcy setting, “putting the matter right” means resolving the
problems of insolvency in beneficial ways (including ways that are wealth maximizing),
and that goal exceeds the capacity of ex ante contracting, whether actual or conceptual,
when all of the relevant considerations are taken into account. For a variety of reasons,
the relevant parties cannot be expected to bargain ex ante for an optimal disposition of
the debtor, the debtor’s property, and the debtor’s liabilities (i.e., they cannot be expected
to bargain for optimal debt-collection, debt-forgiveness, and debt-adjustment terms).38
This is partly for epistemic considerations (e.g., the parties cannot anticipate all the
relevant variables ex ante or easily acquire sufficient information);39 partly for
motivational reasons prior to the debtor’s default (e.g., the parties have strong incentives
in non-bankruptcy markets to contract in advance for remedies that are counterproductive
36 In particular, Jackson’s creditors’-bargain approach employing the idea of conceptual
contracting is discussed infra at 25-54; the views of those who advocate actual
bankruptcy contracting, including Schwartz, are discussed infra at 54-95.
37 COASE, FIRM, supra note 7 at 148 (emphasis added). Just as the law responds to some
social problems better than non-legal solutions, different kinds of legal structures respond
better than others to certain categories of social problems. Cf. SCOTT J. SHAPIRO,
LEGALITY 172 (2011) [hereinafter SHAPIRO, LEGALITY] (explaining that, in many
contexts, “it is extremely costly and risky for people to solve their social problems by
themselves, via improvisation, spontaneous ordering, or private agreements, or
communally, via consensus or personalized forms of hierarchy” and “[l]egal systems, by
contrast, are able to respond to this great demand for norms at a reasonable price”).
38 For example, for a number of reasons creditors cannot be expected to negotiate debt-
forgiveness covenants in their ex ante debt contracts. See infra at 69-75.
39 See infra at 80.
20
in the insolvency context);40 partly for coordination reasons (e.g., the parties cannot
effectively coordinate their activities when their numbers are large);41 partly for various
reasons of non-cooperation incentives following the debtor’s default (e.g., the debtor has
incentives to be uncooperative with creditors, and creditors have incentives to be
uncooperative with each other);42 partly for reasons of the excessive direct costs of
implementation (e.g., excessive negotiating, monitoring, and enforcement costs);43 and
partly for reasons of fairness and the preservation of entitlements (e.g., the parties who
are most likely to bargain cannot be trusted to look out for the interests of others, and
some parties cannot adequately look out for themselves).44 All of this is not to say that
40 See infra at 69-75.
41 See infra at 78-83.
42 See infra at 81-82, 156-68. More recent scholarship suggests that the increasingly
heterogeneous interests of creditors make it even more difficult to reach agreement on the
best disposition of a debtor and its assets. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen,
Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 648, 650-53 (2010) [hereinafter Baird & Rasmussen,
Antibankruptcy].
43 See infra at 59-60, 73-74, 80-83.
44 As Coase has quipped, “if self-interest does promote economic welfare, it is because
human institutions have been devised to make it so.” COASE, FIRM, supra note 7 at 134.
Where the law recognizes an entitlement in C, there is a reason it does not generally
permit A and B to bargain away C’s right, whether through contract, the settlement of
litigation, or otherwise. See, e.g., Local Number 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501,
529 (1986) (“Of course, parties who choose to resolve litigation through settlement may
not dispose of the claims of a third party, and a fortiori may not impose duties or
obligations on a third party, without that party’s agreement.”); United States v. Angle,
760 F. Supp. 1366, 1372 (E.D. Cal. 1991) (“The Supreme Court has taught us that a
voluntary settlement cannot dispose of claims of a third party without that party’s
agreement.”) (citing Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 767-68, 109 S. Ct. 2180, 2187
(1989)). Of course, the law may protect C’s interest in any number of ways, some of
which may permit C to bargain away his rights to some extent. See Calabresi &
Melamed, Property Rules, supra note 5 at 1091-93 (1972). But even then, it may still
protect C’s interest against a variety of encroachments. As discussed infra, bankruptcy
law serves to protect a variety of entitlements precisely in this way, including an
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contracting has no place in bankruptcy. On the contrary, the corrective bankruptcy
market does and should make use of contracts, but it properly does so on an ex post basis
in the context of a regime designed specifically to facilitate contracting in the insolvency
setting (i.e., one that takes into account and remediates as necessary the problems of
insolvency that otherwise impede efficient contracting).45
In “putting the matter right” bankruptcy law also properly employs a court-
supervised administrative process to oversee its substantive and procedural regulations.
It may be true as a general matter that substantive regulations imposed by governmental
agents “will not necessarily give better results than leaving the problem to be solved by
the market.”46 But it is also true that “there is no reason why, on occasion, . . .
governmental administrative regulation should not lead to an improvement in economic
efficiency,” which “would seem particularly likely when . . . a large number of people is
involved and when therefore the costs of handling the problem through the market . . .
may be high.”47 Because a large number of people with antagonistic interests and
individual debtor’s protected interest in his own human capital and the protected interests
of certain creditors under certain circumstances. Notably, Jackson acknowledges that, at
least with respect to individual debtors, bankruptcy law properly intervenes with
substantive rules that protect the debtor’s ability to obtain a discharge because, in part,
individual debtors cannot be expected to look out adequately for themselves in this
regard; individual debtors cannot be expected to look out adequately for others with
respect to the externalities that their overconsumption of credit may generate; and the
availability of discharge heightens the creditors’ incentives to monitor and thus restricts
improvident lending. See Jackson, Fresh-Start, supra note 20 at 1394-95, 1418-24, 1426.
As discussed in Chapter 3, similar considerations support bankruptcy law’s debt-
adjustment functions.
45 See supra note 27 (discussing the concepts of ex ante and ex post bargaining).
46 COASE, FIRM, supra note 7 at 118.
47 Id.
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competing entitlements are characteristically involved in bankruptcy matters, and because
the costs of handling the problems of insolvency contractually in the typical case would
be extremely high (to the extent it could be done at all), bankruptcy presents such an
occasion. This is not to say that the current system functions perfectly—it does not. It is
to say, however, that bankruptcy is properly a situation in which the skepticism of those
who advocate actual or conceptual bankruptcy contracting is misaligned.
In the views of some scholars, of course, “putting the matter right” in the
insolvency context properly involves an exercise very different from the one outlined
above. For example, rather than addressing more broadly the problems of insolvency, the
relevant mission of the contractual exercise might be defined once again in narrow terms
to mean simply (1) reducing the cost of capital for firms,48 or (2) enhancing the value of
the debtor so that this value may be distributed to creditors strictly in accordance with
their non-bankruptcy payment priorities.49 But as suggested above, these views are
overly reductionist because, among other reasons, they inappropriately assume away
many of the relevant problems, ignore the broader beneficial ambitions of bankruptcy
law, and likewise ignore the costs of contracting in other respects. Thus, even if the goals
of bankruptcy law were confined narrowly to these debt-collection values, ex ante
bankruptcy contracting nonetheless would remain infeasible for at least some of the
reasons summarized above.
In conducting the analysis, I take it as a given that the best response to the
problems of insolvency is not simply what may be in the best interests of one particular
48 See Schwartz, Normative Theory, supra note 9 at 1200.
49 See JACKSON, LOGIC, supra note 8 at 20-21.
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group of creditors, or even what may be in the best interests of creditors generally, but
rather “that which brings about the best outcome for the system as a whole.”50 This
includes what is best for all of the participants, debtors and creditors alike, as well as
those who otherwise bear the cost of a system of bankruptcy law. In that sense,
bankruptcy policy cannot afford to focus myopically on procedures that have the effect of
reducing borrowing costs, or in the alternative too expansively on substantive rules
designed to ameliorate perceived deficiencies in non-bankruptcy markets generally.
Rather, bankruptcy law’s powerful debt-collection, debt-forgiveness, and debt-adjustment
mechanisms should be focused more surgically to address the problems of insolvency
that justify their invocation in the first place, with due regard to the impact they have on
the operation of non-bankruptcy systems (e.g., its “ex ante effects”).51
Finally, on the question of how best to measure the value of any particular
bankruptcy procedure, one cannot evaluate adequately how bankruptcy law addresses the
problems of insolvency simply by focusing on how the law reduces a single type of cost.
Instead, because the problems of insolvency and the legal regulations that respond to
them are necessarily complex,52 and because bankruptcy procedures are both costly and
cost-reducing on a number of fronts, the aim of bankruptcy law is properly to reduce
more broadly the sum of (1) the costs of the problems of insolvency and (2) the costs of
50 COASE, FIRM, supra note 7 at 118.
51 See supra note 27 (discussing the concept of “ex ante effects”).
52 See Alan Schwartz, Contracting About Bankruptcy, 13 J.L., ECON. & ORG. 127, 144
(1997) (observing that “good bankruptcy procedures probably will be complex”); see
generally COASE, FIRM, supra note 7 at 77 (“Any economic situation is complex and a
single economic problem does not exist in isolation.”).
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remediating the problems of insolvency.53 Throughout this introductory chapter, I use
my critiques of existing academic theories to set the stage for the discussion that follows
and to illustrate the operation and importance of each of the three faces of bankruptcy law
that both define its remedial content and offer a potent response to the problems that
justify having a bankruptcy law in the first place.
THE CREDITORS’ BARGAIN
In his seminal work The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law, Thomas Jackson
outlines the standard academic account of bankruptcy law’s theoretical object and
purpose.54 Jackson argues that bankruptcy law is necessary to resolve a particular kind of
“collective-action dilemma” in which the assets of an insolvent debtor are viewed as a
“pool” of property available to satisfy the claims of creditors as a community of
interests.55 The dilemma arises because, following default, each individual creditor may
seek to enforce its claim against the assets in the pool in a way that diminishes the pool’s
overall value for creditors as a whole, for example by seizing a particular item the debtor
needs to conduct its operations, thereby destroying the value of the debtor’s business as a
going concern. Jackson explains: “[t]he basic problem that bankruptcy law is designed
53 See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
26 (1970) [hereinafter CALABRESI, COSTS] (“I take it as axiomatic that the principal
function of accident law is to reduce the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of
avoiding accidents.”); see also Richard V. Butler & Scott M. Gilpatric, A Re-Examination
of the Purposes and Goals of Bankruptcy, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 269, 277 (1994)
[hereinafter Butler & Gilpatric, Re-Examination] (arguing that the emphasis of
bankruptcy law should be on maximizing the total social value of a firm).
54 It is appropriate to start with Jackson’s work because, as one commentator has
explained, it is “a kind of ‘founding narrative’ of bankruptcy thought.” John D. Ayer,
The Role of Finance Theory in Shaping Bankruptcy Policy, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
53, 66 (1995).
55 JACKSON, LOGIC, supra note 8 at 10-13.
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to handle, both as a normative matter and as a positive matter, is that the system of
individual creditor remedies may be bad for the creditors as a group when there are not
enough assets to go around.”56 The chief virtue of bankruptcy law, he argues, is that it
forces creditors to work together for their collective benefit in managing the debtor’s
property and dividing its value among themselves.
Building on this narrative, Jackson next offers a theory of how bankruptcy law
ought to resolve the collective-action dilemma through a distinct body of remedial
bankruptcy procedures. He declares that “[b]ankruptcy law, at its core, is debt-collection
law. That is what we all agree on.”57 Expanding on this essential frame, Jackson then
characterizes the subject as addressing two fundamental inquiries: “(1) do we place
limits on what creditors can take from their debtors; and (2) how do we decide rights
among creditors when there are not enough assets to go around?”58 Jackson responds to
the first inquiry with a qualified “no”: bankruptcy law properly limits what creditors may
56 Id. at 10; see also Robert K. Rasmussen, Behavioral Economics, the Economic
Analysis of Bankruptcy Law and the Pricing of Credit, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1679, 1680-82
(1998) [hereinafter Rasmussen, Behavioral Economics] (explaining Jackson’s approach);
Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439, 444 (1992)
[hereinafter Adler, Bankruptcy] (“In theory, bankruptcy’s collective proceeding is
superior to individual creditor actions, because individual creditors have perverse
incentives to act in their own interests, even if such action would disserve the creditors’
collective interest. Thus bankruptcy is beneficial to the extent it protects creditors from
their own worst instincts.”). In significant part, bankruptcy law helps resolve the
collective-action problem by restraining the creditors from exercising their non-
bankruptcy rights. Jackson & Scott, Nature of Bankruptcy, supra note 23 at 162 (“In
order to implement a collective system of distribution, individual creditors must be
restrained from exercising entitlements that they would otherwise enjoy under state
law.”).
57 JACKSON, LOGIC, supra note 8 at 3.
58 Id. at 4.
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recover from their debtors only in cases involving individuals, not firms.59 Jackson
responds to the second inquiry with the idea that bankruptcy law should manage the
debtors’ property and distribute its value among creditors in accordance with a system of
rules that mimic “the kind of contract creditors would agree to if they were able to
negotiate with each other before extending credit”—a hypothetical “creditors’ bargain.”60
He contends that “[t]his is an application of the famous Rawlsian notion of bargaining in
the ‘original position’ behind a ‘veil of ignorance.’”61 Jackson and similar theorists,
59 Id. at 4-5, 225.
60 Id. at 16-17 & n.22; see also Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non Bankruptcy
Entitlement, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 860, 868 (1982) (observing
that bankruptcy law should mirror the agreement that “one would expect the creditors to
form among themselves were they to negotiate such an agreement from an ex ante
position”); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporation Reorganizations, 15 J.
LEGAL STUD. 127 (1986) [hereinafter Baird, Uneasy Case] (applying the “creditor’s
bargain” heuristic in the Chapter 11 context, stating “[a]n analysis of the law of corporate
reorganizations should properly begin with a discussion of whether all of those with
rights to assets of a firm . . . would bargain for [reorganization] if they had the
opportunity to negotiate at the time of their initial investment”); see generally Lynn M.
LoPucki, A Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization, 57 VAND. L. REV.
741, 745-49 (2004) (discussing and critiquing the creditors’ bargain theory). The idea is
that contractual agreements are typically wealth-maximizing and, implicitly, the
“creditors’ bargain” would be too, if only creditors could actually get together and work
out its terms before they lend. See Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of
the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 488, 491-94
(1980) (arguing that “wealth maximization . . . derives support from the principle of
consent” and that, where creditors would presumably agree to a wealth-maximizing
contract, their consent may be implied). At one time, Jackson and Baird were frequent
collaborators and shared many of the same views on the normative purpose of bankruptcy
law and the shortcomings of the existing law. See, e.g., Douglas G Baird & Thomas H.
Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 738 (1986) [hereinafter Baird & Jackson, Bargaining]; Douglas G. Baird &
Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganization and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership
Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U.
CHI. L. REV. 97 (1984) [hereinafter Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganization].
61 JACKSON, LOGIC, supra note 8 at 17 n.22 (quoting JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
136-42 (1971)).
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including Douglas Baird and Robert Scott, downplay any re-distributional ambitions for
bankruptcy law: as a general rule, they argue, creditors should receive their share of the
value of the debtor’s assets in accordance with their basic non-bankruptcy payment
priorities.62
Though inventive and influential, this collective-action approach is fundamentally
flawed. Moreover, the relevant flaws deserve explication because much of the current
literature accepts at least some aspects of Jackson’s approach as foundationally correct,
particularly his claim that bankruptcy law is fundamentally a debt-collection device
concerned with vindicating the creditors’ non-bankruptcy payment rights and priorities.
As we shall see, this has had the unfortunate effect of leading much of the academic
discourse off into the weeds.
At the outset, Jackson’s account of the common-pool dilemma is inadequate to
explain the need for a distinct bankruptcy law for three reasons. First, it is incomplete
because the dilemma is not implicated in every bankruptcy case: an insolvent debtor may
62 See id. at 20 (“What bankruptcy should be doing, in the abstract, is asking how much
someone would pay for the assets of a debtor, assuming they could be sold free of
liabilities. The resulting money is then taken and distributed to the holders of the
liabilities according to their nonbankruptcy entitlements.”); Jackson & Scott, Nature of
Bankruptcy, supra note 23 at 155-56 (arguing that pre-bankruptcy payment entitlements
should be altered only as necessary to maximize net asset distributions and not solely for
distributional reasons); Baird, Loss, supra note 8 at 827 (arguing that the reason for
having a bankruptcy law—to resolve the collective-action dilemma—does not afford an
opportunity to reassess pre-bankruptcy payment entitlements); Mooney, Normative
Theory, supra note 30 at 964 (arguing that, “however the approach [of redistributing
wealth from those with legal entitlements to those without legal entitlements] may be
disguised in noble rhetoric, service to these extraneous interests at the expense of or risk
to rightsholders is prima facie theft”) (footnote omitted); see also Ted Janger, Crystals
and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and Statutory Design, 43 ARIZ. L.
REV. 559, 576 (2001) (observing that a key theme of the collective-action approach is
that bankruptcy law “should not . . . engage in post hoc reallocation of prebankruptcy
entitlements”).
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be in need of bankruptcy relief even though there is but a single creditor, or one creditor
with a priority right to all of the debtor’s assets.63 Second, it is under-inclusive because
the dilemma turns out to be merely one of the reasons for having a distinct bankruptcy
law—there are others of greater importance (discussed in detail in Chapter 2).64 Third, it
is seriously misleading because Jackson’s articulation of the dilemma, with his focus on
the interests of creditors and the payment of their claims, confuses effect with purpose
and misstates the real ambition of bankruptcy law. It is certainly true that maximizing the
value of the debtor’s assets can have the effect of increasing payouts to creditors, but that
is not bankruptcy law’s normative purpose. Bankruptcy law’s true ambition is broader
and, among other things, lies in achieving wealth-maximizing dispositions of the debtor’s
assets, including prominently an individual debtor’s human capital. In context, the
payment of claims is merely of secondary importance.
To understand why this is so, consider a simple illustration. By definition, an
insolvent individual characteristically cannot pay all claims in full. From purely a debt-
63 See Douglas G. Baird & Randal C. Picker, A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model
of Corporate Reorganization, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 311, 312 (1991) [hereinafter Baird &
Picker, Noncooperative Bargaining] (observing that “[i]n the case of a closely held firm
[in which a single senior creditor is entitled to all the value of the debtor’s assets],
bankruptcy does not solve a collective action problem that the general creditors of a firm
face when they are its residual owners” but that bankruptcy law is nevertheless applied
because “some mechanism, perhaps a judicial one, is needed to decide whether [in fact
the senior creditor is entitled to all the value of the debtor’s assets because] the manager-
shareholder and the senior creditor cannot be relied on to protect the rights of third
parties”).
64 Jackson has acknowledged the existence of this criticism, if not its merit. See Thomas
H. Jackson, Comment on Baird, ‘Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11,’ 36 J. LAW & ECON.
655, 659 (1993) (“For the most part, the intellectual debate over bankruptcy policy that
has emerged in the past decade is not whether dealing with the collection action problem
is an appropriate bankruptcy policy but, rather, over whether it should be seen as
essentially the sole bankruptcy policy. There are other theories out there—less
‘competing’ than ‘additive’—as to the goals of the bankruptcy process.”).
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collection perspective, forcing the individual to devote his human capital to paying off his
debts (for the rest of his life if necessary) would likely enhance the creditors’ return and
would thus appear to be desirable if this were the only consideration. Bankruptcy law,
however, routinely sacrifices the creditors’ interests by granting the debtor a discharge—
essentially a release of his preexisting civil liabilities—which has nothing to do with
getting the creditors paid.65 Obviously the creditors’ debt-collection interests do not
control the analysis here, and the reason for this is straightforward enough: in context,
compelling the payment of the creditors’ claims would amount to little more than a
wealth transfer—a shifting of wealth from one person to another without a compensating
net benefit. What actually controls the analysis for bankruptcy purposes is the principle
that forcing an insolvent debtor to labor exclusively for the sake of his creditors is not
optimal when all of the relevant considerations are taken into account, including the
interests of the debtor.66 As explained in Chapter 3, one of the key principles at play
here—namely that the optimal deployment of human capital is more important than the
payment of debts—is one of great public significance, emerging over time as a primary
feature of bankruptcy law, and in particular during the nineteenth century in tandem with
the abolition of the common debt-collection practice of imprisonment for debt and the
adoption of the anti-peonage value embedded in the Thirteen Amendment proscribing
65 See infra notes 72, 76 (discussing the discharge in bankruptcy).
66 The failure of Jackson and other theorists to take into adequate account the interests of
the debtor is what two scholars have called “the missing-debtor problem.” ELIZABETH
WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 886 (5th ed.
2006) [hereinafter WARREN & WESTBROOK, LAW].
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involuntary servitude.67 The principle evolved not only in the context of broader
experience with punitive debt-collection regimes, but also the need for a formal system of
debt forgiveness, and this experience in turn informed and shaped the content of U.S.
bankruptcy law and its ameliorative goals.68
This is not to say that the payment of claims is irrelevant in bankruptcy. On the
contrary, it is important, but for reasons that, owing to the debtor’s insolvency, are of
secondary significance.69 Although it is true as a general matter that compelling the
satisfaction of legal obligations is typically a good thing—hence the prevalence of
67 Forcing an individual to work to pay off civil indebtedness is a form of peonage akin to
slavery. See Clyatt v. U.S., 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1907) (defining peonage as “a status or
condition of compulsory service, based on indebtedness”); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S.
219, 241 (1911) (stating that the Thirteenth Amendment is “a charter of universal civil
freedom for all persons” and that its purpose is “to render impossible any state of
bondage; to make labor free, by prohibiting that control by which the personal service of
one man is disposed of or coerced for another’s benefit, which is the essence of
involuntary servitude”); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (the Thirteenth
Amendment is “an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not
exist in any part of the United States”).
68 An individual’s interest in his human capital protected by a variety of rights is a form
of entitlement, and the individual’s rights in this regard may take the form of property
rules, liability rules, and inalienability rules. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules,
supra note 5. Human capital is generally inalienable—one cannot agree to become a
slave. At the same time, individuals can effectively rent their human capital for
compensation, protected by property rules in the sense that the law “lets each of the
parties say how much the entitlement is worth to him, and gives the seller a veto if the
buyer does not offer enough.” Id. at 1092. Human capital is likewise protected by
liability rules in the sense of affording mechanisms of compensation for a variety of
transgressions—for example, for injury to a person’s ability to work or failure to abide by
minimum wage and similar laws. See id. at 1113 n.44. Regardless of whether it is
efficient in every sense, the entitlement to have and control one’s own human capital is a
fundamental distributional preference that bankruptcy law protects. This is addressed in
Chapter 3.
69 Among other things, bankruptcy’s debt-collection features are necessary to avoid a
problem of moral hazard and harmful ex ante effects. See Jackson, Fresh-Start, supra
note 20 at 1427 (observing that “[b]ecause of the nature of credit, free access to discharge
would be disastrous for a credit-based economy”). These are addressed in Chapter 3.
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remedial non-bankruptcy debt-collection mechanisms—that conclusion does not hold
true as the dominant consideration in the unique world of insolvency when all of the costs
of enforcement in that context are taken into account (as examined in Chapters 2 and 3).
Critically, the art and genius of bankruptcy law is to gauge the point at which the
enforcement of obligations becomes counterproductive from a more generalized
perspective. Accepting this challenge, bankruptcy law’s broader remedial ambition is
thus quite different from the debt-collection perspective Jackson and similar theorists
bring to bear in describing the common-pool dilemma. This is significant because, if all
that mattered were the interests of the creditors and the payment of their claims, there
would be little need for a special system of bankruptcy remedies, at least of the kind that
exists currently. Something more is at work here.
In addition, Jackson’s debt-collection frame and bargaining heuristic are freighted
with other descriptive and analytic errors. To begin with, it is not true as a positive
matter that “all agree” that bankruptcy law is debt-collection law, and Jackson cannot
claim legitimately that his view captures a normative consensus—a point Jackson
acknowledges elsewhere, but attempts to diminish, in his recognition of the debt-
forgiveness function of the discharge in bankruptcy.70 For example, there is the
contrasting view, expressed by one U.S. Court of Appeals, that “debt collection is not a
proper purpose of bankruptcy.”71 The truth, of course, lies between these two positions.
70 See, e.g., Jackson, Fresh-Start, supra note 20. Jackson downplays the significance of
debt forgiveness in bankruptcy law, but his attempts to limit the discharge to situations
involving individual debtors are unsuccessful. See infra at 38-41.
71 Atlas Machine & Iron Works, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 986 F.2d 709, 716 n.11
(4th Cir. 1993) (citing In re Caucus Distributors, Inc., 106 B.R. 890, 928 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1989); Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, pt. I,
at 75 (July 1973)); see also In re Roselli, 2013 WL 828304 *11 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. Mar.
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Debt collection is neither the all-encompassing virtue nor the vanquished vice of
bankruptcy law, but is merely one of its aspects, and properly so. As noted at the outset,
there are others: for many centuries it has also embodied strong features of debt
forgiveness and debt adjustment.
Bankruptcy’s debt-forgiveness remedies include: (1) the signature discharge
mentioned above (applicable to both individuals and firms) that operates to release the
insolvent debtor from the grip of preexisting indebtedness, in whole or in part;72 (2)
various exemption provisions (applicable to individuals) that permit the debtor to retain
certain assets free from the reach of general creditors;73 and (3) certain mechanisms
6, 2013) (“Debt collection is not a proper purpose for bankruptcy”); In re Murrin, 477
B.R. 99, 109 (D. Minn. 2012) (citing cases).
72 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing for a discharge of debts in
Chapter 7 cases), 1141 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing for a discharge in Chapter 11
cases), 1328 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing for a discharge in Chapter 13 cases), 524
(2000 & Supp. 2006) (prescribing the effect of a discharge). Significantly, although they
are analytically distinct, bankruptcy law’s debt-forgiveness features exist in tandem with
its debt-collection features. See, e.g., Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549,
554-55 (1915) (“It is the purpose of the Bankrupt[cy] Act to convert the assets of the
bankrupt into cash for distribution among creditors and then to relieve the honest but
unfortunate debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start
afresh . . . .”). Certain kinds of debts are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. See, e.g., 11
U.S.C. § 523 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (prescribing exceptions to discharge); Kelly v.
Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 47-48 (1986) (holding that the Bankruptcy Code does not affect
or discharge criminal restitution obligations).
73 See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing that an individual debtor may
exempt various items from property, and providing that exempt property is not liable for
most kinds of debts). Notably, exemptions do not insulate the debtor’s property from the
reach of most enforceable purchase-money security interests and voluntary real-property
mortgage liens. See id. § 522(c). Although firms are not entitled to claim property as
exempt within the technical reach of this term, they can effectively retain critical assets
necessary to reorganize through the Chapter 11 reorganization process. See 11 U.S.C. §§
1123(a)(5)(A) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (permitting a Chapter 11 plan to provide for the
debtor’s retention of all or part of its property), 1123(b)(5) (2000 & Supp. 2006)
(permitting the modification of most liens), 1141(c) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing for
the release of property of the reorganizing Chapter 11 debtor from the claims of creditors,
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(applicable to individuals and firms) that strip certain of the debtor’s assets free of
encumbrances, such as liens and the like, so these assets may be more readily deployed in
some fashion, including in the hands of a purchaser.74 In turn, bankruptcy’s debt-
adjustment features (applicable to both individuals and firms) operate to rearrange the
creditors’ non-bankruptcy payment priorities between them as a group, elevating some
and subordinating others.75
In addition, the argument that bankruptcy law is fundamentally a debt-collection
device not only misses its vital debt-forgiveness and debt-adjustment aspects, it is also
deeply ahistorical, and thus further fails as a positive matter. Although early English
bankruptcy law did indeed include a retributive mercantile debt-collection regime, that
regime did not succeed in achieving its stated purpose—to stem the tide of contemporary
except as provided in the debtor’s confirmed plan), 1141(d) (2000 & Supp. 2006)
(providing for the discharge of the reorganizing debtor’s debts, except as provided in the
debtor’s confirmed plan). In Chapter 11 cases, the holders of claims against the debtor,
including the holders of secured claims, are protected in various ways. See, e.g., 11
U.S.C. § 1129 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (prescribing the requirements for confirmation of a
Chapter 11 plan, including the treatment of various kinds of claims); see also 11 U.S.C. §
722 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (permitting the redemption of certain assets subject to certain
liens).
74 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(f) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing for the sale of property free
and clear of interests), 522(f) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing for the avoidance of
certain liens that impair certain claimed exemptions), 1123(a)(5)(D) (2000 & Supp. 2006)
(providing that a Chapter 11 plan may provide for the sale of the debtor’s assets free of
any lien), 1129(b)(2)(A)(II) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing protections for secured
creditors in Chapter 11 cases where assets encumbered by the secured creditors’ liens are
to be sold under the terms of a confirmed plan).
75 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 507 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (prescribing the basic priorities for
claims in bankruptcy cases), 510 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing for the subordination
of certain claims and interests), 725 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing for the disposition
of property encumbered by a lien), 726 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (prescribing further
distributional priorities in Chapter 7 cases), 1129(b) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing that,
in order to be confirmed, a Chapter 11 plan must adhere to certain additional priority
rules).
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mercantile failures—and otherwise did not survive the test of time. In response to its
flaws, and in conjunction with evolving views on the nature of risk, debt, and the
problems of insolvency, English bankruptcy law evolved to include robust features of
debt forgiveness and debt adjustment—features that were otherwise existing and
emerging in the law generally. These features were then incorporated sporadically into
U.S. bankruptcy procedures, where they continued to evolve in innovative ways.
Collectively, it is the three distinct faces of bankruptcy law—debt collection, debt
forgiveness, and debt adjustment—that give the subject its modern content and shape.76
As we shall see, each is desirable in response to the problems that explain the need for a
distinct body of bankruptcy remedies.
76 See Stellwagon v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918) (“The federal system of bankruptcy
[law] is designed not only to distribute the property of the debtor, not by law exempted,
fairly and equally among his creditors, but as a main purpose of the act, intends to aid the
unfortunate debtor by giving him a fresh start in life, free from debts, except of a certain
character,” and observing that “[o]ur decisions lay great stress upon this feature of the
law”); Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902) (stating that “[t]he
subject of “‘bankruptcies’ includes the power to discharge the debtor from his contracts
and legal liabilities, as well as to distribute his property”); 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2000 &
Supp. 2006) (specifying distributional priorities in bankruptcy); John J. McCoid, II,
Discharge: The Most Important Development in Bankruptcy History, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J.
163, 164 (1996) [hereinafter McCoid, Discharge] (“[T]he discharge provision…, it
seems, ranks ahead in importance of all others in Anglo-American bankruptcy history”);
William H. Meckling, Financial Markets, Default, and Bankruptcy: The Role of the
State, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 15 (1977) (noting the centrality of the discharge
of debt in bankruptcy law); see generally United States v. Energy Resources Co., 495
U.S. 545, 549 (1990) (stating that “bankruptcy courts, as courts of equity, have broad
authority to modify creditor-debtor relationships”); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71 (1982) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion)
(observing that “the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations . . . is at the core of the
federal bankruptcy power”); Freeman Hunt, A General Bankrupt Law, 4 MERCH. MAG. &
COMM. REV. 22, 32 (Jan. 1841) [hereinafter Hunt, General Bankrupt Law] (explaining
that bankruptcy law is “[s]imply a declaration, by the supreme law-making power of the
state, defining the extent to which, and the mode in which, under certain circumstances, it
will enforce pecuniary obligations”).
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Critically, Jackson’s debt-collection frame is inherently inadequate to
accommodate these three elements of bankruptcy law. The concepts of debt forgiveness
and debt adjustment do not derive from the debt-collection rationale. On the contrary,
they are independent of it and exist in tension with it. Among other things, debt
collection is a concept of corrective justice: through legally sanctioned means, the
defaulting debtor is made to account for his failure to satisfy his obligations, through
either an individual proceeding brought by a single creditor or a collective proceeding
brought on behalf of creditors as a group. In sharp contrast, debt forgiveness is a concept
of distributive justice: under certain conditions, the debtor’s obligations are suspended,
modified, or simply excused as a distinct exercise.77 For insolvent individuals, debt
forgiveness is generally beneficial because it enhances the value of the debtor’s human
capital and provides a fresh start. For insolvent firms, it is similarly beneficial because it
enhances the value of the debtor’s assets, including the firm’s dedicated human capital,
and enables the enterprise to reorganize. The concept of debt forgiveness is dominant in
bankruptcy because, once again, it enforces the fundamental idea that the optimal
deployment of a debtor’s assets (including an individual debtor’s human capital) is more
important than the payment of claims.78
77 See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 188-193 (1980) [hereinafter
FINNIS, NATURAL LAW] (defining and examining the commutative and distributive
aspects of a just bankruptcy law); Coleman & Ripstein, Mischief, supra note 5 at 93
(1995) (“Corrective justice concerns the rectification of losses owing to private wrongs.
In contrast, distributive justice concerns the general allocation of resources, benefits,
opportunities, and the like. The duty to repair under corrective justice is agent-specific—
only wrongdoers need make up the losses of others. The duties imposed by distributive
justice are, in contrast, agent-general—everyone has a duty to create and sustain just
distributions.”).
78 The positive and normative justifications for the debt-forgiveness aspects of
bankruptcy law are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.
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Like debt forgiveness, debt adjustment is also a concept of distributive justice:
under certain conditions, the non-bankruptcy payment priorities of some creditors are
modified in favor of others, also for a variety of normative reasons. For both insolvent
individuals and firms, debt adjustment is generally beneficial to the extent it channels
losses toward creditors who are the cheapest cost avoiders and the ablest loss spreaders.
The cheapest cost avoiders include creditors who are capable of lending providently
based on their access to evaluative criteria before extending credit, regardless of whether
they elect to do so. The ablest loss spreaders include financial lenders who voluntarily
engage in multiple credit transactions and have the capacity of spreading losses among a
variety of obligors. Poor loss spreaders include (1) involuntary creditors, such as tort
victims, and (2) captive voluntary creditors, such as employees who generally cannot
hedge against potential wage-related losses by simultaneously taking on multiple forms
of employment.79
A key distinction between these qualitatively different elements of bankruptcy
law is that the law’s debt-collection features seek to enforce the claims of creditors
against the debtor and the debtor’s property for the sake of the holders of those claims. In
contrast, bankruptcy law’s debt-forgiveness and debt-adjustment features seek to modify
or eliminate the same claims for the sake of others, particularly debtors and other
creditors, because doing so is normatively desirable. Because of its inability to account
79 The positive and normative justifications for the debt-adjustment aspects of bankruptcy
law are also discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.
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for the law’s desirable debt-forgiveness and debt-adjustment features, Jackson’s attempt
to address the subject through his single focus, debt-collection frame is a non-starter.80
Similarly, Jackson’s metaphor of the creditors’ bargain is inadequate as a vehicle
to conceptualize the normative content of bankruptcy law. Among other deficiencies, it
is inadequate to explain the debtor’s discharge because it cannot be argued plausibly that
creditors as a group would agree prospectively to forgive the debtor’s debts at the time
they extend credit.81 Jackson acknowledges this, contending that one must look
elsewhere for a distinct discharge rationale,82 but the debt-collection focus of his theory
80 Frames matter because they contextualize the debate and serve either to limit or expand
its boundaries. See ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE
ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE 11 (1974) (“The problem . . . is that once a term is
introduced . . . it begins to have too much bearing [and] [t]hus each succeeding section of
the study becomes more entangled, until a step can hardly be made because of what must
be carried with it”). Different labels trigger different mental structures: “[a]ll words are
defined relative to conceptual frames. When you hear a word, its frame (or collection of
frames) is activated in your brain.” GEORGE LAKOFF, DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT!
KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE DEBATE xv (2004); see also CHARLES TILLY,
WHY? 58 (2006) [hereinafter TILLY, WHY] (commenting that “frames . . . focus attention
on some kinds of information while screening out a great deal of other information that
could, in principle, significantly affect their operation”). Jackson’s debt-collection frame
should be rejected because it cannot capture either the actual or ideal scope of bankruptcy
law and artificially narrows its conceptualization. See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra
note 14 at 74 (to be helpful, a conceptual frame should be “at once sufficiently abstract to
be uncontroversial . . . and sufficiently concrete to be useful”).
81 See Mooney, Normative Theory, supra note 30 at 1046, 1048 (observing that “a central
feature—if not the central feature—of an individual’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy case is the
debtor’s entitlement to a discharge of prebankruptcy claims” and commenting that
Jackson’s collective-action approach “does not provide a complete explanation of
discharge . . . or a complete normative theory of discharge under past or current law”).
82 Jackson, Fresh-Start, supra note 20 at 1447 (commenting that “[i]t is difficult to argue
that creditors would view [debt forgiveness] as a necessary part of a collective system for
debt collection.”).
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conflicts abruptly with the debt-forgiveness reality of bankruptcy law and he does not
supply a meta-principle to resolve this important conflict.83
In an effort to downplay this problem, Jackson and others argue that bankruptcy
law’s debt-forgiveness features—specifically the discharge—apply only to individuals as
a special case and not to firms.84 This argument, however, is both descriptively and
normatively false. It is descriptively false because, under the Bankruptcy Code, firms are
eligible for discharge relief and routinely obtain it as the key (or even sole) element of
their bankruptcy reorganizations.85 Moreover, the kind of discharge firms receive is often
more generous than the one available to individuals, owing to the more numerous
limitations and exceptions the current law places on the dischargeability of various
categories of debts that individuals may owe.86 Although it is certainly true that the
forms of discharge relief available to individuals and firms are not precisely the same,
they are substantively aligned in every important respect, and the argument that the
83 Cf. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law,
113 YALE L.J. 541, 543 (2003) [hereinafter Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory]
(criticizing theories of contract that lack “a meta-principle that tells which . . . goals
should be decisive when they conflict”).
84 See, e.g., Jackson, Fresh-Start, supra note 20 at 1395-96 (“Discharge . . . is available
only to individuals.”).
85 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 524 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (prescribing the effect of a discharge in
bankruptcy), 1141 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing for a discharge of debts in Chapter 11
cases involving bankrupt firms).
86 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (establishing exceptions to discharge in
bankruptcy, many of which apply more readily to individuals as opposed to firms, and
some of which apply only to individuals).
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distinguishing characteristics between these forms mean that firms therefore do not
receive a “discharge” simply indulges in “the narcissism of minor differences.”87
In turn, Jackson’s argument is normatively false because granting a discharge to a
viable but insolvent firm is desirable. Without it the firm typically would not be able to
reorganize as a going concern because it is the discharge of excessive indebtedness that
deleverages the firm’s balance sheet, thus relieving it of the financial distress that drove it
into bankruptcy in the first place.88 Representative examples include the numerous air
carriers that have discharged a broad variety of liabilities as part of their successful
Chapter 11 reorganization cases.89 Although it is true that liquidating firms do not
87 In re Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc., 702 F.3d 553, 572 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing
SIGMUND FREUD, ON SEXUALITY 272 (Penguin 1991)). Among other things, the
particular section of the Bankruptcy Code that defines the general scope of the
bankruptcy discharge for both individuals and firms is the same. See 11 U.S.C. § 524
(2000 & Supp. 2006).
88 Jackson counters that “[c]orporations must reorganize before they can obtain a
discharge.” Jackson, Fresh-Start, supra note 20 at 1396 n.7. This misses the point. It is
not that firms reorganize and then, as an afterthought, receive a discharge. Firms receive
a discharge in order to reorganize—the discharge itself is integral to the reorganization
process because without it reorganization is almost never possible. Jackson counters
again that “[t]he policy underlying [the discharge of firms] has little to do with the
rationales underlying the fresh-start policy [applicable to individuals].” In truth,
however, they are closely aligned. This is addressed in Chapter 3.
89 See, e.g., Holmes v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Internat’l, 745 F. Supp. 2d 176, 195-97
(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (dismissing certain claims brought against Delta Airlines on the basis of
its 2007 Chapter 11 discharge in bankruptcy and summarizing the discharges obtained by
other airlines). Although Chapter 11 reorganization practice has changed over the past
two decades, resulting in more Chapter 11 “going-concern sales” (involving the transfer
of the debtor’s operating assets to a purchaser) and fewer “traditional” reorganizations (in
which the debtor retains its assets after discharging a portion of its debts), this has not
diminished the importance of the discharge, but has simply altered the focus of its
application. See Baird & Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, supra note 42 (discussing
structural changes in debt holding patterns and business reorganization practices over the
past two decades). The concept of a discharge in Chapter 11 includes the release of
indebtedness that facilitates going-concern sales by permitting the assets to be transferred
free and clear of preexisting claims, as in the case of the bankruptcy of General Motors
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receive a discharge,90 that is because there is no real point in providing them with one—
just as there is no real point in permitting deceased individuals to commence bankruptcy
proceedings to receive discharge relief.91 In any event, even with firms in liquidation,
other debt-forgiveness aspects of bankruptcy law routinely apply, including its
deleveraging procedures that strip the debtor’s assets of encumbering liens and other
interests in the context of bankruptcy sales.92 In sum, the claim that firms do not receive
Corporation. See infra note 92. By analogy, Chapter 7 liquidation practice has also
changed in many respects over the past two decades, particularly after the 2005
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code that made it more difficult for consumers to receive
a discharge of their obligations, and required more debtors to make use of the repayment
plan process of Chapter 13 rather than the liquidation process of Chapter 7. No one
would argue seriously, however, that this evolution in practice has dislodged the
centrality of the discharge in individual debtor cases.
90 See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (limiting discharge in Chapter 7
liquidation cases to individuals); compare id. § 1141(d)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2006)
(permitting the discharge of a reorganized Chapter 11 corporate debtor that continues in
business) with id. § 1141(d)(3) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (denying a Chapter 11 discharge to
a liquidating corporate debtor or to a corporate debtor that does not engage in business
after consummation of its plan of reorganization).
91 Unlike dead firms, which may still file for bankruptcy, deceased individuals and their
probate estates are ineligible to do so. See, e.g., In re Estate of Patterson, 64 B.R. 807
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1986); In re Brown’s Estate, 16 B.R. 128 (Bankr. D.C. 1981); see also
Harris v. Zion Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 317 U.S. 447, 452 (1943) (concluding under the
former Bankruptcy Act of 1898 that the bankruptcy court property dismissed the debtor’s
case following the debtor’s death). In this respect, bankruptcy relief is once again more
generous to firms than natural persons. The rule that deceased individuals and their
probate estates may not seek bankruptcy relief is subject to an exception: if an individual
debtor dies after commencing a bankruptcy case, some courts have held that, Harris
notwithstanding, the case may nonetheless proceed to conclusion and the debtor’s debts
may be discharged. See, e.g., In re Perkins, 381 B.R. 530 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2007). This
has the practical effect of granting relief to the debtor’s probate estate.
92 Even for firms that do not retain their assets through reorganization, but rather sell
them through a bankruptcy sale to a third party, a signature feature of bankruptcy law is
the release of debts and other encumbrances so the assets may be marketed and sold. See
11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing for the sale of assets free and clear of
liens and interests). For example, General Motors Corporation accomplished its
reorganization in this way—immediately after filing for bankruptcy in 2009, it sold its
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a discharge in bankruptcy would appear to be classically ad hoc—an assertion designed
merely to save the theory rather than illuminate some relevant aspect of the subject
matter.93
Jackson’s focus on business reorganizations in an effort to quarantine the debt-
forgiveness features of bankruptcy law encounters yet another problem: it is self-
marginalizing because it avoids consideration of the most paradigmatic and pervasive
type of bankruptcy case.94 For centuries, the most paradigmatic and pervasive
bankruptcy case has been that of the insolvent individual debtor, not any particular type
of firm (business bankruptcies involving firms account for merely a small fraction of
cases filed each year).95 In turn, the dominant issue in individual debtor cases is the
assets through a series of transactions to a purchaser, new General Motors LLC, leaving
most of its liabilities behind (except those expressly assumed by the new entity). See In
re Motors Liquidation Company, 430 B.R. 65, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (describing the
bankruptcy sale of General Motors); see also Schomaker v. General Motors, Inc., 2011
WL 4433167 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2011), aff’d., 2011 WL 4404120 (W.D. Mich. Sept.
21, 2011) (dismissing claim asserted against purchaser of General Motors because
purchaser did not assume liability through bankruptcy sale, but rather acquired assets free
and clear of claims other than those assumed through the bankruptcy process).
93 See SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 37 at 108-09 (criticizing an argument as “ad hoc”
where “it is motivated solely by the desire to save the theory and not by any other
independent consideration”).
94 As I use these terms, the most “paradigmatic” bankruptcy case is the one that most
vividly illustrates the issues that bankruptcy law addresses. The most “pervasive”
bankruptcy case is the most common.
95 For example, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, responsible for
keeping statistics on bankruptcy filings, reports that, for 2012, there were 1,221,091 total
bankruptcy filings, of which 843,545 were Chapter 7 cases (liquidations), 10,361 were
Chapter 11 cases (reorganizations), 366,532 were Chapter 13 cases (individual wage
earner plans), and 512 were Chapter 12 cases (family farmer plans). Of these, 40,075
were business filings, and 1,181,016 were non-business filings. See
http://www.uscourts.gov/bnkrpctystats/bankruptcystats.htm (last visited June 2, 2013).
Some commentators have argued that the Administrative Office’s statistics understate the
actual business-related filings because they do not appropriately capture filings by
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bankruptcy discharge. The fact that Jackson’s theory has little to say about these matters
is a serious shortcoming, and it is no real answer simply to state that firms and
individuals are “different.”96 Most firms teem with dedicated human capital, and some
are comprised almost entirely of it. This is not to say, of course, that individuals and
firms are the same. Of course they are not. The real question, however, is not whether
there are differences between them (a tautology), but whether these differences call for
fundamentally different bankruptcy regimes or different theoretical conceptualizations of
bankruptcy law.
As it turns out, the real issue is not so much distinguishing individuals from firms,
but rather distinguishing different kinds of firms from each other—those flush with
valuable combinations of dedicated human capital and physical assets that are difficult to
replicate (such as viable airlines, manufacturing companies, complicated service
businesses, and the like) and those that have essentially no dedicated human capital and
function more like fungible commodities (such as single-asset real estate ventures, real
estate investment trusts, special-purpose securitization vehicles, and the like). Analysis
of the problems that explain the need for a distinct bankruptcy law (addressed in Chapter
2) reveals that, generally speaking, the problems that bankruptcy law properly addresses
individuals who were forced into bankruptcy because, among other things, they were
overburdened with business debts from failed ventures. See Robert M. Lawless &
Elizabeth Warren, The Myth of the Disappearing Business Bankruptcy, 93 CAL. L. REV.
743 (2005). Lawless and Warren calculate that, rather than comprising between two and
four percent of all filings, business failures account for approximately seventeen percent
of all filings. Id. at 747. Regardless of the source of their indebtedness, however, the
overwhelming majority of bankruptcy filings are by individuals, not firms. Accordingly,
individual cases are the most paradigmatic and pervasive.
96 See Baird, World, supra note 23 at 181-83 (“Corporations and people are not the
same.”).
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are common to both individuals and most firms, and that, with regard to firms, they
simply arise in more complicated ways. Thus, rather than start the analysis with the
example of a non-paradigmatic and non-pervasive case (the insolvent firm) and build a
theory of bankruptcy law from there, it would seem preferable to start with the more
paradigmatic and pervasive case (the insolvent individual), build a theory that properly
takes this example into account, and then make adjustments as necessary to accommodate
the differences between individuals and firms, and then between different kinds of firms.
This is the path the law has taken, and Jackson does not explain why it is deficient.97
Jackson’s metaphor of the creditors’ bargain is also not, strictly speaking, a viable
application of Rawls’s theory of justice. Parties in the “original position” behind the
“veil of ignorance” would not know that they are creditors when they agree to the
fundamental principles that govern the formation of the structures of a just society—
including a just bankruptcy law—because these parties are, by design, denied access to
such facts.98 As a result, they would not “bargain” in the original position as creditors,
97 Current bankruptcy law provides some distinctively different procedures for insolvent
individuals and firms and, unsurprisingly, the rules for firms tend to be more complex.
For example, only individual debtors may file for bankruptcy relief under the simplified
repayment plan provisions of Chapter 13. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2000 & Supp. 2006)
(specifying eligibility requirements for Chapter 13 relief). Both individuals and firms,
however, may file for relief under the more complicated reorganization provisions of
Chapter 11, although comparatively few individuals do so. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (2000
& Supp. 2006) (specifying eligibility requirements for Chapter 11 relief); Toibb v.
Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991) (individual debtors are eligible for Chapter 11 relief).
98 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118-119 (revised ed. 1999) [hereinafter RAWLS,
THEORY] (none of the parties in the original position “knows his place in society, his
class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural
assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like;” and “[a]s far as possible,
then, the only particular facts which the parties know is that their society is subject to the
circumstances of justice and whatever this implies.”); see Donald R. Korobkin,
Contractarianism and the Normative Foundations of Bankruptcy Law, 71 TEX. L. REV.
541, 559-61 (1993) (arguing that Jackson’s approach is not really an application of the
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but rather would bargain metaphorically with the possibility in mind that they might be
either creditors or debtors. Rather than settle on some set of creditor-oriented debt-
collection procedures as Jackson suggests, they would more likely settle on some
combination of procedures of debt collection, debt forgiveness, and debt adjustment to
the extent these features in combination produce beneficial results from a broader
perspective of justice.
Jackson’s theory also comes up short in terms of its potential implementation.
His bargaining heuristic involves the exercise of imagining the kind of contract creditors
might negotiate to dispose of an insolvent firm in order to distill the rules of bankruptcy
law. In reality, however, no one has been able to employ this heuristic successfully to
generate the details of a workable bankruptcy regime. This is not surprising. As Richard
Epstein observed long ago in the context of critiquing the idea that “the function of the
law of tort is to anticipate those contractual arrangements which parties would have made
had the transactions costs been low enough to permit direct negotiations”:
Given the infinite variation in terms (what price? what services?) that we
could expect to find in such contracts, it is difficult to believe that that
theoretical observation could enable us to determine or even approximate
any bargain which the parties might have made if circumstances had
permitted. It is for good reason that the courts have always refused to
make contracts for the parties.99
Rawlsian notion because in Jackson’s model creditors are not ignorant of their status or
self-interest).
99 Epstein, Theory, supra note 5 at 203. The problem is all the more acute in bankruptcy
because bankruptcy typically involves numerous parties with broadly diverse interests
and asymmetric information, making the exercise of imagining how they might bargain
ex ante in a group essentially intractable. See Schwartz, Bankruptcy Workouts, supra
note 1 at 595 (observing that “[b]ankruptcies involve multiple parties. The theory of two-
party asymmetric information bargaining games is both complex and inconclusive; many
of the factors that affect solutions have been identified, but few general results exist. The
theory of multiparty asymmetric information bargaining is in a more primitive state.
Analysts use the full information theory because it is the only usable theory.”).
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A final but vitally important point about Jackson’s theory also bears mention. It
is remarkable the extent to which it struggles to align bankruptcy law with non-
bankruptcy debt-collection procedures and, in the process, marginalize bankruptcy’s
debt-forgiveness and debt-adjustment features. Why? As Douglas Baird has explained,
Jackson’s account essentially “begin[s] with a faith in markets working effectively or,
more precisely, not being subject to improvement through intervention of a legal
mechanism such as bankruptcy law.”100 As applied, however, this perspective misses the
mark.
Among other deficiencies, it assumes incorrectly that bankruptcy law is or should
be no more than some narrow type of remedial “intervention” into ordinary markets,
rather than a comprehensive body of law that creates and supports a distinct market in
and of itself. Jackson’s account indulges the suspicion that, but for the collective-action
dilemma, ordinary non-bankruptcy markets would be perfectly adequate to accommodate
the debt-collection interests of an insolvent debtor’s creditors, with the further
assumption that vindicating these interests is all that really matters. In other words, all
that is needed is a surgical bankruptcy “fix” to address the collective-action dilemma and,
once that fix is in place, ordinary markets can be trusted to do the rest. Jackson’s view is
inappropriately reductionist for at least three reasons.
First, as noted, the collective-action dilemma is merely one of the problems that
bankruptcy law properly addresses. As discussed in Chapter 2, there are numerous
others, and in order to provide a truly meaningful “fix” to the totality of these problems,
bankruptcy law properly tackles much more than Jackson’s perspective acknowledges,
100 Baird, Uncontested Axioms, supra note 27 at 587.
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and does so in ways that reveal the inadequacy of his account. Second, the reason
bankruptcy law exists to address these special problems is because ordinary non-
bankruptcy markets are not equipped to do so, and it would make no sense to burden
them with bankruptcy procedures needed only in the event of a debtor’s insolvency.
Third, the problems of insolvency are sufficiently complex and costly to justify their own
comprehensive remedial regime. In short, the problems that explain the need for a
distinct bankruptcy regime require something more than minimalist tinkering with
ordinary non-bankruptcy debt-collection mechanisms. What is needed is what
bankruptcy law supplies—a comprehensive remedial market of its own. Viewed in this
light, Jackson’s reluctance to endorse bankruptcy law as a legal mechanism that interferes
with the workings of ordinary non-bankruptcy markets is largely beside the point.
By analogy, regardless of one’s skepticism about the desirability of using legal
regulation to intervene in the workings of a market, one still would not want to use the
market for children’s books to sell automobiles. Likewise, because of the complex and
distinct nature of what is at stake in the unique world of insolvency, one would not want
to use ordinary markets to address the problems that arise in that unique world. This is
unsurprising. As Coase has explained, markets are social institutions that are “created by
the law or are dependent on it,”101 and there are many different kinds of markets, each
responding to its own set of problems and challenges with its own legalities. As
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the problems that collectively explain the need for a
distinct bankruptcy law also justify a distinct bankruptcy market. The question is what
101 COASE, FIRM, supra note 7 at 28. Likewise, “[s]ocial functions are characteristically
performed by legal institutions established and regulated by numerous laws.” JOSEPH
RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 167 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter RAZ, AUTHORITY].
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kind of market and with what mechanisms? (And in order to address that question more
fruitfully, it is first necessary to understand more fully the totality of the problems
bankruptcy law properly attempts to resolve.)
It is inadequate to respond, as Jackson and others do, that bankruptcy and non-
bankruptcy regimes should be as closely aligned as possible because the creation of
separate legal systems with different distributional rules sets up an opportunity for
“forum shopping.”102 Different markets routinely make use of different remedial
procedures, each with its own distributional mechanisms designed to achieve distinct
goals. In defining access to particular markets and their unique procedures there is
always a boundary problem, and bankruptcy law is no different.103
This is not to say that the problem of forum shopping is entirely irrelevant. It is to
say that it is inherent in having different marketplaces for distinct purposes, including
those with distinct regulations and procedures. More important, the problem of forum
shopping in the insolvency context may be addressed by means less drastic than
sacrificing the beneficial goals of bankruptcy law, particularly those underlying its debt-
forgiveness and debt-adjustment procedures. Unsurprisingly, there is a long and
elaborate history of limiting access to bankruptcy relief to those who truly need it and for
whom access to its extraordinary panoply of remedies would not be abusive.104 For
102 JACKSON, LOGIC, supra note 8 at 21-22 (making this claim); see also Baird, Loss,
supra note 8 at 824-28 (discussing forum-shopping costs); Baird, World, supra note 23 at
181-83 (same).
103 For example, one might attempt to sell firearms through the market for produce in
order to take advantage of the different regulatory structure, but one would quickly be
ejected from the produce marketplace.
104 See, e.g., Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 365, 367, 374-75
(2007) (observing that bankruptcy is intended for the “honest but unfortunate debtor,”
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example, although solvent debtors occasionally seek refuge in the sheltering arms of the
bankruptcy court to avoid obligations they can and should perform, they are
characteristically ejected from that forum.105 Bankruptcy is properly limited to insolvent
individuals and firms because it is the special problems of insolvent debtors that
bankruptcy law properly addresses, and Jackson does not explain why the relevant
and bankruptcy relief may be denied for abusive conduct); American United Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U.S. 138, 145 (1940) (federal court has equitable
power to prevent misuse of bankruptcy law); SEC v. United States Realty & Improv. Co.,
310 U.S. 434, 457-58 (1940) (federal court has inherent power to dismiss bankruptcy
case to avoid misuse of the proceeding).
105 See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Cincinnati v. Flershem, 290 U.S. 504, 517 (1934)
(solvent corporation that voluntary defaulted on debt that it had the ability to pay could
not resort to equity receivership process to restructure its obligation); In re Integrated
Telecom Express, Inc., 384 F.3d 108, 112 (3d Cir. 2004) (financially healthy debtor was
not entitled to resort to bankruptcy relief to avoid lease obligation); In re SGL Carbon
Corp., 200 F.3d 154, 165-66 (3d Cir. 1999) (financially healthy debtor could not use
Chapter 11 process to manage litigation because debtor was not in need of bankruptcy
relief, stating “[c]ourts . . . have consistently dismissed Chapter 11 petitions filed by
financially healthy companies with no need to reorganize under the protection of Chapter
11”); Marsch v. Marsch (In re Marsch), 36 F.3d 825, 828 (9th Cir. 1994) (ordering
dismissal of case and imposing sanctions on solvent debtor who filed for bankruptcy to
avoid state court judgment that she could have satisfied); Barclays-American/Business
Credit Inc. v. Radio WBHP, Inc. (In re Dixie Broad., Inc.), 871 F.2d 1023, 1028 (11th
Cir. 1989) (“The Bankruptcy Code is not intended to insulate financially secure sellers or
buyers from the bargains they strike.”); Caruso v. U.S.A. Motel Corp. (In re U.S.A.
Motel Corp.), 450 F.2d 499, 505-06 (9th Cir. 1971) (dismissing bankruptcy petition of
solvent corporation); Dunes Hotel Assocs. v. Hyatt Corp., 245 B.R. 492, 507-12 (D.S.C.
2000) (affirming dismissal of the Chapter 11 case of a solvent debtor and rejecting the
use of Chapter 11 to effect “a post-deal negotiation of a lease”); Furness v. Lilienfield, 35
B.R. 1006, 1009 (D. Md. 1983) (“Chapter 11 was designed to give those teetering on the
verge of a fatal financial plummet an opportunity to reorganize . . ., not to give a
profitable enterprise an opportunity to evade contractual or other liability”); In re
Francfair, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1935) (dismissing bankruptcy petition of
solvent trust); In re Liberate Technologies, 314 B.R. 206 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2004)
(dismissing Chapter 11 case of solvent debtor); In re Southern California Sound Sys.,
Inc., 69 B.R. 893, 900 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1987) (dismissal warranted where debtor was
seeking merely to “take advantage of one of the remedies available under the Code”).
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safeguards protecting its boundaries are inadequate—or if they are inadequate, why they
cannot be sufficiently fortified.
Jackson and similar theorists support their forum-shopping critique and analysis
by invoking the Supreme Court’s iconic decision in Butner v. United States.106 Butner,
however, does not support their cause, and ultimately Jackson’s use of the case amounts
to the extraction of a precedential drop from a vastly more complicated jurisprudential
ocean that, in its totality, undercuts his theory.
In Butner, a creditor (Butner) held a mortgage lien on a piece of real estate the
debtor (Golden) owned, but Butner did not have any interest in the rents Golden collected
from the property under the law of the state where the property was located (North
Carolina). After Golden filed for bankruptcy, Butner claimed an interest in the rents even
though, under state law, he did not have one. Rejecting a line of decisions concluding
that a bankruptcy court could, in the exercise of its equitable powers, create and enforce
such an interest even though state law did not recognize it, the Supreme Court observed
that, although Congress certainly had the power to authorize such a benefit, Congress
“has not chosen to exercise its power . . . .”107 Given Congress’s inaction, the Court
reasoned that “undefined considerations of equity provide no basis for adoption of a
uniform federal rule affording mortgagees an automatic interest in the rents as soon as the
106 440 U.S. 48 (1979); see JACKSON, LOGIC, supra note 8 at 55 (discussing Butner);
BARRY E. ADLER, DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, AND THOMAS H. JACKSON, BANKRUPTCY CASES,
PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS 29-30 (2007) (same).
107 Butner, 440 U.S. at 56.
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mortgagor is declared bankrupt.”108 The Court then bolstered its conclusion with a
prudential Erie-like analysis:
Property interests are created and defined by state law. Unless some
federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such
interests should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party
is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding. Uniform treatment of property
interests by both state and federal courts within a State serves to reduce
uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a party from
receiving ‘a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of
bankruptcy.’109
Jackson contends that the “notion of forum shopping” quoted above is not only
Butner’s “fundamental point,” it also properly circumscribes the breadth of bankruptcy
law.110 He extracts from the Court’s analysis the larger debt-collection principle that
“bankruptcy law should not create rights,” but instead “should act to ensure that the rights
that exist are vindicated to the extent possible” because “[o]nly in this way can
bankruptcy law minimize the conversion costs of transferring an insolvent debtor’s assets
to its creditors.”111
Jackson’s interpretation of Butner is a misreading. To begin with, the
fundamental point of the decision is not to elevate forum shopping concerns as the
lodestar of bankruptcy law but rather to establish a principle of separation of powers:
108 Id. at 55-56. The Court continued: although “[t]he equity powers of the bankruptcy
court play an important part in the administration of bankrupt estates to countless
situations in which the judge is required to deal with particular, individualized problems,”
it “does not follow . . . that ‘equitable administration’ requires that all mortgagees be
afforded an automatic security interest in rents and profits when state law would deny
such an automatic benefit . . . .” Id. at 56.
109 Id. at 55 (quoting Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat’l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)).
110 JACKSON, LOGIC, supra note 8 at 22.
111 Id.
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federal courts should not use their equitable authority to create novel rights in bankruptcy
because establishing rights in bankruptcy is for Congress.112 In context, Justice Stevens’s
comment about forum shopping is merely a supporting consequential flourish of rather
ordinary pedigree: as an aside, federal courts also should not be in the business of
creating novel rights in bankruptcy because doing so tends to inject uncertainty into
commercial markets (among other things, it is uncertain what courts will do, when they
will do it, and when they might stop) and runs the risk of different courts recognizing
different rights with respect to a law that is supposed to be uniform.113
In addition, Jackson’s conclusion that bankruptcy law should not create rights
follows from his premise only if one assumes that the unmitigated costs of forum
shopping he alludes to categorically outweigh the benefits of bankruptcy law’s
substantive debt-forgiveness and debt-adjustment functions, both of which undeniably
create special rights in bankruptcy and have nothing to do with getting the creditors paid
in accordance with their non-bankruptcy payment entitlements. Butner does not support
112 See, e.g., Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 451-54
(2007) (citing Butner and overturning a judicially-created limit on a creditor’s right to
include attorneys’ fees as part of its claim, concluding that, although “Congress, of
course, has the power to amend the Bankruptcy Code by adding a provision expressly
disallowing claims for attorneys’ fees,” Congress has not done so and the federal courts
are not empowered to create such a rule on their own); see also United States v.
Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 229 (1996) (overturning
judicially-created equitable rule that permitted subordination of tax penalties to other
kinds of claims because the “categorical reordering of priorities that takes place at the
legislative level of consideration is beyond the scope of judicial authority”); United States
v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 543 (1996) (same); Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485
U.S. 197, 206 (1988) (“whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must
and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code”).
113 Of course, it is certainly possible to extrapolate a larger-forum shopping concern from
the skeletal mention of it in the decision, but it is not a fair reading to claim that forum
shopping is the decision’s main point.
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this assumption and for good reason. Over the past century, the Supreme Court has
issued over 550 bankruptcy decisions,114 and many of these recognize and enforce a
robust panoply of special bankruptcy rights (such as the debtor’s discharge) that
affirmatively override the creditors’ non-bankruptcy payment entitlements for reasons
that have nothing to do with Jackson’s debt-collection goal. More important, the Court
has done so repeatedly without much apparent concern over forum-shopping costs.115
Within the larger constellation of Supreme Court bankruptcy precedents, Butner stands
merely for the unremarkable proposition that, in the absence of a contrary federal rule
that Congress has authorized, state law establishes the rights of the parties against which
bankruptcy law then operates.116 In other words, state law typically supplies the input to
the process, and bankruptcy law supplies the output. In reality, Butner is simply a
114 See KENNETH N. KLEE, BANKRUPTCY IN THE SUPREME COURT v (2008).
115 See, e.g., Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 245 (1934) (extolling the debtor’s
discharge in bankruptcy). As the Supreme Court stated in its seminal decision in Wright
v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 517 (1938), “[b]ankruptcy proceedings
constantly modify and affect the property rights established by state law.” It does so, the
Court has noted, because “federal bankruptcy law, not state law, governs the distribution
of a bankrupt’s assets to his creditors.” American Sur. Co. v. Sampsell, 327 U.S. 269,
272 (1946). Just as bankruptcy priorities do not apply in state court or other non-
bankruptcy proceedings, see United States v. Emory, 314 U.S. 423, 426 (1941), non-
bankruptcy priorities do not govern in bankruptcy cases. Butner itself recognized that
federal bankruptcy law not only can, but actually does create rights that adjust the
creditors’ state law entitlements. Butner, 440 U.S. at 54 (observing that “[t]he
Bankruptcy Act does include provisions invalidating certain security interests as
fraudulent, or as improper preferences over general creditors.”).
116 See, e.g., Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 450-51
(2007) (“we have long recognized that the ‘“basic rule” in bankruptcy is that state law
governs the substance of claims, Congress having “generally left the determination of
property rights in the assets of a bankrupt’s estate to state law”’”) (quoting Butner);
Raleigh v. Illinois Dept. of Rev., 530 U.S. 15, 20 (1951) (“Creditors’ entitlements in
bankruptcy arise in the first instance from the underlying substantive law creating the
debtor’s obligation, subject to any qualifying or contrary provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code.”) (citing Butner).
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pragmatic decision circumscribing the equitable powers of the federal courts to create
novel rights and, in the process, outlines a relatively mundane aspect of the mechanics of
bankruptcy procedure.
In sum, Jackson’s account of bankruptcy relief as a narrow debt-collection vehicle
is unsuccessful. By focusing on the collective-action dilemma as the essential
justification for a distinct bankruptcy law, and then analyzing that law basically as merely
another debt-collection device, Jackson starts off with an unfortunately stunted account
and ends up assembling a box into which he is then “compelled to force situations which
do not truly fit.”117 His creditors’ bargain theory is similarly unworkable, in no small part
because it is unresponsive to the reality of bankruptcy law and the totality of what it
properly strives to accomplish. If the bankruptcy process were just another garden-
variety debt-collection tool concerned exclusively with facilitating efficient wealth
transfers from debtors to creditors, one might well question the desirability of its current
collection of remedies because most of them have nothing to do with the debt-collection
ambition Jackson identifies. But bankruptcy law is actually something altogether
different from Jackson’s portrayal, and ultimately his characterization articulates a straw
man against which to press exaggerated forum-shopping concerns. As a normative
matter, the questions remain: why should we have a distinct bankruptcy regime, and how
should it be arranged? To answer these questions, we require a better account of the
117 Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, supra note 5 at 1127-28 (“Framework or
model building has two shortcomings. The first is that models can be mistaken for the
total view of the phenomena, like legal relationships, which are too complex to be painted
in any one picture. The second is that models generate boxes into which one feels
compelled to force situations which do not truly fit.”).
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justifications for a distinct bankruptcy law, as well as a better theory of how such a law
should be crafted.
BANKRUPTCY CONTRACTING, SUPER-FORECLOSURE, AND THE COST-OF-CAPITAL METRIC
Responding to the challenge of coming up with a better bankruptcy regime, but
without examining in a systematic way either the weaknesses of Jackson’s seminal
account or the full range of problems that explain the need for a distinct body of
bankruptcy remedies, a second group of scholars has expanded on Jackson’s creditors’-
bargain concept and offered not only inventive proposals for bankruptcy reform, but also
a second normative theory on the purpose of bankruptcy law, at least as it applies to
insolvent firms. Rather than rely on a metaphoric contract to illuminate the rules of an
ideal bankruptcy system, they have instead examined the potential use of actual private
contractual arrangements as complete or partial substitutes for a system of state-supplied,
court-supervised business bankruptcy proceedings.118 These scholars propose that the
118 See ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS 1029-42 (4th ed. 2001) (summarizing different approaches); Schwartz,
Contracting Reviewed, supra note 31 at 346-48 (discussing private contracting about
bankruptcy procedures); Stephen L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A
Bankruptcy Paradigm, 77 TEX. L. REV. 515, 527 (1999) (proposing that certain
contractual waivers be enforceable in bankruptcy); Schwartz, Contract Theory, supra
note 31 at 1821-22 (discussing private contracting about bankruptcy procedures);
Schwartz, Bankruptcy Workouts, supra note 1 at 621-24 (same); Barry E. Adler, A
Theory of Corporate Insolvency, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 343, 343-44 (1997) (explaining that
“[a] system structured under an alternative, ex ante approach . . . would have investors
abide by the consequences of predictions made at the time of investment about a firm’s
likely quality should it become unable to pay its debts. Unless initial investment
contracts provide otherwise, a firm’s failure to make good on its obligations would
trigger a liquidation without any after-the-fact attempt to determine whether the firm
were economically viable. If an ex ante insolvency process thus provided for liquidation
upon default, viable firms surely would be liquidated” and arguing that “such an ex ante
approach may be optimal”); Marshall E. Tracht, Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers:
Reconciling Theory, Practice, and Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 301, 302 (1997) (arguing in
favor of permitting contractual bankruptcy waivers in most cases); Philippe Aghion, et
55
law allow the parties (or certain of them) to designate in advance the debtor’s disposition
upon insolvency through the use of enforceable instruments (such as bankruptcy
contracts, waivers, or corporate charter amendments), including those that mandate some
type of structured whole-business “super-foreclosure” mechanism that automatically
strips away the interests of “out-of-the-money” creditors and equity holders.119 In
al., Improving Bankruptcy Procedure, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 850 (1994) (arguing in
favor of a scheme in which “debt claims are converted into equity, and the decision about
whether to reorganize or liquidate is then put to a vote” and contending that “[t]he merit
of our scheme is that all claimants, once they are shareholders, have a common interest in
voting for the efficient outcome”); Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of
American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 323-33 (1993) [hereinafter
Adler, Financial] (proposing a “chameleon equity” firm as a hypothetical contractual
arrangement, theorizing that that such an arrangement could eliminate the need for
reorganization or dismantling of a viable firm by creditors); Rasmussen, Debtor’s
Choice, supra note 9 at 100-07 (discussing the concept of a corporation binding itself to
liquidation or crafting an individual bankruptcy scheme); Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New
Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775, 781-88 (1988)
[hereinafter Bebchuk, New Approach] (proposing a “bidding-in” procedure for corporate
reorganization); see also Mark J. Roe, Commentary on “On the Nature of Bankruptcy”:
Bankruptcy, Priority, and Economics, 75 VA. L. REV. 219, 222-223 (1989) (asking why
bankruptcy rules derived through the creditors’ bargain heuristic cannot simply be arrived
at by actual contracting or by allowing bankruptcy rules to be modified by contract). A
number of commentators have criticized the various contracting approaches to
bankruptcy law. See Warren & Westbrook, Contracting Out, supra note 10 at 1199
(discussing debate); see also Robert K. Rasmussen, Empirically Bankrupt, 2007 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 179 (2007) (criticizing Warren & Westbrook); see generally Susan Block-
Lieb, The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 503 (discussing
contracting about bankruptcy); Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A
Bankruptcy Paradigm, 77 TEX. L. REV. at 524-34 (discussing debate over contracting
about bankruptcy).
119 See supra note 118 (citing examples of the various proposals). A standard foreclosure
procedure typically operates against a single asset, such as a particular item of real estate.
A “super-foreclosure” procedure is different because it applies to the entirety of the firm
and its assets, essentially amounting to a whole-business foreclosure. The idea traces its
origins in the equity receivership context to an 1848 Georgia case involving the defunct
Monroe Railroad and Banking Company. See Gerrard Glenn, The Basis of Federal
Receivership, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 434, 442 (1925) (discussing the Monroe Railroad case
that allowed the foreclosure sale of the debtor’s assets as a whole, rather than piecemeal).
An “out-of-the-money” creditor is one who, through application of principles of absolute
priority, is not entitled to a distribution in bankruptcy. Under principles of absolute
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offering these proposals, some scholars have focused predominantly, and sometimes
exclusively, on whether and to what extent bankruptcy procedures affect a firm’s cost of
acquiring capital—with Alan Schwartz proposing that this metric alone should matter.120
priority, secured creditors are entitled first to the payment of their claims from the value
of their respective collateral; unsecured creditors are entitled second to any surplus after
the claims of secured creditors are satisfied; and equity interests are entitled third to any
surplus remaining after unsecured creditors are paid in full. See Bank of America Nat’l
Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 444-45 (1999)
(explaining the absolute priority rule as the right of the secured creditors of a bankrupt
debtor to be paid ahead of unsecured creditors, and creditors to be paid ahead of
stockholders) (citations omitted); Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S.
510, 529 (1941) (discussing absolute priority rule); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods.
Co., 308 U.S. 106, 116 (1939) (same); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 508
(1913) (concluding that fairness and equity required that “creditors . . . be paid before
stockholders could retain [their equity interests] for any purpose”); Louisville Trust Co.
v. Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry., 174 U.S. 674, 684 (1899) (reciting “the
familiar rule that the stockholder’s interest in the property is subordinate to the rights of
creditors; first of secured and then of unsecured creditors” and concluding that “any
arrangement of the parties by which the subordinate rights and interests of the
stockholders are attempted to be secured at the expense of the prior rights of either class
of creditors comes within judicial denunciation”); Flynn v. Loewer Realty Co. (In re V.
Loewer’s Gambriuns Brewery Co.), 167 F.2d 318, 320 (2d Cir. 1948) (Hand, J.,
concurring) (“Both the shareholders and the creditors in any enterprise assume some risk
of its failure, but their risks are different. The shareholders stand to lose first, but in
return they have all the winnings above the creditors’ interest, if the venture is successful;
on the other hand the creditors have only their interest, but they come first in distribution
of the assets”); James C. Bonbright & Milton M. Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of
Priority Rights of Security Holders in a Corporation Reorganization, 18 COLUM. L. REV.
127 (1928) (coining the phrase “absolute priority rule”). If all of the debtor’s assets are
encumbered by liens, and there is not enough value in the assets to satisfy the claims of
secured creditors, unsecured creditors are “out-of-the-money” because they are not
entitled to any distribution. If there is enough value to satisfy the claims of all of the
secured creditors with enough left over to permit a distribution to unsecured creditors but
not to equity holders, then the unsecured creditors are “in-the-money” and therefore the
“residual claimants,” but the equity holders are “out-of-the-money.”
120 See Schwartz, Normative Theory, supra note 9 at 1200 (analyzing bankruptcy law
under a cost-of-capital approach and stating that “[s]cholars, especially those of an
economic bent, are coming to agree that a business bankruptcy law should function to
reduce the cost of capital for firms” and that “[t]he novelty of this Article [lies] in its
single-minded application to bankruptcy of the cost of capital metric and in its argument
that only this metric should matter.”); Schwartz, Contract Theory, supra note 31 at 1819
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Some have argued that a bankruptcy procedure that maximizes the creditors’ recoveries
could have the effect of lowering the cost of capital for firms, and some have contended
generally that a bankruptcy law committed to reducing the cost of capital would (and
should) look quite different from the current bankruptcy system.121
Though inventive, these proposals are inadequate for many of the same reasons
that Jackson’s approach is unsatisfying. As a threshold matter, they adopt either overtly
or sub silentio Jackson’s debt-collection frame, and as a result unsurprisingly focus on
ways to transfer wealth from debtors to creditors in accordance with the creditors’
preexisting non-bankruptcy payment entitlements. But just as Jackson’s focus on debt
collection is far too narrow, these proposals are likewise myopic. Because bankruptcy
law aims ambitiously to be ameliorative on a number of fronts, it casts a broader remedial
net in responding to the problems that explain its existence in ways that are unlikely to be
replicated through an ex ante contractual substitute, however clever its design. At
bottom, the various proposals are, by themselves, inadequate to perform the truly
interesting and important work of bankruptcy law. Likewise, the cost-of-capital metric is
inadequate to capture or measure the subject’s true value.
BANKRUPTCY CONTRACTING
Turning first to the general idea of contracting about bankruptcy (specific aspects
of the super-foreclosure concept are treated subsequently), it is helpful to pause for a
(“[u]ntil better arguments are brought to the table . . . [b]ankruptcy systems should
function only to reduce the costs to firms of debt finance”).
121 See Schwartz, Normative Theory, supra note 9 at 1200 (arguing that “a bankruptcy
law committed to capital cost reduction would be considerably smaller and less
centralized than the law we now have”); see also Schwartz, Contracting Reviewed, supra
note 31 at 344-48 (defending virtues of contract theory and its benefits).
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moment and examine more closely the fundamental premise on which this idea is
constructed—that it is efficient to resolve ex ante by contract how best to dispose of an
insolvent firm before the firm actually fails.122 Analysis of the problems that explain the
need for a distinct bankruptcy law (discussed in Chapter 2) reveals that one of the key
points of having such a law is to avoid burdening non-bankruptcy markets with costly
procedures that are needed only when a debtor becomes unable to pay all claims in full.
As a group, the contracting proposals violate this principle by attempting to place one of
the most complicated problems of insolvency back into the non-bankruptcy marketplace,
namely how to dispose of an insolvent firm in the most beneficial fashion.123 In essence,
they typically propose that the parties endeavor in advance to prescribe a fix for a firm
before the firm is actually broken (and its illness diagnosed) by selecting the remedial
path the firm must take if it eventually goes belly up.124 This initiative encounters a
number of unresolved difficulties.
122 As used here, the term “ex ante” means at the time creditors initially lend to the firm.
See, e.g., Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice, supra note 9 at 66-67 (proposing that “[w]hen a
firm is formed, it would be required to select what courses of action it wishes to have
available if it runs into financial difficulties down the road” and arguing that “[t]he virtue
of standardized options is that they reduce transactions costs and make communication to
third parties easy”); see also supra note 27 (discussing the concepts of ex ante and ex post
bargaining).
123 If anything, the challenge of deciding how best to dispose of an insolvent firm has
only become more complicated in recent years, owing to the increasingly heterogeneous
interests of creditors, the episodic instability of capital markets, and other factors. See
Baird & Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, supra note 42 (discussing these issues and their
implications for business reorganization law and practice).
124 As discussed below, U.S. bankruptcy law does not operate in this way. First, it is
overwhelmingly a voluntary procedure. Although creditors may petition to put a firm
into bankruptcy involuntarily, that is an exceptionally rare occurrence. See 11 U.S.C. §
303 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (authorizing the commencement of involuntary bankruptcy
cases in certain instances and under certain conditions); Susan Block-Lieb, Why
Creditors File So Few Involuntary Petitions and Why the Number Is Not Too Small, 57
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Critically absent from the various contracting proposals is any serious attempt to
describe in a systematic way the full range of challenges current bankruptcy law faces in
addressing the plight of insolvent firms—and, by extension, that any substitute
contractual arrangement would have to address, in whole or in part. This shortfall is
significant. Among other reasons, a comprehensive understanding of these challenges is
essential to evaluate whether a contractual undertaking of some kind (as opposed to the
mechanisms of the current law) would be capable of addressing them fruitfully. As a
practical matter, any reform is worthwhile only to the extent it represents an improvement
over existing legal structures, and the burden is on those proposing innovation to
demonstrate that it does. This requires a competitive comparative analysis,125 and
BROOK. L. REV. 803 (1991) [hereinafter Block-Lieb, Why]; see also John C. McCoid, The
Occasion for Involuntary Bankruptcy, 61 AM. BANKR. L.J. 195 (1987) (discussing the
history of involuntary petitions in bankruptcy). Second, the process is flexible to
accommodate the vagaries of particular cases. Relatively few outcomes are foreclosed.
Recognizing that circumstances change and that an initial ex ante contractual solution to
a firm’s insolvency might turn out to be suboptimal later, Schwartz has proposed a
process of readjustments whereby new creditors would be able to negotiate adjusted
insolvency terms, replacing the bargain with initial creditors. See Schwartz, Contracting
Reviewed, supra note 31 at 347-48 (“A renegotiation-proof contract would have to be
modified in those cases in which the creditors lent at different times because the optimal
bribe [i.e., the payment to the owner/managers to make the optimal decision regarding the
disposition of the firm in the event of insolvency] could change with changes in the
relevant economic parameters. The contract thus would need a conversion term, such
that if the optimal bribe later changed, the bribes in all prior contracts would be updated
to equal the new optimal bribe: the portion of the bankruptcy return from whatever
system the insolvent firm chose that would be sufficient to induce the firm to choose
optimally.”). This readjustment proposal, however, would magnify the transaction costs
of bankruptcy contracting and, in the process, increase the burdens on non-bankruptcy
markets to resolve in advance the problems of insolvent firms. See WARREN &
WESTBROOK, LAW, supra note 66 at 885 (“All in all, the negotiations over possible
bankruptcy clauses involve potentially huge transaction costs and a battle over the forms
beyond anything taught in Contracts class.”).
125 See COASE, FIRM, supra note 7 at 154 (“whatever we may have in mind as our ideal
world, it is clear that we have not yet discovered how to get to it from where we are. A
better approach would seem to be to start our analysis with a situation approximating that
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conducting that analysis reveals inherent weaknesses in the relevant proposals. A few
examples illustrate the point.
To begin with, insolvent firms seeking to reorganize typically require, and often
obtain, new capital after they become insolvent and enter bankruptcy, but before the
reorganization process is complete—a stabilizing practice known as “dip financing” that
the current law makes possible by permitting a new lender to capitalize a bankrupt firm’s
operations on preferred terms after the firm commences a Chapter 11 case.126 It is
implausible that a private bankruptcy contract could arrange for this financing ex ante or
replicate efficiently the conditions that facilitate it, let alone constitute an improvement
over existing law.
which actually exists, to examine the effects of a proposed policy change, and to attempt
to decide whether the new situation would be, in total, better or worse than the original
one. In this way, conclusions for policy would have some relevance to the actual
situation.”); Robert K. Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on
Investment Incentives, 72 WASH. U.L.Q. 1159, 1163 (1994) [hereinafter Rasmussen, Ex
Ante] (“an advocate of change must show that current bankruptcy law is worse than one
of the proposed alternatives, not that it falls short of the unattainable goal of perfect
efficiency”).
126 The term “dip” refers to the “debtor in possession.” In Chapter 11 cases, the debtor
typically remains in possession of its property while it attempts to reorganize and is thus
referred to as the “debtor in possession” or “dip.” See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101 (2000 & Supp.
2006) (defining the term “debtor in possession”), 1107 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (prescribing
the rights, powers, and duties of a debtor in possession in a Chapter 11 case); In re
Curlew Valley Assocs., 14 B.R. 506, 509-11 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (explaining that the
Bankruptcy Code allows the debtor to remain in possession of its property and run its
business). “Dip finanancing” is the financing in Chapter 11 that the debtor in possession
obtains during the reorganization process. See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2000 & Supp. 2006)
(authorizing additional borrowing after the debtor commences a Chapter 11 case);
George G. Triantis, A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-In-Possession Financing, 46
VAND. L. REV. 901 (1993) [hereinafter Triantis, Theory] (discussing dip financing in
bankruptcy and proposing a regulatory model to insure that the debtor invests only in
“firm value maximizing projects”).
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First, the parties to an ex ante bankruptcy contract cannot in any practical way
bind a third party to make future loans to the firm should the firm ever become insolvent.
Among other reasons, the identity of the third party lender, the availability of the loan,
the price the lender would charge, and the relevant terms of the financing are all unlikely
to be known until the debtor actually encounters financial difficulty.127 The reality is that
each dip loan is unique, and the process of obtaining dip financing is complex and
sensitive to the particular circumstances of the firm at the time of insolvency.128 In
addition, unless the prior rights of existing creditors are somehow suspended or otherwise
accommodated, no new lender would be willing to lend to an insolvent enterprise. Given
these obstacles, all that an ex ante bankruptcy contract realistically might say about this
crucial aspect of business reorganization is that, if reorganization is pursued, the debtor
127 In addition, there is always the possibility of the problem of the disappearing lender—
a lender that fails before the time to make the future loan arrives.
128 Post-bankruptcy dip loans are governed by section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code. See
11 U.S.C. § 364 (2000 & Supp. 2006). After the commencement of a bankruptcy case,
section 364(a) authorizes a debtor in possession to incur unsecured debt in the ordinary
course of its business as an expense of administration without court approval. Id. §
364(a). In contrast, section 364(b) permits the debtor in possession to incur unsecured
debt other than in the ordinary course of its business as an expense of administration only
with court authorization. Id. § 364(b). Section 364(c) provides that, under certain
conditions, the bankruptcy court may authorize the debtor in possession to incur
unsecured debt on a priority basis, subject only to prior liens. Id. § 364(c). Finally,
section 364(d) provides that, under certain conditions, the bankruptcy court may
authorize the debtor in possession to incur debt secured by a lien with a priority that is
equal or senior to existing liens. Id. § 364(d). Liens authorized under section 364(d)
have the effect of “priming” existing forms of security. See, e.g., In re Fontainebleau Las
Vegas Holdings, LLC, 434 B.R. 716, 725 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010) (explaining the concept
of a priming lien). For a discussion of the dip lending process, see David A. Skeel, Jr.,
The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-In-Possession Financing, 25 CARDOZO L. REV.
1905, 1916-1921 (2004); David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New
Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 923-26 (2003).
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may use its best efforts to obtain appropriate dip financing—in other words, what it might
say is essentially nothing.
Critically, unless the ex ante contract could replicate the relevant provisions of the
current law in some enforceable way, it could not do what the current law does, namely
facilitate dip lending by providing an environment (the bankruptcy marketplace) that
makes it attractive for creditors to actually lend to an insolvent enterprise by, among
other things, suspending the enforcement of prior claims and permitting priority for the
new debt.129 Given the complexity involved in this legal mechanism, it would be
infeasible for a bankruptcy contract to replicate it. Recognizing this, the law takes a
different tack. Rather than promote the use of ex ante contracts negotiated in ordinary
debt markets to facilitate lending to insolvent firms, the law establishes and supports a
special bankruptcy market to make this possible.
Second, even if a bankruptcy contract could meaningfully address the issue of dip
financing with more concrete terms, no lender would be willing to bind itself to make a
future loan to an insolvent business without charging a hefty up-front commitment fee.
Thus, even if crafting an ex ante bankruptcy contract for future dip financing were
feasible, it is unlikely that the parties would be interested in incurring the costs of
negotiating it ex ante given that it may never be necessary to invoke the option.130
129 The automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code essentially enjoin the
enforcement of most pre-bankruptcy debts. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000 & Supp. 2006);
supra note 16. Priority borrowing in bankruptcy is discussed in supra notes 126, 128.
130 In theory, existing creditors might attempt to bind themselves (or some subgroup of
them) to make a dip loan. This would avoid the problem of attempting to bind a third
party, but would not avoid the problem of the cost—any existing creditor would require
significant compensation for this kind of agreement. Recognizing implicitly that these
kinds of arrangements are undesirable, current bankruptcy law renders unenforceable
executory pre-bankruptcy lending commitments following the commencement of the
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Next, insolvent firms seeking to reorganize often have to modify their collective
bargaining agreements during the reorganization process. Current law permits this under
supervised conditions after the bankruptcy case has been filed—once again as part of the
special procedures of the bankruptcy market.131 It is implausible that a private
bankruptcy contract could specify ex ante the circumstances under which this would
occur, let alone in a manner superior to existing law. Among other reasons, a firm’s
financial creditors cannot in advance bargain away the employees’ rights, or dictate how
their collective bargaining agreement must be modified. In addition, it is unlikely that
anyone could know in advance what kinds of modifications may be necessary to assist in
reorganizing the debtor. Moreover, even if these problems could be overcome, it is still
unlikely that the parties would be interested in incurring the cost of this kind of
negotiation on an ex ante basis.
Further, insolvent firms seeking to reorganize typically have to deal with such
diverse issues as asbestos tort claims, underfunded pension obligations, and
environmental clean-up liabilities. The current law supplies complex vehicles for
resolving all of these matters—once again as part of the unique procedures of the
debtor’s bankruptcy case—in other words, a pre-bankruptcy agreement to make a loan is
not enforceable once the case is commenced. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(2) (2000 & Supp.
2006) (barring the assumption of executory contracts to make a loan or extend other debt
financing or financial accommodation). As noted, post-bankruptcy dip loans to debtors
in possession and trustees are governed by section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11
U.S.C. § 364 (2000 & Supp. 2006).
131 For example, section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code permits the rejection and
renegotiation of collective bargaining agreements under certain conditions. See 11
U.S.C. § 1113 (2000 & Supp. 2006); In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc., 981 F.2d 85, 89-91
(2d Cir. 1992) (discussing section 1113).
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bankruptcy market.132 It does not appear that a bankruptcy contract might do so, let alone
in a fashion superior to existing law.
Apart from these and similar concerns, the various contracting approaches have
broader conceptual flaws. As scholars have recognized, a key dilemma in the case of an
insolvent firm is whether to reorganize or liquidate. Although it is common to
conceptualize this as a binary choice,133 it actually represents at least four distinct
options. First, the firm might be placed essentially in foreclosure (meaning creditors
might be allowed to seize the firm’s assets and liquidate them piecemeal through various
132 The Bankruptcy Code provides complex mechanisms for dealing with asbestos tort
liabilities. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing for the special
treatment of asbestos tort liabilities, including the creation of a trust and the granting of
injunctive relief to facilitate the settlement and payment of present and future claims); In
re Combustion Engineering, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 233-35 (3d Cir. 2004) (discussing section
524(g)); Yair Listokin & Kenneth Ayotte, Protecting Future Claimants in Mass Tort
Bankruptcies, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1435 (2004) (discussing the treatment of asbestos
claims in bankruptcy and the representation of future claimants); Alan N. Resnick,
Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass Tort Liability, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 2045 (2000) (discussing the treatment of mass tort claims in bankruptcy).
In conjunction with other law, the Code likewise provides complex mechanisms
governing the treatment of pension benefits. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000 & Supp.
2006) (providing for the treatment of pension obligations in Chapter 11 cases); In re
Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 456 F.3d 328 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussing the termination of
pension plans in bankruptcy). A number of Code provisions address the treatment of
environmental liabilities in bankruptcy. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 554 (2000 & Supp. 2006)
(permitting the abandonment of property that is burdensome to the estate); Midlantic
Nat’l Bank v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494 (1986) (holding that a
trustee many not abandon property in violation of state regulation reasonably designed to
protect the public health and safety from environmental hazards); Kathryn R. Heidt,
Environmental Obligations in Bankruptcy: A Fundamental Framework, 44 FLA. L. REV.
153 (1992) (discussing the treatment of environmental obligations in bankruptcy).
133 See Schwartz, Normative Theory, supra note 9 at 1238 (describing options under the
current law as “liquidation (Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code) and reorganization
(Chapter 11).”); Bebchuk, New Approach, supra note 118 at 775 (“Reorganization is one
of the two routes that a corporation in bankruptcy may take. When a corporation
becomes insolvent and bankruptcy proceedings are commenced, the corporation is either
liquidated or reorganized.”).
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forced-sale procedures). Second, the firm might reorganize by selling its assets to a third
party as a going-concern.134 Third, the firm might reorganize on a stand-alone basis by
retaining its property and achieving a streamlined capital structure by stripping away
(discharging) excessive indebtedness.135 Fourth, the firm might engage in some
combination of these alternatives with respect to its distinct business operations and
assets.
Central to resolving the multitude of choices inherent in selecting one of these
disparate paths is deciding whether the firm is suffering from “financial distress”
(meaning excessive indebtedness encumbering an otherwise viable operational core);
“economic distress” (meaning excessive indebtedness encumbering a non-viable
operational core); or some mixture of the two with respect to any separate business lines
the firm may have.136 If the firm is suffering merely from financial distress, it is
potentially a candidate for any of the four options outlined above depending on a number
of factors, including the state of the market in which the firm operates and the firm’s
access to capital, the identity of its creditors and their preferences at the time of
insolvency, and managerial capabilities. If the firm is suffering from economic distress,
it is a candidate for the first two options (including some combination of them). The hard
questions include identifying (1) who is going to decide whether the firm, or what portion
134 For example, this is how General Motors Corporation achieved its reorganization. See
supra note 92.
135 For example, this is how many of the U.S. air carriers that have filed for bankruptcy
relief have reorganized their businesses. See supra note 89.
136 See Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Economic Analysis of Corporate
Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 87-8 (1995) [hereinafter Rasmussen &
Skeel, Economic Analysis] (explaining the difference between “financial distress” and
“economic distress”); Rasmussen, Ex Ante, supra note 125 at 1167 (same).
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of it, is suffering from financial or economic distress and on what basis, and (2) which
option(s) to pursue, depending upon, among other things, how much risk the relevant
decision-making constituents are willing to assume.
Conceptually, a bankruptcy contract might designate both a decision maker and
an evaluative standard in response to these questions, but the devil truly lies in the details.
To begin with, regardless of whether the contract designated the debtor or one or more
creditors to make the relevant decisions at the time of insolvency, each has incentives in
the insolvency context to make the wrong choices (these are explored in Chapter 2).137
For example, insolvent debtors have incentives to take excessive risks, and secured
creditors have incentives to engage in improvident foreclosure activities.138 Because a
debtor’s insolvency distorts the parties’ incentives in inefficient ways, some mechanism
is needed to neutralize these incentives to clear the path for better decision making (or at
least reduce their effects).139 Bankruptcy law does this through its various mechanisms of
debt collection, debt forgiveness, and debt adjustment. In contrast, bankruptcy
contracting does not offer the feasible prospect of a comparatively superior apparatus
because the alteration of the parties’ incentives requires something more than a
contractual stipulation—it requires the more powerful intervention of a corrective
market.140 In addition, further complications arise in crafting and applying the relevant
137 See infra at 129-89. In addition, as a general matter, individual constituents cannot be
trusted to look out for the interests of others. See infra note 164.
138 See infra at 138-55, 162-68.
139 See id.
140 For example, insolvent debtors have incentives to avoid information sharing. See
infra note 164. Bankruptcy law supplies mechanisms for neutralizing these incentives,
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evaluative standard (whatever it may be), and then achieving an appropriate disposition
of the firm based on the outcome of that evaluation.
For example, the customary initial hindsight procedure for determining whether
an insolvent firm is suffering from financial or economic distress is to review the firm’s
historic earnings before taxes, depreciation, and debt.141 But that is only part of the
analysis. The frequently more important question involves considering the firm’s future
prospects, including whether it is possible to reduce the firm’s costs, increase its prices,
and/or increase its sales. This kind of evaluation is highly sensitive to context and often
turns on variables that are difficult to predict and account for ex ante in any meaningful
way, including the nature of the market in which the firm operates at the time of
insolvency. In addition, selecting an appropriate disposition of the firm turns on a
number of variables, including the relevant constituents’ appetites for risk (which
constituents at the time of insolvency may be quite different from those around at the
time a bankruptcy contract is negotiated). Finally, achieving an appropriate disposition
frequently calls for methods of implementation beyond the scope of recognized
contractual remediation.
To illustrate, suppose the debtor (Firm) is a manufacturing company with a solid
product line, but a high cost structure owing to unfavorable long-term supply contracts it
entered into in prior years. Suppose Firm negotiated its supply contracts at a time when
paving the way for more informed decisions regarding the debtor’s condition and
prospects. The relevant incentives, and how bankruptcy law addresses them to facilitate
decision making, are discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.
141 If the earnings are significantly positive, this suggests that the debtor is suffering from
financial distress—it simply has too much debt. If they are negative, this suggests
economic distress. See supra notes 1, 136.
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prices for the commodities it consumes were high, but prices have since fallen
dramatically, giving Firm’s competitors a devastating pricing advantage in the
marketplace. One potential solution to Firm’s problem under the current law would be
for it to file for bankruptcy, reject its long-term supply contracts in favor of more
competitive agreements, and reorganize. To the extent this outcome is optimal (because,
among other things, Firm is suffering from financial rather than economic distress), an
efficient bankruptcy contract would have to include mechanisms for recognizing the
particular problem Firm has encountered and prescribing the same fix, among all the
other possible problems Firm might have encountered and all the other corresponding
resolutions.142 Because at the time of contracting the number of possible future problems
Firm might encounter are large, each generating its own potential resolution options,
anticipating and accommodating them all in a bankruptcy contract in any concrete,
detailed way is likely to be unworkable. In addition, from a contracting perspective,
there is a significant feasibility problem to the particular solution involved in the
hypothetical—Firm’s ability to get out of its long-term supply contracts. By itself, a
bankruptcy contract between Firm and, say, its bank lender could not accomplish this
solution without either the consent of Firm’s suppliers or some legal mechanism for
rejecting Firm’s supply agreements. Current bankruptcy law supplies such a mechanism
and specifies its own criteria for invoking it, as well as the consequences of doing so
142 For example, suppose in the alternative that Firm’s problem was that no one wanted to
buy its products because of their poor design. Unless there is an imminent, feasible
solution to this problem, Firm is suffering from economic distress and should be
liquidated. The question then becomes what is the best method of liquidation. That, in
turn, will depend on such variables as the condition of the marketplace in which the
liquidation would be conducted.
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within the bankruptcy marketplace.143 It would not appear that bankruptcy contracting
offers any advantage here.144
In addition to these problems, bankruptcy contracting encounters additional
conceptual challenges. These include (1) the understandable reluctance of lenders to
agree in advance to the forgiveness of any portion of their claims, even though debt
forgiveness may be a crucial aspect of the debtor’s reorganization, (2) the problem of
binding future parties to an agreement and the potentially negative effects this may have
on the value of the lenders’ claims, (3) general difficulties inherent in predicting future
events, and (4) other challenging coordination and enforcement problems.
As indicated previously, a central mechanism for achieving the successful
reorganization of a firm suffering from financial distress is through a reduction of the
firm’s indebtedness, either by deleveraging its balance sheet or disencumbering its assets
in order that they may be sold.145 At the time they lend, however, financial creditors have
no interest in specifying the circumstances under which they would be willing to forgive
143 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (permitting the rejection of executory
contracts without the consent of the non-debtor party).
144 Schwartz has proposed a procedure whereby an initial bankruptcy contract could be
readjusted as circumstances change, resulting in a series of bankruptcy contracts updated
on the basis of more contemporaneous information. See supra note 124. In theory, the
final contract might address the disposition of the debtor’s assets based on the debtor’s
circumstances as an insolvent or nearly-insolvent enterprise, but this suggests that there is
little point to the earlier superseded bankruptcy contracts. Further, it has not been
explained how the final contract might address unilaterally the challenges outlined above
(those of dip lending, collective bargaining modification, claims resolution, diagnosis of
the firm’s condition, remediation option selection, and implementation). In addition, the
concept of the final contract appears to resemble a work-out agreement, discussed below.
For a number of reasons, work-out agreements are difficult to negotiate, are of limited
utility, and owe their success significantly to the shadow of existing bankruptcy law. See
infra at 82-84.
145 See supra notes 72, 76, 88.
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their loans (either in whole or in part), and it is easy to understand why. Among other
reasons, doing so would impair the presumed benefits of the “bonding role of debt.”146
Schwartz has argued that maximizing the return of creditors is important because
the more losses they suffer, the more they will tend to charge for credit. This is
undesirable, he claims, because any increased cost of debt financing will have the effect
of reducing a firm’s incentives to engage in worthwhile projects—a problem of
146 For a discussion of the “bonding role of debt,” see Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of
Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 324
(1986) [hereinafter Jensen, Agency Costs] discussing the “control function of debt” to
police managerial behavior); see also Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in
Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 68-73 (1982) [hereinafter
Levmore, Monitors]; Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD.
209, 226-34 (1989) (discussing the incentives that firms have to finance projects with
debt rather than equity). As explained by one group of commentators:
In practice, managers, who enjoy private benefits of control, may be
unwilling to shrink or liquidate an unprofitable company. Moreover, the
market for corporate control [e.g., supervision by equity holders] may not
work well enough to force them to do so. Under these conditions, debt
plays an important role in constraining or bonding managers to act in [the
equity] holders’ interests. Specifically, the managers of a highly leveraged
firm face a choice: Reduce slack or go bankrupt.
Philip Aghion, Oliver Hart & John Moore, The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 523, 531 (1992) [hereinafter Aghion, et al., Economics] (citing Sanford J.
Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives,
printed in THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND UNCERTAINTY 107 (J.J. McCall ed.
1982)); see also Aghion, et al. at 532-33 (“In broad terms, we think that a good
bankruptcy procedure is one that meets two goals: (1) it maximizes the ex post value of
the firm (with an appropriate distribution of this value across claimants); [and] (2) it
preserves the (ex ante) bonding role of debt by penalizing management adequately in
bankruptcy states.”) (internal emphasis omitted); Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate
Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 411 (1990) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Corporate
Bankruptcy] (arguing that corporate bankruptcy law has two functions: delivering a
penalty for failure and reducing the costs of failure); George G. Triantis & Ronald J.
Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073,
1082 (1995) [hereinafter Triantis & Daniels, Role of Debt] (arguing that creditors may be
better able to keep managers in line than equity holders).
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“underinvestment.”147 He explains that increased borrowing costs have a negative effect
on a firm’s incentives to engage in worthwhile projects because the firm has to share
returns with creditors.148 Under this view, the less a firm has to pay financiers (to a
point) the better because the firm therefore has an incentive to pursue more worthwhile
projects.149 But among other difficulties, this observation is in tension with the notion
147 The concept of “underinvestment” refers to investment behavior that involves
inadequate risk taking, such as stuffing money into a mattress. See David A. Skeel, Jr.,
An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1325, 1333 n.17 (1998) [hereinafter Skeel, Evolutionary] (illustrating the problems of
“overinvestment” and “underinvestment”); see generally Stewart C. Myers, Determinants
of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147 (1977) [hereinafter Myers, Determinants]
(discussing managerial behavior). In contrast, the concept of “overinvestment” refers to
investment behavior that involves excessive risk taking, such as gambling the rent
money.
148 See Schwartz, Normative Theory, supra note 9 at 1217 (“When a firm is financed with
debt, it must share its success state return with creditors, whom it must compensate for
bearing the risk of nonpayment. As a consequence, a debt-financed firm’s private
marginal return is lower than the social marginal return. The firm will respond by
‘underinvesting’; by choosing a lower effort then is socially optimal.”).
149 See Schwartz, Normative Theory, supra note 9 at 1204 (“Society thus should want an
efficient bankruptcy system because lower interest rates [arising from increased payouts
to financial creditors] increase the share of good state returns that firms can keep, thereby
reducing the wedge between the socially efficient project set and the project set that debt-
financed firms will pursue”). This is true, of course, so long as the number of worthwhile
projects is greater than the number of pursuers. If worthwhile projects are relatively
scarce (which seems at least plausible), firms will pursue them even though borrowing
costs are high and they have to share returns with creditors, up to the point at which
borrowing costs approach anticipated profits. Firms may even pursue projects where the
anticipated profits are less than the borrowing costs if, for example, the availability of tax
benefits more than compensates for the loss. Of course, there is a floor to how little a
firm may pay to financiers: if the return on the loan is too low, financiers will not lend.
In addition, the reasons creditors incur losses are diverse. First, they may extend credit
improvidently. Second, debtors may pursue worthwhile projects incompetently (a matter
of operational risk). Third, debtors may competently pursue projects that turn out to be
not worthwhile (a matter of investment risk). Fourth, debtors may encounter difficulties
beyond their control independent of operational and ordinary investment risk, resulting in
default and nonpayment (for example, there may be an outbreak of war). It is at least
conceivable that lowering borrowing costs by increasing payouts to creditors would
amount to a wash—creditors would simply lend the gain improvidently, or to debtors
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behind the bonding role of debt—the idea that debt financing has a disciplinary effect on
firms that helps increase their productivity and reduce “agency costs.”150 Under this
view, the more the firm has to pay financiers (to a point) the better because the firm then
has incentives to be as productive as possible.151 But as noted, one critically important
way to achieve value maximization in the bankruptcy reorganization context is through
debt forgiveness, the very idea of which is caustic to the premises underlying the bonding
role of debt.152 The key to resolving these competing considerations is by reference to
timing and context.
who pursue projects incompetently, who competently pursue projects that turn out to be
not worthwhile, or encounter difficulties beyond their control. Accordingly, it is not
necessarily true that increasing payouts to creditors will result in an overall reduction of
borrowing costs for firms. See also infra at 99-100.
150 In general, the phrase “agency costs” refers to the costs associated with the corporate
form of organization in which those with capital (e.g., shareholders) invest in the firm
and allow managers to act as their “agents” in handling the firm’s affairs. As explained
by one commentator, “the agency relationship exposes owners to the risk that managers
will use owners’ funds for management’s benefit, thereby creating agency costs—the
costs to the principal of obtaining faithful and effective performance by its agent.”
Edward S. Adams, Governance in Chapter 11 Reorganizations: Reducing Costs,
Improving Results, 73 B.U. L. Rev. 581, 601 (1993) [hereinafter Adams, Governance];
see also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976)
[hereinafter Jensen & Meckling, Theory] (defining agency costs as arising from a
principal-agent relationship and equaling the “sum of: (1) the monitoring expenditures by
the principal, (2) the bonding expenditures by the agent, [and] (3) the residual loss”) (note
omitted).
151 There is a ceiling to how much a firm will be willing to pay to financiers: if the price
of the loan is too high, the cost in terms of the creation of an incentive for
underinvestment will exceed the benefits of any reduction in agency costs.
152 For example, deleveraging an insolvent firm’s balance sheet may permit the firm to
survive as a going concern, permitting creditors to recover more than they would in
liquidation. Likewise, stripping liens from over-encumbered assets may permit them to
be sold where otherwise they would find no purchasers. See infra at 99-100.
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In solvent states, preserving the bonding role of debt is paramount—hence the
preference in non-bankruptcy markets for the enforcement of debt obligations without
debt forgiveness. It is only when a firm becomes insolvent (or nearly so) that there is any
real need to consider debt forgiveness. Because insolvency may or may not happen, and
if it does happen it may or may not be necessary to consider reorganization and debt
forgiveness, it would be counterproductive for a lender to undertake the cost of
addressing debt forgiveness in advance.
Among other reasons, doing so would necessarily increase the price of the loan by
at least the amount of the transaction costs involved in negotiating in advance any debt-
forgiveness option (not to mention the costs of monitoring the agreement)—a potentially
enormous sum when the negotiation expense is multiplied across myriad transactions
throughout the economy.153 In the aggregate, the additional transaction costs are likely to
exceed any benefit realized from any enhanced reorganization payout given the relative
large amount of lending (in the trillions) compared to the relatively small reorganization
benefit creditors realize from those few firms that successfully reorganize after becoming
insolvent. In comparison, the cost of the state-supplied bankruptcy system would have to
be truly enormous to justify the aggregate transaction costs of a substitute regime of
bankruptcy contracting, but it turns out that the cost of current reorganization procedure
is not that great.154 Thus, the transactions costs involved in prescribing debt forgiveness
153 See WARREN & WESTBROOK, LAW, supra note 66 at 885 (“because it is hard to know
in advance which companies would eventually end up in bankruptcy, the negotiations
would also be necessary for a much wider swath of the American economy.”).
154 See Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, The Determinants of Professional Fees
in Large Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 111, 140 (2004)
(reporting fees and expenses to represent approximately 2.2 percent of the value of the
firm’s assets in large Chapter 11 cases); Stephen Lubben, The Direct Costs of Corporate
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in bankruptcy contracts would likely only exacerbate Schwartz’s problem of
underinvestment by increasing the cost of lending. Hence, firms do not negotiate debt
forgiveness in advance.
Consistent with this observation, it is no surprise that, to the extent creditors
explicitly negotiate bankruptcy contracts (which they do routinely, especially in their
security agreements), they make insolvency an event of default and prescribe foreclosure
(not debt forgiveness) as the remedy. This has the effect of keeping the feet of the firm’s
managers to the fire. Yet, as Schwartz and others have argued, foreclosure is often
exactly the worst option the parties could select for handling a firm’s insolvency because
Reorganization: An Empirical Examination of Professional Fees in Large Chapter 11
Cases, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 509, 515 (2000) (reporting the direct costs in large
reorganization cases to be approximately 2 percent of the firm’s assets); Brian Betker,
The Administrative Costs of Debt Restructuring: Some Recent Evidence, 26 FIN.
MANAGEMENT 56 (1999) [hereinafter Betker, Administrative Costs] (reporting the ratio of
direct costs to assets to be 3.9 percent for large Chapter 11 cases). As a percentage of
assets, the costs appear to be typically higher for small Chapter 11 cases. See Stephen P.
Ferris & Robert M. Lawless, The Expenses of Financial Distress: The Direct Costs of
Chapter 11, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 629, 651 (2000) (estimating the ratio of expenses to
assets to be 17.6 percent small Chapter 11 cases); Robert M. Lawless, et al., A Glimpse at
Professional Fees and Other Direct Costs in Small Firm Bankruptcies, 1994 U. ILL. L.
REV. 847, 868 (1994) (estimating the ratio to be approximately 8.66 percent for small
Chapter 11 cases). The available evidence suggests that these costs of reorganization are
not particularly high in comparison to the costs of other kinds of corporate transactions.
See, e.g., Easterbrook, Corporate Bankruptcy, supra note 146 (arguing that Chapter 11 is
generally efficient and comparing the cost of corporate bankruptcy with the cost of other
sorts of transactions); see also James S. Ang, Jess H. Chua & John J. McConnell, The
Administrative Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: A Note, 37 J. FIN. 219, 223-234 (1982)
(estimating administrative costs in the range of seven to eight percent of asset values);
Betker, Administrative Costs, at 57 (estimating administrative costs at approximately four
percent of asset values); Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct costs and
Violation of Priority Claims, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 285, 289-90 (1990) (estimating that the
direct costs of Chapter 11 amount to approximately three percent of asset values); see
also Edward I. Altman, A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost
Question, 39 J. FIN. 1067, 1077 (1984); Gregor Andrade & Steven N. Kaplan, How
Costly is Financial (Not Economic) Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged
Transactions That Become Distressed, 53 J. FIN. 1443, 1488 (1998) [hereinafter Andrade
& Kaplan, How Costly].
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it is value-destroying.155 Not surprisingly, actual bankruptcy contracts negotiated ex ante
(which typically prescribe foreclosure) are unenforceable in bankruptcy. Instead
bankruptcy law permits the invocation of the mechanisms of a corrective bankruptcy
market that requires an evaluation of the circumstances of the insolvent firm based on
relevant contemporary information in order to address how best to dispose of the firm and
its property.
Review of the history of bankruptcy law supports these observations. For most of
the nineteenth century, the United States had no formal bankruptcy regime.156
Interestingly, there is no evidence that, during this period, creditors endeavored in any
systematic way to write ex ante bankruptcy contracts to facilitate in advance value-
maximizing dispositions of insolvent firms, as opposed to simply opting for individual
debt enforcement and foreclosure in conjunction with their debt contracts in the event of
default. With the rise of large business enterprises, particularly railroads, it became
155 See Schwartz, Normative Theory, supra note 9 at 1260-6. As the Supreme Court has
observed: “property that must be sold [through a quick foreclosure liquidation
procedure] is simply worth less. No one would pay as much to own such property as he
would pay to own real estate that could be sold at leisure and pursuant to normal
marketing techniques.” BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 539 (1994); see
also id. at 551 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting). As Justice Souter has observed:
Buyers no doubt hope for bargains at foreclosure sales, but an investor
with a million dollars cash in his pocket might be ready to pay “as much”
for a desired parcel of property on forced sale, at least if a rival, equally
determined millionaire were to appear at the same auction. The principal
reason such sales yield low prices is . . . that such free-spending
millionaires are in short supply, and those who do exist are unlikely to
read the fine print which fills the “legal notice” columns of their morning
newspaper.
Id.; see also infra at 164-65.
156 See infra note 370.
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apparent that some mechanism other than foreclosure was needed to address the problems
of insolvent firms. Instead of drafting comprehensive ex ante bankruptcy contracts with
elaborate reorganization options, however, sophisticated lawyers created the equity
receivership—a collective ex post court-centered reorganization procedure that evolved
over time to deal with the problems of insolvent firms in ways that aimed to preserve
their value. Congress later codified the equity receivership mechanism in modified form
as part of the national bankruptcy law.157 Presumably, if bankruptcy contracts were a
viable, superior alternative, they would have been selected over the equity receivership
mechanism that lawyers devised. In reality, the equity receivership arose precisely
because, in the absence of a bankruptcy law, creditors routinely opted contractually for
value-destroying debt-collection mechanisms such as foreclosure.
Creditors have other incentives to avoid contracting in advance over a given
insolvency procedure (other than by prescribing foreclosure as the remedy). Financial
creditors often sell their claims to third parties, either in the ordinary course after lending
or upon the debtor’s default or insolvency, and this trend has only increased in recent
years.158 Although in theory the selling creditor might rationally prefer the firm to
engage in some form of reorganization in some states (because doing so would enhance
the selling creditor’s return by preserving the debtor’s value as a going concern), a
157 See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN
AMERICA 48-70 (2001) [hereinafter SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION] (describing the equity
receivership procedure and the circumstances giving rise to it); infra note 165.
158 See Baird & Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, supra note 42 at 659-61 (describing modern
claims trading practices); Rasmussen & Skeel, Economic Analysis, supra note 136 at
101-04 (noting increase in claims trading); David A. Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of
Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461, 513-18
(1992) [hereinafter Skeel, Nature] (same).
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purchaser of the claim might have a different view depending on its goals (for example,
whether it wishes to take over the firm in its entirety, acquire merely part of it, or sell it in
pieces to liquidate its purchased claim).159 The seller’s advance stipulation to permit
reorganization in a particular way (as opposed to foreclosure) might have the effect of
decreasing the value of its claim in the secondary claims-trading market because, to avoid
the firm’s reorganization option that the selling creditor extended, the purchasing creditor
that desires some other outcome would have to buy the option back from the firm (or the
lender would have to do so prior to the sale of its claim). Because insolvent firms tend to
prefer reorganization even when this is not optimal,160 the resulting need for a settlement
with the firm could become both routine and costly, further exacerbating the costs and
complexity of bankruptcy.161 Again, it is not surprising that creditors select foreclosure
as the default remedy in their debt contracts because, in reality, this is an option the
creditor can control by waiving it if the creditor believes that, based on information
159 See Baird & Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, supra note 42 at 670 (explaining how
different holders of claims can have vastly different views on the best outcome of a
debtor’s bankruptcy case).
160 See Schwartz, Normative Theory, supra note 9 at 1248 (“[T]he firm’s owners and
managers receive a private benefit from operating the firm during a bankruptcy
procedure. This benefit is larger in the [reorganization] procedure because a
reorganization takes longer to realize and thus permits the owners to be in charge for a
longer period (and to have a greater probability of remaining in charge permanently).
Only private benefits matter to the firm because, being insolvent, it has no claim to the
monetary return a procedure could generate. There, the firm will always choose the
[reorganization] procedure unless constrained.”).
161 Schwartz has suggested that creditors might offer the firm’s managers a “bribe” to
make the correct decision, overcoming their preference for reorganization in cases where
it would not be optimal. See Schwartz, Contracting Reviewed, supra note 31 at 344-48.
The prospect of creditors having to bribe managers to achieve liquidation, however,
would necessarily increase the cost of lending. This would add to the overall cost of
bankruptcy contracting.
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available at the time of default, some other outcome would be in its best interests, and
more important it is an option that does not undermine the bonding role of debt in solvent
states.162
Problems also emerge in terms of (1) actually drafting the kind of bankruptcy
agreements some scholars envision and coordinating their terms among the effected
parties where these parties are constantly changing (and involve such diverse constituents
as government agencies, financial creditors, and labor unions); (2) coalition formation
when the parties have no immediate incentive to coalesce into interest groups (for
example, the debtor is solvent); and (3) updating or renegotiating the terms of these
agreements as circumstances change.163 Among other critical details, it remains entirely
unsettled what kinds of terms are permissible (e.g., can one creditor insist by contract that
it take the entire business upon the debtor’s default regardless of its value?), who should
do the negotiating (e.g., can a bank speak for a tort victim?), and who is empowered to
bind whom (e.g., can a vendor bind an employee?), especially given that no single
162 The ability of one creditor to waive a particular remedy such as foreclosure is not, of
course, a complete solution to the challenge of determining the best disposition of an
insolvent firm. Among other reasons, there remains the collective-action dilemma—a
creditor will tend to avoid waiving foreclosure so long as it fears others will not also
forego their foreclosure rights. Creditors otherwise have incentives to pursue foreclosure
even though doing so would not be value-maximizing on the whole. These incentives are
discussed in Chapter 2.
163 Robert Rasmussen would solve the first and second problems by having the firm
stipulate the bankruptcy outcome in its charter or other organizing document.
Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice, supra note 9 at 66-67. This, of course, would not solve the
third problem. Schwartz would solve the third problem by permitting readjustment. See
supra note 124. But that would increase the transaction costs and does not resolve the
first and second problems.
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creditor or group can be trusted to look out for the interests of others.164 The law of
corporate reorganization evolved into the relatively complex device it is today precisely
because of the general inability of creditors to work well together and look out for their
collective interests—which is, after all, Jackson’s basic point in articulating the
collective-action dilemma.165 The advocates of the various contracting proposals have
remained extremely vague on these challenging issues in part because they have no
164 As Jackson points out in articulating the collective-action dilemma, one reason for
having a bankruptcy law is that, left to their own devices, individual creditors will look
out only for themselves. See also Warren & Westbrook, Contracting Out, supra note 10
at 1214 (arguing that “the central feature of any proposal that calls for parties to contact
for a set of applicable bankruptcy rules is the effect the scheme chosen will have on the
rights of creditors who were not part of the negotiation” and that “[c]ontracting creditors
can be expected to negotiate for a system that benefits themselves, not the parties who are
absent from the negotiating table”); Baird & Picker, Noncooperative Bargaining, supra
note 63 at 311-12 (arguing that “[a] bankruptcy proceeding is needed largely because
[negotiations over the disposition of the firm’s assets between senior creditors and the
debtor] cannot be entirely the province of private contracting. If the firm is worth less
than what the most senior creditor is owed, the general creditors should receive nothing,
but some mechanism, perhaps a judicial one, is needed to decide whether this condition
holds, as the manager-shareholder and the senior creditor cannot be relied on to protect
the rights of third parties.”). As Rasmussen has observed, absent mandatory regulations
that protect the interests of parties absent from the bargaining table, allowing one group
to select the debtor’s disposition in the event of insolvency would “encourage consensual
creditors to shift the costs of insolvency onto nonconsensual creditors.” Rasmussen,
Debtor’s Choice, supra note 9 at 67.
165 See supra at 24-25; supra note 164; see also In re Philadelphia & Reading Coal &
Iron Co., 105 F.2d 358, 359-60 (3d Cir. 1939) (describing some of the abuses of early
business reorganization practice under the equity receivership mechanism and section
77B of the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898); In re Albert Dickinson Co., Inc., 104 F.2d
771, 775 (7th Cir. 1939) (same). If anything, the inability of creditors to work
cooperatively together has only increased in recent years, based on a number of factors.
See Baird & Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, supra note 42 (discussing the increasingly
fragmented and heterogeneous interests of creditors and the complexities this poses for
bankruptcy reorganization law and practice).
80
satisfying theory for resolving them,166 in the process leaving the concept of bankruptcy
contracting particularly vulnerable to the criticism that, “[n]ot being clear, it was never
clearly wrong.”167
In addition, the idea of bankruptcy contracting encounters difficulties owing to the
limits of human knowledge and perception. Humans in general are not particularly gifted
at predicting future events.168 Yet, to be useful, a comprehensive ex ante bankruptcy
contract would have to either (1) be quite detailed about how to deal with future events,
or (2) prescribe adequate procedures for dealing with these events as they arise. The first
requirement is not likely to be satisfied unless the drafters have both extraordinary gifts
of prescience and unusual powers of persuasion to convince others to go along with their
predictions. The second requirement seems remarkably like what bankruptcy law already
does. Again, one reasonably might ask why it is useful to incur the costs of bankruptcy
contracting when it may never be necessary in any particular case and bankruptcy law
exists to address the problems of insolvency as and when they occur within the context of
the bankruptcy marketplace.169
166 See Warren & Westbrook, Contracting Out, supra note 10 at 1201 (arguing that
“contractualists are vague about how their schemes will be implemented and how they
will work”).
167 COASE, FIRM, supra note 7 at 149.
168 See NASSIM N. TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN 136-142 (2007) [hereinafter TALEB, SWAN]
(making this point); see also SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 37 at 199 (observing that
“committing to a course of conduct far in advance of action is inherently risky” and that
“[b]ecause the future is often unclear and human beings do not have the ability to
consider ever single contingency, it often makes sense to wait until more information is
available before deciding how to respond”).
169 Schwartz has explained in an analogous context that creditors do not attempt to
bargain with firms over their commitment of effort to particular projects because “it is
difficult to know whether a borrowing firm is exerting the optimal amount of effort” and
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A further problem arises in terms of policing the parties’ contractual bankruptcy
bargain after a debtor enters a state of insolvency. Suppose the parties negotiated an
elaborate scheme specifying the particular disposition of the firm in different states based
on certain triggering standards. Logically, if it were in the interests of one of the parties
to dispute whether a particular triggering event had occurred (for example, because the
outcome would impair its stake in the debtor compared to other possible outcomes), that
party would dispute the event.170 An analogous situation arises frequently in litigation
over inter-creditor agreements—contractual arrangements among discrete creditor groups
that typically grant one group (the senior creditors) control and decision-making rights
over another (the junior creditors), often in connection with the disposition of the parties’
mutual collateral.171 When they perceive it to be in their interests, junior creditors often
dispute these agreements or the occurrence of events that trigger their provisions,
“it would be costly to describe in a contract the various efficient actions the firm should
take in each of the many possible states of the world that could materialize.” See
Schwartz, Normative Theory, supra note 9 at 1216. In other words, financial creditors do
not contract to micromanage the operational activities of their borrowers, and it is
assumed that a firm’s “effort” is “noncontractible.” Id. Creditors face a similar barrier
when it comes to the even more challenging exercise of navigating a firm remotely
through the straits of insolvency through the provisions of an antecedent contract.
170 See WARREN & WESTBROOK, LAW, supra note 66 at 886 (arguing similarly that those
advocating bankruptcy contracting have “assumed that debtors will go willingly to the
sacrifice, rather than manipulating or secreting assets and filing lawsuits”). As Merton
Miller has put it, “[d]ebtors, like some poets, do not ‘go gentle into that good night.’”
Merton H. Miller, Leverage, reprinted in CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY 6 (J.S. Bhandari &
L.A. Weiss eds. 1996) [hereinafter Miller, Leverage].
171 Inter-creditor and subordination agreements are generally enforceable in bankruptcy.
See 11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (recognizing the enforceability of
contractual subordination agreements in bankruptcy cases).
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sometimes giving rise to costly battles.172 By their nature, bankruptcy contracts would
not only be costly to negotiate and maintain, they would likely be costly to enforce.
In the real world, as a debtor approaches or enters a state of insolvency, interested
parties often come together and attempt to “work-out” a beneficial resolution of the
debtor’s affairs. Perhaps in the work-out context conditions might be ripe for creditors to
band together and negotiate an elaborate bankruptcy contract to resolve the debtor’s fate
based on then-current information. Of course, at this juncture the hold-out problem
typically looms large, as well as (1) the threat of debt-collection free-for-alls as creditors
begin to exercise their non-bankruptcy rights following default, (2) difficulties of
coalition formation, and (3) information-sharing obstacles.173 It is thus at this point that
the intervention of a corrective bankruptcy market with its own remedial rules and
procedures is often most needed, and the negotiation of a work-out solution often difficult
to achieve. This is not to say that work-outs do not happen. Of course they do, but
usually the successful ones involve debtors with the least serious problems or the least
complicated capital structures. In addition, in many instances a bankruptcy filing is often
172 See Baird & Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, supra note 42 at 673-74 (explaining inter-
creditor agreements and the potential for costly litigation over them).
173 These are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. For an example of the difficulties
involved in negotiating a complicated out-of-court debt restructuring, including the
problem of hold-outs, see MICHAEL MORITZ & BARRETT SEAMAN, GOING FOR BROKE:
THE CHRYSLER STORY 297-317 (1981). In order to avoid a variety of perceived abuses,
various non-bankruptcy mechanisms designed to regulate non-bankruptcy markets
actually promote hold-out behavior in the insolvency setting. A good example is the
Trust Indenture Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa, et seq. Among other things, the Act prevents the
modification of the payment rights of the holders of public debt issued under its
provisions without the holders’ consent. This is to prevent the issuers of public debt from
abusing majoritarian voting mechanisms to reduce their debt obligations. Rather than
burden the operation of the Act with complex insolvency exceptions, bankruptcy law
simply deploys a substitute mechanism.
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the cheaper option, as compared to negotiating a time-consuming work-out contract
among numerous competing constituents.174 Further, successful work-outs
characteristically owe a debt (at least in part) to the shadow of existing bankruptcy law—
the threat that if the parties do not reach an agreement, they face a potentially lengthy
court-supervised bankruptcy proceeding.175
From this vantage point, successful work-outs can be seen as occupying a distinct
amelioratory niche—they work in the relatively few instances in which the parties
perceive a contractual means to achieve a more efficient outcome than the state-supplied
bankruptcy process. That, of course, does not mean that the state-supplied process is
generally inefficient. It simply means that, by reason of its general applicability to a
multitude of debtor types and circumstances, there may be some debtors that are able to
achieve the same benefits more cheaply under some circumstances without invoking its
provisions. Ironically, if resort to the state-supplied bankruptcy procedure could be
supplanted in advance through the vehicle of a bankruptcy contract, this might have the
effect of diminishing the prospect of successful work-outs by, among other things,
removing the shadow of the very law that makes so many of them possible.
174 See Stuart Gilson, Transaction Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from
Financially Distressed Firms, 52 J. FIN. 161 (1997) (arguing that out-of-court workouts
do not reduce debt sufficiently); Stuart Gilson, et al., Troubled Debt Restructurings: An
Empirical Study of Private Reorganization of Firms Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 315 (1990)
(study of large, publicly traded companies).
175 JACKSON, LOGIC, supra note 8 at 17 (“Bankruptcy law stipulates a minimum set of
entitlements for claimants. That, in turn, permits them to ‘bargain in the shadow of the
law’ and to implement a consensual collective proceeding outside of the bankruptcy
process.”) (quoting Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow
of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979)).
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As Schwartz acknowledges, “[t]o be sure, any contracting scheme, including a
bankruptcy contracting scheme, requires supporting regulation.”176 Bankruptcy law
provides such a supporting regulatory apparatus—one that facilitates the negotiation of a
Chapter 11 plan (essentially an elaborate contract) to resolve the debtor’s fate and
likewise, by extension, facilitates work-outs prior to bankruptcy. The key here, though, is
that Chapter 11 plans are negotiated ex post in the context of a comprehensive framework
(the bankruptcy process) freighted with rules and procedures designed expressly to deal
with the unique problems insolvent firms face that if left unresolved would preclude their
reorganization or liquidation in the most optimal way (such as their need for dip lending).
In contrast, non-bankruptcy markets do not truly support bankruptcy contracting, nor
should they as there is no real reason to incur the costs of such a regime outside the
insolvency setting. Once again, the perspective embedded in the bankruptcy contracting
concept not only underestimates the complexity of the problems of insolvency but also
runs afoul of the basic prohibition against fixing something that is not broken.
SUPER-FORECLOSURE
As the foregoing illustrates, it would not appear to be either feasible or beneficial
to use enforceable bankruptcy contracts to specify ex ante the details of the disposition of
an insolvent firm. Perhaps, however, some form of special super-foreclosure mechanism
might be useful to accomplish some narrower ambition, such as to specify in advance a
mechanism for identifying the relevant decision maker, rather than the decision itself,
regarding what is to be done when a firm becomes insolvent, and perhaps additionally
deleverage the firm’s balance sheet so that the decision maker can make choices free
176 See Schwartz, Normative Theory, supra note 9 at 1255.
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from the distorting incentives that insolvency generates. This is the apparent strategy
behind many of the super-foreclosure proposals that would essentially divest existing
equity holders and out-of-the-money creditors of their stakes in the firm in favor of more
senior creditors once a firm enters a state of insolvency.177 These devices, however,
encounter unresolved problems of their own.
To illustrate, imagine a solvent firm (Firm) with a fairly simple, fixed capital
structure. At the outset (Time One), Firm is worth $1,000, has one shareholder (Investor)
who runs Firm, and has five creditors: a secured creditor (Bank) holding a claim of $400
for a loan secured by a lien on Firm’s assets; a tort creditor (Victim) holding a claim of
$100 for an environmental tort Firm committed; an employee (Worker) holding a claim
of $100 for unpaid wages and benefits; a supplier (Vendor) holding a claim of $100 for
unpaid goods sold to Firm; and a government agency (Tax Collector) holding a claim of
$100 for unpaid taxes. At Time One, Firm’s capital structure thus consists of the
following divisions: one equity holder consisting of Investor holding an interest worth
$200; one class of unsecured claims totaling $400 held by Victim, Worker, Vendor, and
Tax Collector, each with an individual claim of $100; and one secured claim totaling
$400 held by Bank. Under principles of absolute priority, Bank has the highest payment
priority entitlement by virtue of its lien; the unsecured creditors come next; and Investor
has the lowest priority.178
177 See, e.g., Adler, Financial, supra note 118 at 323-33; Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice,
supra note 9 at 100-07; Bebchuk, New Approach, supra note 118 at 781-83; see also
supra note 119 (discussing the term “out-of-the-money”).
178 See supra note 119 (discussing absolute priority). Under the current law, Tax
Collector and Worker may actually out-rank Victim and Vendor because of the
Bankruptcy Code’s provisions prioritizing some unsecured claims over others. For the
sake of simplicity, these effects are not considered in the example.
86
Six months later (Time Two), Firm has declined in value to $500, is now
insolvent, and needs to reorganize. Suppose Firm had negotiated in advance a binding
agreement that provides as follows: upon Firm’s insolvency, Investor’s interest is
cancelled, and the creditors holding the next highest priority will own Firm if their claims
are still in-the-money, meaning there is some value to Firm after more senior claims are
accounted for.179 Because Firm’s value is $500, and Bank’s senior claim is $400, the
unsecured creditors are still in-the-money to the tune of $100, even though there is not
enough to pay all of their unsecured claims in full. Under this arrangement, the
unsecured creditors would become the new owners either automatically or on condition
they buy out Bank’s claim (we will see momentarily why Bank would want the buy-out
requirement as a condition to its agreement to the contract).
Notice right away what this kind of arrangement does not do. It does not tell us
anything about whether Firm is worth saving or how it might be salvaged. It does not
provide Firm with any new working capital in the form of new loans or the like. It does
not supply any particular mechanism to permit Firm to renegotiate its labor relationship
with Worker, clean up the pollution it has caused, or remedy its failure to pay its taxes. It
simply reduces Firm’s debt and tells us who gets to run Firm at Time Two—namely,
Victim, Worker, Vendor, and Tax Collector. Presumably the new owners could then
decide what to do with Firm or sell their interests to someone else who would then
decide.
It is worth asking: why should the law sanction such an arrangement? On its
face, it is merely a debt-collection wealth-transfer mechanism. It is not designed to
179 See supra note 119 (discussing the concepts of “in-the-money” and “out-of-the-
money”).
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salvage Firm per se. In fact, it is likely to have the opposite effect and, along the way,
reduce the creditors’ chances of recovery.
One issue that looms large in the insolvency context is the “bankruptcy initiation
problem.”180 As discussed in Chapter 2, individual debtors have incentives to gamble
away their assets as they approach and enter a state of insolvency. They do this because
they have little to lose, and something to gain, by taking increased risks.181 This is
wasteful. Insolvent individuals likewise have incentives to obscure the true nature of
their financial condition to avoid default and foreclosure.182 This is also wasteful. In the
180 See JACKSON, LOGIC, supra note 8 at 193-208 (observing that “[e]nsuring that
bankruptcy cases are initiated only when they are needed, and then neither too early nor
too late, is a difficult task” and discussing some aspects of the initiation problem from the
perspective of the collective-action dilemma).
181 See infra at 146-47; JACKSON, LOGIC, supra note 8 at 205 (making this point); Charles
W. Adams, An Economic Justification for Corporate Reorganizations, 20 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 117, 125-27 (1991) [hereinafter Adams, Economic Justification] (explaining that a
debtor will tend to take greater risks in an attempt to increase returns as it sinks deeper
into insolvency); Devra L. Golbe, The Effects of Imminent Bankruptcy on Stockholder
Risk Preferences and Behavior, 12 BELL J. ECON. 321, 326 (1981) [hereinafter Golbe,
Effects] (same); Lynn M. LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State
Remedies/Bankruptcy System, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 311, 21-22 [hereinafter LoPucki,
General Theory] (observing that, when a debtor’s assets exceed his or her liabilities, “the
debtor is motivated in the direction high risk investment” because “high risk investment,
regardless of its intrinsic merits, may offer the only possibility that the debts will be
repaid and that there will be something remaining for the debtor”); Merton H. Miller, The
Wealth Transfers of Bankruptcy: Some Illustrative Examples, 41 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 39, 40 (1977) [hereinafter Miller, Wealth Transfers] (same); see also Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 404
(1983) (observing that “[w]hen the firm is in distress, the shareholders’ residual claim
goes under water, and they lose the appropriate incentives”).
182 See infra at 186; Miniscribe Corp. v. Keymarc, Inc. (In re Miniscribe Corp.), 123 B.R.
86, 89 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991) (discussing how press accounts of false reporting preceded
bankruptcy proceeding); Andy Zipser, Cooking the Books, How Pressure to Raise Sales
Led Miniscribe to Falsify Numbers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 1989, at A1; see also Lee
Berton, Convenient Fiction: Inventory Chicanery Tempts More Firms, Fools More
Auditors: A Quick Way To Pad Profits, It Is Often Revealed Only When Concern
Collapses, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 1992, at A1 (discussing false financial reporting);
88
case of firms, equity holders and managers have these same incentives,183 which would
only be exacerbated if the first thing that happens once insolvency is discovered is that
equity holders forfeit their stakes or the managers lose their jobs. Significantly, it is
Richard Korman & David Rosenbaum, After Bankruptcy, More Trouble, ENGINEERING
NEWS RECORD, June 28, 1999, at 12 (discussing the bankruptcy proceedings of Guy F.
Atkinson Co., a large international construction firm, and allegations that certain of
Atkinson’s former officers misled certain creditors regarding the firm’s financial
condition in order to induce the creditors to continue to do business with the firm);
Mercury Finance Co.: Reorganization Plan Filed Under Bankruptcy Code, WALL ST. J.,
July 16, 1998, at A6 (observing that, before it filed for bankruptcy protection, “Mercury’s
stock price collapsed in January 1997 after it disclosed that its profits had been vastly
overstated”); Richard Zoglin, The Impressario in Exile, TIME, Aug. 2, 1999, at 70
(discussing the bankruptcy proceedings of Livent, a well-known entertainment
production company, preceded by allegations of fraud and “fiddl[ing] with the books to
disguise Livent’s precarious financial condition”). Of course, Enron may well stand out
as the most infamous distributor of financial misinformation. See, e.g., ENRON:
CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS (N.B. Rapoport & B.G. Dharan eds.
2004) [hereinafter ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS]; MIMI SWARTZ & SHERRON WATKINS,
POWER FAILURE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON (2003) [hereinafter
SWARTZ & WATKINS, POWER FAILURE].
183 See Schwartz, Normative Theory, supra note 9 at 1220, 1238-40 (“the firm has an
incentive to delay entry into the [bankruptcy] system in the hope that its fortunes will
improve, thereby probably wasting assets”); Adler, Bankruptcy, supra note 56 at 448-49
(“[f]aced with the prospect of no payout, equity favors delay”). As one commentator has
noted:
If the firm’s prospects are volatile, shareholders will want the managers to
delay, in the hope of selling when the price is high. On average, however,
delay will be costly. Equity claimants have reason to wait too long and to
set unrealistic reservation prices, for their claims are worthless unless
something unexpectedly good happens. Immediate sale at a realistic price
wipes them out; debt claimants bear any erosion of value during a delay,
yet have fixed claims and so do not realize the full gain if things turn out
well. This is the standard conflict between debt and equity claims, and as
usual is substantially aggravated during times of financial distress, when
the equity claim is worth little.
Easterbrook, Corporate Bankruptcy, supra note 146 at 415; see Michelle J. White, Public
Policy Toward Bankruptcy: Me-First and Other Priority Rules, 11 BELL J. ECON. 550,
553 (1980) [hereinafter White, Public Policy] (observing that “equity holders always
favor continuance, since their interest disappears under liquidation”).
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precisely the law’s failure to deal with these problems that doomed the Chapter X
corporate reorganization procedure under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.184 To avoid these
184 Corporate reorganizations under the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898 could be effected
through confirmation of a plan of reorganization under the provisions of Chapter X, or
through confirmation of an arrangement under Chapter XI—both added to the Act of
1898 through the Chandler Amendments in 1938. Chapter X was available only to
corporations. Bankruptcy Act § 106(5), 11 U.S.C. § 506 (repealed 1979); Chapter XI
was available to corporations, and also to individuals and partnerships engaged in
business. See Bankruptcy Act § 306(3), 11 U.S.C. § 706 (repealed 1979). Under the
provisions of Chapter X, a trustee automatically replaced the debtor’s managers upon the
commencement of the case. See SEC v. United States Realty & Improv. Co., 310 U.S.
434, 446-53 (1940) (discussing differences between Chapter X and Chapter XI). As a
result, managers avoided Chapter X to avoid losing their jobs and losing control over
their firms. Although managers typically remained in possession after filing for relief
under the provisions of Chapter XI, Chapter XI was a much more limited procedure.
Among other things, Chapter XI did not permit the adjustment of secured debt or the
adjustment of the interests of equity holders—it permitted only the adjustment of
unsecured claims. Moreover, the issue whether a corporation properly belonged in
Chapter X or Chapter XI turned ambiguously on “the needs to be served,” General Stores
Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462, 466 (1956), and a proceeding could not be maintained
in Chapter X if “adequate relief would be obtainable by a debtor’s petition under the
provisions of Chapter XI.” 11 U.S.C. § 546 (repealed 1979). In enacting Chapter 11 to
replace the former Chapters X and XI, Congress recognized these shortcomings, see H.R.
REP. NO. 95-595, at 223 (1977), reprinted in 1978 USCCAN 5963, 6183 (observing that
“Chapter X has become an unworkable procedure, and Chapter XI is inadequate to fill
the void,” and concluding that “Chapter XI needs to be expanded to permit adjustment of
secured debt and equity”), and particularly the initiation problem occasioned by the
automatic appointment of a trustee, observing that, because Chapter X automatically
ousted existing management, “debtors too often wait[ed] too long to seek bankruptcy
relief,” H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 223-24 (1977), reprinted in 1978 USCCAN at 6193, and
that a law that too often led to the appointment of a trustee “would exacerbate the
problem,” id.; see also In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727, 736 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1984) (explaining that one of the goals of the Bankruptcy Code was to ensure that debtors
did not wait until the last minute to file for bankruptcy); Douglas E. Deutsch, Ensuring
Proper Bankruptcy Solicitation: Evaluating Bankruptcy Law, the First Amendment, the
Code of Ethics, and Securities Law in Bankruptcy Solicitation Cases, 11 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 213, 217-18 (2003) (observing that one of the reasons debtors chose to use
Chapter XI over Chapter X was to maintain possession and operation of the business). In
response, the current corporate reorganization procedure—Chapter 11—does not
automatically oust the debtor’s managers upon the bankruptcy filing in favor of a trustee.
See infra note 241. Instead they typically remain at the helm, at least initially. In
addition, they are given an exclusive period to propose a Chapter 11 plan. See Karen
Gross & Patricia Redmond, In Defense of Debtor Exclusivity: Assessing Four of the 1994
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problems, it is helpful to reorganize troubled firms sooner rather than later, and to provide
equity holders and managers with an incentive to do so—namely, to initiate some kind of
beneficial restructuring or liquidation before there is nothing to salvage. Chapter 11
provides this incentive by allowing managers to continue to run their firms following a
bankruptcy filing and by not automatically canceling the equity holders’ interests.185 By
their nature, foreclosure mechanisms (including the super-foreclosure variety) do
precisely the opposite and thus follow in the footsteps of the failed Chapter X
reorganization procedure.
Continuing the hypothetical outlined above, under the super-foreclosure
arrangement Investor would have every incentive to hide Firm’s true financial condition,
delay creditors, and gamble with Firm’s assets in order to avoid the automatic
Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 287, 291 (1995) (arguing that
exclusivity is an important incentive to encourage reorganization by permitting debtors to
retain control). For a discussion of the differences between former Chapter X and the
current Chapter 11, see SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION, supra note 157 at 160-83, 212-37.
185 This does not mean that existing managers remain in control indefinitely once their
companies have filed for bankruptcy. Although the typical annual turnover for chief
executive officers of public corporations is somewhere between three and five percent, a
much larger percentage resign within two years of their companies’ bankruptcy filing.
See Brian L. Betker, Management Changes, Equity’s Bargaining Power and Deviations
from Absolute Priority in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies, 68 J. BUS. 161, 174 (1995); Lynn M.
LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 723-37
(1993) [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate Governance]; see also Stuart C.
Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders: Evidence on Changes in
Corporate Ownership and Control When Firms Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 355, 386 (1990)
[hereinafter Gilson, Bankruptcy] (finding that “[o]n average, only 46% of incumbent
directors and 43% of CEO’s remain with their firms at the conclusion of the bankruptcy
or debt restructuring”); Stuart C. Gilson, Management Turnover and Financial Distress,
25 J. FIN. ECON. 241, 261 (1989) [hereinafter Gilson, Management] (finding that, “[i]n
any given year, 52% of sampled firms experience a senior management change if they are
either in default on their debt, bankrupt, or privately restructuring their debt to avoid
bankruptcy”).
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cancellation of his interest. Indeed, because this cancellation is automatic, his incentive
would be acute. This is not likely to encourage optimal dispositions.
One way to avoid this problem might be for the parties to employ strict micro-
managerial monitoring devices to reveal periodically Firm’s true financial condition. But
that would be costly, and would only serve as a partial solution in any event. As Firm’s
condition deteriorates, it is easy to see how Bank would have an incentive to claim that
Firm’s value had declined more than it actually had, while collectively Victim, Worker,
Vendor, and Tax Collector would have an incentive to claim exactly the opposite. If
Firm is worth only $400, Bank becomes the sole owner. If Firm is worth $500, Victim,
Worker, Vendor, and Tax Collector become the owners (subject to Bank’s claim), but
without any particular expertise in managing Firm—hence Bank’s incentive to require
that its claim be bought out before Victim, Worker, Vendor, and Tax Collector could
actually become the new owners (Bank probably would not want to retain its stake with
this crew at the helm). Of course, to the extent they cannot pony up $400 to buy out
Bank’s claim (which is likely), they would simply forfeit their interests—a $100 windfall
to Bank.186 Bank will have cause to fear that Firm will continue to deteriorate, eventually
leaving Bank with nothing. This is likely to set the stage for not one but multiple battles
over valuation: the first one that sets up Victim, Worker, Vendor, and Tax Collector as
the new owners, and then potentially others as perceptions of Firm’s shifting value
186 Victim, Worker, Vendor, and Tax Collector are unlikely to come up with $400 for any
number of reasons. First, one or more of them may lack the necessary funds. Second,
one or more of them may disagree about Firm’s value, and thus whether it is worth it to
come up with the funds. This disagreement may turn on their different appetites for risk.
Third, one or more of them may have no expertise or competence in evaluating Firm’s
circumstances and prospects, managing Firm’s business, or assessing Firm’s value.
Fourth, one or more of them may have aligned with Bank to scuttle the purchase.
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likewise shift. Perhaps this difficulty might be overcome by designating in advance a
single, fixed valuation procedure in the event of Firm’s default,187 but that does not solve
the problem of the parties’ incentives to avoid triggering the mechanism, whatever it may
be. Likewise it does not solve the problem of shifting values—if Firm’s condition is not
stabilized once Victim, Worker, Vendor, and Tax Collector become the new owners, but
continues to deteriorate (which is plausible given that all the super-foreclosure procedure
does is cancel Investor’s interest and convert the unsecured creditors into the new
owners), it seems likely that Firm will soon once again become insolvent and in need of
another round of super-foreclosure. In addition, the procedure would be difficult to
implement if one or more of the unsecured claims remained unliquidated at the time of
Firm’s insolvency—a fairly common occurrence.188 This kind of procedure is unlikely to
be desirable.
If all that mattered in bankruptcy were dividing up the value of an insolvent firm’s
assets for distribution to creditors (as Jackson’s account suggests and many
commentators accept uncritically), super-foreclosure might have some appeal in some
settings. But that is not all that matters. As noted at the outset, bankruptcy law’s true
ambition is to be ameliorative in a broader sense, which in the case of insolvent firms
means, among other things, salvaging viable business enterprises because such entities
are themselves both beneficial and scarce. As purely a secondary matter, preserving a
187 See, e.g., Barry E. Adler & Ian Ayres, A Dilution Mechanism for Valuing
Corporations in Bankruptcy, 111 YALE L.J. 83 (2001).
188 For example, suppose Victim’s claim has not yet been determined. If Victim’s claim
were actually $1,000 rather than $100, it would be entitled to a larger ownership share
and would control Firm. Until Victim’s claim was determined, ownership of Firm would
remain in flux. Of course, determining the precise amount of Victim’s claim could take a
considerable amount of time.
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firm’s going-concern value also permits larger payouts to creditors. But once again it is
important to avoid confusing purpose with effect.
At this point it should be fairly clear how Jackson’s idea that bankruptcy law is
fundamentally a debt-collection regime has influenced the direction of the academic
discourse, leading to proposals that focus on clever ways to distribute value to creditors
rather than addressing more directly the challenging problems of deciding what to do
with an insolvent debtor, its assets, and its liabilities in optimal ways. Like Jackson’s
creditors’-bargain approach, a key assumption behind super-foreclosure is that, once the
condition of insolvency is eliminated through the transfer of ownership through some
kind of mechanism that cancels out-of-the-money interests, ordinary non-bankruptcy
markets will take care of the question of disposition (essentially, the new owners will
“decide” what to do with the debtor’s assets).189 In theory, this might work well enough
in cases in which the debtor is basically a durable, non-deteriorating commodity, such as
a single-asset real estate venture that owns an office building. But what about more
fragile enterprises that consist of complicated combinations of physical assets and
dedicated human capital, the kind bankruptcy law really cares about? Here the
bankruptcy initiation problem looms large because by the time super-foreclosure occurs
there may be little left to the enterprise. Moreover, there is more than an air of unreality
to the notion that simply transferring a firm’s ownership to in-the-money creditors will
necessarily generate optimal decisions over how best to dispose of the firm’s assets.
189 See Bebchuk, New Approach, supra note 118 at 781-83 (describing process of
dividing ownership interests in firm through super-foreclosure mechanism); see also
WARREN & WESTBROOK, LAW, supra note 66 at 878 (following the foreclosure of junior
interests, “[t]he new owner would then decide how to deploy the assets, whether through
sale of assets or continuing operation of the business.”).
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The current law takes a different road. It first focuses on stabilizing the firm with
existing management and equity holders in place to avoid the initiation problem and then,
later on and only as a secondary matter, addresses distributing the firm’s value. It
attempts to stabilize the debtor not by initially installing in-the-money creditors in the
driver’s seat (who, in all likelihood, are busy operating their own businesses) or the
purchasers of their interests, but rather by a process that enlists the aid of turnaround
experts and other professionals skilled in assessing and addressing the problems of
troubled firms.190 As noted, it also attempts to neutralize the negative incentives the
parties have—both debtor and creditors alike—to make suboptimal decisions regarding
the exercise of their rights and the disposition of the debtor’s property. As explained in
Chapter 2, these negative insolvency-related incentives are numerous. The current
bankruptcy process has various checks and balances to ensure that it is as fair as possible,
and because the salvage of an insolvent but viable business takes flexibility, decision-
making skill, and judgment, the current law attempts to foster an environment—the
corrective bankruptcy market—where these are nurtured and put to good use.191
The allure of super-foreclosure is that it promises to routinize the process of
transferring ownership of an insolvent enterprise. Transferring ownership, however, is a
sideshow, diverting attention from the main event, and leading the discourse into the
190 See Douglas G. Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation
Uncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargain, 115 YALE L.J. 1930, 1932-33 (2006)
[hereinafter Baird & Bernstein, Absolute Priority] (discussing the use of turnaround
specialists).
191 If anything, increasing complexity in the patterns of corporate indebtedness and other
factors underscore the need for such a dynamic environment, and the disutility of ex ante
contracts to address them. See Baird & Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, supra note 42
(discussing structural changes in debt holding patterns and other factors, and the
corresponding difficulties this poses for business reorganization law and practice).
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underbrush. What really matters is how bankruptcy law responds comprehensively to the
problems that explain its existence through its mechanisms of debt enforcement, debt
forgiveness, and debt adjustment, and how these seek to achieve improved dispositions of
the debtor, the debtor’s assets, and the debtor’s liabilities. In addition, corporate
bankruptcy law is complex because the reality of business reorganization is complex.
This is not surprising. If optimal outcomes in this context were so simple, any old law
(or contract) could do it.
THE COST-OF-CAPITAL METRIC
A few words also should be said about the idea that the normative aim of business
bankruptcy should be singularly to reduce the cost of capital for firms, and
correspondingly that any bankruptcy procedure should be measured in terms of how it
accomplishes this goal—the “cost-of-capital” metric.192 Once again, the idea here is that
(1) increasing payouts to financial creditors will reduce borrowing costs by curtailing
their losses; (2) reducing borrowing costs will increase the likelihood that firms will
pursue a greater number of worthwhile projects because firms will have to share less of
the returns with their lenders; and (3) all other things being equal, the increased pursuit of
worthwhile projects is likely to be wealth maximizing. In other words, the cost-of-capital
metric aims to measure a potentially wealth-maximizing dimension of the debt-collection
aspects of bankruptcy law. The chief problem with this metric, however, is that it
attempts to import improvidently into the insolvency context one narrow justification for
non-bankruptcy debt-collection procedures and, in the process, ignores the other
192 See Schwartz, Normative Theory, supra note 9 at 1203.
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beneficial functions of the bankruptcy system. In this regard, it is aligned with Jackson’s
forum-shopping argument and suffers from similar weaknesses.
A second problem is also one noted previously—regardless of how it is
structured, a bankruptcy procedure devoted to increasing payouts to creditors is unlikely
to reduce borrowing costs significantly because any increase is likely to be trivial within
the larger context of the overall lending market.193 A third problem is that, even if
increasing payouts to creditors in bankruptcy could reduce borrowing costs significantly,
doing so will not necessarily result in the pursuit of more worthwhile projects. In fact, it
may have the opposite effect—and in the process simply generate externalities born by
other constituents. Recognizing this implicitly, bankruptcy law aims to be ameliorative
in ways the cost-of-capital metric simply does not capture.
As applied to firms, bankruptcy law has traditionally sought to advance several
recognized goals through its various features of debt collection, debt forgiveness, and
debt adjustment: (1) orchestrating the claims of creditors and enhancing their return by
reducing costs;194 (2) deleveraging the firm’s balance sheet so that it may reorganize and
193 See supra at 73. As noted, the overall lending market is enormous, involving many
trillions of dollars. In contrast, the number of firms that file for bankruptcy is miniscule.
See supra note 95. Although as a positive matter bankruptcy law aims to improve the
payouts creditors receive, the difference between what they receive through the
bankruptcy process and what they would have received in the absence of bankruptcy is
not likely to be significant in the overall scheme of things.
194 See, e.g., Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code: An Empirical
Study of the Supreme Court’s Bankruptcy Decisions, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 173, 187 (2000)
(observing that one of the recognized policies of the Bankruptcy Code is “the
maximization of value”); Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking, supra note 10 at 346 (“A
number of provisions [of the Bankruptcy Code] are designed to increase collection
efficiency in a bankruptcy action; quick decisions, abbreviated trials, estimation of
claims, elimination of duplicate efforts, restricted notification requirements, reduced
waiting periods, minimal paperwork, automatic stays from collection, stipulated
valuations, and emergency orders are all bankruptcy devices intended to capture value for
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unencumbering assets to avoid misuse of economic resources;195 and (3) adjusting the
creditors’ priorities and entitlements to facilitate ratable distribution and loss
spreading.196 The prominent feature of the cost-of-capital metric is that it selectively
culls these policies, narrowly reducing them to one (the debt-collection goal of
maximizing the return of financial creditors), but does not evaluate whether doing so is
inappropriately reductionist or would have the effect of ignoring (or generating)
offsetting costs.
By analogy, in considering legal rules that address the problem of products
involved in accidents that inflict costs on multiple parties, one would not measure the
utility of any particular regulation (for example, a particular liability rule) solely by its
ability to lower the product owner’s cost of acquiring the very product involved in the
accident. For example, one would not evaluate a liability rule that precludes individual
aircraft accident victims from recovering damages simply by whether it lowers the
carrier’s cost of acquiring aircraft precisely because doing so would ignore the costs of
the estate under the adverse conditions that multiparty litigation and a failing business
present.”).
195 See supra notes 72, 74, 76, infra note 334; see also NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465
U.S. 513, 527 (1984) (observing that “the policy of Chapter 11 is to permit successful
rehabilitation of debtors”); United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983)
(stating that “Congress presumed that the assets of the debtor would be more valuable if
used in a rehabilitated business than if ‘sold for scrap’”).
196 See Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651, 654 (2006)
(“the Bankruptcy Code aims, in the main, to secure equal distribution among creditors”);
Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 210 (1945) (“one of the prime purposes of
bankruptcy law has been to bring about a ratable distribution among creditors of a
bankrupt’s assets”); Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224, 227 (1930) (“The broad
purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is to bring about an equitable distribution of the
bankrupt’s estate”); 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (prescribing priorities for
certain types of claims, including those of a debtor’s employees).
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the rule borne by individual crash victims.197 Likewise, in cases in which a debtor’s
insolvency impacts multiple parties (which is almost always the case),198 one cannot
evaluate the efficiency of any bankruptcy law simply by looking at whether it reduces the
transaction costs between the borrower and one type of creditor.199
To illustrate, imagine once again the hypothetical Firm discussed above. At the
outset (Time One), Firm is worth $1,000, has one shareholder (Investor) who runs Firm,
and has five creditors: a secured creditor (Bank) holding a claim of $400 for a loan
secured by a lien on Firm’s assets; a tort creditor (Victim) holding a claim of $100 for an
environmental tort Firm committed; an employee (Worker) holding a claim of $100 for
unpaid wages and benefits; a supplier (Vendor) holding a claim of $100 for unpaid goods
sold to Firm; and a government agency (Tax Collector) holding a claim of $100 for
unpaid taxes. Six months later (Time Two), Firm has declined in value to $500, is now
insolvent, and needs to reorganize. Assume that Firm is worth more if it reorganizes than
if it liquidates, and that Firm currently employs Worker under a long-term contract.
Under the cost-of-capital metric, the ideal disposition of Firm is the one that results in the
197 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability
for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1907-1909 (1991) (discussing incentives and
risks to unlimited liability and the impact on cost shifting); see generally David W.
Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565 (1991)
(discussing the financial effects of limited liability).
198 See Warren & Westbrook, Contracting Out, supra note 10 at 1203 (arguing on the
basis of an empirical analysis that most bankruptcies involve many different kinds of
constituencies).
199 See id. at 1214 (arguing that “if there are creditors who were absent from the
bargaining table and cannot adjust behavior or prices to reflect each distinct risk profile
[generated by each distinct bankruptcy bargain that binds them], then the efficiencies
gained from permitting multiple bankruptcy systems are quickly overwhelmed by the
inefficiencies that arise from forcing risks onto parties who cannot adjust their prices to
reflect those risks”).
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greatest payout to creditors who in the future will correspondingly charge less for their
extensions of credit. Taking into account the relative investment commitments of the
various creditors (namely, that Worker may continue to work for Firm at a reduced
amount even if Worker’s claim is not paid because of Worker’s age, firm-specific skills,
a thin labor market, or other factors), and the ongoing ability of Firm to borrow from
some creditors involuntarily (namely, it can incur future tort and tax liabilities without
paying the claims of Victim and Tax Collector), Firm’s ideal disposition under the cost-
of-capital metric would be for it to (1) reject its employment agreement with Worker and
continue to employ him at a reduced wage without paying his claim, and (2) reorganize
its financial affairs by cancelling Investor’s interest and transferring all of its value to
Bank and Vendor. Most obviously, this outcome ignores the costs placed on Worker,
Victim, and Tax Collector.
Finally, as noted, it does not necessarily follow that altering bankruptcy rules to
improve the returns of financial creditors will necessarily result in the increased pursuit
of worthwhile projects by firms. Assuming realistically a finite (rather than infinite)
supply of worthwhile investments (or at least a spectrum of investments, not all of which
are equally worthwhile), creditors who assume less risk because they share less of the
burden of insolvency may respond by simply maintaining their overall risk exposure
across their loan portfolios by lending any surplus to riskier businesses. The net result
may be that lenders end up funding riskier projects with the costs borne by other
constituents of insolvent firms.200 To a point, forcing financial creditors to bear
200 See supra note 149. An example is lending in the credit card industry. Historically,
credit card issuers would engage in significant underwriting before extending credit.
Currently, many issuers perform little (or no) underwriting and extend credit broadly,
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(“internalize”) more of the costs of insolvencies than they would if they were permitted to
garner more of the advantages of reorganization for themselves may actually maximize
social welfare by constricting improvident lending (and thereby avoid at least some
insolvencies).201
In any event, rather than pursue the singularly narrow goal embedded in the cost-
of-capital metric, the current law of business reorganization aims to be beneficial in a
broader sense. Every business fails eventually and most fail within a few years of their
inception.202 The reason bankruptcy law attempts to salvage viable firms is because
with the costs borne generally by consumer constituents through the imposition of high
interest rates and other charges. See TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L.
WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS 108-111, 128-132, 134-38, 246-49, 254-55
(2000) [hereinafter SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE] (discussing lending in
the credit card industry, its historical evolution, the current lack of underwriting, and
interest rate insensitivity).
201 Improvident lending includes indiscriminate lending with little or no regard to the
riskiness of the loan and lending otherwise unaccompanied by the exercise of credit
judgment. An example of lending without the exercise of significant credit judgment in
the form of underwriting is most lending in the credit card industry. See id. at 246-47
(describing extensions of credit in the credit card industry, and explaining “[m]ost
issuers, it appears, make little or no attempt to review the borrower’s financial status after
the initial issuance of the credit card except to raise the limit. The result is an absence of
the credit judgment we have traditionally associated with lending, an almost complete
disconnection between the circumstances of the borrower and the granting of the credit at
the time it is granted.”). While highly profitable for creditors, this type of lending, with
its high interest rates and charges, can easily spiral out of control and spell financial
disaster for debtors. See id. at 111-40 (chronicling how to go bankrupt with credit cards).
Improvident lending is not limited to the consumer finance arena. See id. at 211
(describing bank failures during the twelve-year period between 1980 and 1992 from bad
commercial and consumer loans).
202 See TALEB, SWAN, supra note 168 at 221 (“Of the five hundred largest U.S.
companies in 1957, only seventy-four were still part of that select group, the Standard
and Poor’s 500, forty years later. Only a few had disappeared in mergers; the rest either
shrank or went bust.”); Amy E. Knaup, Survival and Longevity in the Business
Employment Dynamics Data, 128 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 50, 51-52 (2005) (reciting that
although two-thirds of new employer establishments survive at least two years, only
forty-four per cent survive four years or more); United States Small Business
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viable firms are scarce commodities and are themselves vehicles for value creation,
which is the primary justification for having firms in the first place. The reason
bankruptcy law relieves an insolvent but viable firm from the burdens of excessive
indebtedness is not to enhance the creditors’ return, but to salvage the enterprise. And
the reason bankruptcy law permits the adjustment of the priorities of the various creditors
is to pursue the beneficial goal of loss spreading. Again, this is not to say that the
payment of claims in bankruptcy is unimportant. It is to say that it is important for
reasons that are of secondary significance—largely to avoid the moral hazard of having a
bankruptcy law that excused obligations too loosely.203 Because the cost-of-capital
metric cannot appropriately capture the law’s true value, it is deficient.
BANKRUPTCY LAW AS AN ASSORTMENT OF LOSS-SPREADING NORMS
In contrast with both Jackson’s collective-action approach and the views of those
who advocate bankruptcy contracting and the like, other scholars, including Elizabeth
Warren, Jay Westbrook, and Lynn LoPucki, reject the idea of bankruptcy law as
exclusively, or even predominantly, a debt-collection device as Jackson conceptualizes it.
Although these scholars generally acknowledge some version of the collective-action
dilemma as one aspect of the phenomenon of insolvency,204 and have at times identified
Administration, Advocacy Small Business Statistics and Research: Frequently Asked
Questions, #5, available at http://app1.sba.gov/faqs/faqindex.cfm?areaID=24 (detailing
that from 2001 to 2005 inclusive, roughly 570,000 to 670,000 small businesses started
each year, and roughly 540,000 to 587,000 closed each year).
203 The relevant concepts of “loss spreading” and “moral hazard” are discussed in
Chapter 3.
204 See Warren & Westbrook, Contracting Out, supra note 10 at 1200 (stating that “[t]he
details of the current bankruptcy system are labyrinthine, but they can be described
generally as constraining the collection rights of each creditor individually in order to
promote a somewhat more efficient liquidation or reorganization for the benefit of all
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debt-collection rationales as integral to the bankruptcy process,205 they also contend that
there are other competing reasons for having a bankruptcy law, and have likewise offered
their own analytical rubric to compete with Jackson’s debt-collection frame. In
particular, Warren contends that bankruptcy law is fundamentally a loss-spreading
regime animated by an assortment of competing and sometimes conflicting policy goals,
including (1) enhancing the value of the debtor’s assets, (2) distributing that value
equitably among a broad number of constituents, (3) forcing creditors to internalize the
cost of credit to avoid losses, and (4) avoiding the need for public bailouts.206
concerned.”); see also Susan Block-Lieb, Fishing in Muddy Waters: Clarifying the
Common Pool Analogy as Applied to the Standard for Commencement of a Bankruptcy
Case, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 337, 391 (1993) (discussing the superiority of a collective
federal bankruptcy procedure for the disposition of the debtor’s assets).
205 See LoPucki, General Theory, supra note 181 at 315-16 (arguing that “[t]he state
remedies/bankruptcy system exists to facilitate the lending of money” and explaining that
“[t]he underlying assumption is that if creditors have no means of coercing the repayment
of loans, they will be unwilling to make them in the first place and the economy will
suffer” and, thus, “coercion of repayment remains a function that is central to the
system”).
206 See Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking, supra note 10 at 343-44 (arguing that
bankruptcy law “aims, with greater or lesser efficacy, toward four principal goals: (1) to
enhance the value of the failing debtor; (2) to distribute value according to multiple
normative principles; (3) to internalize the costs of the business failures to the parties
dealing with the debtor; and (4) to create reliance on private monitoring”); Warren,
Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 10 at 777 (“I see bankruptcy as an attempt to reckon with
a debtor’s multiple defaults and to distribute the consequences among a number of
different actors. . . . As I see it, no one value predominates, so that bankruptcy policy
becomes a composite of factors that bear on a better answer to the question, ‘How shall
the losses be distributed?”); see also Karen Gross, On the Merits: A Response to
Professors White and Girth, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 486-493 (1999) (arguing that
bankruptcy law does and ought to take account not only of debtors and creditors, but also
of affected communities); Baird, Uncontested Axioms, supra note 27 at 577-80
(discussing the main schools of thought on the aims of bankruptcy law); Nathalie D.
Martin, Noneconomic Interests in Bankruptcy: Standing on the Outside Looking In, 59
OHIO ST. L. J. 429, 461-503 (1998) (arguing that noneconomic interests can be adversely
affected by bankruptcy and that they should be taken into account by the bankruptcy
system). Warren characteristically avoids models that ignore the details of the
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Describing how bankruptcy law spreads losses in fulfillment of its embedded
policy norms, Warren and LoPucki characterize the bankruptcy process as a federal
overlay imposed on existing state-law debt-collection structures, establishing in
combination a single comprehensive “system” of rights and remedies, with the federal
component essentially balancing deficiencies in the debt-collection aspects of its state
law counterpart, including its scheme of distributional entitlements.207 In contrast with
Jackson’s forum-shopping concerns, Warren and Westbrook view the adjustment of non-
bankruptcy distributional entitlements as a vibrant feature of bankruptcy regulation,208
and as one intertwined with the issue of how best to preserve a debtor’s value and spread
the losses occasioned by the debtor’s financial demise. Warren contends that it is only
because bankruptcy law engages in adjusting the distributional rights of creditors that
non-bankruptcy law remains free to function the way it does unburdened with the
bankruptcy system, and relies more on positive analysis of the law and its underlying
policies than abstract theory. See Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 10 at 777-78 (“I
begin with a historical observation about legal structures, I surmise the concerns of the
drafters, and I end with only tentative conclusions and more complex answers.”).
207 See LOPUCKI & WARREN, SECURED CREDIT, supra note 32 at 239 (arguing that
“[m]ost of the creditor’s rights are found in state law; most of the debtor’s rights are
found in bankruptcy law. The two sets of laws combine to create a system in which the
debtor who has the ability to cure a default and make the installment payments generally
will have the opportunity to do so.”); LoPucki, General Theory, supra note 181 at 351
(arguing that federal bankruptcy law and the state law system of remedies perform the
same functions and concluding that “in dealing with the debtor in financial difficulty the
bankruptcy subsystem performs the functions of the state remedies/bankruptcy system
better than the state remedies subsystem in nearly every respect”).
208 See Warren & Westbrook, Contracting Out, supra note 10 at 1200-01 (stating that
bankruptcy law accomplishes more efficient liquidations and reorganizations than non-
bankruptcy law “by shrinking the collection rights of the most powerful creditors in order
to achieve somewhat greater distribution among all those who have a stake in the
debtor”).
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protections bankruptcy supplies.209 Consistent with these views, these scholars are
characteristically antagonistic to the priority of secured claims in bankruptcy at the
expense of other stakeholders,210 and they tend to favor reorganizations over
liquidations211 with the value of any reorganization surplus distributed broadly across a
number of constituencies affected by the debtor’s financial failure.212
209 See Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 10 at 779 (arguing that, “[w]ithout the
refined and balanced system of debtor-creditor law—which includes a well-developed
concept of bankruptcy—contract law itself would look very different, and its enforcement
would be considerably more constrained”).
210 See Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect Information: The Article 9 Full
Priority Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1373, 1379-83 (1997) [hereinafter Warren,
Making Policy] (arguing for the reformation of Article 9 and a reduced priority for
secured claims); Kenneth N. Klee, Barbarians at the Trough: Riposte in Defense of the
Warren Carve-Out Proposal, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1466, 1467 (1997) [hereinafter Klee,
Barbarians] (arguing that the case for full priority for secured creditors in bankruptcy
remains unproven and that unrepresented parties may deserve higher priority); Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditors’ Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1920-24 (1994)
[hereinafter LoPucki, Unsecured] (challenging the efficiency of the secured creditor’s
priority); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority
of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 921-26 (1996) [hereinafter
Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case] (critiquing the secured creditor’s priority in bankruptcy).
211 See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm, 56 STAN. L. REV. 645,
666-70 (2003) (arguing that reorganization is preferable because liquidation sales
sometimes destroy value rather than capture it); but see Douglas G. Baird & Robert K.
Rasmussen, Reply: Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV. 673, 699 (2003) (arguing
that “[a]ny going-concern surplus can be captured for creditors via a sale”).
212 See Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, supra note 10 at 777 (describing the loss-spreading
function of bankruptcy law); see also KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS:
REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 3, 8 (1997) (arguing that bankruptcy law
should provide protection to disadvantaged constituencies); Karen Gross, Taking
Community Interests into Account in Bankruptcy: An Essay, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1031,
1035 (1994) (discussing a framework of bankruptcy that takes into account the interests
of communities affected by a debtor’s failure); Butler & Gilpatric, Re-Examination,
supra note 53 at 289 (arguing that “the goal of the bankruptcy system should be
economic efficiency in a broad sense: to maximize the value to society of the debtor firm
by preserving the private and social components of its going concern surplus when such a
surplus exists, or by achieving the highest possible liquidation value when it does not”);
David G. Carlsen, Contemporary Issues in Bankruptcy and Corporate Law: Bankruptcy
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With their relatively complex conceptualizations of the structures and purposes of
bankruptcy law, and their focus on its interplay with state-law debt-collection
mechanisms, these scholars more successfully describe the complexity of the
phenomenon of insolvency and its impact on those affected by it, and likewise the
complexity of bankruptcy law’s response to this phenomenon. Among other things, they
take into fuller account the vital role and significance of the debtor’s discharge, and also
the importance of having some centralized mechanism of “control” over the debtor, its
assets, and its liabilities as a means of fulfilling bankruptcy law’s discrete policy
objectives.213 As a normative matter, however, their approach falls short in terms of
explaining both the need for a distinct collection of bankruptcy remedies and how those
remedies ought to be arranged.
First, to say that the content of bankruptcy law expresses a collection of
competing and sometimes conflicting policy goals offers little normative guidance in
deciding what the make-up of that collection should be, or how best to resolve conflicts
Theory and the Creditors’ Bargain, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 453, 471 n.72 (1992) (criticizing
Jackson’s account for its exclusion of constituents other than creditors); see generally
Julie A. Veach, Note, On Considering the Public Interest in Bankruptcy: Looking to the
Railroads for Answers, 72 IND. L. J. 1211, 1229-30 (1997) (arguing that railroad
reorganizations offer clues about how to give a greater number of interested parties
voices in the bankruptcy process).
213 See WARREN & WESTBROOK, LAW, supra note 66 at 409 (“The law’s immediate
responses to the filing of a bankruptcy petition . . . put the courts in overall charge of the
debtor and its business and therefore empower these agents of government to impose
socially mandated policies on the process of sorting out the effects of a debtor’s general
default.”); Jay L. Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 795,
803-05 (2004) (discussing how centralized control over the debtor, its assets, and its
liabilities ensures the fulfillment of the policies that bankruptcy law champions).
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between the relevant policies when they clash.214 It is not enough simply to say that
bankruptcy law expresses a number of policies and then offer a descriptive list with
supporting commentary (albeit extensive in scope). Among other considerations, without
some organizing theory to help separate the wheat from the chaff, the content of
bankruptcy law is left vulnerable to improvident manipulation. Instead of responding
coherently to the reasons that justify its existence, it is susceptible to becoming (and at
times has become) a vehicle of inept social experimentation. For example, in recent
years well-organized and well-funded interest groups have successfully lobbied Congress
to alter the policy focus of the Bankruptcy Code and implement costly obstacles to
bankruptcy relief, with disappointing results.215 In order to evaluate the policies that
bankruptcy law expresses (or should express), it is first essential to understand why
having any set of bankruptcy policies is worthwhile. In other words, it is essential to
understand more fully the problems that bankruptcy law properly aims to redress. Once
that it done, the analysis can then proceed to examine more fruitfully both the specific
214 Cf. Schwartz & Scott, Contract Theory, supra note 83 at 543 (criticizing contract
theories that lack a governing principle to resolve conflicts between the relevant goals
that the theories endorse).
215 See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE, supra note 200 at 252-61
(critiquing various bankruptcy reform proposals); Kara J. Bruce, Rehabilitating
Bankruptcy Reform, 13 NEV. L.J. 174 (2012) (discussing bankruptcy reform, the
extensive 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, the role of interest groups, and
criticisms of the amendments); Richard Levin & Alesia Ranney-Marinelli, The Creeping
Repeal of Chapter 11: The Significant Business Provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 603 (2005)
(noting the responsiveness of the 2005 amendments to interest-group initiatives); Henry
J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Representing Consumers Under the
“Bankruptcy Abuse prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005”, 79 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 191 (2005) (criticizing the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code); Charles J.
Tabb, A Century of Regress or Progress? A Political History of Bankruptcy Legislation
in 1898 and 1998, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 343, 350-53 (1999) (discussing the politics
surrounding proposed bankruptcy reform in 1998).
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policies that bankruptcy law ought to embody and the best conceptual framework for
organizing them.
Second, the absence of a governing theoretical framework is not solved by
conceptualizing bankruptcy law as a “loss-spreading” regime because, by itself, this label
is too vague. Many legal institutions spread losses, and this thematic characterization
raises several fundamental questions, including what kind of loss-spreading mechanism is
the most appropriate in this context and why? Among other difficulties, the concept of
loss-spreading is, without more, susceptible to the criticism that it, too, is merely a
vehicle of wealth transfer. What remains to be explained is how loss spreading in the
bankruptcy context can be beneficial and in what way. For example, it is certainly true
that there are deficiencies in current non-bankruptcy debt-collection mechanisms. But
rather than attempt to correct these deficiencies through a system of bankruptcy law that
applies only sporadically when a debtor happens to commence a federal bankruptcy case,
why not correct them directly through reform of the non-bankruptcy debt-collection
mechanisms themselves?216 As Warren, Westbrook, and others have recognized, a
debtor’s insolvency is not an opportunity to correct every perceived distributional
injustice that happens to show up in a bankruptcy case.217 Bankruptcy law’s loss-
spreading ambitions should be more carefully defined and tailored so that bankruptcy law
does not take on problems of a more general nature best left to resolution in some other
market.
216 See Baird, Loss, supra note 8 at 823-24 (making this point).
217 See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE, supra note 200 at 197 (“It is
always a mistake . . . to think that the law can fix everything.”).
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For example, Warren and others have expressed hostility toward the enforcement
of the priority of security interests in bankruptcy because doing so prefers the holders of
those interests (typically financial creditors) over others (such as tort victims, employees,
and small trade creditors).218 A security interest, however, often has its greatest utility to
a secured creditor when the debtor is insolvent. By definition, an insolvent debtor cannot
pay all claims in full, and a properly taken security interest ensures that the secured party
will recover at least the value of its collateral ahead of other claimants. If the bankruptcy
market did not recognize the payment priority of security interests in prescribing the
division of the debtor’s assets (at least to the point of delivering to the secured creditor
what the secured creditor would have received outside the bankruptcy context), then one
of the most essential values of these financing devices would be destroyed. One might
well question whether that would be a desirable achievement, particularly given the size
of the secured lending market (in the trillions of dollars).219 Security interests are
presumably beneficial in some way. If they are not, then perhaps they should be
eliminated or restricted as a matter of non-bankruptcy law. If they are generally
beneficial, but not so only in the special world of insolvency, then perhaps bankruptcy
218 See supra note 210, infra note 238.
219 See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Measuring the Social Costs and
Benefits and Indentifying the Victims of Subordinating Security Interests in Bankruptcy,
82 CORNELL L. REV. 1349 (1997) [hereinafter Harris & Mooney, Measuring] (arguing
against the subordination of security interests because doing so would promote inefficient
conduct); Alan Schwartz, Priority Contracts and Priority in Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L.
REV. 1396, 1414-19 (1997) [hereinafter Schwartz, Priority] (arguing that the case for
restricting security interests in bankruptcy is weak); Robert E. Scott, The Truth About
Secured Financing, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1436, 1460-61 (1997) [hereinafter Scott, Truth]
(arguing that secured creditors’ claims should be accorded full priority because they
facilitate positive value projects).
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law might restrict them in some appropriate way—to the extent doing so would not
completely erode their optimal utility generally. But that remains to be demonstrated.
Third, the concept of bankruptcy law as simply a component of a single “system”
of overlapping and interlocking federal and state remedies obscures more than it reveals.
In particular, it obscures the properly distinct features and boundaries of the bankruptcy
marketplace,220 and begs the critical question of when is it appropriate to invoke
bankruptcy law’s unique body of remedial mechanisms. The bankruptcy and non-
bankruptcy markets are not fungible. Consistent with any coherent theory of credit and
risk, debtors may not simply resort to the non-bankruptcy markets to incur credit in the
first instance and then transport themselves at will to the bankruptcy market to discharge
their obligations regardless of their financial circumstances.221 Access to the bankruptcy
market is necessarily constrained, and more than anything else the criteria for access to
that market separates it from the non-bankruptcy world.
Similarly, bankruptcy law does not exist to cure deficiencies in the debt-collection
mechanisms of non-bankruptcy markets as those mechanisms apply generally within
those markets. Bankruptcy law properly exists to address the problems of insolvency
within the context of the bankruptcy marketplace when it is appropriate for debtors to be
in that special place, and the criteria for access to the bankruptcy market should be based
on the need for bankruptcy relief, namely the presence of the problems that justify having
a bankruptcy market in the first place. Although there is much about the loss-spreading
220 See LoPucki, General Theory, supra note 181 at 352, 362 (complaining that, as part of
a single system, state debt-collection law and bankruptcy law interact “inadvertently,”
and arguing in favor of a better channeling mechanism).
221 See Jackson, Fresh-Start, supra note 20 at 1427 (observing that free access to
discharge relief would be disastrous to an economy that is based on credit).
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approach that is admirable—especially its rejection of Jackson’s narrow debt-collection
frame in favor of a more eclectic view of the debt-collection, debt-forgiveness, and debt-
adjustment aspects of bankruptcy law—the loss-spreading approach requires greater
theoretical definition to guide its implementation.
In sum, just as Jackson’s conception of bankruptcy law as a debt-collection device
to implement a hypothetical creditors’ bargain is too narrow, the conceptualization of
bankruptcy law as a loss-spreading vehicle intertwined with non-bankruptcy debt-
collection mechanisms as a means to express an assortment of competing and conflicting
policy goals is also unsatisfying and requires a better theoretical organization. Whereas
Jackson’s approach focuses too rigidly on the debt-collection aspects of bankruptcy law,
the view that bankruptcy law is fundamentally a loss-spreading regime focuses too
loosely on the re-distributional power of its debt-adjustment and debt-forgiveness
features. Once again, the questions persist: why should we have a distinct bankruptcy
regime and how should it be arranged?
As summarized at the outset, I argue that the purpose and art of bankruptcy law is
essentially to turn a sow’s ear into a silk purse. The sow’s ear equates to the problems of
insolvency. The silk purse is what bankruptcy law does with the person, property, and
liabilities of the debtor in response to these problems because these problems are costly.
The key to understanding the role of bankruptcy law, however, is to understand that the
problems it properly addresses are all insolvency-related. Ordinary non-bankruptcy debt-
collection systems are not so limited. They govern the typical mine run of debt-
collection activities involving debtors both solvent and not. Bankruptcy law unavoidably
interferes with their operation—indeed, it essentially supplants them. But as a normative
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matter it does so only in defined circumstances, and then again only to achieve beneficial
dispositions of the debtor, its property, and its liabilities.
To better understand how and why this is so, it is useful first to examine in a more
focused way the problems of insolvency that justify having a distinct bankruptcy law.
That is the purpose of Chapter 2. Chapter 3 follows with an examination of the debt-
collection, debt-forgiveness, and debt-adjustment features of bankruptcy law that address
the problems of insolvency. As I explain, each of these features properly responds to
distinct categories of the problems of insolvency in distinct ways. I then evaluate these
features and the solutions they offer using three different standards: (1) equity (fairness),
(2) efficiency (wealth-maximization), and (3) entitlement (the preservation of protected
interests). I also use these standards to evaluate how bankruptcy prioritizes its various
debt-collection, debt-forgiveness, and debt-adjustment mechanisms. In addition, Chapter
3 offers the details of my theory on how bankruptcy law ought to respond to the problems
of insolvency through the vehicle of a corrective bankruptcy market that incorporates
these mechanisms. Finally, Chapter 3 offers a brief conclusion.
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CHAPTER 2
The Problems of Insolvency
Bankruptcy law is characteristically complex, time-consuming, and expensive.
So why have it? Is it to solve the collective-action dilemma? Is it to help drive down the
costs of credit? Is it to cure various defects in non-bankruptcy debt-collection systems
for the sake of promoting a handful of important policy objectives? Or is it for some
other reason?
It must be admitted that it is at least theoretically possible that a bankruptcy
system might be crafted purely as a debt-collection regime focused exclusively on
addressing the collective-action dilemma. But as discussed in the preceding chapter and
elaborated below, bankruptcy law is not so narrowly instrumental and for good reason:
the collective-action dilemma is not the only problem in need of remediation—there are
others of greater significance.
Likewise, it is possible that a bankruptcy system might be constructed purely as a
debt-collection device devoted exclusively to reducing borrowing costs. But as also
discussed in the preceding chapter, this assumes that borrowing costs are in need of
remediation and, more dubiously, that bankruptcy law might meaningfully reduce them.
More important, focusing on the reduction of borrowing costs is again too instrumentally
narrow because it assumes away other problems and costs that bankruptcy law properly
addresses.
113
Finally, it is possible that a bankruptcy system might be crafted as an “add-on” to
state law debt-collection devices for the sake of rewiring these devices to promote a
number of policy goals. But as discussed in the preceding chapter, bankruptcy law is not
so invasively super-normative. General defects in non-bankruptcy debt-collection
systems should be remedied as such. Bankruptcy law, so to speak, has its own fish to fry.
In order to gain some purchase on the kinds of problems that bankruptcy law properly
addresses, however, it is first useful to pause for a moment and consider more generally
the role of law as a problem-solving mechanism, as well as how the relevant problem set
for any particular branch of law may be identified.
Although scholars have long wrangled over the most useful articulation of the
concept of “law,” and in the process have offered a number of competing perspectives of
varying clarity and coherence,222 one thing appears relatively uncontroversial: laws
222 John Austin (1790-1859) defined it as the command of the sovereign backed by
threats. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED, Lecture VI
(1832) (defining laws as commands, and stating that a law is “a rule laid down for the
guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent being having power over him”). Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1841-1935) defined it famously as “the prophesies of what the
courts will do in fact . . . .” Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REV. 457, 460-61 (1897) [hereinafter Holmes, Path]. Similar to Austin, Hans Kelsen
(1881-1973) defined it as “the primary norm, which stipulates the sanction.” HANS
KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 61 (1945). Karl Llewellyn (1893-1962)
defined it as “[w]hat officials do about disputes . . . .” KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE
BRAMBLE BUSH 5 (Oxford 2008). Criticizing Holmes, Llewellyn remarked that “[n]o
vast literature is dedicated to answering the questions ‘What is chemistry?’ or ‘What is
medicine?’” and quipped that no one would think to respond to these questions with such
answers as “a prediction of what doctors will do.” Id. at 1. Breaking ranks with earlier
theorists, H.L.A. Hart (1907-1992) avoided offering a definition of the law “in the sense
of a rule by reference to which the correctness of the use of the word can be tested,”
preferring instead to “advance legal theory by providing an improved analysis of the
distinctive structure of a municipal legal system” together with “a better understanding of
the resemblances and differences between law, coercion, and morality, as types of social
phenomenon.” H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 17 (Oxford 2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter
HART, CONCEPT]. In particular, Hart avoided a court-centered approach, offering instead
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address certain kinds of social phenomena. More specifically, they address social
phenomena that satisfy what Scott Shapiro has called the “circumstances of legality,”
meaning social problems of a serious nature that are sufficiently “complex, contentious,
the idea of law as a broader form of social regulation, stating that “[t]he principle
functions of the law as a means of social control are not to be seen in private litigation or
prosecutions, which represent vital but still ancillary provisions for the failures of the
system,” but rather are to be seen “in the diverse ways in which the law is used to control,
to guide, and to plan life out of court.” Id. at 40; see also RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 98
at 236 (defining “legal order” as a “system of rules addressed to rational persons”).
Charting his own course, Ronald Dworkin (1931-2013) also avoided defining the subject
in a short descriptive phrase, instead contending more abstractly “that legal reasoning is
an exercise in constructive interpretation, that our law consists in the best justification of
our legal practices as a whole, that it consists in the narrative story that makes of these
practices the best they can be.” DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 14 at i; see also
PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW 45 (1997) [hereinafter KAHN, REIGN] (articulating an
approach to the rule of law “as a set of beliefs by which members of the American culture
understand themselves and their world”); LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1969)
(elaborating an internal morality of law). Scott Shapiro has offered still another take,
conceptualizing law as fundamentally a sophisticated social planning tool, arguing that
“[b]y providing a highly nimble and durable method of social planning, the law enables
communities to solve the numerous and serious problems that would otherwise be too
costly or risky to resolve.” SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 37 at 170. Shapiro observes
that humans are planning creatures, id. at 119; laws facilitate planning in contexts in
which shared activity may be particularly complex or contentious, id. at 134; and
“whenever the law properly addresses a particular social problem, it does so because,
given current social conditions, alternative methods of planning are somehow deficient,”
id. at 175. Central to this view is the idea that the law properly addresses significant
problems of social planning. See id. at 170. As I discuss in greater detail in this chapter
and Chapter 3, bankruptcy law addresses certain social problems (the “problems of
insolvency”) that arise from economic failure, including the failure of plans. Among
other things, bankruptcy law does this to facilitate future planning activities within
ordinary non-bankruptcy markets by remediating the problems of insolvency so that
insolvent debtors and their property may once again return to, and participate fully in,
ordinary markets unburdened by the waste, inefficiency, and distorted decision-making
incentives that insolvency generates. The need for bankruptcy law arises in the first
instance, however, because the problems of social failure that I identify are typically
complex and contentious—hence the need for some kind of law to address them. In turn,
they are properly the subject of bankruptcy law because they are all insolvency related
and it would make no sense to burden non-bankruptcy legal systems with mechanisms for
their resolution—it is far more appropriate to deal with them through a specialized body
of bankruptcy law. For an earlier discussion of various aspects of the problems of
insolvency, see G. Eric Brunstad, Jr., Bankruptcy and the Problems of Economic Futility:
A Theory on the Unique Role of Bankruptcy Law, 55 BUS. LAW. 499 (2000).
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or arbitrary” to be appropriate for legal ordering and resolution, as opposed to those
better left to “nonlegal forms of ordering behavior, such as improvisation, spontaneous
ordering, private agreements, communal consensus, or personalized hierarchies.”223 We
may refer to problems that satisfy these criteria as “legal problems,” in contrast with the
more general category of “social problems” from which they are extracted.
Of course, it is not enough for our purposes simply to define in broad terms the
kinds of social problems that the law generally addresses. What is needed is some further
elaboration to isolate the subset of legal problems that bankruptcy law properly attempts
to tackle. This requires identifying an appropriate process of descriptive categorization
and explanation.224
Within our general conception of legality, different kinds of laws obviously
address different categories of legal problems. For example, immigration laws respond to
immigration problems; tort laws address problems of social behavior giving rise to torts;
223 SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 37 at 170. Shapiro derives his definition of the
“circumstances of legality” in part from Hume’s concept of the “circumstances of
justice.” See DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS, part
I, section 3 (1751); SHAPIRO, LEGALITY at 170 n.11. I make use of it here (in somewhat
modified form) because it illuminates the fundamental concept that laws address specific
kinds of social problems and, implicitly, that before addressing how a particular kind of
law should be arranged, it is first necessary to determine the nature of the specific legal
problems in need of some form of legal remedy.
224 See also RAZ, AUTHORITY, supra note 101 at 167 (“The aim of the analyst should be
to propose a classification of the social functions of the law which is of use to the
reformer, but is not too closely tied to any particular viewpoint.”). Although it may seem
obvious, it is important in this setting to consciously distinguish problems from solutions.
The identification of problems and the identification of solutions are discrete inquiries.
For example, a social problem does not disappear simply because we have concluded that
it is not worth remediating on the theory that the available solutions are worse than the
problem. We may call this the “problem/solution dichotomy.” It is important as a tool
for organizing the analysis of problem identification as distinct from the analysis of
selecting appropriate solutions to problems. See also supra note 7, infra note 226.
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contract laws respond to problems with the creation and enforcement of contractual
agreements; and criminal laws address problems of social conduct giving rise to
crimes.225 It is also true that laws generate social effects, which may in turn lead to more
problems and perhaps more laws (or revisions of laws), but the first step in
conceptualizing what a particular law should look like is to identify the particular legal
problem or problems that give rise to the need for the specific law in question. Logically,
bankruptcy law should address bankruptcy problems. But what are these? The answer to
this threshold question is critical because, without it, one cannot proceed meaningfully to
the subsequent question of how bankruptcy law ought to respond to the problems that
justify its existence.226
In order to answer the threshold question adequately, it is necessary both to
describe the relevant problems and explain why, in fact, they constitute a distinct set in
order then to proceed to make correlative value judgments about the relevant problems.
As Eugene Meehan has stated, “[v]alue judgments are absolutely contingent upon
225 Among other things, if no one ever stole anything, there would never have been any
need for the proscription “thou shalt not steal.” As Shapiro observes, “[l]egal institutions
are supposed to enable communities to overcome the complexity, contentiousness, and
arbitrariness of communal life by resolving those social problems that cannot be solved,
or solved as well, by nonlegal means alone.” SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 37 at 171.
By extension, in a purely ideal world that lacked social problems, there would be no need
for law. We may call this the “no problem, no law” hypothesis. This is not a circular
tautology because, although laws may themselves create social problems, social problems
may exist without laws. Social problems come first, laws second.
226 As noted, because laws properly respond to social problems (perceived or real) that
satisfy the circumstances of legality, without such social problems there would be no real
need for law. See supra note 223. It follows that it is necessary to identify the problems
one is hoping to resolve legally before turning to how the law might actually go about
doing so. See also supra notes 7, 224.
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descriptions and explanations.”227 For example, until a situation has been described
accurately, and the consequences of the choices open to the actor have been identified by
an accurate explanation of the nature of the situation, “no [meaningful] choice can be
made.”228 That is because “[e]very choice implies a description and an explanation of the
empirical world” and “[w]ithout adequate descriptions and explanations, the actor in the
situation is forced to choose among unknown [alternatives]—a contradiction in terms . . .
[resulting in] randomness.”229
Stated somewhat differently, there is an embedded normative aspect to the
process of problem identification for the purposes of defining an area of law such as
bankruptcy. The inquiry is not simply the positive one of what problems bankruptcy law
happens to address. The real challenge is to identify the problems that bankruptcy law
ought to remedy. This is more complicated, requiring both a description of a potential
problem to be included on the list (the positive inquiry) and an explanation why it should
be there (the normative inquiry). Once that is done, however, the analysis can then
proceed to how bankruptcy law might be arranged to address the relevant problems. This
chapter is devoted to identifying and explaining why a particular set of social problems—
the problems of insolvency—are properly the subject of a discrete area of law devoted to
their resolution called “bankruptcy law.” Chapter 3 addresses the subsequent normative
question of how bankruptcy law should go about resolving them.
227 EUGENE J. MEEHAN, VALUE JUDGMENT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 54 (1969).
228 Id. at 54-55.
229 Id. at 55.
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DEFINING THE RELEVANT PROBLEM SET
The problems that justify having a distinct bankruptcy law cannot be the same as
the problems of the law generally; they are necessarily narrower. In addition, the
problems that justify having a distinct bankruptcy law cannot be the same as, say, the
general problems that tort and contract law remedy; they are necessarily different if,
indeed, bankruptcy law is to have its own distinct content and successfully avoid the
forum-shopping problem.230 Traditionally, bankruptcy law has focused on addressing a
number of problems that arise when a debtor becomes insolvent.231 Accordingly, it
makes sense to begin with some analysis of what the “problems of insolvency” actually
are and whether they warrant a special body of law to address them. As we shall see, the
essential problems of insolvency are sufficiently “complex, contentious, and arbitrary” to
satisfy the circumstances of legality.232 They are likewise sufficiently unique to justify
having a distinct bankruptcy law to remedy them because they are all insolvency related
and it would make no sense to treat them as part of some other body of law. Social
problems that satisfy these criteria—namely, those that are sufficiently complex and
contentious to satisfy the circumstances of legality—and are also sufficiently insolvency
230 See supra at 12, 47-53 (discussing the forum-shopping problem).
231 The term “insolvent” is defined in supra note 1.
232 A problem is “complex” to the extent it is not capable of simple, expedient resolution.
A problem is “contentious” to the extent it invites social conflict. A problem is
“arbitrary” to the extent it naturally invites relatively arbitrary resolution, such as whether
cars should be driven on the right- or left-hand side of the road—in such cases it may
matter more that a decision selecting one or the other as the rule is made, rather than
which decision is made. See SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 37 at 109 (“preferences for
everyone riding on the right could always be changed to the left if it were supposed that
almost everyone rides on the left instead”). Behavior may also be arbitrary in a different
sense: it may be irrational. Irrational behavior can be a social problem that is both
complex and contentious, and can also lead to social failure in the form of insolvency.
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related to justify a special body of law to address them, may be thought of as satisfying
the “circumstances of bankruptcy legality.”
Although they overlap in some respects, the unique problems of insolvency that
bankruptcy law properly addresses fall into three separate categories: (1) special
problems of claims mediation and payment discrimination; (2) unique challenges of
overinvestment, underinvestment, and other moral hazard; and (3) unrecoverable
collection, monitoring, and related costs associated with a debtor’s financial ruin. These
problems are each described below, together with an explanation of why they are
properly the subject of a distinct body of bankruptcy law.
PROBLEMS OF CLAIMS MEDIATION AND PAYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Most debtors owe debts to more than one creditor. In the case of an individual, it
is not uncommon for the debtor to have a dozen creditors or more, ranging from the
finance company that financed the debtor’s car, the utility company that supplies the
debtor with electricity each month, and the bank that extends credit through the debtor’s
use of a credit card. In the case of a firm, there may be thousands, even tens of thousands
of creditors (or more). By definition, a solvent debtor can satisfy all claims in full. Thus,
in the context of solvency, there is generally no need to decide, for example, whether a
tort liability is more important than a contractual debt, or whether a tax obligation is more
important than a debt for child support. Similarly, so long as the debtor remains solvent,
there is generally no reason for complaint if on a temporal basis the debtor pays one debt
ahead of another—by definition, a solvent debtor can still pay all other claims in full. If a
debtor becomes insolvent, however, things are quite different.
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Because an insolvent debtor cannot satisfy all claims in full, there arises the
problem of conflicts between competing obligations such as, for example, tax collectors
and tort victims, employees and bondholders, the local environmental protection agency
and the local finance company.233 Similarly, the debtor’s inability to satisfy all claims in
full gives rise to the possibility (and frequent reality) of payment discrimination—the
debtor’s payment of some claims ahead of others for reasons that typically have little or
nothing to do with the relative merit of the competing claims or some normative
evaluation of whether one should be paid ahead of others.
Moreover, the views of the affected parties on how to resolve these conflicts and
discriminations are not likely to be consensual. For example, an unpaid tort victim is not
likely to agree that the payment of a tax obligation is more important than the satisfaction
of his claim. Similarly, employees are not likely to agree that their claims should be paid
only after a debt to a finance company has been satisfied in full. In turn, the unpaid
creditors of an insolvent debtor are likely to look jealously at the funds the debtor has
transferred to some other creditor who thereby receives payment in full. Accordingly,
these aspects of the phenomenon of insolvency—conflicts among competing claims and
payment discriminations—are likely to be both complex and contentious. Because they
are also uniquely insolvency related and it would make no sense to address them through
non-bankruptcy laws, they properly satisfy the circumstances of bankruptcy legality and
are thus properly the subject of a special bankruptcy law.
233 See Barry A. Adler, The Law of Last Resort, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1661, 1663, 1674
(2002) [hereinafter Adler, Law] (observing that, when obligations conflict, bankruptcy
law “fills the breach” with a means to “choose among them,” and arguing that bankruptcy
law must reconcile “mutually insupportable obligations”).
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CLAIMS MEDIATION
In the insolvency context, conflicts among competing claims typically arise in one
of two distinct ways. First, they occur between different obligations arising under the
same body of law (such as between two tort claims, or between two contractual debts).
As a general rule, tort law itself does not supply any overt mechanism for prioritizing one
type of tort claim over another (e.g., a claim for negligence versus a claim for
conversion). It simply prescribes rules regarding the imposition of liability. The
question of priority among conflicting obligations is left to some other body of law, in
part because it is difficult to conceive how tort law might handle this issue given the
involuntary nature of tort obligations, and in part because the issue typically only matters
if the tortfeasor cannot satisfy all claims in full (i.e., becomes insolvent).
In contrast, contract law commonly facilitates the prioritization of competing
claims among creditors, but only incompletely. For example, two creditors holding
potentially conflicting obligations may enter into a binding contractual subordination
agreement. Under the terms of their contract, one creditor agrees (in exchange for some
type of consideration) that its claim will have a priority junior to the claim held by the
other creditor.234 In general, however, agreements of this kind bind only the specific
parties that elect to enter into them, and two creditors cannot by agreement alone
subordinate the claim of a third party who has not consented to be subordinated.235
Accordingly, the general reach of these types of instruments is limited to the specific
234 See supra note 171, infra note 244 (discussing subordination agreements); see also 4
ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J. SOMMER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 510.03 (16th ed.
2012) [hereinafter COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY] (describing the nature and enforceability of
subordination agreements in bankruptcy).
235 See id.; supra note 44.
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parties who have agreed to prioritize their claims among themselves, and does not
typically affect the debtor’s general creditor body.
A partial exception exists in the form of security interests. Under the law of
secured transactions, a debtor and creditor may enter into a contract granting the creditor
a priority right in specific items of the debtor’s property (the “collateral”) in exchange for
some kind of consideration. In theory, the secured creditor essentially “purchases” its
priority right to the collateral, even though the debtor typically remains in possession of
the property.236 If certain conditions are satisfied, this contract will be binding on other
creditors irrespective of their consent (and even irrespective of whether they receive
actual notice of the secured creditor’s interest).237
One essential purpose of security interests is to assure that the secured party will
have an isolated source of payment ahead of other claimants, ostensibly to induce the
secured creditor to engage in transactions with the debtor on terms more favorable than
the debtor could obtain otherwise.238 The result is akin to what would happen if the
236 The Uniform Commercial Code treats the interest of the secured creditor as a
“purchase.” See U.C.C. § 9-201(b)(29) (defining the term “purchase” to include the
taking of a security interest). This, of course, is a fiction, but is one that facilitates a large
amount of lending.
237 See U.C.C. § 9-201(a) (providing that “except as otherwise provided in [the Uniform
Commercial Code], a security agreement is effective according to its terms between the
parties, against purchasers of collateral, and against creditors.”); see also 4 JAMES J.
WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 33-2 (5th ed. 2002)
(“The sentence means what it says; the secured creditor, even an unperfected secured
creditor, has greater rights in its collateral than any other creditor, unless the [UCC]
provides otherwise.”) (emphasis added).
238 See, e.g., Homer Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of
Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 934-47 (1985)
[hereinafter Kripke, Law] (arguing that secured financing provides a number of micro-
and macroeconomic benefits, including permitting the debtor to acquire assets either that
the debtor otherwise would not be able to obtain at all, or at a greater cost). Scholars have
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secured party had actually purchased the item of collateral for value and taken possession
of it, thereby removing it from the pool of assets other creditors could look to for the
satisfaction of their claims (replaced by the consideration the secured creditor supplies in
exchange for its priority right).239 In theory, the added benefit of a secured transaction to
the debtor and the debtor’s other creditors is that the secured party who has “purchased”
both criticized and defended the general efficiency of security interests. See, e.g.,
Thomas H. Jackson & Alan Schwartz, Vacuum of Fact or Vacuous Theory: A Reply to
Professor Kripke, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 987 (1985) [hereinafter Jackson & Schwartz,
Vacuum] (challenging Kripke’s account and arguing that the efficiency of security
interests has not been demonstrated); James J. White, Efficiency Justifications for
Personal Property Security, 37 VAND. L. REV. 473 (1984) [hereinafter White, Efficiency]
(arguing that security interests are generally efficient); Alan Schwartz, The Continuing
Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1984) [hereinafter Schwartz, Continuing
Puzzle] (disputing White’s account). Some scholars have also challenged the priority
treatment of secured claims in bankruptcy and have offered proposals for reform. See
Warren, Making Policy, supra note 210 at 1379-83 (arguing for the reformation of
Article 9 and the treatment of a secured creditor’s priority); Klee, Barbarians, supra note
210 at 1467 (arguing that the case for full priority remains unproven and that
unrepresented parties might deserve higher priority); Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case,
supra note 210 at 921-26 (arguing that permitting secured creditors fully priority in
bankruptcy may be inefficient in some cases and offering a proposal for reform);
LoPucki, Unsecured, supra note 210 at 1920-24 (challenging the efficiency of the
secured creditor’s priority). Others have criticized these critics. See Steven L. Schwarcz,
The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE L.J. 425
(1997) (criticizing Bebchuk and Fried’s proposal and arguing in favor of the secured
creditor’s priority); Harris & Mooney, Measuring, supra note 219 (arguing against
subordination proposals); Schwartz, Priority, supra note 219 at 1414-19 (arguing that the
case for restricting priority in bankruptcy is weak); Scott, Truth, supra note 219 at 1460-
61 (arguing that secured creditors’ claims should be accorded full priority because they
facilitate positive value projects).
239 In general, creditors cannot look to items of property their debtor has sold to a third
party for the payment of their claims because these items do not belong to the debtor;
they belong to the purchaser. One exception is property the debtor has transferred
fraudulently, which may be recovered to satisfy the claims of the debtor’s creditors under
state or federal law. See infra note 345 (discussing fraudulent transfers).
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the item nonetheless leaves it with the debtor so the debtor can make use of it, thereby
generating a return. There may be other benefits as well, although these are contested.240
Again, however, the reach of contractual security agreements is limited. It
elevates the priority only of the particular secured party, and only with respect to the
secured party’s particular collateral. It does not address conflicts between the obligations
of creditors who are not secured, or property that is not encumbered with a valid security
interest. Accordingly, like subordination agreements, security interests are only partial,
incomplete prioritization vehicles.
Second, conflicts may arise between different obligations arising under different
bodies of law (such as between a tort claim and a contract claim, or between a tax claim
and a criminal fine). In general, no body of law (other than bankruptcy law) generally
mediates disputes of this kind—although some bodies of law, such as state foreclosure
law, may regulate the priority of claims with respect to specific items of property that
pass through the foreclosure process. As discussed, a limited exception exists for secured
claims, which have a priority elevated above most other types of claims, including tort
liabilities.
As suggested above, if the debtor remains solvent, there is little need for priority
mechanisms that mediate conflicts between competing obligations for the simple reason
that, absent insolvency, these obligations do not really compete in the practical sense of
240 See GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 259-61 (1965)
(arguing that a secured creditor may act as an effective monitor, preventing harm to other
creditors); see also supra notes 210, 238, infra note 672. Procedurally, a secured
creditor’s collection rights are typically more streamlined, and potentially more
expeditious, than those enjoyed by other creditors. See U.C.C. § 9-601 et. seq.
(prescribing special enforcement and collection rights for holders of security interests);
see also 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 234, ch. 506 (describing a secured
creditor’s rights in bankruptcy).
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getting paid. If a solvent debtor defaults on an obligation, any creditor may obtain
payment without depriving other creditors of their due—that is what solvency essentially
means. Once the debtor becomes insolvent, however, the situation changes entirely.
Because the conflict among competing obligations arises truly as a result of the debtor’s
insolvency, it is properly a bankruptcy question.
Having identified the problem of conflicting obligations, one might well ask:
instead of addressing them through a mechanism of bankruptcy law, why not simply
modify existing legal structures to remedy them? For example, tort law might prescribe a
mechanism of prioritization among competing tort claims, and contract law might do the
same within its sphere. But here we confront the fact that it is only in the context of
insolvency that the problem assumes any real significance. There is simply no need for
contract or tort law to undertake the challenge outside the insolvency arena—other than
in the special case of subordination agreements and security interests, which are only
partial prioritization mechanisms in any event. Moreover, even if, for example, tort law
were to specify a mechanism for prioritizing competing tort claims, it would still be
necessary to harmonize the tort priority regime with any competing regime supplied by
some other body of law (e.g., contract law), and thus a separate body of law would still
be necessary to resolve the conflicts that emerge between the priority rules of different
bodies of law. Different laws respond to different kinds of social problems and do so in
different ways (presumably because this is desirable). Bankruptcy law is no different,
126
and the problem of conflicting payment obligations arising in the insolvency context
properly falls within its bailiwick.241
The existence of subordination agreements and security interests as creatures of
contract law (and, in the case of security interests, also property law) does not undermine
this observation. The fact that some priority issues may be resolved profitably by
241 Notably, bankruptcy law prescribes several comprehensive mechanisms for
prioritizing claims. By operation of law, the commencement of a bankruptcy case creates
a bankruptcy estate consisting of all of the debtor’s interests in property wherever
located. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000 & Supp. 2006). The bankruptcy court presiding over the
case is vested with exclusive in rem jurisdiction over all property of the estate, and the
estate is formed in custodia legis. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e); Tennessee Student Assistance
Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 447 (2004); Straton v. New, 283 U.S. 318, 320-21 (1931).
In addition, the filing of a bankruptcy petition triggers the automatic stay, which enjoins
most debt collection activities against the debtor and property of the estate during the
bankruptcy proceeding. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000 & Supp. 2006). In lieu of non-
bankruptcy debt collection procedures, a creditor holding a debtor’s pre-bankruptcy
monetary obligation is deemed to hold a claim against the debtor’s estate, and the creditor
is entitled to file a proof of claim with the bankruptcy court. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5) (2000
& Supp. 2006), 101(10) (2000 & Supp. 2006), 501(a) (2000 & Supp. 2006), 502(b) (2000
& Supp. 2006); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001, 3002; see Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 336
(1966) (“bankruptcy . . . converts the creditor’s legal claim into an equitable claim to a
pro rata share of the res”). Only creditors that file proofs of claim may receive
distributions from the estate. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002(a); New York v. Irving Trust Co.,
288 U.S. 329, 333 (1933). In a Chapter 7 (liquidation) case, a Chapter 7 trustee is
appointed or elected, and is responsible for collecting and liquidating the estate, and
distributing the proceeds among creditors. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701 (2000 & Supp. 2006), 702
(2000 & Supp. 2006), 704 (2000 & Supp. 2006). The trustee distributes property in
accordance with several provisions of the Code that prioritize claims. 11 U.S.C. §§ 507
(2000 & Supp. 2006), 725 (2000 & Supp. 2006), 726 (2000 & Supp. 2006). In a Chapter
11 (reorganization) case, a trustee is not ordinarily appointed, and the debtor typically
remains in possession of estate property as a debtor in possession. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1)
(2000 & Supp. 2006). The debtor in possession has many of the responsibilities of a
trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (2000 & Supp. 2006). A principal goal of Chapter 11 is the
formulation and confirmation of a plan of reorganization that will specify the disposition
of the debtor’s property and the payment of claims. 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (2000 & Supp.
2006) (prescribing contents of plan); see also supra note 75 (discussing the debt-
adjustment functions of bankruptcy law).
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contract does not mean that they all must be addressed in that way.242 Nor does it mean
that we should accept the outcome of non-bankruptcy priority contracting come what
may. As noted, the primary utility of both subordination agreements and security
interests is to provide an enhanced prospect of payment for a particular creditor in the
event the debtor is unable to pay all obligations in full. If the debtor is solvent, all
creditors ultimately will be paid irrespective of whether they have rights under a
subordination agreement or by virtue of a security interest. It is only when the debtor
becomes insolvent that these devices have particular distributional bite.243
Critically, to the extent that subordination agreements and security interests
prescribe distributional entitlements in the context of bankruptcy cases, that is so only
because bankruptcy law recognizes them as effective in that setting.244 Presumably,
bankruptcy law permits the limited contractual allocation of priorities achieved through
subordination agreements and security interests because doing so is generally desirable,
242 See SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 37 at 213 (observing that “when simpler methods
of organizing behavior work, it would be irrational to abandon or overturn them in favor
of accomplishing the very same ends through more sophisticated methods” and stating
that “[t]hus, when customs or contracts solve moral problems, the law will typically let
them stand” and “legal systems often rely on custom and contract when they judge these
methods of solving moral problems to be superior to legal planning”).
243 As noted, they may have other value outside the insolvency setting. See supra note
240 (discussing a secured creditor’s enhanced and streamlined debt-collection rights).
244 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 510(a) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (recognizing the enforceability of
contractual subordination agreements in bankruptcy cases), 506 (2000 & Supp. 2006)
(prescribing the treatment of secured claims in bankruptcy); see also United States v. Ron
Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989) (discussing section 506); United Sav. Ass’n of
Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371-73 (1988)
(further explaining section 506); 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 234, ch. 506 &
510 (discussing the operation of these sections).
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at least to a certain extent.245 To the extent it is not, bankruptcy law specifically modifies
the rights of secured parties for its own purposes,246 and thus the efficacy of security
interests is not left entirely to non-bankruptcy law. Rather, security interests work in one
way outside the bankruptcy setting and in a different way in bankruptcy cases for reasons
peculiar to bankruptcy law.247 In other words, to the extent subordination agreements and
security interests prescribe distributional priorities that are recognized in bankruptcy
settings (albeit in modified form), they are, by incorporation, part of the fabric of
245 See supra notes 75, 171, 219, 210, 234, 238, 240, 244.
246 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (enjoining the enforcement of a
security interest once a bankruptcy case is commenced), 506 (2000 & Supp. 2006)
(limiting security interests to the value of the underlying collateral and voiding certain
security interests), 547 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (permitting the avoidance of security
interests that constitute preferences), 1123(b)(5) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (permitting the
proponent of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization to modify the rights of the holders of
secured claims), 1129(b)(2) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (permitting the proponent of a Chapter
11 plan to gain confirmation of the plan that modifies the rights of a secured party over
the objection of the secured party if certain criteria are satisfied); see also RadLAX
Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065 (2012) (discussing the
operation of section 1129(b)); Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953
(1997) (discussing the treatment of certain secured claims in bankruptcy); Dewsnup v.
Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) (same); United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S.
235 (1989) (same).
247 Among other things, current bankruptcy law embodies the general policy of equality
of distribution among creditors and prescribes various distributional rules to effect this
policy. See, e.g., Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 26, 29 (1952) (stating that the “[t]he
theme of the Bankruptcy Act is ‘equality of distribution,’ and if one claimant is to be
preferred over others, the purpose should be clear from the statute.”) (quoting Sampsell v.
Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 219 (1941)); see also Union Bank v. Wolas,
502 U.S. 151, 154-55, 160-61 (1991) (discussing preference law under the Bankruptcy
Code and how it facilitates the policy of equality of distribution); Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S.
53, 58 (1990) (same); supra note 75. At the same time, current bankruptcy law also
prescribes specific priority rules that elevate the claims of certain creditors over others for
distributional purposes—typically those who are poor loss spreaders. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.
§ 507 (2000 & Supp. 2006); see also supra note 258.
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bankruptcy law.248 This is appropriate. First, the problem of conflicting payment
obligations that they address is complex and contentious. Second, it is acutely insolvency
related because the conflict arises as a consequence of the debtor’s inability to satisfy all
obligations in full. The problem is thus properly a bankruptcy matter.
PAYMENT DISCRIMINATION
A problem closely related to that of conflicting payment obligations is the
problem of payment discrimination. Once again, if a debtor is solvent, it generally makes
little difference which creditor receives payment first on a temporal basis because, by
definition, a solvent debtor is able to pay all claims in full. Thus, if the debtor defaults in
paying a particular debt, the creditor’s recourse to ordinary legal relief, such as by
obtaining a judgment and satisfaction of that judgment through execution, is usually fully
effective without adverse impact on other creditors because collection of the claim leaves
ample resources behind for the satisfaction of other obligations.
Unsurprisingly, non-bankruptcy law is not typically concerned with forcing
solvent debtors to pay one obligation before others on a temporal basis. If the debtor
becomes insolvent, however, the payment of one claim ahead of others (or the assurance
of the payment of a particular claim ahead of others such as by granting the preferred
creditor a security interest in specific items of the debtor’s property) may irrevocably
compromise remaining claims simply because the debtor may retain insufficient
resources to pay other debts. In other words, the debtor’s payment (or assurance of
priority payment) of the preferred claim may create a discriminatory “externality” with
248 See Adler, Law, supra note 233 at 1665 (arguing that bankruptcy law includes “any
law, from whatever source, that governs or permits insupportable obligation,” that “where
such obligations are necessarily inconsistent, the law provides a resolution,” and that
“[t]his is bankruptcy law”).
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respect to unpaid claimants.249 In general, this discrimination may arise in one of six
distinct ways.
First, in deciding which obligations to pay, an insolvent debtor may simply
choose to pay some creditors over others, perhaps based on whim, but more likely based
on self-interest. For example, an insolvent individual may value his or her home more
than other assets and thus may pay the mortgage ahead of other claims—regardless of
whether doing so is in the best interests of the debtor, creditors as a group, or society as a
whole.250 Similarly, the manager of an insolvent firm who has guaranteed personally a
particular obligation may cause the firm to pay that obligation first, thereby reducing his
249 As Coase has explained:
An externality is . . . usually defined as the effect of one person’s decision
on someone who is not a party to that decision. Thus, if A buys something
from B, A’s decision to buy affects B, but this effect is not considered to
be an “externality.” However, if A’s transaction with B affects C, D, and
E, who are not parties to the transaction, because, for example, it results in
noise or smoke which impinge on C, D, and E, the effects on C, D, and E
are termed “externalities.”
COASE, FIRM, supra note 7 at 24. In the case of payment discrimination, an insolvent
debtor’s choice to pay creditor A, thereby leaving inadequate resources to pay creditor B,
creates an externality with respect to creditor B.
250 See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE, supra note 200 at 200, 218-19,
224-26 (observing that homeowners often make decisions regarding their homes that are
based on emotional considerations and may continue to strive to keep their houses even
though doing so may simply make them worse off financially). This is an illustration of
the “endowment effect”—the tendency of people to overvalue what they have because it
is theirs. See Richard H. Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 43-47 (1980) [hereinafter Thaler, Positive Theory] (discussing
the “endowment effect”).
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individual liability.251 In either situation, the debtor’s voluntary choice has the effect of
discriminating against creditors who are not paid.
Second, the debtor may choose under pressure to pay certain creditors, leaving
fewer funds to satisfy competing claims. Certainly the most persistent creditors
(particularly those who threaten or actually pursue debt-collection remedies) may receive
payment ahead of others.252 But debtors may also prefer certain kinds of persistent
creditors, while purposefully stalling others who are equally vocal. For example, if the
debtor is in the manufacturing business and requires a continuous supply of materials
from one particular vendor to continue operations, the debtor may meet its obligations to
that vendor ahead of the claims of other persistent creditors simply to stay in business.253
251 See Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186, 1187-88 (7th Cir. 1989)
(finding that the bankrupt corporation made payments on loans guaranteed by three
corporate insiders, including the corporation’s president, during the year prior to the
corporation’s filing for bankruptcy); Smith v. Tostevin, 247 F. 102, 103 (2d Cir. 1917)
(L. Hand, J.) (finding that bankrupt husband made payment on his bank loan one week
before filing for bankruptcy in order to obtain the bank’s release of stock that his wife
had pledged as security for the loan); see also David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line
Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471, 495 (1994)
[hereinafter Skeel, Rethinking] (observing that “[w]hile many prebankruptcy preferences
may reflect a debtor’s legitimate efforts to allocate scarce resources in the face of
financial distress, others stem from insiders’ less appropriate desires to help themselves
to the firm’s assets at the expense of other creditors”).
252 See Miniscribe Corp. v. Keymarc, Inc. (In re Miniscribe), 123 B.R. 86, 88 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1991) (observing that the debtor would make preferential payments “to various
creditors based upon each creditor’s ‘threshold of pain’ . . . a term which describes when
a creditor would complain of late payment and threaten to either ship the goods C.O.D. or
terminate its relationship with Miniscribe”).
253 One commentator has suggested that this may be optimal. See James W. Bowers,
Whither What Hits the Fan?: Murphy’s Law, Bankruptcy Theory, and the Elementary
Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L. REV. 27, 50 (1991) (arguing that “[d]ebtors
will tend to prefer those creditors who have specialized in dealing with them and whose
losses from nonpayment therefore are likely to be greatest.”). This, however, is not
necessarily so. For example, a debtor’s tort obligations may dwarf its liabilities to critical
trade vendors “who have specialized in dealing [with the debtor],” and, comparatively,
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Third, regardless of whether payments are made under pressure or not, certain
creditors may make off with funds from sources controlled by the debtor in which others
have a superior interest. For example, a secured creditor may hold a lien on a defaulting
debtor’s accounts, as well as the cash proceeds arising from the debtor’s collection of its
accounts. But until the secured creditor manages to take control of the collateral (which
may take a significant amount of time, particularly if the debtor resists), the debtor may
use the cash to pay other creditors in the sense that, by fiat, the debtor simply makes these
payments.254
the debtor’s inability to pay tort claims may have a more devastating effect on the victims
of the debtor’s torts as compared to trade creditors because of the tort victims’ relative
inability to spread their losses. A second commentator has likewise suggested that a
distressed firm should be entitled to make preferential payments to “whomever it
chooses.” See Schwartz, Normative Theory, supra note 9 at 1228. Among other things,
Schwartz has argued that “creditors cannot force a distressed firm to pay preferences”
because debtors can threaten bankruptcy in order to stave off such debt-collection
activity. Id. at 1225. While this may be somewhat true with respect to certain financial
creditors that lack leverage over the debtor in the form of prospective advances of credit
or sales of needed goods, it is not true for other creditors who may exert such leverage.
Non-bankruptcy laws also privilege certain creditors (such as tax claimants and
employees) with enhanced sanctions (including criminal fines) if their claims are not
paid. Timing also matters. For example, creditors may well ignore an insolvent debtor’s
threat of filing, even if facially credible, on the theory that it is better to obtain payment
currently and take the risk of the debtor’s filing than forego payment currently because
there are many reasons why a debtor may elect to delay filing even though some creditors
engage in aggressive debt-collection activities and receive payment of their claims as a
result. These reasons for delay may include the debtor’s near-settlement with other, more
important creditors, or the debtor’s need to line up post-filing financing before
commencing a bankruptcy case. See supra at 60 (discussing post-filing financing in
bankruptcy).
254 Debtors often make transfers to creditors holding junior claims, leaving more senior
creditors without recourse. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-332(a) (“A transferee of money takes
the money free of a security interest unless the transferee acts in collusion with the debtor
in violating the rights of the secured party”); see also U.C.C. § 9-332(a) cmt. 2 (“This
section affords broad protection to transferees who take funds from a deposit account and
to those who take money.”); LoPucki, General Theory, supra note 181 at 344 (observing,
for example, that “[d]ebtors in financial difficulty commonly ignore the ‘priority’ of the
obligation to pay withheld taxes to the IRS and instead pay what they regard as more
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Fourth, different obligations often incorporate different types of default
mechanisms, and creditors benefiting from stricter covenants may simply be able to
exercise their rights sooner than others. Hence, some creditors may receive payment
ahead of others for reasons having nothing to do with the overall validity or legal priority
of their claims.255
Fifth, the debtor may assure the payment of the claim of a particular creditor
ahead of others, such as by granting the creditor a security interest in one or more items
of the debtor’s property. Although the creditor may not thereby receive payment in full
at the time the security interest is granted, the grant of the security interest may
effectively assure priority payment.256
pressing obligations that formally have a low priority.”). Conversely, a secured creditor
holding a lien on one type of collateral essential to the debtor’s operations might pressure
the debtor to sell other assets quickly and at low prices in order to convert the proceeds
into the type of collateral in which the creditor holds a lien. See Anthony T. Kronman,
The Treatment of Security Interests in After-Acquired Property Under the Proposed
Bankruptcy Act, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 110, 144 (1975) (discussing this type of pressure).
255 As one court has noted in an analogous context: “In bankruptcy, as in life, timing
matters.” In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 162 B.R. 619, 628 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994), aff’d,
168 B.R. 434 (S.D. Fla. 1994), aff’d, 58 F.3d 1573 (11th cir. 1995). That is why most
debt contracts have cross-default provisions. If, however, a creditor is unaware of the
debtor’s default to another creditor, it may not know that it may assert its rights under a
cross-default covenant.
256 See, e.g., Corn Exchange Nat. Bank & Trust Co., Philadelphia v. Klauder, 318 U.S.
434 (1943) (treating as a preference an assignment of accounts receivable in
consideration of a loan). One commentator has argued that assuring payment of
preexisting unsecured debts may be beneficial “so that financially distressed firms could
borrow more easily.” See Schwartz, Normative Theory, supra note 9 at 1230. But it
depends. Presumably, lenders will extend new value to distressed firms if they can be
assured of full repayment for the new value given. In theory, assuring payment of
preexisting indebtedness is not necessary as a condition of obtaining new credit because a
lender who will make a profit from the new extension of credit will do so rather than
succumb to the sunk-cost fallacy and refuse to deal with the debtor unless the old debt
(the sunk-cost) is paid. See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 873 (7th Cir. 2004)
(Easterbrook, J.) (discussing the sunk-cost fallacy). A lender who is willing to extend
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Finally, payment discrimination may arise solely as a result of fortuity. For
example, if two different obligations mature at different times, the debtor may simply pay
the first to mature. In addition, some claimants (for example, tort victims who have not
yet manifested any injury arising from the debtor’s prior conduct) may not even know
they have a claim at the point at which the debtor turns over his last nickel to some other
creditor.257
By definition, if a debtor is solvent and remains so, creditors suffering from any of
these types of discriminations do not really suffer because they may still obtain full,
compensatory relief simply by compelling the debtor to pay their claims. In general, this
is the relief that ordinary debt-enforcement mechanisms provide. In the context of a
solvent debtor, this relief is a complete answer to the problem of payment discrimination
because, by definition, solvent debtors can afford to pay, and thereby can make all
creditors whole.
new credit and receives assurance of repayment for both its new value and its existing
claims inflicts a type of payment discrimination on other existing creditors. Moreover,
the harm may be grossly disproportionate. For example, the lender may extend new
value to the debtor in the amount of $1 million in exchange for the assurance of
repayment (through the granting of liens) of the $1 million of new value plus the
assurance of repayment of $10 million of existing unsecured indebtedness. The lender
would agree to this arrangement because it greatly benefits the lender, and the debtor
would agree if doing so merely came at the expense of other creditors. Courts, however,
have sometimes rejected this kind of maneuver. See In re Saybrook Mfg. Co., 963 F.2d
1490, 1491 (11th Cir. 1992).
257 The problem of unmanifested tort claims has arisen repeatedly in the bankruptcy
context, both with respect to commonplace negligence claims and in the mass-tort
product-liability area. See In re UNR Indus., Inc., 725 F.2d 1111, 1118-21 (7th Cir.
1984) (discussing whether it is appropriate to appoint a representative for future asbestos
claimants who have not yet developed an injury from exposure to asbestos products
manufactured by the debtor); Roach v. Edge (In re Edge), 60 B.R. 690, 691 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1986) (involving an injury from the prepetition negligence of an insolvent dentist
that did not manifest itself until after the dentist filed for bankruptcy).
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On the other hand, if the debtor is insolvent (or threatens to become insolvent in
the near term), the situation is very different. Because the victims of payment
discrimination may receive little or nothing if the debtor lacks the wherewithal to pay all
claims in full, resort to traditional non-bankruptcy enforcement devices may well fail to
provide an adequate response to their plight precisely because these devices do nothing
more than require the debtor to pay valid claims.258
258 Not surprisingly, current bankruptcy law prescribes mechanisms to remedy payment
discrimination, such as through the avoidance and recovery of preferences. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 547 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing for the avoidance of certain preferential
payments that have the effect of preferring certain creditors over others), 550 (2000 &
Supp. 2006) (providing for the recovery of preferential payments); Union Bank v. Wolas,
502 U.S. 151, 154-55 (1991) (discussing preference law under the Bankruptcy Code);
Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 58 (1990) (same); In re Bullion Reserve of North America,
836 F.2d 1214, 1217 (9th Cir. 1988) (explaining that “[t]he dual purpose of §547 . . . is to
discourage creditors from racing to the courthouse to dismember the debtor during its
slide into bankruptcy and to further the prime bankruptcy policy of equal distribution
among similarly situated creditors.”). Remedies for payment discrimination have been an
essential feature of bankruptcy law for many centuries. See Central Virginia Comm.
College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 372 (2006) (observing that the authority to avoid and
recover preferences in bankruptcy “has been a core aspect of the administration of
bankruptcy estates since at least the 18th century”). Edward Coke first explained the
basic idea in 1584, as well as its central premise of equality of distribution. See The Case
of Bankrupts, 76 Eng. Rep. 441, 473 (K.B. 1584) (stating that “it would be unequal and
unconscionable, and a great defect in the law, if, after he hath utterly discredited himself
by becoming a bankrupt, the law should credit him to make distribution of his goods to
whom he pleased . . . .”); see also Vern Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable
Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REV. 713, 714-25 (1985) [hereinafter
Countryman, Concept] (discussing the history of preference law). By 1758, the recovery
of preferential transfers in a manner similar to that prescribed by the current Bankruptcy
Code had become established law. See Worsely v. DeMattos, 1 Burr. 467, 482, 96 Eng.
Rep. 1160 (K.B. 1758) (Mansfield, C.J.) (a debtor’s voluntary payment to a creditor, not
in the regular course of business, was “void with respect to other creditors”); see also 32
& 33 Vict., ch. 71, § 92 (1869) (Eng.) (providing that any payment by a debtor to a
creditor within three months of the bankruptcy “with a view of giving such creditor a
preference over the other creditors shall . . . be . . . void as against the trustee of the
bankrupt”). During the colonial era, different States likewise experimented with
preference laws. See PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA:
INSOLVENCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY, 1607-1900, 69, 212 (1974)
[hereinafter COLEMAN, DEBTORS] (discussing Vermont and Delaware laws); F. REGIS
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In response to these problems, one might ask: instead of addressing payment
discrimination through a mechanism of bankruptcy law, why not simply modify existing
enforcement mechanisms to address it? Here, however, we again confront the fact that it
is only in the context of insolvency that the problem of payment discrimination assumes
any real significance. Accordingly, there is no real point in addressing the problem in
every collection action regardless of the solvency of the obligor.259 Because the problem
is peculiarly one of insolvency, there is simply no reason to incur the costs of addressing
it in every context and thus violate the rule against fixing something that is not broken.260
In addition, because the insolvency-related problem of payment discrimination is
complex and contentious, it satisfies the circumstances of bankruptcy legality and is
properly the subject of bankruptcy law.
NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAW, 43-44 (2002) [hereinafter NOEL, HISTORY]
(discussing Maryland law); Thomas E. Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, 71 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1063, 1086-87 (2002) (discussing Maryland law); Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (as
amended by the Chandler Act), ch. 575, § 60(b), 52 Stat. 870 (providing for the
avoidance of preferential payments).
259 See John C. McCoid II, Bankruptcy, Preferences, and Efficiency: An Expression of
Doubt, 67 VA. L. REV. 249, 159-60 (1981) (observing that “[s]o long as a debtor is
solvent, every creditor can expect to be paid in full, and each may act independently
without affecting others. There is generally no occasion for collective action.”).
260 It is at least conceivable, of course, that doing nothing to address the problem of
payment discrimination is an appropriate response in the insolvency context if the
available solutions are worse than the problem. See supra notes 253, 256 (discussing
suggestions that payment discriminations arising under non-bankruptcy law may be
optimal). For many centuries, however, bankruptcy law has sought to remedy the
problem of payment discrimination through its preference provisions. See supra note 258
(summarizing history of preference law in bankruptcy). This may be appropriate not only
to vindicate bankruptcy law’s debt-adjustment values, but also to help remedy the
bankruptcy initiation problem. See supra at 87-90 (discussing the initiation problem).
To the extent insolvent debtors and creditors have incentives to avoid making and
accepting preferential payments, this may help encourage debtors in need of bankruptcy
relief to file for bankruptcy sooner rather than later, when it may be more efficacious.
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PROBLEMS OF OVERINVESTMENT, UNDERINVESTMENT, AND OTHER MORAL HAZARD
In addition to the problems of claims mediation and payment discrimination
discussed above, a debtor’s insolvency also generates additional problems of
overinvestment, underinvestment, and other moral hazard.261 The problem of
overinvestment arises owing to an insolvent debtor’s enhanced incentives to engage in
wasteful delay and excessive risk taking. The problem of underinvestment arises as a
result of the creditors’ incentives to take actions that lead to value-diminishing debt-
collection “free-for-alls,” and likewise problems of stagnating and overburdened assets,
261 See Skeel, Evolutionary, supra note 147 at 1333 n.17 (illustrating the problems of
“overinvestment” and “underinvestment”); see generally Myers, Determinants, supra
note 147 (discussing managerial behavior). The problem of overinvestment includes the
incentive that both insolvent individuals and the shareholders of an insolvent firm have to
encourage managers to pursue excessively risky investments. See EDWARD
CHANCELLOR, DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST, A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL SPECULATION 252
(1999) [hereinafter CHANCELLOR, DEVIL] (discussing the Hunt brothers’ risky attempt to
corner the silver market in 1979-80, which triggered additional desperate efforts to
recover their fortune after they became insolvent); ALAN C. SHAPIRO, MODERN
CORPORATE FINANCE 463-64 (1990) (detailing the efforts of the bankrupt Hunt brothers,
who, after sustaining huge losses stemming from their failed attempt to corner the
international silver market, sought to persuade the bankruptcy court over the objection of
creditors to permit them to continue to fund an excessively risky offshore oil venture that,
while offering the brothers the prospect of potential gain, represented a negative net
present value for their creditors once the risks of the venture were taken into account). In
contrast, the problem of underinvestment includes taking too little entrepreneurial risk.
In general, a problem of moral hazard arises whenever one is in the position of taking on
risk, but someone else will bear the cost if things go badly. Problems of moral hazard
thus involve externalities. See supra note 249 (discussing externalities). The classic
example of a problem of moral hazard is insurance. If an individual’s car is not insured,
he has an incentive to drive carefully, make sure the car is locked when not in use, and
otherwise avoid injury to the vehicle and others. With insurance, however, this incentive
is reduced because the insurer bears the loss of injury. Customary insurance practices
and legal regulation aim to compensate for this kind of moral hazard, at least in part, by
requiring insureds to bear at least some of any loss through deductibles, limits, and the
like, and by penalizing certain forms of bad behavior, such as purposefully destroying
property to obtain a recovery from an insurer. The problems of overinvestment and
underinvestment can also be problems of moral hazard, particularly in the insolvency
context.
138
including most prominently a debtor’s human capital. An additional problem of moral
hazard arises owing to an insolvent debtor’s increased incentives to shelter his assets,
including making outright gratuitous transfers—a species of fraud. Like the problems of
competing claims and payment discrimination, these aspects of the phenomenon of
insolvency are complex and contentious. Moreover, they are all characteristically
insolvency related in ways similar to the problems of claims mediation and payment
discrimination, and it would make no sense to modify non-bankruptcy legal systems to
address them. As a consequence, they satisfy the circumstances of bankruptcy legality
and are properly the subject of bankruptcy law.
INCENTIVES FOR DELAY AND EXCESSIVE RISK TAKING
A major problem that arises as a consequence of insolvency is the debtor’s
increased incentives to delay debt-collection activity and gamble with his assets. In order
to understand the magnitude of this problem and why it is properly a concern of
bankruptcy law, it is first helpful to examine a debtor’s incentives to manage his assets in
solvent states and compare these to the radically skewed incentives of the insolvent
debtor.
In general, an individual debtor’s ownership interest in property permits him to
make use of his assets in any number of useful (or even not-so-useful) ways. If the
debtor’s efforts are successful in generating profits, these are for the debtor to keep and
use as he sees fit. That is the prerogative that comes with equity.262 In contrast, creditors
are only entitled to the payment of their claims and, absent default, have no right to the
262 I refer to “equity” here as the interest of an owner to enjoy the value, including the
upside potential and profits, of an item of property.
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debtor’s property above and beyond their fixed payment entitlements. The same is
generally true for both individuals and firms.263
As long as a debtor remains solvent, the value of his overall ownership interest
has two fundamental aspects relevant to the payment of claims: the present value of the
assets as measured by what they are worth if sold in some market today, and the assets’
potential future value in terms of their ability to increase or decrease in value in some
way, either as a result of the debtor’s investment of the assets by putting them to some
productive use, the debtor’s investment of labor to improve the assets, or through
changing market conditions independent of the debtor’s efforts (which potential future
value obviously might be quite different from current value). In addition, as long as the
debtor remains solvent, the debtor will possess what might be thought of as ordinary (or
“normal”) risk incentives in the use of his property. This simply means that, because the
debtor has a stake in the outcome of the investment, he will usually make decisions based
upon his own judgment of success or failure and his own personal preference for risk,
263 As Judge Learned Hand (1872-1971) explained the concept:
Both the shareholders and the creditors in any enterprise assume some risk
of its failure, but their risks are different. The shareholders stand to lose
first, but in return they have all the winnings above the creditors’ interest,
if the venture is successful; on the other hand the creditors have only their
interest, but they come first in distribution of the assets . . . . [E]very
creditor rightly assumes that his risk is measured by the collective claims
of other creditors, and by creditors he understands those alone, who like
him, have only a stipulated share in the profits [calculated on the basis of
their claims]. To compel him to divide the assets in insolvency with those
who at their option have all along had the power to take all the earnings, is
to add to the risk which he accepted.
Flynn v. Loewer Realty Co. (In re V. Loewer’s Gambrinus Brewery Co.), 167 F.2d 318,
320 (2d Cir. 1948) (L. Hand, J., concurring); see also Rasmussen, Behavioral Economics,
supra note 56 at 1685 (observing that, in contrast to equity holders, “[c]reditors, through
the market, are limited to a competitive rate of return”).
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recognizing that he has both something to gain and something to lose from any particular
investment decision. In general, markets rely on such rational decision making to
function smoothly and predictably.
Further, as long as an individual debtor remains solvent (and absent some special
arrangement or relationship between the debtor and others relevant to the disposition of a
particular asset), the law does not regulate strictly the risks that he may take with his
property—other than risks that impact other persons in such as way as to justify specific
regulation of some kind, such as excessive noise, pollution, and the like. Rather, the law
typically leaves it to the debtor to enjoy the gains or losses from his choices. Moreover,
absent some contractual agreement to the contrary, or some special relationship imposed
by law, creditors are not typically entitled to dictate what the debtor may do with his
property, and the debtor does not owe creditors any general fiduciary obligation in this
regard.264
The relationship between the creditors and managers of a solvent firm are
similarly aligned.265 In general, the law does not regulate strictly the kinds of investment
264 See Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 953, 965
n.39 (1981) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law] (observing that “[a]n unsecured
creditor has no enforceable interest in particular property of the debtor. The creditor
either must obtain a security interest in property or execute upon property in enforcing a
judgment”).
265 See In re STN Enters., 779 F.2d 901, 904 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that the “directors of
a solvent corporation do not owe a fiduciary duty to creditors”); see also 3 WILLIAM M.
FLETCHER, ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 849
(perm ed. 1965). As stated in FLETCHER:
it is difficult to perceive upon what principle a director of a corporation
can be considered a trustee of its creditors. He is selected by the
shareholders, not by creditors; he has no contractual relation with the latter
. . . [and] it is not pretended that in the latter case the agent would be the
trustee of the creditors of his principal. And . . . by the great weight of
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choices that managers may make.266 Instead, the firm (and in some limited circumstances
the managers themselves) must bear the losses associated with poor investment decisions.
Hence, although managers may owe fiduciary duties to the firm’s equity holders on
whose behalf they toil, and may be liable to them if they take negligent risks or otherwise
violate their duties,267 no similar duty or potential cause of action exists between the
managers and creditors of a solvent firm.268
authority such trust relation is distinctly repudiated, when the corporation
is a going concern.
Id. (quotations omitted).
266 See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and its
Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 836 (1985) [hereinafter Baird & Jackson,
Fraudulent Conveyance] (describing the normative premise of the “business judgment
rule” that “a firm’s investment decisions should be made by its managers even though
that freedom necessarily conflicts to some extent with creditor security,” and observing
that “[t]his conflict motivates creditors to bargain for limitations on the ability of a debtor
to engage in certain activities”). Exceptions to the general rule of legal noninterference
with the discretion of managers to make investment decisions include legal restrictions on
the investment activities of the managers of certain nonprofit organizations and trusts.
See Lewis D. Solomon & Karen C. Coe, Social Investments by Nonprofit Corporations
and Charitable Trusts: A Legal and Business Primer for Foundation Managers and
Other Nonprofit Fiduciaries, 66 UMKC L. REV. 213, 220 (1997).
267 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991 & Supp. 1998); Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 358, 360-62 (Del. 1993) (holding that rebuttal of the
business judgment rule will only be successful where the plaintiff can show that a
director breached one of the triad of fiduciary duties: good faith, loyalty, or due care),
modified on reh’g, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994); Sirn v. VLI Corp., 621 A.2d 773, 775-78
(Del. 1993) (holding that a director’s duty to disclose all material facts bearing on a
merger arises under the duties of due care and loyalty); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
858, 872-73 (Del. 1985); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713-15 (Del. 1983)
(holding that minority shareholders were entitled to damages where a merger did not
meet the test of fairness because of misrepresentations by directors). As long as the
corporate managers act in good faith and use due care to discover the relevant facts, the
business judgment rule will normally restrict courts from second-guessing their ordinary
business decisions. See Wolgin v. Simon, 722 F.2d 389, 393 (8th Cir. 1983) (stating that
“where the matter under consideration is one that calls for the business judgment or
discretion of a corporation’s board of directors the courts will not interfere so long as that
judgment is exercised fairly and honestly”); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir.
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Among other things, the relative absence of regulation over the investment
choices of solvent individuals is grounded on the perceived normative value of
maintaining a relatively diverse risk-taking environment wherein individuals are free to
1982); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293-95 (7th Cir. 1981). Some
jurisdictions permit firms to insulate managers from liability for breaches of the duty of
due care. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.210(1)(N) (Michie 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-
202(B)(3) (Michie 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(4) (1994); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-6002(b)(8) (1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 13(b)(1½) (1998); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 79-4-2.02(b)(4) (1996); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinny 1999); OR. REV.
STAT. § 60.047(2)(c) (1998). Some jurisdictions are more strict with respect to a
director’s duty of loyalty. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(i) (1991) (exempting
duty of loyalty from a firm’s ability to insulate directors from liability in breach of
fiduciary actions).
268 Two commentators have explained this rule in the following terms: “Managers owe
fiduciary duties to equity investors, but not debt investors or employees, because these
claimants can contract at low cost, while the costs of [specifying the details of the
relationship, including the roles and duties of managers] are prohibitively high for
residual claimants.” Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary
Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 437 (1993); see supra note 119, infra note 735 and
accompanying text (discussing the concept of a “residual claim”). According to these
commentators, there is no need for any special duty to creditors because it is relatively
easy for creditors to enter into contracts prescribing their rights. Equity holders, on the
other hand, entrust the debtor’s assets to “specialists” (i.e., managers) to perform a
variety of specific functions that are not easy to circumscribe in contractual terms. This
explanation is interesting, but incomplete, and other considerations may also inform the
rule, perhaps in equally compelling ways. For example, equity holders as a group may be
relatively poor monitors as compared to their creditor colleagues, thus justifying their
heightened protection. See Roberta Romano, Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel,
“Contract and Fiduciary Duty”, 36 J.L. & ECON. 447, 448 (1993). Similarly, the
diversity of the interests and preferences of equity holders may require the more
generalized standard of “fiduciary responsibility” to avoid inevitable conflicts between
their relative preferences if established on a contractual basis (e.g., one equity investor
might wish to contract with the debtor to pursue a relatively conservative investment
approach while another might prefer a more aggressive one). Finally, Easterbrook and
Fischel’s model does not account adequately for the interests of involuntary creditors,
such as tort victims, who do not have any realistic opportunity to contract with the debtor.
The point here, however, is not to resolve the issue of how best to explain why managers
owe fiduciary obligations to equity holders, but rather to illustrate the general absence of
a similar duty with respect to the creditors of a solvent firm.
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take risks and reap either the rewards or losses of their own investment decisions.269 It is
also based on the normative assumption that individual debtors are good decision makers
regarding the investment of assets within their control (or at least function better than the
alternatives, such as state-directed investment rules).270 Moreover, so long as the debtor
remains solvent, creditors can be said to suffer no immediate harm to their interests
arising from any loss occasioned by the debtor’s investment choices because the creditors
do not directly suffer the effects of the loss—because the debtor remains solvent, they
may still be paid. Likewise, debtors will tend to manage their affairs without taking
either excessive or inadequate risks because they have both something to lose and
something to gain by their choices. This collection of relatively unrestricted entitlements
(e.g., ownership rights and general non-interference with investment decisions)
269 See Baird, Uneasy Case, supra note 60 at 130-31. Baird has observed:
For the most part, investors who pool their assets may divide rights of
payout, control, withdrawal, and priority among themselves as they see fit.
This fact of corporate law reflects the general principle that individuals
can, for the most part, deploy their assets and enter into contracts as they
please.
Id.
270 See Jackson, Fresh-Start, supra note 20 at 1404. Jackson has stated that,
[n]ot only the American law of contracts, but also much of American
society in general, is structured around the premise that individuals should
for the most part have the freedom to order their own affairs as they
please, because rational, self-interested actors will tend to make decisions
that maximize their own utility.
Id.; see also ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT
LAW 1-7 (1979) (arguing that bilateral exchange pursuant to voluntary agreements tends
to transfer resources to their highest and best uses). As I discuss in Chapter 3, this
principle has important implications for the debt-forgiveness aspects of bankruptcy law.
In essence, insolvency impairs the ability of individuals and firms to engage in rational
self-direction. Debt forgiveness restores that capacity.
144
presumably maximizes social welfare by creating an environment in which actors are free
to make decisions for themselves and by harnessing their incentives to engage in
productive activities. It works presumably because solvent debtors have incentives to
operate within a normatively optimal range of risk-taking preferences that avoids the
relatively unpredictable extremes of both overinvestment (excessive risk taking) and
underinvestment (taking too little risk).271
Similarly, in the context of a solvent firm, this system of rules also reflects certain
additional assumptions. Among other things, while managers may sometimes shirk their
responsibilities to equity holders in order to pursue their own personal gain,272 it is
probably true that, to the best of their abilities, most managers will typically avoid
leading firms into financial ruin, if only to preserve their own positions.273 But once the
debtor approaches or enters a state of insolvency (for whatever reason), things change in
several material and cumulative respects.
First, an insolvent debtor no longer takes risks exclusively for his or her own
account. Upon the debtor’s default, creditors have the legal right to exhaust the value of
271 See supra notes 147, 261 (discussing the concepts of “overinvestment” and
“underinvestment”).
272 See Jensen & Meckling, Theory, supra note 150 at 308 (discussing this problem).
273 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy and Investment
Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 279 (1991) (making this point). Among other things,
managers may wish to avoid losing their jobs, as well as any negative impact on their
careers associated with the firm’s failure. See PHILIP B. NELSON, CORPORATIONS IN
CRISIS 98 (1981) (describing the stigma attached to bankruptcy); see also supra note 185,
infra note 292 (discussing the likelihood that managers will lose their positions once the
firm commences a bankruptcy proceeding).
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the debtor’s non-exempt property through the enforcement of their claims.274 Because of
this right, any further diminution in the value of the debtor’s property arising from the
debtor’s risk taking will necessarily and directly reduce the value of the creditors’ stake.
Second, if the debtor is insolvent, the value of the debtor’s interest (once claims
are taken into account) lies in the potential future increase in the value of his property.
Again, because creditors have the right to the payment of their claims ahead of the
defaulting debtor’s right to retain and use non-exempt property, the creditors may,
through the collection of their claims, exhaust entirely the current value of an insolvent
debtor’s non-exempt assets. Thus, the only hope an insolvent debtor may have of
recovering his position is if the debtor can stall the creditors from collecting on their
claims long enough so that the value of the assets may increase faster than the accrual of
interest and other recoverable charges (or the debtor is able somehow to add new assets
to the pool, obtain forgiveness of debt, or shelter assets from the reach of creditors).275
274 Only individuals may claim exempt assets; firms characteristically may not. See
supra note 73 (discussing exemptions).
275 As one commentator has noted in the context of an insolvent firm:
If the firm’s prospects are volatile, shareholders will want the managers to
delay, in the hope of selling when the price is high. On average, however,
delay will be costly. Equity claimants have reason to wait too long and to
set unrealistic reservation prices, for their claims are worthless unless
something unexpectedly good happens. Immediate sale at a realistic price
wipes them out; debt claimants bear any erosion of value during a delay,
yet have fixed claims and so do not realize the full gain if things turn out
well. This is the standard conflict between debt and equity claims, and as
usual is substantially aggravated during times of financial distress, when
the equity claim is worth little.
Easterbrook, Corporate Bankruptcy, supra note 146 at 415; see White, Public Policy,
supra note 183 at 553 (observing that “equity holders always favor continuance, since
their interest disappears under liquidation”); see also infra notes 276-78 (discussing an
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Third, building on the foregoing, the debtor’s risk incentives typically change in
ways that may be harmful to creditors. As noted, an insolvent debtor’s hope of
recovering his stake lies only in the prospect of increasing the value of the assets at a rate
greater than the accrual of interest and other charges on the creditors’ claims (assuming
no debt forgiveness, no new assets are brought into the picture, and the debtor cannot
shelter assets). The usual way to increase return, however, is through increased risk
taking.276 Hence, the deeper the debtor’s insolvency, the greater the debtor’s incentive to
take additional risks because that is commonly perceived as the only path to the debtor’s
recovery. In other words, the debtor is more likely to engage in excessive risk taking
because the debtor has nothing to lose and something to gain by doing so, and the
insolvent debtor’s incentives to gamble with his or her assets). As another commentator
has explained:
Faced with the prospect of no payout, equity favors delay for two reasons.
First, delay allows . . . resolution of the bankruptcy, and thus prolongs the
opportunity for a reversal of fortune large enough to return the firm to
solvency and return equity investors to a stake in the firm. If equity can
control the firm, moreover, it can increase the risk of the debtor’s
investments and thereby enhance this opportunity. However unlikely the
reversal of fortune, and whatever the cost to creditors of the protraction—
directly or from investment risk unjustified by expected returns—equity
gains from prolongation of its option on the firm’s value. Second, the
costs of the protracted procedure itself provide equity with an advantage.
Even without a realistic hope that the debtor will become solvent, equity
can impose the costs of delay until it wrests an extracontractual settlement
from senior claimants. Equity, if able, may hold the debtor hostage and
allow it to deteriorate in order to extract ransom from the debtor’s
contractual owners, the creditors.
Adler, Bankruptcy, supra note 56 at 448-49 (footnotes omitted).
276 See John Cassidy, Time Bomb, THE NEW YORKER, July 5, 1999, at 31 (paraphrasing
“the oldest law in finance: that higher returns can be generated only at the cost of higher
risk”).
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debtor’s insolvent state thus tends to influence the debtor into taking abnormal risks.277
Obviously, this is likely to lead to the debtor’s gambling with the creditors’ money,
thereby increasing their potential losses. In addition, it skews the debtor’s behavior
within the market—instead of acting under the influences of normal risk incentives, the
debtor is acting under the influences of the high octane lure of speculative recovery.
A famous illustration of this phenomenon is the story arising from the early
history of FedEx (formerly known as Federal Express). “Federal Express was near
financial collapse within a few years of its inception. The founder, Frederick Smith, took
$20,000 of corporate funds to Las Vegas in despair. He won at the gambling tables,
providing enough capital to allow the firm to survive.”278 Although FedEx was able to
survive owing to this gambling exercise, the more probable outcome in most cases is that
the debtor’s excessive risk taking will only exacerbate the creditor’s losses and generally
squander the debtor’s resources and time.
Acknowledging that an insolvent debtor has incentives to take excessive risks,
and likewise that an insolvent debtor who continues to take risks is actually trading on the
creditors’ account, the law generally recognizes that, looking through the lens of debt-
collection, insolvent debtors become, in some sense, the caretaking “managers” of their
assets for the creditors’ benefit.279 Specifically, courts have recognized that, upon the
277 See supra notes 275, 277 (discussing this point); JACKSON, LOGIC, supra note 8 at 205
(same); Adams, Economic Justification, supra note 181 at 125-27 (same); Golbe, Effects,
supra note 181 at 326 (same); LoPucki, General Theory, supra note 181 at 321-22
(same); Miller, Wealth Transfers, supra note 181 at 40 (same).
278 STEPHEN A. ROSS, ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 421-22 (4th ed. 1996).
279 Early decisions held that an insolvent debtor’s officers and directors were essentially
trustees obligated to preserve the value of the assets of the corporation for the benefit of
creditors. See Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U.S. 222, 240 (1935) (holding that the debtor’s
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debtor’s insolvency, creditors have an equitable interest in the assets of the debtor that
deserves consideration. In essence, their relative rights undergo an equitable
transformation to accommodate new economic interests and obligations.280 In particular,
an insolvent firm has been described as owing fiduciary duties to creditors that it would
not otherwise owe if solvent, although some courts have denied that this results in any
substantive shift in duties.281
officers “are to be dealt with just as if they were technically trustees for creditors and
stockholders”); New York Credit Men’s Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Weiss, 110 N.E.2d
397, 398 (N.Y. 1953) (stating that “[i]f the corporation was insolvent at that time it is
clear that defendants, as officers and directors thereof, were to be considered as though
trustees of the property for the corporate creditor-beneficiaries”); Davis v. Woolf, 147
F.2d 629, 633 (4th Cir. 1945) (noting that “[t]he law by the great weight of authority
seems to be settled that when a corporation becomes insolvent, or in a failing condition,
the officers and directors no longer represent the stockholders, but by the fact of
insolvency, become trustees for the creditors”) (citations omitted).
280 See Butler & Gilpatric, Re-Examination, supra note 53 at 283 (reasoning that the
going concern surplus of an insolvent firm belongs to the creditors as owners of the firm).
Scholars have built on this “ownership” premise in evaluating bankruptcy law, arguing,
for example, that Chapter 11 bankruptcy procedures are a way to transfer formal
ownership to give effect to the creditors’ entitlement. See, e.g., Rasmussen, Debtor’s
Choice, supra note 9 at 80 (arguing that the “extant provisions of Chapter 11 are in effect
a sale of the corporation to its creditors”).
281 See Pay ’N Pak Stores, Inc. v. Court Square Capital, Ltd. (In re PNP Holdings Corp.),
No. 96-35835, 1998 WL 133560, at *4 (9th Cir. Mar. 18, 1998) (recognizing a shift in
fiduciary duty to creditors once the debtor has become insolvent); FDIC v. Sea Pines Co.,
692 F.2d 973, 976-77 (4th Cir. 1982) (observing that “when the corporation becomes
insolvent, the fiduciary duty of the directors shifts from the stockholders to the
creditors”); Henderson v. Buchanan (In re Western World Funding, Inc.), 52 B.R. 743,
763 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985) (same); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe
Communications Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *36 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec.
30, 1991) (mem.) (concluding that the directors of a solvent debtor “in the vicinity of
insolvency” have duties to creditors, not just shareholders); see also Laura Lin, Shift of
Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors’ Duty to
Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1512-23 (1993) (reviewing the various court opinions
in which corporate directors were held to owe creditors a fiduciary duty); LoPucki &
Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 185 at 706-710 (arguing that officers and
directors of an insolvent corporation owe fiduciary duties to both the shareholders and the
creditors of the corporation). But see Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., Does a Corporation’s
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On the other hand, even though the creditors of an insolvent debtor may be
viewed as the new equitable “owners” of an insolvent debtor’s property, this does not
mean that they automatically gain control of this property or can easily forestall the
debtor’s gambling with the assets. Although non-bankruptcy debt-enforcement devices
typically provide various mechanisms to enable creditors to obtain satisfaction of their
claims from the debtor’s assets, and although these mechanisms may include procedures
that enable creditors to seize certain items in advance of their obtaining a judgment (or
Board of Directors Owe a Fiduciary Duty to its Creditors?, 25 ST. MARY’S L.J. 589, 592-
94 (1994) (criticizing the view that the managers of a solvent or insolvent corporation
have any fiduciary duties to creditors). In recent years, Delaware courts have clarified
that, for purposes of Delaware law, the substantive duties of a firm’s officers and
directors do not change when a firm approaches or becomes insolvent, at least not to the
extent of suspending the business judgment rule or creating any novel causes of action
that creditors may pursue. See Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc.,
863 A.2d 772, 792 (Del. Ch. 2004) (stating that “the fact of insolvency does not change
the primary object of the director’s concern, which is the firm itself” and “[t]he firm’s
insolvency simply makes the creditors the principal constituency injured by any fiduciary
breaches that diminish the firm’s value and logically gives them standing to pursue
claims to rectify that injury”); see also North American Catholic Educational
Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 103 (Del. 2007) (stating that
“[t]o recognize a new right for creditors to bring fiduciary claims against . . . directors
would create a conflict between those directors’ duties to maximize the value of an
insolvent corporation for the benefit of all those having an interest in it”); Trenwick
America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 205 (Del. Ch. 2006)
(rejecting “deepening insolvency” cause of action under Delaware law and emphasizing
that the directors of an insolvent corporation have no fiduciary duty to choose a relatively
conservative approach over a more aggressive investment strategy). The rules may be
different in other jurisdictions. See Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v.
Baldwin (In re Lemington Home for the Aged), 659 F.3d 282 (3d Cir. 2011) (applying
Pennsylvania law). In any event, consistent with the idea that the creditors’ interests in
an insolvent enterprise are paramount, insolvent firms are typically prohibited from
paying dividends to shareholders. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 501 (West 1998); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 29-218 (1996); IOWA CODE ANN. § 491.41 (West 1999); MASS GEN. LAWS
ch. 156B, § 61 (1992 & Supp. 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:7-14.1 (West Supp. 1999);
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 510(a) (McKinney 1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.33(C)
(Anderson 1997); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1551 (1995); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §
6.40(c)(1) & (2) (1998).
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have them placed in the hands of a receiver), these devices are also typically freighted
with numerous safeguards that can lead to lengthy proceedings.282
For example, creditors may be required to prove their claims to ensure that the
debtor is not made to satisfy fictitious, or otherwise defective, obligations. Similarly,
allegations of creditor fraud and other misconduct bearing on, or perhaps reducing, a
particular claim may have to be tried. Significantly, these procedures typically entail
varying degrees of delay. If the debtor is solvent, creditors are not harmed by the
debtor’s resort to these procedures in the sense that, if the creditors prevail in pursing
their claims, they will ultimately receive full payment (including, perhaps, interest to
compensate for the lost time-value of money and collection costs, if provided by contract,
statute, or rule). Moreover, if the debtor is solvent, the debtor has incentives to avoid
defaulting needlessly on legitimate obligations because doing so avoids the consequences
of default, including debt-collection activity and harm to the debtor’s reputation. But if
the debtor is insolvent, unique challenges arise.
First, if a debtor is insolvent other than on a temporary basis, default is usually
inevitable and unavoidable.283 Second, the debtor’s incentive to delay may cause the
282 For example, it can sometimes take years for a commercial dispute to wind its way
through the court system. See Skeel, Rethinking, supra note 251 at 528 n.241 (noting that
“many cases take as long as five to six years to come to trial in Chicago and other major
cities”). Additional federal glosses on state law protections may entail further delay. For
example, the Supreme Court has invalidated certain types of collection remedies that fail
to provide adequate notice and an opportunity for a hearing to the debtor. See North Ga.
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606-08 (1975) (invalidating Georgia’s
garnishment statute); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96-97 (1972) (invalidating the
Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes).
283 Some debtors, of course, experience insolvency only on a temporary basis. See supra
note 1. But in many cases, insolvency leads to default. See Baird & Jackson, Corporate
Reorganization, supra note 60 at 119 n.69 (1984) (observing that “whenever a firm is
insolvent, defaults are inevitable”).
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debtor to take advantage of the time-consuming safeguards embedded in ordinary debt-
collection procedures regardless of whether there is any substantive merit to the debtor’s
efforts (e.g., because the creditors’ claims are truly defective for some reason).284 Third,
during the course of any delay in enforcement (which may be considerable), the debtor
will often continue to control his property. As a result, the debtor may continue to deploy
his assets in accordance with the debtor’s preferences influenced by the debtor’s
incentive to take excessive risks—at least in the sense that the debtor, by fiat, will
continue to do so regardless of any new “fiduciary” obligation to creditors.285 If the
insolvent debtor’s risk preferences differ from those of at least some of the new creditor-
owners (which they often will), then the debtor’s continued control may result in costs to
these creditor-owners in the form of losses they would not suffer if the assets were
managed in accordance with the creditors’ preferences (e.g., investments that are less
risky than those the insolvent debtor would be inclined to pursue) or in accordance with
the preferences of a solvent debtor with normal risk-taking incentives.
Additional complications arise in the context of insolvent firms. Before the onset
of insolvency, managers owe their loyalties to the firm’s equity owners. Once the firm
becomes insolvent, however, managers may owe new fiduciary obligations to
creditors.286 Yet, because the managers of an insolvent firm typically remain subject to
284 See supra note 275 (discussing the debtor’s incentives for delay).
285 Rarely, if ever, will a court enjoin a debtor’s ongoing operations pending the outcome
of a commercial dispute between a debtor and creditor. See Grupo Mexicano de
Desarrollo, SA v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 321 (1999) (following “the
well-established general rule that a judgment establishing the debt was necessary before a
court of equity would interfere with the debtor’s use of his property”).
286 See supra note 281 (discussing the potential shift of the duties of the managers of an
insolvent firm from shareholders to creditors).
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dismissal by preexisting equity holders (or may hold equity stakes themselves),287 their
loyalties may be divided and, as a practical matter, they may pursue the interests of the
equity holders at whose pleasure they continue to serve.
Because the creditors of an insolvent firm have the right to exhaust the value of
the firm’s assets through the enforcement of their claims, equity holders have nothing to
lose and everything to gain by the managers’ increased risk taking, and thus have a
“perverse incentive” to compel managers to take excessive risk, again generating a
problem of overinvestment.288 In some cases, of course, equity holders may be
ineffective in coordinating and promoting their interests (e.g., because they are too
numerous and diffuse).289 In other instances, however, they may well coalesce into a
cohesive and organized force, and exert a strong influence on management decisions,
particularly where the owners and managers of the firm are one and the same.290
287 See Manville Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders Comm. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 801
F.2d 60, 69 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that the equity holders of an insolvent company could
hold a meeting to replace the corporate directors absent a finding that the equity holders
intended to completely derail the debtor’s reorganization); In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 111
F.2d 590, 592 (2d Cir. 1940) (stating that “the right of the majority of stockholders to be
represented by directors of their own choice and thus to control corporate policy is
paramount and will not be disturbed unless a clear case of abuse is made out”); see also
Skeel, Rethinking, supra note 251 at 507 (discussing the Manville decision).
288 See Skeel, Evolutionary, supra note 147 at 1333 (discussing the concept of “perverse
incentives”); see also supra notes 147, 261 (discussing the concept of “overinvestment”).
289 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of
Shareholder Choice, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1, 39-55 (1988) (describing various problems in
coordinating shareholder voting, including voter apathy); see generally MARK J. ROE,
STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE
FINANCE 4-18 (1994) (outlining the development of the model of detached, fragmented
ownership of American firms).
290 CHANCELLOR, DEVIL, supra note 261 at 330 (observing that “[b]ecause the interest of
management is nowadays more closely aligned with shareholders through executive
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Moreover, individual self-interest may color the managers’ decision making in
inappropriate ways,291 thus yielding additional variables in the cost equation.
This is not to say, of course, that the managers of an insolvent firm never
represent the interests of creditors. Managers, particularly those who have no significant
equity position in the firm, may prefer less risky investments than equity holders in order
to prevent the complete failure of the firm and the loss of any firm-specific investment
that they have made (such as their investment in accumulating expertise in managing the
particular business of the debtor) and that they would forfeit if they were to lose their
positions. Certainly risk of job loss incident to bankruptcy is significant.292 But that is
not the only consideration, and many managers, particularly those with significant equity
positions, may well be inclined toward increased risk taking.293
stock-option schemes” the shareholders “hold the whip and will crack it when
necessary”).
291 For example, managers might discriminate in favor of the payment of claims that they
have guaranteed personally, even though preferring other claims might have more
beneficial effects for the firm. See supra note 251 (citing cases involving a manager’s
payment of a claim that he guaranteed ahead of other claims); see also Rasmussen,
Behavioral Economics, supra note 56 at 1685 (observing that “managers, in selecting
which investments to pursue, will act in their own self-interest. Thus managers will make
investment decisions based on how management will fare both when the decisions turn
out to be successes . . . and when they turn out to be failures.”).
292 See supra note 185 (discussing likelihood that managers will be replaced before and
after a firm files for bankruptcy); Baird & Bernstein, Absolute Priority, supra note 190 at
1932-33 (observing that “[o]ld managers frequently are replaced (often before the
Chapter 11 case even begins) with turnaround specialists whose loyalties, if any, are with
the senior creditors.”); Gilson, Bankruptcy, supra note 185 at 386 (reporting findings on
management displacement); Gilson, Management, supra note 185 at 261 (same).
293 As one commentator has argued, the evidence suggests that
even prior to insolvency and outside bankruptcy, in many firms the
managers’ equity investments are large enough and their fiduciary duties
are strong enough [to equity holders] to align management and equity
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All of the foregoing are forms of agency costs and, of course, agency costs are
certainly nothing new.294 Nor are they limited to insolvency situations.295 What is
unique in the insolvency context, however, is the degree to which the relevant risk
incentives change, depending on the depth of the debtor’s financial crisis and the debtor’s
prospects for recovery. In non-bankruptcy systems, agency costs may be controlled in a
variety of ways (e.g., by creating incentives to avoid them, including imposing liability
rules for certain types of behaviors)296 and, at least ideally, the costs of these controls
interests. After insolvency, and once inside bankruptcy, that incentive not
only persists but is enhanced, because when bankruptcy’s potential effect
on the managers’ jobs becomes real, managers’ interests in the debtor are
pared to their equity investments and abilities to use the reorganization
process to prolong their employment or to exact other personal benefits.
Adler, Bankruptcy, supra note 56 at 450 (footnotes omitted).
294 See supra note 150 (discussing the concept of “agency costs”); Adams, Governance,
supra note 150 at 601 (same); Jensen & Meckling, Theory, supra note 150 at 308 (same).
For an extreme historical example, see ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND
CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 741 (R.H. Campbell, et al. eds. 1976) (describing
the management of the South Sea Company, a notoriously speculative venture at the
center of the South Sea Bubble crisis in England in 1720); CHANCELLOR, DEVIL, supra
note 261 at 58-95 (discussing the South Sea Bubble).
295 See Erica M. Ryland, Bracing for the “Failure Boom”: Should a Revlon Auction Duty
Arise in Chapter 11?, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2255, 2255-58 (1990) [hereinafter Ryland,
Bracing] (discussing agency costs in the non-bankruptcy context); see generally Eugene
F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980)
(discussing agency costs generally).
296 See Adams, Governance, supra note 150 at 601-03 (arguing that, although market
forces and contractual relationships act to control agency costs, corporate law also
attempts to control agency costs by imposing upon management the fiduciary duties of
care and loyalty); Ryland, Bracing, supra note 295 at 2255-58 (explaining how state
corporate law has attempted to control agency costs in the non-bankruptcy context);
Skeel, Evolutionary, supra note 147 at 1332-33 (observing that “[m]uch of corporate law
and of the parties’ own contractual arrangements can be seen as efforts to minimize . . .
agency costs”).
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should not exceed the costs they avoid.297 Moreover, one would expect that, in non-
bankruptcy systems, the relevant controls would be tailored to the norms of non-
bankruptcy circumstances (e.g., the assumption that the equity holders of a solvent firm
have appropriate incentives to compel managers to act in normatively appropriate ways).
Insolvency, however, creates a novel cost context in which key assumptions
underlying normal legal regulation and the operation of ordinary markets no longer hold
true.298 Indeed, the situation is radically different. Because (1) insolvency creates special
incentives for wasteful delay and excessive risk taking, (2) these problems are complex
and contentious, and (3) it would make no sense for ordinary non-bankruptcy law to
address them, they satisfy the circumstances of bankruptcy legality and are thus properly
the subject of bankruptcy law.299
297 See COASE, FIRM, supra note 7 at 26-27 (arguing that legal regulation is often
necessary to control costs, but that the losses sought to be avoided should be greater than
the costs of the controls). Some commentators have challenged the effectiveness of
certain non-bankruptcy legal controls on agency costs, particularly shareholder derivative
actions. See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 55 (1991) (questioning the utility of derivative actions); Skeel,
Rethinking, supra note 251 at 498 (discussing debate on the utility of derivative actions).
298 See Adams, Governance, supra note 150 at 605-07 (explaining that agency costs are
greater when corporations become insolvent); Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in
Chapter 11, 36 J.L. & ECON. 633, 641-46 (1993) [hereinafter Baird, Revisiting]
(discussing the agency costs that arise during bankruptcy).
299 Current bankruptcy law seeks to reduce the costs associated with delay and excessive
risk-taking. For example, in Chapter 7 cases a trustee (who may be elected by creditors)
displaces the debtor and liquidates the debtor’s non-exempt assets for the creditors’
benefit, subject to court supervision, the opportunity for creditor involvement, and
supervision by the office of the United States Trustee. See supra notes 16, 241 (outlining
procedures in Chapter 7 cases). In Chapter 11 reorganization cases, the debtor typically
remains in control of the assets, but is subjected to court supervision, information-sharing
requirements, scrutiny by creditors, and shared decision-making. See supra notes 16,
126, 241 (outlining procedures in Chapter 11 cases). In addition, the provisions of
Chapter 11 create a structured bargaining process for the resolution of the debtor’s fate
through shared decision making (i.e., decision making superintended by special forms of
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DUELING STAKEHOLDERS, THE DEBT-COLLECTION “FREE-FOR-ALL,”
AND STAGNATING AND OVERBURDENED ASSETS
In addition to the problems addressed above that focus on an insolvent debtor’s
incentives to mismanage his property, there are similar problems related to the behavior
of creditors. These arise from the way in which creditors perceive their competing
interests in the debtor and the debtor’s property, the circumstances of their diverse
relationships with the debtor, and their heterogenous perspectives on risk. As a group,
these problems are characteristically complex and contentious, and likewise sufficiently
insolvency related that it would make no sense to address them through the modification
of ordinary non-bankruptcy procedures. Accordingly, they also satisfy the circumstances
of bankruptcy legality. In order to explain these problems fruitfully, however, it is
helpful first to distinguish the interests and incentives of different illustrative creditor
constituencies.
DUELING STAKEHOLDERS
Just as the risk preferences of an insolvent debtor may differ substantially from
those of a solvent debtor or any particular creditor, the risk preferences of one creditor
may be quite different from those of another. Similarly, they may also have quite
different perspectives on the nature of their respective relationships with the debtor and
their interests in the debtor and the debtor’s property. A comparison of three hypothetical
creditors illustrates the point.
legal regulation), either culminating in a sale of the debtor’s business or the negotiation
of a plan providing for the disposition of the debtor’s assets and the payment of claims.
See Baird & Bernstein, Absolute Priority, supra note 190 at 1932, 1950-51 (observing
that a Chapter 11 proceeding may involve the sale of the business or a stand-alone
reorganization, and discussing the dynamics of the negotiation process). The shared
decision-making process is designed to negate incentives for delay and excessive risk-
taking.
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First, suppose an insolvent debtor is obligated to a secured creditor for some
amount of funded indebtedness (i.e., loans of money) and is in default on his obligation.
If the value of the creditor’s collateral is sufficient to pay off the claim in full, the secured
creditor may well wish to dispose of its collateral as quickly as possible after the debtor’s
default (regardless of the impact of doing so on the debtor’s operations or other
creditors), thereby permitting the creditor to obtain a quick recovery and allow it to
reinvestment the funds with some other borrower.300 Secured creditors typically have
some idea of what they believe their collateral is worth (even if their estimate may not be
precisely accurate). They are also typically suspicious that an insolvent debtor will tend
to gamble with their collateral. Accordingly, the secured creditor may be understandably
squeamish about the debtor’s continued use of any collateral after default, particularly
any use that might result in any diminution in the collateral’s value (e.g., its use to run the
debtor’s business, or to pay other claims). Creditors of this type (with much to lose and
little to gain from the debtor’s continued use and control of collateral) may be classified
as generally tending to be highly risk averse—a conclusion perhaps bolstered by the fact
that they took security in the first place.301
Second, the insolvent debtor may also be indebted to an unsecured trade creditor
who supplies the debtor with goods and services. If the current value of the debtor’s
assets (after deducting the value of secured claims) is insufficient to pay the trade creditor
in full for its prior unpaid invoices, the trade creditor might nonetheless be willing to cut
300 See Baird & Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, supra note 42 at 667 (observing that,
traditionally, senior secured lenders have been “biased toward liquidation”).
301 See Triantis, Theory, supra note 126 at 910-12 (discussing a secured creditor’s
preference to avoid risk with respect to its collateral).
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the debtor some slack and continue to extend credit to the debtor if the debtor’s prospects
for continued operation are at least reasonable. To begin with, this may be the only way
that the trade creditor may be able to recover a greater percentage of its unpaid invoices.
In addition, the trade creditor’s willingness on this score would likely increase if the
creditor is able to continue selling new goods to the debtor with some assured means of
payment, such as on a C.O.D. or some other type of cash basis, particularly if the
payments come from some other creditor’s collateral (e.g., the proceeds of the debtor’s
accounts receivable in which a secured creditor may hold a security interest).
Significantly, these new sales will likely generate profit for the trade creditor, and this
profit might be thought of as a means of offsetting some of the trade creditor’s losses if
the old debt is not paid.302 Similarly, the debtor’s continued ability to make purchases
from the trade creditor will allow the trade creditor to retain a customer, thereby
preventing (or at least mitigating) the loss of any investment that the trade creditor made
in acquiring and retaining the debtor as a customer in the first place.303 Hence, because
of the trade creditor’s particular position (with something to lose from the debtor’s
continued operations, but also something to gain), the trade creditor may well be less risk
averse than the secured creditor regarding the debtor’s continued operations.
302 A trade creditor’s profit structure is often quite different from that of a secured lender.
A secured lender may have a profit margin of a few basis points. Trade creditors,
however, may have as much as a 40-60% mark-up on their products (and sometimes
more). The amount of margin in any particular case can vary tremendously. See
Rasmussen, Behavioral Economics, supra note 56 at 1693 (observing that financial
intermediaries such as banks “tend to make investments [i.e., loans] that have a capped
upper limit on the potential return they will receive” in contrast to those who sell goods to
a firm).
303 The trade creditor may have made a sizeable investment in one form or another in
attracting and keeping the debtor as a client.
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Third, the insolvent debtor may be indebted to an employee for unpaid wages or
other employment benefits. If the current value of the debtor’s assets is insufficient to
pay the employee’s unpaid claim in full, but the debtor continues to employ the claimant,
he may be quite willing to cut the debtor a great deal of slack if the alternative is the
liquidation of the debtor’s property and a consequent loss of employment (assuming
assured payment for future services). Hence, the employee (with a lot to gain and
relatively little to lose from the debtor’s continued operation) may be even less risk
averse than the trade creditor regarding the debtor’s continued operations.304
The picture may be complicated even further by a host of additional factors of
almost infinite variation. For example, a secured creditor may also hold an unsecured
claim. This unsecured claim might be an entirely separate claim against the debtor, or
might arise simply because the value of the collateral underlying the creditor’s secured
claim is insufficient to pay the claim in full, leaving a “deficiency.”305 The holder of
304 One commentator has explained the competing interests of various creditor
constituencies as follows:
under certain circumstances, the value-maximizing decision might be to
discontinue a financially distressed business that is currently unprofitable,
but that nonetheless is a viable economic entity in the longer term. In such
a situation, promoting the interests of the firm’s investors would
presumably defeat the interests of the firm’s employees in preserving their
jobs. Financial distress creates a political arena, in which various
constituencies of the firm pursue competing and often incommensurable
aims. In financial distress, pursuing one set of aims typically frustrates
other aims.
Donald R. Korobkin, The Unwarranted Case Against Corporate Reorganization: A Reply
to Bradley and Rosenzweig, 78 IOWA L. REV. 669, 732 (1993).
305 Deficiency claims commonly arise in the foreclosure context and they represent the
difference between the amount of the debt owed and the value of the collateral where the
former is greater than the latter (in contrast, where the value of the collateral exceeds the
amount of the debt, the difference is known as a “surplus”). See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT.
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both a secured and unsecured claim may harbor conflicting motivations, depending on
the amount of each claim and the particular circumstances of the case.306
In addition, informational asymmetries may cause some creditors to view the
debtor’s prospects inaccurately, coloring their preferences.307 Similarly, some creditors
may hold ancillary rights of payment from alternative sources, such as third-party
guarantors, or have purchased derivative enhancements, such as credit default swaps.308
ANN. §§ 33-727, 33-729, 33-730 (West 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 48-14 (1994); TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 52.004 (West 1995). Like commercial law generally, bankruptcy
law recognizes and provides a means to calculate a secured creditor’s deficiency claim.
Under the Bankruptcy Code, to the extent that the amount of a secured creditor’s claim is
greater than the value of the collateral securing the claim, the secured creditor is
commonly left with an unsecured deficiency claim against the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.
See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000 & Supp. 2006); Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520
U.S. 953, 961 (1997) (explaining that section 506(a) “tells us that a secured creditor's
claim is to be divided into secured and unsecured portions, with the secured portion of the
claim limited to the value of the collateral”); United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood
Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1988) (explaining the operation of section 506(a)).
306 See Baird & Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, supra note 42 at 685 (observing that
creditors may wear “multiple hats” by holding different kinds of debts of the debtor).
307 For example, different creditors may have different access to a debtor’s financial
information. See Fischer Black, Bank Funds Management in an Efficient Market, 2 J.
FIN. ECON. 323, 326 (1975) [hereinafter Black, Bank Funds] (observing that banks may
have more immediate access to a debtor’s financial records available as part of the bank’s
overall relationship with the debtor).
308 See Baird & Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, supra note 42 at 679-84 (discussing credit
default swaps, which enable a creditor to recover the face amount of its loan from a
counterparty upon the occurrence of a “credit event” such as the debtor’s bankruptcy). In
general, the Bankruptcy Code does not affect a creditor’s rights against third party
guarantors who are not themselves in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2000 & Supp.
2006) (providing that “[e]xcept as provided in subsection (a)(3) of this section, discharge
of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property
of any other entity for, such debt”). In some circumstances, however, a bankruptcy court
may issue an injunction staying collection actions against third-party guarantors if,
among other things, the injunction is necessary to permit the debtor to reorganize
successfully. See Regency Realty Assocs. v. Howard Fertilizer, Inc. (In re Regency
Realty Assocs.), 179 B.R. 717, 719 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995). In the Regency case, the
court explained that
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Finally, even creditors that hold similar kinds of claims may harbor vastly different risk
preferences. For example, one secured creditor may be the administrator of a
conservatively run pension fund, while another might be the administrator of a high-yield
junk-bond portfolio or hedge fund.309
As long as the debtor can pay all claims in full, the motivations and risk
preferences of the creditors are relatively unimportant because the debtor may
accommodate all of the creditors’ various biases and risk tolerances simply through the
payment of their claims as required by the parties’ individual agreements or by law.
Once the debtor becomes insolvent, however, the motivations of the creditors become
critically relevant because of (1) their new status as creditor-owners and their ability to
exercise a variety of remedies against the debtor following the debtor’s default, and (2)
the debtor’s corresponding inability to orchestrate their diverse perspectives and interests
through performance. At the same time, because the preferences of creditors may be
rationally divergent, it may be difficult (if not impossible) for a diverse group of them to
in a Chapter 11 reorganization case the Bankruptcy Court may use its
power granted by § 105 to temporarily protect non-debtors by injunctive
relief. The classic scenario which warrants such relief is an affirmative
showing with competent proof that the non-debtors sought to be protected
(1) have the financial wherewithal and (2) they are willing to contribute
their credit, funds or properties to fund the plan of reorganization of the
Debtor.
Id.; see also Chase Manhattan Bank v. Third Eighty-Ninth Assocs. (In re Third Eighty-
Ninth Assocs.), 138 B.R. 144, 148-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (upholding an injunction staying
collection actions against one third-party guarantor because he was intimately involved
with the debtor’s management and necessary for a successful reorganization).
309 See Baird & Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, supra note 42 at 670, 671 (“Banks and
hedge funds, though owning the same instrument, often have drastically different
business models” and, hence, very different views on risk; “[f]ar from having a
liquidation bias, a hedge fund may affirmatively want to advance a reorganization plan in
which it ends up with the equity of the business.”).
162
agree among themselves on an appropriate disposition of the debtor’s property, let alone
reach a collective agreement with the debtor.310 In many instances, this incendiary set of
circumstances is likely to lead to a debt-collection “free-for-all,” with deleterious
consequences.
THE DEBT-COLLECTION FREE-FOR-ALL
In the absence of an agreement forestalling collection activity, once a debtor
becomes insolvent (or nearly so), claimants with the most conservative risk tolerances
will likely begin to exercise their rights of enforcement on an immediate basis for any
number of reasons. First, under applicable non-bankruptcy law, it may be their general
right to do so (assuming the existence of a default). Second, they may fear payment
discrimination if they do not take immediate steps to collect their claims—particularly
secured creditors who fear that the debtor will use their collateral to satisfy the claims of
other creditors. Third, they may not wish the debtor (or other creditors) to take increased
risks with their collateral. Fourth, they may take a dim view of the debtor’s prospects,
even assuming that the debtor is likely to be able to stave off other creditors for the time
being. Significantly, some creditors may take this view systematically—not because of
any individual assessment of any particular debtor, but simply because they generally
hold the view that the reasons for an insolvent debtor’s decline are typically endogenous
310 See supra at 78-80 (discussing difficulties associated with reaching agreement among
creditors regarding the disposition of the debtor, the debtor’s assets, and the debtor’s
liabilities). Because their claims are individual in nature, the creditors of an insolvent
firm typically have rights that are more complex as a group than those of any class of
ordinary shareholders of a solvent firm. For example, ordinary shareholders typically
receive pro rata dividends, and have no individual collection rights entitling them to
liquidated sums of money at prescribed points in time. Creditors, on the other hand, have
widely divergent payment rights, as well as individual collection entitlements. This
diversity obviously complicates the handling of claims in the bankruptcy context.
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(e.g., arise from poor management) rather than exogenous (i.e., arise from circumstances
beyond the debtor’s control). Creditors may tend to take this view because it is often
difficult to determine whether a particular debtor’s demise is actually the result of
incompetence or simply arises from circumstances beyond the debtor’s control.
Moreover, once some creditors begin to exercise their rights, others will often
follow suit, if for no other reason than to avoid the prospects of being left behind while
the debtor pays other claims. This, in turn, will often precipitate a rush of collection
activity, leading to a debt-collection free-for-all.311 Although all creditors might
participate (other than those whose obligations are not yet in default or who did not know
that accelerating collection activity had begun),312 the preferences of creditors with the
lowest risk tolerances will often initiate the process. But just as a debtor’s high-risk
tendencies may lead to unsound asset speculations and the incurrence of agency costs at
the expense of creditors,313 the low risk tolerances of certain creditors may lead to
unsound asset liquidations at the expense of others affected by a debtor’s financial
downfall.
311 See JACKSON, LOGIC, supra note 8 at 16 n.20 (observing that creditors are most likely
to “attempt to collect their claims at roughly the same time” upon learning of a debtor’s
insolvency); Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy in the Administrative State, 50 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 33 (1987) (observing that “[b]ankruptcy sends a signal to everyone
dealing with a bankrupt debtor: ‘Get out now with as much as you can as fast as you
can’”).
312 See supra at 134 (discussing how certain creditors may not yet even know they hold
claims against the debtor at the time other creditors begin collecting on their claims).
313 See supra note 150 (discussing the concept of “agency costs”).
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For a number of reasons, quick foreclosure liquidations typically realize lower
prices.314 For example, as one commentator has summarized: “[e]stimates suggest that a
typical home loses something like half its value when it goes into foreclosure . . . . In
addition, foreclosures disrupt lives, create neglected properties, and leave whole
neighborhoods suffering.”315 Similarly, the piecemeal dismemberment of an insolvent
firm’s assets may well destroy its enterprise value.316 Creditors understand this, and thus
314 See supra note 155 (discussing this point); see, e.g., BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.,
511 U.S. 531, 539 (1994) (“property that must be sold [through a quick liquidation
procedure] is simply worth less” because “[n]o one would pay as much to own such
property as he would pay to own real estate that could be sold at leisure and pursuant to
normal marketing techniques.”); SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE, supra
note 200 at 222 (observing that quick foreclosure sales “are notorious for fetching low
prices.”).
315 ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, THE RESPONSE,
AND THE WORK AHEAD 321 (2013) [hereinafter BLINDER, AFTER].
316 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS
ON BANKRUPTCY 40 (2d ed. 1990) (noting that when secured creditors act in their own
self-interest and exercise their rights to the collateral, the going concern value of the
debtor may be destroyed); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case
for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043 (1992) [hereinafter Bradley & Rosenzweig,
Untenable] (explaining that, in adopting the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, “Congress
believed that assets would be more highly valued if utilized in the industry for which they
were designed, rather than scrapped”); Butler & Gilpatric, Re-Examination, supra note 53
at 272-73 (arguing that, if the creditors individually press their claims, the total value of
the firm may decline because, “the firm may have a greater value to its creditors as a
going concern than in liquidation”); see also Adams, Economic Justification, supra note
181 at 129 (arguing that “[t]here are situations . . . in which an insolvent corporation is
worth saving,” naming Texaco, Manville, and A.H. Robbins as examples); Theodore
Eisenberg & Soichi Tagashira, Should We Abolish Chapter 11? The Evidence from
Japan, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 111, 113 (1994) (arguing that even a low rate of reorganization
among small and mid-sized Chapter 11 cases yields more to creditors than liquidation);
supra note 195 (discussing the rehabilitative purposes of Chapter 11 reorganization). On
the other hand, efforts to reorganize debtors sometimes may do more harm than good.
See Baird & Jackson, Bargaining, supra note 60 at 741. For example, with respect to
firms suffering from economic distress, Baird and Jackson have argued that
[s]ome firms that cannot meet their obligations are not worth keeping
intact as going concerns. These are the manufacturers that sell computers
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often threaten to exercise their rights in order to extract payment from debtors
experiencing financial distress precisely because the exercise of their rights may be
disastrous to the enterprise.317 Typically, however, the insolvent debtor’s acquiescence
will lead only to more debt-collection activity. The consequence is that the debtor’s
assets are likely to be caught up in a frantic debt-collection drama rather than being put to
more productive use.
In situations involving solvent debtors, the ability of a creditor with risk-averse
preferences to trigger a debt-collection free-for-all is controlled in important ways. To
begin with, even the most risk-averse creditor cannot exercise its rights in the absence of
the debtor’s default, or in a manner contrary to applicable contractual or legal
requirements. Thus, so long as the debtor complies with his obligations, precipitous debt-
collection activity cannot proceed. In turn, the ability of a creditor to demand hair-trigger
no one will buy and the restaurants that serve food no one will eat. The
firm’s assets are worth more sold piece by piece than as a unit.
Id.; see also Baird, Revisiting, supra note 298 (arguing in favor of auctioning off the
debtor assets to avoid the unwarranted costs of reorganization); William L. Cary,
Liquidation of Corporations in Bankruptcy Reorganization, 60 HARV. L. REV. 173, 194
(1946) (observing that “[r]ehabilitation of the debtor, though it may be possible, is not
always the best solution, either for the creditors and security holders or for the economy
as a whole”); see generally Baird & Bernstein, Absolute Priority, supra note 190 at 1936
(“If reorganization law should facilitate absolute priority (as we believe it should) and if
it already takes close to maximum advantage of markets (as we believe it does), reform
should focus on its appraisal mechanism and the challenge of minimizing the variance
associated with its valuations.”).
317 See Block-Lieb, Why, supra note 124 at 847 (arguing that the creditors’ exercise of
their rights “can close down a debtor’s business or render an individual virtually
penniless. Creditors know this and often threaten to pursue [their] remedies solely to
intimidate the debtor into payment.”); see also Arthur A. Leff, Injury, Ignorance and
Spite—The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE L.J. 1, 17-18 (1970) (discussing
the use of collection remedies); LoPucki, General Theory, supra note 181 at 355
(discussing collection remedies and creditor behavior).
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default terms is controlled by market forces through the availability of credit with less
stringent conditions.318
In addition, because a solvent debtor can pay all claims in full, other creditors
who understand that the debtor is solvent are less likely to take precipitous action even if
the debtor happens to default on his obligations to one creditor. Moreover, following
default, a solvent debtor is more likely to be able to pay off an aggressive risk-averse
creditor, thus stopping any further debt-collection activity in its tracks. Hence, as long as
the debtor remains financially sound, the opportunity for an aggressive risk-averse
creditor to trigger a debt-collection free-for-all is constrained.
So long as the debtor remains financially healthy, matters thus tend to proceed in
fairly routine, stable, and predictable ways, and relevant legal structures generally reflect
this reality. Apart from prescribing certain types of remedial procedures and a relatively
limited number of mandatory rules, non-bankruptcy law does not strictly limit the
contractual options of creditors to declare defaults and exercise their rights, presumably
because debtors and creditors are efficient decision makers in structuring and policing
their own contractual arrangements. Further, in the context of a solvent firm, the
presence of debt obligations is thought to help police the behavior of managers.319
318 In a competitive market, a financially healthy firm should be able to shop for the best
terms, including less costly (i.e., less restrictive) covenants. See Douglas W. Diamond,
Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice Between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt,
99 J. POL. ECON. 689, 690 (1991) [hereinafter Diamond, Monitoring] (observing that
financially healthy debtors may be able to borrow funds from the public debt markets at
lower cost as compared to other forms of lending); see also Rasmussen, Behavioral
Economics, supra note 56 at 1683 (observing that “[r]ational debtors have the incentives
to borrow money and purchase goods at the lowest possible cost. They force creditors to
compete for the opportunity to supply credit.”).
319 This is the so-called bonding role of debt. See supra note 146; Aghion, et al.,
Economics, supra note 146 at 531 (citing Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart,
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Without debt, it is argued, managers might tend to shirk their responsibilities more
readily because of the general inability of diverse shareholders to police their conduct
effectively.320 Creditors, on the other hand, may be better able to keep managers in line
by establishing and monitoring consistent benchmarks for their performance.321
In contrast, an insolvent debtor’s situation is quite different. First, default is the
norm.322 Second, the more insolvent the debtor becomes, the more likely it is that the
interests of the various parties affected by the debtor’s financial demise will diverge. As
noted above, just as increasingly insolvent debtors are more likely to adopt riskier
strategies in order to recover their positions, risk-averse creditors are more likely to grow
squeamish and insist on exercising their rights. Because risk-averse creditors hold the
collection trump card (in the absence of some form of external constraint), a debtor’s
deepening financial crisis is only all the more likely to trigger an avalanche of collection
activity.
Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives, printed in THE ECONOMICS OF
INFORMATION AND UNCERTAINTY 107 (J.J. McCall ed. 1982)) (observing how “debt plays
an important role in constraining or bonding managers to act in [the equity] holders’
interests”); Jensen, Agency Costs, supra note 146 at 324 (discussing the “control function
of debt” to police managerial behavior); see also Triantis & Daniels, Role of Debt, supra
note 146 at 1082 (arguing that creditors may be better able to keep managers in line than
equity holders).
320 See Jensen, Agency Costs, supra note 146 at 324 (arguing that “debt reduces the
agency costs of free cash flow by reducing the cash flow available for spending at the
discretion of managers”); see also supra note 150 (discussing the concept of “agency
costs”).
321 See Triantis & Daniels, Role of Debt, supra note 146 at 1082 (making this point with
respect to bank lenders).
322 See supra note 283; Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganization, supra note 60 at 119
n.69 (making this point).
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Notably, the foregoing sketches out the basic circumstances of the collective-
action dilemma.323 As a group, everyone with an interest in an insolvent debtor
(including creditors) may be better off if a debt-collection free-for-all is avoided. Yet
creditors individually have incentives to engage in value-destroying debt collection
activities and often do, generating a problem of underinvestment in the general sense of
fomenting the suboptimal deployment of the debtor’s assets.324
Often enough, the costs of the ensuing debacle are difficult to justify. For
example, they may arise not because creditors with risk-averse preferences are in any real
jeopardy, but simply because these creditors harbor risk-averse tolerances and have
nothing to lose from exercising their rights. But even where creditors with highly risk-
averse preferences actually are in some form of jeopardy (owing perhaps to deteriorating
collateral), creditors as a group may still fare much worse in a debt-collection free-for-all
than if the debtor’s assets were shepherded in a more value-enhancing manner. Because
the problem of the debt-collection free-for-all stems from insolvency and is likewise
complex and contentious, it is properly a bankruptcy question.325
323 See supra at 24-25; JACKSON, LOGIC, supra note 8 at 10 (explaining the problem of
collection action, and observing that, when a debtor is insolvent, “the system of
individual creditor remedies may be bad for the creditors as a group when there are not
enough assets to go around” because creditors will tend to act in self-interested ways in
seeking repayment, without regard to whether their individual collection activities reduce
the value for all creditors).
324 See supra note 147 (discussing the concept of “underinvestment”).
325 Bankruptcy law currently prescribes a number of mechanisms to address the problem
of the debt-collection free-for-all. As noted, the commencement of a bankruptcy case
triggers the automatic stay, which enjoins most debt collection activities against the
debtor and property of the estate during the bankruptcy proceeding. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a) (2000 & Supp. 2006); supra note 16. While secured creditors are enjoined from
foreclosing on their collateral, they are entitled to protection against the erosion of their
security, thus protecting them (albeit imperfectly) from the risk of the debtor gambling
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STAGNATING AND OVERBURDENED ASSETS
In addition to the debt-collection free-for-all, additional problems arising in the
insolvency context include the challenges of stagnating and overburdened assets. These
may take three very different forms.
First, insolvent debtors who have defaulted on their obligations will not always
act on their incentives to take excessive risks, but may instead take the opposite tack if
necessary to appease a particularly influential creditor, particularly a secured creditor
holding a tight grip on key assets.326 Individual debtors (as well as the managers of
insolvent firms) who cannot avoid the imminent debt-collection activities of an
influential risk-averse creditor may sometimes make improvidently conservative
investment decisions as a form of appeasement, even if this means foregoing reasonable
opportunities that would otherwise enhance the debtor’s value.327 This illustrates another
example of the potential for insolvency to generate conditions for underinvestment.328
with their collateral. See United Sav. Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest
Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 368-75 (1988) (discussing adequate protection); Baird &
Jackson, Corporate Reorganization, supra note 60. The liquidation provisions of
Chapter 7 attempt to reconcile the interests of all creditors charged with representing their
collective interests. See supra note 241 (discussing the liquidation provisions of Chapter
7). Through its shared decision-making mechanisms (i.e., decision making superintended
by special forms of legal regulation), the reorganization provisions of Chapter 11 attempt
to reconcile the diverse interests of creditors as a group through a negotiated plan of
reorganization, or agreement on some other disposition of the debtor’s assets. See supra
notes 241, 299 (discussing the shared decision-making mechanisms of Chapter 11).
326 See supra at 131, 163-64.
327 See Otte v. Manufacturers Hanover Commercial Corp. (In re Texlon Corp.), 596 F.2d
1092, 1098 (2d Cir. 1979). In Otte, the court observed that
[t]he debtor in possession [in a Chapter 11 case] is hardly neutral. Its
interest is in its own survival, even at the expense of equal treatment of
creditors, and close relations with a lending institution tend to prevent the
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In the case of a solvent debtor, this problem may be avoided by the simple
expedient of avoiding default. It may also be avoided by obtaining alternative financing
from less controlling lenders (albeit perhaps on more expensive terms). If a debtor is
insolvent, however, alternative financing is likely to be in extremely short supply, and
ordinary market protections are unlikely to be of assistance.
Second, the assets of insolvent debtors are frequently over-encumbered, meaning
that the total amount of the debt secured by all liens attached to them exceeds the assets’
value. As a result, the assets may be underutilized because the debtor may be impaired in
his efforts to sell them to some third party (or otherwise dispose of them) because
creditors (and in some instances the shareholders of an insolvent firm) may have perverse
incentives to block value-maximizing dispositions.
For example, suppose that two creditors, a bank and an investment company, hold
liens on the debtor’s equipment. In addition, suppose that the value of the debtor’s
equipment is $100,000, and the amount of the debt owed to the bank is $100,000.
Suppose also that the amount owed to the investment company is $30,000. It is
reasonable to assume that, absent special circumstances, no third party would be willing
to purchase the equipment if the liens remained attached to it because no rational buyer
would pay $130,000 (the amount necessary to discharge the liens) for an asset worth
$100,000. Conversely, if the debtor were otherwise unable to satisfy the investment
exploration of other available courses in which a more objective receiver
or trustee would engage.
Id.
328 See Triantis, Theory, supra note 126 at 910-12 (discussing how certain creditors of an
insolvent debtor, particularly those extending credit on a secured basis, may cause the
debtor to under-invest through excessively risk-adverse debt covenants).
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company’s claim, the investment company could be expected to refuse to consent to the
voluntary release of its lien unless it received some form of compensation out of funds
that would otherwise go to the bank—in other words, it would use its liens to hold the
equipment hostage.
In the case of a solvent debtor, this type of holdout behavior has a ready solution:
the debtor may simply pay the claim of the investment company and sell the asset. In the
insolvency context, however, this type of problem often has no ready solution, short of
foreclosure by the senior secured party to free the asset of encumbrances. But
foreclosure may be precisely what the debtor and other creditors may well wish to avoid
in order to maximize the collateral’s value—and, if nothing else, avoid an unnecessary
deficiency claim.
Third and most important, insolvency otherwise tends to promote misapplication
of the debtor’s resources, including, in the case of individuals, the debtor’s human
capital. To begin with, as noted above, insolvent debtors tend to engage in a variety of
activities to stave off the creditors’ debt-collection activities. At times, these avoidance
efforts can be quite complex and time-consuming, and sometimes involve intricate
schemes including gratuitous transfers (discussed below). These avoidance efforts also
ultimately tend to be futile in the long run. Obviously, the debtor’s labor and other
resources could be devoted more productively toward other endeavors.
In addition, as a general rule, the creditors’ debt-collection rights against a debtor
typically extend not only to a debtor’s current assets, but also to whatever property a
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debtor may obtain in the future.329 If the debtor’s current obligations are sufficiently
onerous, they may well exhaust the entirety of the value of the fruits of the debtor’s
foreseeable endeavors, excluding exempt property. To the extent that the debtor cannot
reap the benefits of his labor owing to the collection activities of persistent creditors, the
debtor’s incentive to engage in productive activities and acquire and hold property is
reduced, if not eliminated entirely.
Under applicable non-bankruptcy law, the ability of creditors to enforce their
claims has obvious value, in spite of its cost on defaulting debtors, and this value is
presumably greater than the cost.330 Among other reasons, without debt enforcement
mechanisms, there would be little incentive to lend and commerce would grind to a
halt.331 Moreover, as a general rule, the law leaves it to creditors to decide whether or not
329 See Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902) (observing that
creditors are entitled generally to payment in personam from the debtor or in rem from
the debtor’s property).
330 In a classic essay, Walter Blum observed the point regarding the need to respect the
creditor’s non-bankruptcy collection rights in the face of the potential harshness of
vindicating those rights. See Walter J. Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate
Reorganization, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 565, 565-80 (1950). But as Coase has suggested in
an analogous context:
The problem which we face in dealing with actions which have harmful
effects is not simply one of restraining those responsible for them. What
has to be decided is whether the gain from preventing the harm is greater
than the loss which would be suffered elsewhere as a result of stopping the
action which produces the harm.
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 27 (1960) [hereinafter
Coase, Problem]. Although there are benefits to the enforcement of claims, the issue is
how far those benefits extend in the context of insolvency, and whether they effectively
hit an even greater wall of countervailing costs.
331 See LoPucki, General Theory, supra note 181 at 315 (noting that debt-collection
remedies facilitate lending); see also Jackson, Fresh-Start, supra note 20 at 1427
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to pursue individual debt-collection activity, presumably because leaving the decision to
them is generally desirable.332
Enforcing debts against insolvent debtors, however, presents a special cost
scenario. A particular creditor who pursues a debtor vigorously may succeed in
collecting some or all of its claim, but obviously not all of the creditors of an insolvent
debtor will be able to do so. In the meantime, their direct collection and monitoring costs
are likely to be relatively high (as discussed in greater detail below), as will be the direct
costs of the debtor’s efforts to stave them off—some or all of which are likely to be
unrecoverable.333
Further, the creditors of an insolvent debtor are likely to be indifferent to the
resulting incentives for the misuse of the debtor’s human capital generated by their debt-
collection activities. Typically, creditors care about the payment of their claims. As
between forgiving a debt voluntarily and pursuing a debt with the consequence of
diminishing the likelihood of the optimal deployment of the debtor’s human capital, one
(observing that “[b]ecause of the nature of credit, free access to discharge would be
disastrous for a credit-based economy”).
332 As a consequence, unless the parties settle voluntarily for less, the law recognizes the
discharge of a debt only through full repayment. See Beldock v. Faberge (In re S & W
Exporters, Inc.), 16 B.R. 941, 945 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (stating that “once application
of payment has been made and the debtor notified, the debt is discharged”); 60 AM. JUR.
2D PAYMENT § 136 (1987) (providing that “[w]hen payment is made in full and it is
applied to the underlying debt, the debt is discharged”).
333 See infra at 180-89 (discussing the collection and monitoring costs occasioned by
debt-collection activities against insolvent debtors).
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would predict that creditors would routinely chose the latter because they will likely reap
no benefit from the former.334
The problems of stagnating and overburdened assets, including prominently the
potential misuse of the debtor’s human capital, present unique challenges as illustrated
above. In addition, their resolution is likely to be complex and contentious. Moreover,
because they arise as a consequence of insolvency, it would make no sense to burden
ordinary non-bankruptcy devices to address them. Accordingly, they are properly the
province of bankruptcy law.
GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS
Another problem that also arises in the insolvency context is the problem of an
insolvent debtor’s gratuitous transfers—an acute problem of moral hazard. Taxes aside,
334 Bankruptcy law has long experimented with mechanisms to address this problem,
particularly the effects of insolvency and debt-collection activity on a debtor’s human
capital. The most important remedial mechanism is the debtor’s discharge. See supra at
32, infra at 273-300 (discussing the debtor’s discharge); see also McCoid, Discharge,
supra note 76 (discussing the development of discharge in bankruptcy). As a general
theme, bankruptcy law otherwise addresses the problems outlined above by restructuring
the basic relationships between creditors and their insolvent debtors. As the Supreme
Court has explained: “[t]he especial purpose of all bankruptcy legislation is to interfere
with the relations between the parties concerned—to change, modify or impair the
obligations of their contracts.” Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist.,
298 U.S. 513, 530 (1936); see also United States v. Energy Resources Co., 495 U.S. 545,
549 (1990) (stating that “bankruptcy courts, as courts of equity, have broad authority to
modify creditor-debtor relationships”); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71 (1982) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (observing that “the
restructuring of debtor-creditor relations . . . is at the core of the federal bankruptcy
power”); Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902) (stating that “[t]he
subject of “‘bankruptcies’ includes the power to discharge the debtor from his contracts
and legal liabilities, as well as to distribute his property”); Adler, Bankruptcy, supra note
56 at 444 (discussing how “[b]ankruptcy law alters contracts between creditors and their
debtor”); Hunt, General Bankrupt Law, supra note 76 at 32 (explaining in 1841 that
bankruptcy law is “[s]imply a declaration, by the supreme law-making power of the state,
defining the extent to which, and the mode in which, under certain circumstances, it will
enforce pecuniary obligations”).
175
our system of law generally permits the unrestricted transfer of assets, either in exchange
for some form of consideration or purely as gifts from one person to the next. As long as
a debtor remains solvent, it is typically of no particular concern to creditors that the
debtor might give away one or more of his assets because, by definition, a solvent debtor
still retains the wherewithal to pay all claims in full from the property that remains.335
Hence, as a general matter, the law does not strictly regulate gift giving in the sense of
either policing the merits of any particular gift (such as by revoking a gift that is not
“meritorious” in some sense), or demanding that all creditors be paid in full before a gift
may be made. Instead, the law trusts in general that the owners of property are the best
decision makers concerning the disposition of their assets, including transactions in the
form of gifts.
If the debtor/owner is insolvent, however, the situation is very different, at least
with respect to the impact of any gift on creditors. The donation of an asset means that
the debtor will have even less means than before to satisfy the creditors’ claims,336 thus
335 An exception exists in the case of a creditor’s entitlement to a unique item. For
example, a solvent debtor may sign a contract to sell a particular painting, but before
consummating the sale, may deliver the painting to a relative for free. The purchaser
under the contract may have an interest in recovering the painting, notwithstanding that
the debtor may be able to satisfy a damage claim for breach of contract. See Fast v.
Southern Offshore Yachts, 587 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Conn. 1984) (specific
performance of the delivery of a customized yacht was warranted because the yacht was
“undeniably unique”); Bander v. Gossman, 611 N.Y.S.2d 985, 988 (Sup. Ct. 1994)
(stating that “specific performance may be decreed where the goods are unique”) (citing
U.C.C. § 2-716(1)); see also Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89
YALE L.J. 271, 275-78 (1979) [hereinafter Schwartz, Specific Performance] (discussing
justifications for the doctrine of specific performance).
336 See 1 GERRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES 1 (rev. ed.
1940) [hereinafter GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES] (noting that a fraudulent
conveyance is “an infringement of the creditor’s right to realize upon the available assets
of this debtor”); Barry L. Zaretsky, Fraudulent Transfer Law as the Arbiter of
Unreasonable Risk, 46 S.C. L. REV. 1165, 1172 (1995) [hereinafter Zaretsky, Fraudulent
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generating an externality with respect to these creditors.337 In general, these kinds of
gratuitous transfers may arise in one of four typical ways.
First, a spiteful debtor faced with a horde of clamoring creditors may simply wish
to frustrate their collection efforts. To this end, the spiteful debtor may give away all of
his assets with the affirmative intent that creditors receive nothing.338
Second, an unscrupulous debtor faced with the prospect of losing everything
might transfer some or all of his assets to sympathetic third parties, such as relatives or
friends. The debtor-transferor might then claim to be impoverished while, at the same
time, continuing to enjoy the benefits of the assets now ostensibly owned by someone
else.339
Transfer] (arguing that “gifts by insolvents, even if done without any fraudulent intent,
are objectionable because they can only harm creditors by reducing the already
insufficient property available”); see also Robert C. Clark, The Duties of the Corporate
Debtor to its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1977) [hereinafter Clark, Duties].
337 See supra note 249 (discussing the concept of an “externality”); see also Thomas H.
Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725, 777-86 (1984)
(explaining the purpose of fraudulent transfer law to protect creditors against debtor
misbehavior). Gratuitous transfers are thus properly a problem of moral hazard because,
by transferring assets in exchange for little or no consideration, an insolvent debtor
increases the risk of his nonperformance of his obligations to his creditors and, because
he is insolvent, the cost of this increased risk falls on their shoulders. See supra note 261
(discussing the concept of “moral hazard”).
338 See Sherman v. Third Nat’l Bank (In re Sherman), 67 F.3d 1348, 1351-54 (8th Cir.
1995) (reciting that the debtors transferred eleven real properties to their parents in order
to frustrate the collection efforts of their creditors); Martino v. Edison Worldwide Capital
(In re Randy), 189 B.R. 425, 438-39 (Bankr. E.D. Ill. 1995) (observing that the
commissions paid to brokers for their efforts in marketing the debtor’s “Ponzi” scheme
were made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the debtor’s creditors).
339 See Kaylor v. Craig (In re Craig), 144 F.3d 587, 591-93 (8th Cir. 1998) (observing
that husband transferred assets in exchange for a house that was placed in his wife’s
name); Taylor v. Rupp (In re Taylor), 133 F.3d 1336, 1338 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that
seventeen days before the husband filed for bankruptcy, the Taylors traded in one car that
they owned jointly for a new car that the wife alone owned).
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Third, a debtor might simply make gifts or sell property at less than fair-market
value without any particular ill intent toward creditors.340 For example, the debtor might
liquidate precipitously some or all of his assets at less than fair-market value to satisfy the
demands of certain persistent creditors who hope to be paid quickly from the proceeds
before other creditors begin making demands for payment. This may occur if a creditor
insists on the quick liquidation of certain assets (and prompt payment of its claim from
the proceeds) as a condition of the creditor’s continuing to do business with, or extend
further credit to, the debtor. The effect of the quick liquidation on creditors who are not
paid is the same: the debtor is left with fewer means to satisfy remaining debts. In
contrast, if the assets had been sold at a better price, creditors as a group might be much
better off.
Fourth, the debtor may simply incur an obligation (or grant an interest in his
assets) without corresponding benefit. For example, an insolvent firm may obligate itself
contractually to pay money to a shareholder without receiving anything of value in
exchange.341 Like outright transfers of assets, transactions of this kind prejudice
creditors, such as by diluting their ability to recover from the debtor.342
340 See Dietz v. St. Edward’s Catholic Church (In re Bargfrede), 117 F.3d 1078, 1080 (8th
Cir. 1997) (concluding that the payment made by the debtor from his pension fund to
satisfy the debt of his wife was a fraudulent transfer because the debtor received no
tangible value for the payment); Misty Management Corp. v. Lockwood, 539 F.2d 1205,
1212 (9th Cir. 1976) (concluding that the payment of only $108,000 for real property
worth $375,000 did not constitute a “fair equivalent” consideration).
341 See Gaddis v. Allison, 234 B.R. 805 (D. Kan. 1999) (transfers to shareholder by
insolvent company for no consideration deemed to be a fraudulent transfer under Kansas
fraudulent conveyance act); Block v. Warehouse Consultants, Inc. (In re Americana
Servs., Inc.), 175 B.R. 1018 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994) (transfers to shareholders by
insolvent corporation were fraudulent under Missouri fraudulent transfer statute); Yoder
v. T.E.L. Leasing, Inc. (In re Suburban Motor Freight, Inc.), 124 B.R. 984 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1990); Dwyer v. Jones (In re Tri-State Paving, Inc.), 32 B.R. 2 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
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Like payment discriminations, the real consequences to creditors of these kinds of
gratuitous transfers are typically felt only in the context of insolvency. If a debtor is
solvent (and thus can otherwise make creditors whole), creditors will almost never have
need to recover gifts the debtor makes.343 Accordingly, there is generally no reason to
address the consequences of gratuitous transfers in every debt-collection situation.
Conversely, if the debtor is insolvent at the time a gift is made, becomes insolvent as a
result, or the transfer threatens to render the debtor insolvent, the situation is very
different. Resort to traditional debt-collection devices, such as attachment and execution,
will typically fail to provide an adequate remedy because, as a general rule, assets the
debtor has transferred to others are no longer available to satisfy claims.344
1982) (holding that transfer of funds to stockholders from insolvent corporate-debtor was
fraudulent transfer).
342 An interesting twist on the scenarios outlined above arises in the case of the “insolvent
heir”—one who refuses a bequest because he or she would rather see the property go
elsewhere than to his creditors. See generally Adam J. Hirsch, The Problem of the
Insolvent Heir, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 587 (1989).
343 An exception may exist if the creditor has an interest in the particular item of property
transferred and the item is not fungible. See supra note 335.
344 An exception may exist for transferred property encumbered by a specific interest,
such as a security interest. For example, as a general rule, a security interest that has
attached to specific property continues with respect to the property notwithstanding the
transfer. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(1) (providing that “a security interest . . . continues
in collateral notwithstanding sale, lease, license, exchange, or other disposition thereof
unless the secured party authorized the disposition free of the security interest”). There
are qualifications to this rule. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-316(a) (providing that security
interest does not continue after a period of time following the transfer of the collateral to
a new owner located in another jurisdiction).
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Without question, resolution of the problem of gratuitous transfers in the
insolvency context is likely to be complex and contentious. Because the problem also
typically arises as a consequence of insolvency, it is properly a bankruptcy matter.345
345 As with payment discrimination, it is conceivable that the law might do nothing to
respond to the problem of gratuitous transfers. Current bankruptcy law, however,
prescribes remedies, including its fraudulent transfer provisions. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 548
(2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing for the avoidance of fraudulent transfers), 550 (2000 &
Supp. 2006) (providing for the recovery of avoided transfers). Historically, gratuitous
transfers were viewed as a species of fraud, violating “the policy of the law that the
debtor be just before he be generous,” Hearn 45 St. Corp. v. Jano, 27 N.E.2d 814, 816
(N.Y. 1940), and fraudulent transfer remedies have been an essential feature of
bankruptcy law for many centuries. See 1 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES, supra
note 336 at 79-103 (tracing the history of fraudulent transfer law); Baird & Jackson,
Fraudulent Conveyance, supra note 266 at 829-31 (discussing the historical evolution of
fraudulent transfer rules); Zaretsky, Fraudulent Transfer, supra note 336 at 1168-71
(discussing historical evolution of fraudulent transfer rules); 13 Stat. Eliz., ch. 7, § 1
(1571) (Eng.) (proscribing fraudulent transfers). In addition to the Bankruptcy Code,
state law also prescribes remedies for fraudulent transfers, which the Bankruptcy Code
largely incorporates by reference. See 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2000 & Supp. 2006). Under
both the Bankruptcy Code and state law, fraudulent transfer remedies are of several
types. To begin with, they operate to avoid transfers the debtor made with actual
(subjective) intent to deny creditors their recoveries. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A) (2000
& Supp. 2006) (granting the bankruptcy trustee the power to avoid a transfer of the
interest of the debtor in property made “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any
entity to which the debtor was or became . . . indebted”); Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act § 4(a)(1) (1984) (providing that a transfer “by a debtor is fraudulent to a creditor . . .
if the debtor made the transfer . . . [w]ith actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any
creditor of the debtor”). In addition, they operate to avoid the transfers of insolvent (or
nearly insolvent) debtors that are at least to some extent objectively gratuitous. See 11
U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (granting the bankruptcy trustee the power to
avoid a transfer of the interest of the debtor in property if the debtor “received less than
reasonably equivalent value” in exchange for the transfer and the debtor was insolvent,
became insolvent, or was likely to become insolvent at the time of the transfer); Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act § 4(a)(2) (providing that a transfer by a debtor is fraudulent as to
a creditor if the debtor made the transfer “[w]ithout receiving a reasonable equivalent
value in exchange for the transfer” and if the debtor’s financial condition falls below
certain criteria). Although some fraudulent transfer scenarios can be quite simple, others
can be extraordinarily complex, such as those involving certain types of leveraged buyout
transactions. See United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir.
1986) (analyzing complex leverage buyout under Pennsylvania fraudulent conveyance
law); see also Douglas G. Baird, Fraudulent Conveyances, Agency Costs, and Leveraged
Buyouts, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1991) (discussing the application of fraudulent transfer
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DEADWEIGHT COLLECTION AND MONITORING COSTS
Finally, a debtor’s insolvency will typically generate additional problems in the
form of unrecoverable or “deadweight” collection and monitoring costs.346 Because
these, too, are likely to be complex and contentious in their resolution and are also
insolvency-related problems, they are likewise properly the subject of bankruptcy law.
In the ordinary course of extending credit and collecting claims, creditors
typically incur a variety of transaction costs.347 These costs may range from the
relatively trivial expense of preparing an invoice and following up with a reminder
notice, to the more onerous expense of hiring an attorney and pursuing legal action.
Creditors typically absorb these expenses and pass them along (if they can) as costs of
law in the context of a leverage buyout); Baird & Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance,
supra note 266 at 850-54 (discussing the interplay between leveraged buyout transactions
and fraudulent transfer law); Zaretsky, Fraudulent Transfer, supra note 336 at 1178-92
(same).
346 See Miller, Leverage, supra note 170 at 3, 5-6 (discussing the concept of “deadweight
costs” arising in the context of financial distress as those costs that are essentially
unrecoverable).
347 As Coase has explained, “transaction costs” are, essentially, the “costs involved in
carrying out market transactions.” Coase, Problem, supra note 330 at 37. As Coase has
further explained:
In order to carry out a market transaction, it is necessary to discover who it
is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal
and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to
draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that
the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on. These operations
are often extremely costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many
transactions that would be carried out in a world in which the pricing
system worked without cost.
Id.; see also Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 148
(1979) (describing transactions costs as “search and information costs, bargaining and
decision costs, policing and enforcement costs”).
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doing business. Critically, in deciding what collection efforts to pursue against a
defaulting debtor, creditors will be guided by their own cost-benefit analyses in deciding
what actions to take.
For example, if the amount of the creditor’s claim is relatively small (e.g.,
$10,000), one would not often expect the creditor to expend $40,000 hiring an attorney
and pursuing a lawsuit to obtain payment from a defaulting debtor, unless the creditor
had the ability to transfer the collection expense directly to the debtor or some third
party.348 In contrast, if the claim is large (e.g., $10 million), one might expect the creditor
to be willing to expend a significant sum to obtain payment, regardless of whether the
creditor could transfer the collection expense to someone else. But before spending
significant sums on collection activities, creditors also typically assess whether the
expenditure is likely to be fruitful from whatever information they may have. For
example, if a creditor is certain the debtor will not be able to pay any part of its claim (let
alone any part of the costs of collection), the creditor may elect to forego further
collection activity even if its claim is large. Conversely, if the creditor is certain of
348 Creditors often incorporate collection recovery provisions in their contracts with
debtors, such as those that provide that the creditor can recover its attorneys’ fees
incurred in collecting a debt. Similarly, some laws also provide for the recovery of such
costs. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-514(c) (1991) (providing for the recovery of legal
costs for attaching or levying creditors whose claims are allowed before the appointment
of a receiver over a debtor corporation or partnership); Ai. v. Frank Huff Agency, Ltd.,
607 P.2d 1304, 1307 n.3 (Haw. 1980) (citing Hawaii state statute for the proposition that
attorneys’ fees could be recovered by a licensee filing suit for the collection of a debt). If
the debtor is solvent, and the creditor can recover its costs, the creditor may be willing to
incur the costs of collection even if they exceed the amount of the debt.
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collection (including costs) to at least some extent, the creditor may pursue the debtor
relentlessly.349 These considerations inform any rational debt-collection decision.
In order to protect their interests and evaluate their options, creditors also
typically engage in monitoring—and incur monitoring expenses—to detect collection
problems as early as possible, to keep themselves apprised of the debtor’s financial
condition, and to insure compliance with any contractual or other legal obligations
bearing on the creditors’ ability to collect their claims. Monitoring expenses may include
the relatively minor cost associated with supervising a debtor’s payment history on prior
invoices or obtaining periodic credit reports from a credit-reporting agency. They may
also include the more significant expense of obtaining and analyzing detailed financial
reports, conducting field audits of the debtor’s assets, or otherwise policing the debtor’s
compliance with complicated financial covenants.350 Like collection costs generally,
monitoring expenses will vary depending on the circumstances of the parties, the nature
349 A creditor may also be willing to incur collection costs disproportionate to its
expected collection payoff from any particular debtor if pursuing the debtor vigorously
brings some other benefit to the creditor, such as improving the creditor’s ability to
collect from other debtors by establishing a reputation for tough debt-collection practices.
350 See Miller, Wealth Transfers, supra note 181 at 40 (explaining the use of restrictive
covenants and monitoring to protect creditors “from risk-increasing changes in the nature
of the firm after their original bargain with it has been struck”); George G. Triantis,
Secured Debt Under Conditions of Imperfect Information, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 242-
43 (1992) (comparing forms of monitoring); Clifford W. Smith & Jerold B. Warner, On
Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 122-24
(1979) (discussing types of contractual bond covenants designed to limit risky behavior);
see also Private Placement Enhancement Project, Model Forms (copies on file with
author) (providing examples of and explaining various covenants in debt contracts); see
generally Levmore, Monitors, supra note 146 (discussing the role of monitoring and the
potential for inefficient over-monitoring and under-monitoring). Even tort creditors may
engage in monitoring. For example, a tort creditor who has filed suit against the debtor
may attempt to monitor the debtor’s financial condition to determine whether any
judgment may be paid and to detect transfers of the debtor’s assets.
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of the transaction in question, and general market conditions, including whether the
relevant debt is short- or long-term in nature, how much risk the creditor is willing to
assume in extending credit, and how much competition there may be for the debtor’s
business.351 In general, creditors who are to be paid large sums over extended periods
(and thus assume long-term risk of default and nonpayment) are more likely to insist on
more elaborate (and more expensive) monitoring procedures than creditors who will be
paid small amounts in full within a short cycle.
As long as the debtor remains solvent, collection and monitoring costs will tend to
remain relatively low because creditors will tend to incur them only as necessary, and the
debtor will tend to avoid them through timely payment strategies and monitoring
compliance, as well as by selecting available lenders with the least costly monitoring
requirements. Obviously, a debtor who pays his debts in a timely manner will avoid the
cost of having to respond to a creditor’s more onerous debt-collection activities,
including any direct obligation to pay the creditor’s collection costs. Likewise, the debtor
will avoid harm to his reputation occasioned by default. In addition, a debtor who
351 For example, different creditors may have different access to a debtor’s financial
information, and thus different monitoring costs. See Black, Bank Funds, supra note 307
at 326 (observing that banks may have lower monitoring costs to the extent they have
immediate access to a debtor’s financial records available as part of the bank’s overall
relationship with the debtor). In addition, some creditors may not feel the need to incur
significant monitoring expenses because they may hope to “free-ride” off the monitoring
activities of others. See Levmore, Monitors, supra note 146 at 53-54 (discussing the free-
rider problem in the monitoring context). Further, instead of borrowing from a lender
with relatively onerous monitoring requirements, a financially healthy firm may elect to
borrow funds on different terms from some other source. See Diamond, Monitoring,
supra note 318 at 690 (observing that financially healthy debtors may be able to borrow
funds from the public debt markets at lower cost as compared to other forms of lending);
see also Rasmussen, Behavioral Economics, supra note 56 at 1683 (observing effects of
competitive markets on borrowing terms).
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consistently pays his debts over time may suffer less monitoring burdens or at least avoid
increased monitoring expenses.
In general, non-bankruptcy law does not typically intervene to reduce the costs of
individual monitoring and debt-collection practices, at least not in the sense of mandating
the use of collectivized procedures to reduce redundancies among claimants. Although
overlapping collection and monitoring costs might not be theoretically ideal,352 and the
parties might benefit from certain collectivized procedures (such as the collectivized
monitoring provisions of bond indentures under the Trust Indenture Act),353 the probable
reason why redundancies are at least tolerable is that they are most often less onerous
than the costs of avoiding them through resort to collectivized mechanisms.354
For example, as long as a debtor remains financially healthy, it would make little
sense to force all of the debtor’s creditors to participate in some common debt-collection
procedure (such as a class-action-style lawsuit involving all claimants) simply because
the debtor is engaged in a collection dispute with one creditor. In the typical case, the
added cost of dragging everyone into the dispute could not be justified. Similarly, so
long as the debtor remains solvent, it probably would make no sense to force every
creditor to participate in some type of collectivized monitoring procedure. In the
commercial world, monitoring arrangements span a broad spectrum depending on the
352 See Levmore, Monitors, supra note 146 at 76-83 (discussing possible inefficiencies in
monitoring structures and arguing that legal rules should pay attention to these
inefficiencies).
353 15 U.S.C §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1994).
354 See SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 37 at 213 (observing that “when simpler methods
of organizing behavior work, it would be irrational to abandon or overturn them in favor
of accomplishing the very same ends through more sophisticated methods”).
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circumstances of the parties and the particular transactional setting at issue, and forcing
participation in some alternative procedure to reduce overlapping costs suggests once
more the rule against fixing something that is not broken.355
As the debtor approaches and enters a state of insolvency, however, redundant
collection and monitoring costs typically become more prominent, more onerous, less
recoverable, less effective, and, hence, less desirable.356 First, as the debtor begins to
default, more and more creditors typically will begin to take various steps to protect their
individual interests, including the commencement and prosecution of collection
actions.357 Second, as the debtor’s financial deterioration becomes more apparent (owing
to missed payments and other indications), monitoring activities and demands also tend
to increase. At the same time, these activities tend to be increasingly inefficient, not only
because they are needlessly redundant (i.e., many creditors pursuing separately the same
collection and monitoring activities at the same time),358 but also because they become
355 Among other reasons, a collectivized procedure would likely provide too much
monitoring for some creditors, and too little for others. The discussion here is not meant
to suggest that legal innovations in monitoring (or innovations that reduce the need for
more expensive monitoring, such as reviewing credit scoring information available
electronically as opposed to other forms of monitoring) are not warranted. It is simply to
suggest that forcing all creditors to participate in a single monitoring scheme is likely to
be inefficient where the debtor is solvent.
356 See JACKSON, LOGIC, supra note 8 at 16. n.20 (observing that, following a debtor’s
insolvency, “[a] single inquiry into recurring collection questions is likely to be less
expensive (both for creditors and for the debtor) than the multiple inquiries necessary in
an individualistic remedies system.”) (citing John Weistart, The Costs of Bankruptcy, 41
LAW & CONTEM. PROBS. 107 (1977)).
357 See supra at 162-64.
358 As one commentator has explained:
since each rational creditor can anticipate that there will be a race to the
debtor’s assets once the firm becomes insolvent, each creditor has an
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dynamically less effective (e.g., as monitoring becomes less effective, this has a negative
impact on the efficiency of collection activities because it leaves creditors less well
informed).
In general, financially healthy debtors have incentives to disclose their true
financial condition in order to, among other things, attract capital and clients—they have
a good story to tell. In contrast, insolvent debtors have incentives to hide their financial
problems because, among other things, full disclosure might prompt creditors to take
precipitous action and scare away clients—they have a bad story to tell.359 Certainly
more than one bankruptcy filing has been preceded by disclosures of shocking accounting
irregularities in previous financial reporting that gave the appearance of financial
health.360
incentive to monitor the affairs of the debtor. To the extent that much of
this monitoring is repetitive, this represents an excess cost. Second, once
the race to the assets begins, each creditor will spend money to collect on
its debt. These multiple expenditures are again a cost that, all things being
equal, should be avoided.
Rasmussen, Behavioral Economic, supra note 56 at 1681-82.
359 See supra at 87, 138-55 (discussing an insolvent debtor’s incentives to stall creditors’
collection efforts and avoid disclosing accurate financial information); see also Ian
Ayres, The Possibility of Inefficient Corporate Contracts, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 387 (1991)
(using game theory to explain a corporate debtor’s incentives to provide lenders with
false signaling in order to conceal the riskiness of their activities); Carol J. Loomis, Lies,
Damned Lies, and Managed Earnings, FORTUNE, August 2, 1999, at 74, 77 (discussing
incentives that managers have to avoid negative accounting disclosures, how minor
cover-ups can lead to major fraud, and remarking that “[l]et business go south, and
abusive financial reporting can veil huge amounts of deterioration”); see generally
Andrade & Kaplan, How Costly, supra note 154 (discussing the bankruptcy and financial
distress costs of highly leveraged transactions since the mid-1980’s that resulted in a
more than a 30% default rate).
360 See supra note 182 (listing examples); Miniscribe Corp. v. Keymarc, Inc. (In re
Miniscribe Corp.), 123 B.R. 86, 89 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991) (discussing how press
accounts of false reporting preceded bankruptcy proceeding); Mercury Finance Co.:
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As a general matter, creditors understand that insolvent debtors may be more than
coy in revealing their true financial condition and may respond by increasing their
monitoring activities at the first sign of trouble in order to accumulate information and
assess whether and to what extent they should engage in collection activities.361 This can
be a difficult exercise, not only because it can be time-consuming to form an accurate
picture of the debtor’s financial health, but also because the debtor may mask his
problems. For example, a creditor may begin to receive late payments from the debtor
and, upon inquiry, receive all kinds of explanations from the debtor that purport to assure
the creditor that the problem is only temporary, or the product of some administrative
error, or something similarly innocuous. If the problem is only temporary, the creditor
would not want to act precipitously. Moreover, payment problems are, in fact,
temporary, or otherwise relatively innocuous, in a sufficient number of instances, and
collection costs are themselves sufficiently burdensome, that the creditor may not
necessarily want to jump automatically to aggressive debt-collection efforts at the first
sign of trouble. What the creditor does want, however, is accurate information so it can
decide whether the debtor’s problem is more serious than represented, and whether the
creditor will be paid in a relatively timely fashion without having to pursue aggressive
debt-collection measures. Hence, creditors tend to increase their monitoring demands if
signs of trouble emerge.
Reorganization Plan Filed Under Bankruptcy Code, WALL ST. J., July 16, 1998, at A6
(discussing false reporting prior to bankruptcy filing).
361 See Rasmussen, Behavioral Economics, supra note 56 at 1681-82 (offering this
observation).
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Debtors, of course, understand that creditors will tend to become nervous about
their deteriorating financial circumstances. Debtors also understand that if creditors learn
of their insolvency, they may begin to take precipitous action to avoid, among other
things, nonpayment or payment discrimination. The debtor may naturally attempt to
assuage the creditors’ fears. If the creditors’ concerns cannot be quelled, however, things
can unravel fairly quickly. To avoid ruin as long as possible, insolvent debtors thus have
an incentive to keep their true financial condition secret and resist covertly, and
sometimes fraudulently, their creditors’ monitoring efforts.362
All of this activity is costly. In addition to the direct expenses that creditors incur
in assessing and reacting to the debtor’s deteriorating circumstances, the debtor must also
incur direct costs in responding to the creditors’ increased collection and monitoring
activities. For example, the debtor’s employees may be forced to devote more and more
of their time to responding to the demands of creditors rather than running the debtor’s
business, and the debtor may have to hire counsel to defend against various debt-
collection efforts. More often than not, the debtor’s incurrence of these costs will only
further deplete the debtor’s limited resources, leaving even less for the overall
satisfaction of claims. As a result, many of the escalating costs associated with increased
362 See, e.g., TOM BOWER, MAXWELL: THE FINAL VERDICT 220-84, 343-68 (1995)
(describing the chaotic events leading up to the ultimate collapse of the financial and
business empire of Robert Maxwell); see also supra at 87, 186 (discussing an insolvent
debtor’s incentives to hide financial problems). Recognizing that debtors may tend to
under-disclose financial problems, creditors may also overreact in individual cases
involving honest and straightforward debtors out of the suspicion the debtor is
underreporting. Moreover, because different creditors have different access to a debtor’s
financial information, creditors with inferior access may assume the worst based on
incomplete data, thus potentially exacerbating the problem. See supra note 351
(discussing that different creditors are likely to have different access to a debtor’s
financial information).
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collection and monitoring activities are pointless and unrecoverable, becoming
deadweight in nature.363
As noted at the outset, the resolution of these problems is likely to be complex
and contentious. In addition, these problems are insolvency related. Accordingly, they
satisfy the circumstances of bankruptcy legality and are properly the subject of
bankruptcy law.
363 Not surprisingly, bankruptcy law has traditionally offered a variety of collective
procedures designed to reduce dead-weight collection and monitoring costs. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 521 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (requiring a debtor to file “a list of creditors, and
unless the court orders otherwise, a schedule of assets and liabilities, a schedule of
current income and current expenditures, and a statement of the debtor’s financial
affairs”), 704 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing that “[t]he trustee shall . . . collect and
reduce to money the property of the estate”), 1103 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (granting powers
to a creditor’s committee as the representative of creditors, ostensibly to reduce
duplication of monitoring that creditors otherwise would undertake and over
administration of the debtor), 1104 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (allowing for the appointment
of a trustee or examiner in a Chapter 11 reorganization case), 1125 (2000 & Supp. 2006)
(governing certain common disclosure in Chapter 11 cases regarding the debtor’s plan of
reorganization); see also Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking, supra note 10 at 346
(observing that “[t]he Bankruptcy Code reduces the costs of collection from a troubled
debtor by collectivizing creditor activities.”). As Warren has explained:
A number of provisions [of the Bankruptcy Code] are designed to increase
collection efficiency in a bankruptcy action; quick decisions, abbreviated
trials, estimation of claims, elimination of duplicate efforts, restricted
notification requirements, reduced waiting periods, minimal paperwork,
automatic stays from collection, stipulated valuations, and emergency
orders are all bankruptcy devices intended to capture value for the estate





Remediating the Problems of Insolvency
and the Contours of the Bankruptcy Market
Chapter 2 was devoted to identifying a set of special social problems—the
“problems of insolvency”—that are sufficiently unique, complex, and contentious that
they satisfy the “circumstances of bankruptcy legality,” meaning they qualify for
potential resolution under a special legal system called “bankruptcy law.” To summarize,
the relevant problems include those of (1) claims mediation and payment discrimination;
(2) overinvestment, underinvestment, and other moral hazard; and (3) unrecoverable
collection, monitoring, and related costs associated with a debtor’s financial ruin. As we
have seen, what is unique about these problems, and what ties them all together, is that
they are all insolvency-related. Moreover, because the need to resolve them arises only
in the insolvency context, it would make no sense to burden ordinary non-bankruptcy
legal systems with costly procedures to address them. On the contrary, that is what
bankruptcy law is for.
This chapter is devoted to addressing how bankruptcy law ought to respond to the
problems of insolvency, and immediately two questions arise. First, regardless of
whether the problems of insolvency satisfy the circumstances of bankruptcy legality, why
should bankruptcy law actually attempt to resolve them, as opposed to simply letting
them be? Although disheartening, financial failure is a fairly common fact of life for
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many, and certainly the law does not attempt to resolve every disheartening social
problem simply because it is unique, complex, and contentious.
Second, harkening back to the theories of other scholars discussed in Chapter 1, if
bankruptcy law should undertake to resolve the problems of insolvency, how should it go
about addressing this challenge? Should it deploy the kinds of legal remedies creditors
would bargain for if only they could get together and negotiate these remedies
collectively before extending credit (conceptual contracting)?364 Should it facilitate the
negotiation and enforcement of actual bankruptcy agreements to address them (actual
contracting)?365 Alternatively, should it adopt remedies that promote the avoidance of
public bailouts, enhance the debtor’s value, force creditors to internalize the costs of
credit, and distribute value equitably across a number of constituents (loss spreading)?366
Or should it be doing something else?
Turning to the first question—whether bankruptcy law has anything truly
meaningful to offer in addressing the problems of insolvency—Holmes observed that
“the public generally profits by individual activity” and argued that “[s]tate interference
is an evil, where it cannot be shown to be a good.”367 He concluded that, at least in the
context of accidents, losses should ordinarily be left to lie where they fall, unless it can be
364 See supra at 24-27 (discussing the creditors’-bargain approach and the concept of
conceptual contracting).
365 See supra at 54-58 (discussing actual bankruptcy contracting).
366 See supra at 101-05 (discussing the loss-spreading approach).
367 HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 5 at 95-96. Holmes observed that legal
regulation responds to the “felt necessities of the time,” quipping that “[t]he life of the
law has not been logic: it has been experience.” Id. at 1.
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shown that placing them somewhere else would constitute a material public gain.368
Bankruptcy law currently responds to the problems of insolvency with elaborate
mechanisms of debt collection, debt forgiveness, and debt adjustment that have the effect
of shifting insolvency-related losses in a variety of ways, sometimes dramatically.369 But
is intervention of any kind really beneficial?
It must be admitted that it is at least abstractly possible that the problems of
insolvency deserve no special treatment, and certainly the losses they generate could be
left to lie where they fall.370 But as even cursory review of these problems reveals, a
debtor’s financial failure characteristically generates serious forms of waste, inefficiency,
and unfairness. As a result, it is perhaps unsurprising that no one today argues that the
law should do nothing about them.371 In other words, the modern consensus appears to
368 Id. at 94-96, 106-111; but see Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, supra note 5 at
1091 (1972) (“When a loss is left where it falls in an auto accident, it is not because God
so ordained it” but rather “it is because the state has granted the injurer an entitlement to
be free of liability”); see also CALABRESI, COSTS, supra note 53 at 261-63 (criticizing
Holmes’s approach).
369 See, e.g., supra notes 72-76, 241, 246-47, 258, 299, 325, 334, 345, 363.
370 After all, for much of the nineteenth century, the United States had no national
bankruptcy law. It was not until 1898 that Congress enacted a permanent system of
bankruptcy remedies. See CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY
(1935) [hereinafter WARREN, BANKRUPTCY HISTORY] (chronicling the often heated
congressional debates over bankruptcy legislation during the nineteenth century, the
sporadic enactment of national bankruptcy laws in 1800, 1841, and 1867, and the
eventual enactment of the permanent Bankruptcy Act in 1898); NOEL, HISTORY, supra
note 258 at 157-80 (discussing the enactment of the Act of 1898); Bankruptcy Act of
1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), amended by the Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840
(1938) (repealed 1979), and replaced by the current Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-
1330 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
371 By way of comparison, the earliest English and American bankruptcy laws addressed
directly only some of the problems of insolvency, and by failing to discharge the
obligations of honest but hopelessly insolvent individuals who had been imprisoned for
their debts in accordance with prevailing debt-collection procedures, these early laws
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be that letting the problems of insolvency go unresolved is not a wise option.372 But what
then should the law be doing to address them?
Turning to the second question—the merits of the theoretical approaches of other
theorists—neither actual nor conceptual contracting appear to offer workable solutions,
as discussed at length in Chapter 1.373 On the other hand, the loss-spreading goals of
avoiding public bailouts, enhancing the debtor’s value, forcing creditors to internalize the
costs of credit, and distributing value equitably across a number of constituents at least
ignored a costly problem. See COLEMAN, DEBTORS, supra note 258 at 9 (noting that the
common practice of imprisonment for debt during the colonial era often left the debt
unpaid and “deprived the community of the prisoner’s labor”); NOEL, HISTORY, supra
note 258 at 70-72 (describing the appalling conditions in debtors’ prisons in the U.S.
during the colonial era); see also BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS 78-108 (2002)
(discussing the practice of imprisonment for debt in the U.S. during the late seventeenth
and early eighteenth centuries); CRAIG MULDREW, THE ECONOMY OF OBLIGATION: THE
CULTURE OF CREDIT AND SOCIAL RELATIONS IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 274-98 (1998)
[hereinafter MULDREW, ECONOMY] (discussing debt-collection practices and procedures
in early modern England); infra note 604 (discussing the gradual abolition of
imprisonment for debt in the United States during the nineteenth century). Moreover, as
Charles Warren has related, Congress’s inability to pass bankruptcy legislation during the
nineteenth century was not so much a problem of inattention, but rather disagreement
over what the content of bankruptcy law should be. See WARREN, BANKRUPTCY
HISTORY, supra note 370 (chronicling the repeated attempts to pass bankruptcy
legislation, with only sporadic success, during the nineteenth century). Regarding the
magnitude of the problem of imprisonment for debt, Warren estimated that, as late as
1833, as many as 75,000 persons annually were sent to jail for debt in the United States.
Id. at 52 n.8.
372 It is sometimes true, of course, that the losses occasioned by the problems of
insolvency should be left to lie were they fall. For example, suppose an insolvent debtor
is deceased and has no assets. Absent special circumstances, bankruptcy law would have
little to offer in such a situation. Likewise, suppose an insolvent firm is not viable and
has few or no assets. Absent special circumstances, the best course in such a case may
likewise be one of non-intervention. See supra at 65-66, infra at 288-89 (discussing the
appropriate treatment of firms that suffer from economic distress and are not salvageable,
as opposed to those suffering merely from financial distress that may be salvaged if,
among other things, they are able to deleverage their balance sheets).
373 See supra at 24-95.
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have the virtue of capturing in a more comprehensive manner some of the general aspects
of bankruptcy law’s remedial ambitions and effects. As also discussed in Chapter 1,
however, the loss-spreading account is both problematic and incomplete.374 Among other
things, although having a bankruptcy law that apportions losses tends to avoid the need to
consider public bailouts, no one really argues that routine public bailouts would be a
sound idea even if we did not have a bankruptcy law. Except in the most extraordinary
situations, the systematic use of public funds to resolve the problems of insolvency is a
potential solution that we may safely set aside.375
In addition, although it is true as a descriptive matter that bankruptcy law
endeavors to enhance the debtor’s value, force creditors to internalize the costs of credit,
374 See supra at 101-10.
375 It is true, of course, that the government sometimes administers public bailouts,
including recently in salvaging the domestic automobile industry and certain banking and
other financial institutions in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-2008, and likewise
at various other times in the past in response to certain financial disasters. See, e.g.,
BLINDER, AFTER, supra note 315 (discussing the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the
government’s response to it); Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979, Pub. L.
No. 96-185, 93 Stat. 1324 (1979); see also JAMES S. OLSON, SAVING CAPITALISM: THE
RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE CORPORATION AND THE NEW DEAL, 1933-1940 (1988)
(discussing the role of the reconstruction finance corporation during the Great
Depression); JAMES S. OLSON, HERBERT HOOVER AND THE RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE
CORPORATION, 1931-1933 (1977) (discussing the formation of the reconstruction finance
corporation, initially to make loans to banks to facilitate lending to businesses); Press
Release, Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, PBGC Protects Benefits of 82,000 LTV
Workers In Largest-Ever Federal Pension Takeover (Mar. 29, 2002),
http://www.pbgc.gov/-media/news-archive/news-releases/2002/pr02-16.html. In general,
however, the public bailout approach has been thought to be unworkable except in
extraordinary circumstances. Of some relevance, the Constitution limits Congress’s
bankruptcy power to establishing “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (emphasis added); see
Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 471 (1982) (“A law can
hardly be said to be uniform throughout the country if it applies only to one debtor and
can be enforced only by the one bankruptcy court having jurisdiction over that debtor.”);
see also infra at 206-07 (discussing further the public-bailout option and the special
problems of moral hazard that it may generate).
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and distribute value equitably across a number of constituents, these seemingly laudable
ambitions require further refinement and a more fully elaborated normative anchor.
More precisely, it is important to understand exactly why these goals and effects are
desirable, how they should be prioritized when they conflict, and how bankruptcy law
should go about accomplishing them. Here again it is important to distinguish positive
from normative analysis,376 and in order to identify whether bankruptcy law should be
doing these things and in what way, it is necessary to articulate more systematically the
relevant framework and principles that properly guide the selection and organization of
bankruptcy law’s remedial possibilities.
Rejecting Holmes’s theories—particularly his judge-centered view of law as “the
prophesies of what the courts will do in fact”377—H.L.A. Hart observed that one of the
key benefits of having legal regulation is to be seen “in the diverse ways in which the law
is used to control, to guide, and to plan life out of court.”378 Drawing on the work of
Michael Bratman, Scott Shapiro observes in similar fashion that a critical virtue of law—
and in his view the critical virtue—is that “[b]y providing a highly nimble and durable
method of social planning, the law enables communities to solve the numerous and
serious problems that would otherwise be too costly or risky to resolve.”379 Shapiro
376 See supra note 14 (discussing Hume’s observation that one cannot derive an “ought”
purely from an “is”).
377 Holmes, Path, supra note 222 at 460-61; see also supra note 222 (discussing Holmes).
378 HART, CONCEPT, supra note 222 at 40; see supra note 222 (discussing Hart’s views on
law).
379 SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 37 at 170; see id. at 119 (citing Bratman); supra notes
222-23, 225, 232 (discussing Shapiro’s views on legality); see also MICHAEL E.
BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASON (Stanford 1999); MICHAEL E.
BRATMAN, FACES OF INTENTION (Cambridge 1999) [hereinafter BRATMAN, FACES].
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crystallizes this idea into his “Planning Thesis,” summarized as the postulate that “[l]egal
activity is an activity of social planning.”380
Laws perform this general function in a variety of recognizable ways. Among
other things, they set up markets to facilitate exchange; provide for the recognition and
regulation of firms to organize economic and other activity; authorize transactions of
various kinds for a number of useful social purposes; and direct the resolution of
significant disputes in ways that avoid (hopefully) resort to violent forms of self-help and
retribution. All of these things involve and facilitate social planning. But as the
sociologist Charles Tilly has observed, “people rarely accomplish exactly what they
consciously plan, and constantly find events unrolling differently from what they
Bratman summarizes: “We are planning agents. Our purposive activity is typically
embedded in multiple, interwoven quilts of partial, future-directed plans of action. We
settle in advance on such plans of action, fill them in, adjust them, and follow through
with them as time goes by. We thereby support complex forms of organization in our
own, temporally extended lives and in our interactions with others; and we do this in
ways that are sensitive to the limits on our cognitive resources.” Id. at 1. Shapiro
observes that the “pragmatic justifications for the requirements of rationality” underlying
the planning account, together with the “content of the requirements themselves,” are
“the subject of philosophical controversy.” SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 37 at 119 n.4
(citing John Broome, Normative Requirements, 12 RATIO 398 (1999); R. Jay Wallace,
Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason, 3 PHILOSOPHERS’ IMPRINT 1 (2001);
Kieran Setiya, Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason, 117 ETHICS 649 (2007)).
380 SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 37 at 195-204. Shapiro explains further that, in his
view, “the fundamental problem to which law is a solution is not any particular moral
quandary,” but rather that “law is an answer to a higher-order problem, namely, the
problem of how to solve moral quandaries in general.” Id. at 173. Characterizing laws,
like intentions, as a type of “universal means,” he argues that “[j]ust as there are no
specific ends that intentions are supposed to serve, there are no substantive goals or
values that laws are supposed to achieve or realize.” Id. On the other hand, regardless of
whether law is merely an answer to the higher-order problem of solving moral quandaries
in general, we use it routinely to solve specific problems. In order to be useful, law must
be able to address the specific, not simply the general. See infra note 388 (discussing
Shapiro’s view on how law accomplishes this).
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anticipated.”381 In other words, the best laid plans often go awry, and inevitably some of
these failed plans will lead to bankruptcy.
Of course, one might object to Tilly’s observation on the ground that it seems a
bit extreme. After all, most individuals manage on a daily basis to accomplish at least
some of their plans. For example, most manage to get out of bed in the morning, get to
work on time, and keep their scheduled appointments—at least often enough to form
relatively predictable patterns of behavior. These smaller types of plans, however, are
not the real concern. For our purposes, what matters most about Tilly’s observation is
that when it comes to the major plans of life that typically unfold over longer periods of
time—and also tend to involve much greater investments of time, energy, and other
resources—all sorts of unexpected circumstances may and often do intercede, sometimes
with disastrous results. For individuals, these may include a variety of unhappy events,
such as divorce, loss of employment, or illness, to say nothing of circumstances such as
war, famine, flood, or earthquake.382 For businesses, particularly smaller ones, the
potential list of unanticipated calamities is even longer.383 As Tilly has also observed, the
ubiquity of our encounters with unplanned events is well illustrated in the prominence of
one of our most pervasive social practices: as a matter of social competency, we all
381 TILLY, WHY, supra note 80 at i.
382 See infra at 264 (discussing the most common causes of insolvency). Of course, the
intervening circumstances of life can also include events that turn out to be happy in
nature, such as the birth of an unplanned child.
383 This may be due in part to the way in which society privileges the creation of routine
supportive planning structures for individuals. As noted previously, most new businesses
fail within the first four years of their inception. See supra note 202 (discussing rates of
failure for new businesses). Most individuals last longer and benefit from more
developed supporting social structures to help ensure that they may.
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develop the ability (with varying degrees of diplomacy, tact, and honesty) to offer
reasons of repair that seek to explain in reconciliatory ways the circumstances that cause
our plans to change when those changes result in inconvenience (or worse) to others.384
Inevitably, some major planning disasters will lead to financial ruin and,
characteristically, the problems of insolvency. With the Planning Thesis in mind, the
question arises: as a means to facilitate planning activity, what should the law say about
the costs of these failed plans?
Before proceeding further, however, it is worth pausing for a moment to consider
whether Tilly’s observation actually poses a challenge to the Planning Thesis.385 It seems
384 As Tilly has observed, “much reason giving repairs relations, as someone who has
inflicted damage on someone else tells a story to show that the damage was inadvertent
or unavoidable and therefore, despite appearances, does not reflect badly on the
relationship between giver and receiver.” Id. at 20. Moreover, the more our excuses are
accepted by others, the more generally acceptable they tend to become. The acceptability
of a broad range of social excuses is perhaps justifiable in part because it is often difficult
to know, for example, if the person who fails to show up for an appointment actually
experienced some sympathetic mishap or simply skipped the commitment. It is also
perhaps justifiable because everyone makes use of social excuses and only someone
without any social grace whatsoever would refuse to accept at least some of them some
of the time. This can be thought of as a process of “normalization.” See, e.g., IAN
AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS 79 (2010) [hereinafter AYRES, CARROTS] (describing the
work of Robert Cialdini and the problem of normalizing theft). Legal procedure,
however, has caught on to the inadequacy of much excuse giving, and the standard for
“excusable neglect” sufficient to justify missing certain legal deadlines is more exacting
than many prevailing social practices. See Pioneer Investment Servcs. Co. v. Brunswick
Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380 (1993) (discussing the excusable neglect standard).
385 Among other things, if the Planning Thesis is correct, but plans often go awry as Tilly
observes, then law must inevitably facilitate a kind of social activity (i.e., planning) that
is frequently a source of frustration and failure (e.g., starting a new business, particularly
a restaurant). Moreover, to the extent individuals and groups are relatively poor planners
because, for example, it is hard for them to take accurate account of future events, laws
must also have the ironic effect of facilitating activities that individuals and groups are
not particularly adept at handling. On the other hand, Shapiro points out that one of law’s
virtues is that it helps compensate for the relative inability of individuals and groups to
plan. See, e.g., SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 37 at 151 (“Without some method for
correcting or guiding behavior, information asymmetries, cognitive incapacities, and
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undeniable that the costs of insolvency characteristically arise from financial failure,
including failed plans, but is it correct to say that these costs always arise from social
planning activities? If not, then how else do they arise and how might this affect the
analysis?386
In general, it seems relatively clear that financial failure is characteristically
associated with social planning activities. To begin with, the kinds of failures that
generate the problems of insolvency typically arise as a result of social activities that
involve indebtedness of some sort, and it is hard to imagine an activity involving
indebtedness that does not also involve at least some kind of planned social activity,
successful or otherwise. More important, what makes at least some of the problems of
insolvency so pressing is not simply that they arise out of failure, but that a debtor’s
insolvency generates consequences that profoundly affect ongoing and future social
planning. For example, an insolvent debtor’s incentives to gamble with his assets and
avoid debt-collection efforts have clear implications for how the debtor will plan his
activities and conduct himself in the marketplace. Likewise, the creditors’ incentives to
engage in debt-collection free-for-alls have implications of a similar nature. It would
divergent preferences threaten to plunge joint ventures into chaos.”). As Shapiro
explains, laws do this by establishing “institutions of social planning” that “compensate
for the deficiencies of alternative forms of planning in the circumstances of legality.” Id.
at 171.
386 For example, it might be possible to draw a distinction between financial failure
arising from poor plans and financial failure arising from the poor execution of plans.
The making and execution of plans, however, would both seem to be forms of planning
activity—after all, the point of making plans is generally to bring them to fulfillment.
See supra note 222; BRATMAN, FACES, supra note 379 at 1 (observing that one of the
purposes of plans is to follow through with them).
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thus seem entirely appropriate to view the problems of insolvency as integral to social
planning activities.
But there remains a deeper concern. Social planning is not always a good thing,
and not simply because some plans fail. Although laws undeniably facilitate social
planning activities, many plans turn out badly, not merely because some innocent ones
fail, but also because some are harmful, including sinister ones that seek to accomplish
illicit goals or make use of illicit means. In other words, not all plans are of the same
moral character or worth. Without more, to say that the aim of law is to facilitate social
planning is to say that it facilitates both good and bad plans indifferently, including those
that may be extremely unjust or immoral. And it is at best awkward to conclude that the
aim of law is to facilitate social plans regardless of whether they are good, bad, or ugly.
As Shapiro points out, “[t]he claims of law are far too serious to accept the
possibility that they are amoral in nature,”387 but in positivist fashion, he also contends
that “there are no substantive goals or values that laws are supposed to achieve or
realize.”388 In other words, as a form of “universal means,” law is like clay that may be
387 SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 37 at 111.
388 Id. at 173. Shapiro explains that the determination of legal validity is a sociological
inquiry, rather than a moral one. He contends that “[i]f we want to discover the existence
or content of the fundamental rules of a legal system, we must look . . . only to what
officials think, intend, claim, and do around here.” Id. at 177. A key virtue of this
approach, he claims, is that laws effectively settle normative questions so the relevant
parties engaged in social planning activities need not think about them: “The logic of
planning requires that plans be ascertainable by a method that does not resurrect the very
questions that plans are designed to settle. Only social facts, not moral ones, can serve
this function.” Id. In other words, the point of law as a facilitator of social planning is
precisely to avoid moral questions. Shapiro argues: “[l]egal authority, rights, and
obligations are possible . . . simply because highly impersonal shared practices of social
planning are possible.” Id. at 182. In other words, a system of law exists as an extension
of human planning capacity and rationality; from the “legal point of view,” it is because it
is. Id. at 186-88.
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shaped with particular values in mind, but does not itself have any of its own (other than
perhaps to help social planning along), at least not in the sense of any that are directed
toward the resolution of specific problems. This raises an important question: at what
point and in what way do normative criteria, or “norms,” enter into the calculus to shape
the content of law and our evaluation of it so that law may, in turn, encourage positive
social planning activities, discourage those that are negative, and—most critical for our
purposes—assist in repairing the consequences of failed plans that lead to insolvency?
Moreover, how are these norms to be selected?
In the absence of consensus, the task of identifying appropriate norms to guide the
selection of rules that govern social planning activities is itself often a serious social
problem (e.g., what are the norms to be used in deciding whether each citizen should be
allowed to have unlimited children or only two?). It is also a task that is sufficiently
complex and contentious that it would appear to satisfy the circumstances of legality.
But unlike most other social problems that invite resolution through social planning
activities, it is difficult to conceive of the process of selecting the norms that shape our
conception of what law ought to produce (e.g., just outcomes) as the same thing as, for
example, the process of planning the details of a particular market regulation in
accordance with those norms (e.g., builders must use wiring of a sufficient quality to
avoid fires). Among other things, we do not typically think of justice or morality as
something the law creates in the same fashion as zoning regulations or building-code
requirements, which are products of legal processes. Rather, we typically think of justice
and morality as things that law takes account of and settles only in the sense of deciding
which contested version of justice or morality to follow. Justice may be a matter of
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outcomes in the sense that laws may be viewed as unjust based on their effects,389 but it is
also a matter of inputs into the legal process itself.390 But what then are the norms to be
used in selecting the norms?
It is certainly true that we may often accept the authority of others to prescribe
and enforce rules that govern our planning activities simply because they have that
power. At the same time, however, we also expect that those rules will be just or moral,
and this is not simply an empty aspiration. If the rules are not just or moral, we expect
that they can and will be changed.391 Shapiro offers the sociological view that law
reflects “what officials think, intend, claim, and do around here,” and this has the virtue
of settling vexing problems so that individuals can go about their planning activities
without first having to worry about settling a variety of nettlesome and troubling issues;
officials do that for them.392 But is this perspective a completely satisfying answer? Are
justice and morality properly localized and cabined in this way as an instrumental means
to facilitate social planning? And if justice and morality are not purely instrumental to
social planning or localized in a particular person or institution, how do we select the
389 See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 14 at 180 (“Justice is a matter of outcomes:
a political decision causes injustice, however fair the procedures that produced it, when it
denies people some resource, liberty, or opportunity that the best theories of justice
entitle them to have”).
390 For example, regardless of its relative wisdom, no one today would view the law
promulgated by a single person to be just even though all were bound by compulsion to
obey it, or a judicial pronouncement adverse to a party where that party had no
opportunity to participate.
391 See RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 98 at 236 (“If deviations from justice . . . are too
pervasive, a serious question may arise whether a system of law exists as opposed to a
collection of particular orders designed to advance the interests of a dictator or the ideal
of a benevolent despot.”).
392SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 37 at 177; supra note 388.
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norms that guide the creation of legal rules within a system that purports not to have any
of its own, at least not inherently? In other words, how is it possible to identify the
“ought” of justice or morality that we hope drives our system of law from the “is” of the
desire to promote social plans, unless the very desire to promote social plans is itself
instrumental to some deeper ambition ripe with normative purpose that laws also attempt
to express?393
As intriguing as these questions may be, however, we need not resolve them at
this juncture, or for that matter accept every aspect of Shapiro’s insightful account of law,
in order to proceed with the analysis. Regardless of whether laws always facilitate social
planning or do so only some of the time, and regardless of whether laws facilitate
planning activities with or without the benefit of an intrinsic system of norms that
expresses a set of deeper social beliefs, it remains true that (1) laws serve as complex
problem-solving mechanisms that respond to complex and contentious social phenomena,
and (2) norms inevitably come into the picture at some point to help us resolve them.394
393 Paul Kahn has argued that “[t]he rule of law . . . is not simply talk about whatever is
judged to be of interest to a collection of speakers. The discourse of law is not just a
matter of giving reasons.” KAHN, REIGN, supra note 222 at 44. Rather, “[t]he reasons of
law are uniquely its own.” Id. He continues, “[w]e must stop approaching law’s claims
as if they were descriptive of actual institutions or processes of decision making” and
instead “approach the rule of law as a set of beliefs by which members of [a] culture
understand themselves and their world.” Id. at 45. He states, “[t]he rule of law is a
structure of the imagination before it is a structure of political events.” Id. Following
Dworkin, Kahn also “breaks down the distinction between law and morality.” Id. Unlike
Dworkin, however, he does not claim that there is a single correct set of answers to the
various questions of law. He observes that, although the “rule of law is indeed a
complete account of our experience of the political,” it remains “a contested account.”
Id. Borrowing from this observation—that there are different conceptions of law’s
normative ambitions—I use several standards to evaluate potential solutions to the
problems of insolvency, rather than one.
394 After all, the basic idea behind the concept of law as a means to facilitate social
planning is precisely that social planning serves as a powerful problem-solving device.
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The problems of insolvency are clearly social problems within the scope of this more
generic problem-solving framework, and in order to determine how bankruptcy law
might fruitfully address them as a problem-solving exercise, it is useful to know two
basic things: (1) the nature of the relevant problems in sufficient detail to permit the
identification of potentially appropriate solutions (a question of correlation based on
adequate information); and (2) the relevant norms to be used in evaluating potential
solutions and selecting the best ones from the plausible alternatives. As discussed at the
outset, I make use of three different normative standards: equity (fairness), efficiency
(wealth-maximization), and entitlement (the preservation of protected interests). As we
shall see, each has its own particular virtues and shortcomings. Collectively, however,
they offer a fairly comprehensive means to evaluate whether bankruptcy law’s actual or
potential solutions to the problems of insolvency are beneficial. Before applying these
different evaluative standards, however, it is first necessary to organize the inquiry by
identifying more precisely how and why bankruptcy law’s actual and potential debt-
collection, debt-forgiveness, and debt-adjustment solutions correlate to different
categories of the problems of insolvency.
See SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 37 at 170; supra notes 222, 225. If follows that, at a
more general level of abstraction, law is a problem-solving tool. We may call this
expanded conception the “Problem-Solving Thesis,” postulated as “legal activity is an
activity of problem-solving addressed to social problems that satisfy the circumstances of
legality.” In addition to being broad enough to encompass the challenge of how law
might encourage positive social planning activities and discourage negative ones, it is
also capacious enough to encompass the task of deciding how law might assist in
repairing the consequences of failed plans that lead to insolvency. In addition, the
relevant norms that ought to be used in resolving these challenges may also be viewed as
social problems that satisfy the circumstances of legality, and are thus appropriate for a
legal response in the sense of being incorporated into the analysis. The question then
becomes one of selecting the relevant norms.
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CATEGORIZING THE PROBLEMS OF INSOLVENCY AND THEIR POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
In theory, there are many potential ways to respond to the problems of insolvency,
including various combinations of distinct remedies of debt collection, debt forgiveness,
and debt adjustment. A debt-collection remedy is one concerned with the enforcement of
the creditors’ claims against an insolvent debtor and/or the debtor’s property in response
to one or more of the problems of insolvency—for example, some kind of collectivized
and streamlined procedure for the recognition and enforcement of claims to reduce the
problems of deadweight collection costs. A debt-forgiveness remedy is one concerned
with the release of the debtor and/or the debtor’s property from some or all of the
debtor’s liabilities in response to one or more of the problems of insolvency—for
example, some kind of discharge of the debtor’s liabilities to remedy the problem of
overburdened human capital. A debt-adjustment remedy is one concerned with the
prioritization of the competing claims of creditors in response to one or more of the
problems of insolvency—for example, some kind of claims-prioritization protocol to
address the problem of claims mediation.
Note that, as these examples illustrate, each of the three types of remedies
outlined above may be thought of as correlating to certain specific problems of
insolvency, at least suggesting the possibility that we might fruitfully organize the
various problems and their potential remedies in this way—i.e., debt-collection solutions
in response to the debt-collection problems, debt-forgiveness solutions in response to the
debt-forgiveness problems, and debt-adjustment solutions in response to the debt-
adjustment problems. As it turns out, that is the case, but in order to understand why that
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is so, it is first necessary to consider whether there are viable solution strategies to the
problems of insolvency that defy these categorizations.
Here it is worth observing that there is indeed one potential debt-collection
solution that, all by itself, solves all the problems of insolvency—a variant of the public-
bailout remedy discussed above. Specifically, upon a debtor’s financial demise, the state
might intervene with a public payment program that ensures that all of the debtor’s debts
will be paid in full on a “non-recourse” basis, and we may call this the “bailout-
insurance” option.395 This may be thought of as an “exclusive” remedy because, by
itself, it handily excludes the need for any other debt-collection, debt-forgiveness, or
debt-adjustment relief for the simple reason that, if this type of public-bailout device were
known to be readily available, creditors would be assured of the full satisfaction of their
claims and all of the various problems of insolvency would simply disappear. For
example, there would be no incentive for creditors to engage in debt-collection free-for-
alls because they would always be assured of full payment. Likewise, there would be no
possibility of payment discrimination in any meaningful sense, and gratuitous transfers
would become a non-concern. Significantly, the bailout-insurance option is a form of
debt-collection, debt-forgiveness, and debt-adjustment procedure all rolled up into one: it
simultaneously pays, extinguishes, and distributes in one fell swoop.
395 The solution is a non-recourse type of insurance because, after paying all of the
debtor’s debts, the state would not have recourse to the debtor to recover what it paid to
creditors. Of course, to the extent the state merely substituted for the creditors and could
assert a claim against the debtor for amounts the state paid to the creditors, the debtor
would remain insolvent and the problems of insolvency would persist.
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There is, however, an enormous potential for moral hazard associated with such a
scheme.396 Because the state would effectively insure the payment of claims, creditors
would have little incentive to lend providently, and debtors would have every incentive to
incur obligations profligately, including tort liabilities imposed involuntarily on their tort
victims. Similar ex ante effects explain why other forms of public bailouts are always the
remedy of absolute last resort. As noted above, no one advocates the use of public-
bailout programs (except in the most limited and extraordinary of circumstances), and we
can safely set them aside as a form of routine solution to the problems of insolvency.397
In contrast, it is also worth noting that, unlike the bailout-insurance option
outlined above, there are no other exclusive debt-collection, debt-forgiveness, or debt-
adjustment options that, by themselves, cause all of the problems of insolvency simply to
disappear. For example, suppose that, once a debtor became insolvent, the law simply
divested the debtor of all of his property, liquidated it for the benefit of creditors, and
either required the debtor to work exclusively to pay off his debts or permitted the debtor
to be sold off into slavery. We may call this the “Roman-divestiture” option, named after
the procedure under the Law of the Twelve Tables (c. 450 B.C.) that permitted the
defaulting insolvent debtor to be sold into slavery to satisfy the creditors’ claims.398 This
396 See supra note 261 (discussing the concept of “moral hazard”); see also JACKSON,
LOGIC, supra note 8 at 232 (observing that “[t]he difficulty with a solution whereby the
government uses its revenues to make grants to reduce the losses that creditors sustain . . .
is that it aggravates the problem of moral hazard.”) (internal marks and citations omitted).
397 See supra note 375 (discussing some examples of public bailout measures).
398 See Louis E. Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 223,
231-32 (1918) [hereinafter Levinthal, Early History] (describing the procedure); see also
ALLAN C. JOHNSON, ET AL., ANCIENT ROMAN STATUTES 9-18 (C. Pharr. ed. 1961).
Holmes believed that this procedure gave the creditors the option of either selling the
debtor as a slave or putting him to death. HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 5 at 14 (“a
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debt-collection remedy would not be exclusive in nature because implementing it would
not eliminate all of the problems of insolvency or the need for other forms of relief.
Indeed, it would only likely make many of these problems worse. For instance, the
harshness of the penalty would tend to exacerbate the debtor’s incentives to avoid the
creditors’ debt collection efforts, engage in deception, and gamble with his property. In
addition, following the liquidation of the insolvent debtor and his property, the question
of dividing the proceeds would remain. Similarly, the problem of stagnating assets
would also persist unless there was also some procedure to avoid encumbrances on
overburdened assets so they might be sold or otherwise put to productive use. In
addition, the Roman-divestiture option is quite obviously unpalatable for other important
reasons. Once again, no one today advocates this kind of solution, and we may safely set
it aside.
Alternatively, suppose that, once a debtor became insolvent, the law simply
cancelled all of the debtor’s obligations in full. We may call this the “automatic-debt-
cancellation” option. This would be a type of exclusive debt-forgiveness remedy
because, by eliminating all of the debtor’s debts, there would be no need for any debt-
collection or debt-adjustment relief—the debts simply would be gone.399 If this type of
debt-forgiveness option were known to be available, debtors would be assured of
complete relief from their obligations if they should become insolvent, but at least some
debtor who did not pay his debts . . . was dealt with on the same footing as a thief” and
“if a man was indebted to several creditors and insolvent, . . . they might cut up his body
and divide it among them” or “[i]f there was a single creditor, he might put his debtor to
death or sell him as a slave”).
399 It is different from the bailout-insurance option because, instead of paying the
creditors’ claims, the state would simply extinguish them, forcing the creditors to bear the
losses.
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of the problems of insolvency would still persist—for example, those of payment
discrimination and gratuitous transfers arising from transactions the debtor made before
becoming insolvent and obtaining a complete release of all debts. Indeed, the automatic-
debt-cancellation option would likely exacerbate these problems as creditors scrambled
for payment before the remedy took effect. In addition, the blanket cancellation of the
debtor’s indebtedness would itself likely generate other undesirable ex ante effects.
Among other things, it is likely that financial creditors would be reluctant to lend and
debtors would have every incentive to engage in conduct that gave rise to tort liabilities
and other types of involuntary debts because those would be freely cancellable. Once
again, no one advocates this type of exclusive debt-forgiveness remedy and we may
safely set it aside as well.
Similarly, suppose that, upon a debtor’s insolvency, the law provided for the
prioritization of the debtor’s debts—for example, it stipulated that the claims of tort
victims must be paid ahead of all other claims—but offered no accompanying debt-
collection or debt-forgiveness remedy. We may call this the “simple-prioritization”
option. By its nature, this would not be an exclusive remedy because, if implemented, it
would not obviate the need for debt-collection and debt-forgiveness relief. Nor would it
resolve all of the problems of insolvency. Unlike the automatic-debt-cancellation option,
it would not terminate all debt-collection activities; and unlike the bailout-insurance
option, it would not cause the problems of insolvency simply to disappear. On the
contrary, most of them would remain. For these reasons, consideration of the simple-
prioritization option need not detain us long because it, too, is plainly inadequate as a
comprehensive remedy.
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In addition, just as it would be unwise to attempt to resolve the problems of
insolvency with any of the single-remedy solutions discussed above (i.e., the bailout-
insurance, Roman-divestiture, automatic-debt-cancellation, and simple-prioritization
options), it would also be infeasible to attempt to remedy the problems of insolvency with
merely some combination of two of the three types of remedies categorized above (debt
collection, debt forgiveness, and debt adjustment).400 For example, a bankruptcy law that
made use of streamlined, collectivized debt-collection procedures to avoid the problem of
deadweight collection costs (a debt-collection solution) and prioritized the payment of
claims to address the problem of claims mediation (a debt-adjustment solution) would not
resolve the problems of overburdened and stagnating assets. What is needed to address
the latter is some kind of debt-forgiveness solution. Because this analysis holds as a
general matter (i.e., different combinations of merely two of the three solution categories
are inadequate to remedy all of the problems of insolvency), it follows that the problems
of insolvency cannot be remediated comprehensively without incorporating into the
remedial mix some kind of remedy from each of the categories, including some kind of
debt-forgiveness solution. In other words, among other things, we can safely reject a
“no-discharge” option if the goal is to resolve all of the problems of insolvency.
400 By way of illustration, it might be possible as a conceptual matter to adopt a debt-
adjustment mechanism that eliminates the need for a special debt-collection remedy to
address various debt-collection problems such as deadweight collection costs. For
instance, the law might direct in far-fetched fashion that, upon a debtor’s insolvency, the
first creditor to file a claim with some public agency (regardless of the size of the claim)
would receive the exclusive right to seize and keep all the debtor’s assets to the exclusion
of all others. This solution, however, is infeasible because, among other things, it would
over-compensate the creditor, perhaps even grossly so, if the value of the creditor’s claim
exceeded the value of the debtor’s assets.
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Once the bailout-insurance, Roman-divestiture, automatic debt-cancellation, and
no-discharge options are eliminated as feasible alternatives, the various problems of
insolvency can be readily categorized individually as either problems of debt collection,
debt adjustment, or debt forgiveness in the sense that, as a matter of correlation, they are
categorically subject to debt-collection, debt-adjustment, or debt-forgiveness solutions.
For example, assuming that bankruptcy law should not abandon completely the
enforcement of claims against insolvent debtors and their property (i.e., the automatic-
debt-cancellation option is eliminated), the problem of deadweight collection costs is
properly a debt-collection issue because, so long as creditors may pursue their claims in
bankruptcy against the debtor or the debtor’s property in some fashion, the problem of
deadweight collection costs will persist in the collection process unless remediated in
some way. Similarly, assuming that the automatic debt-cancellation and bailout-
insurance options are eliminated, the problem of claims mediation is one of debt-
adjustment because, so long as creditors may pursue their claims in some fashion against
the insolvent debtor or his property, there remains the need for some device to sort and
prioritize their conflicting rights to payment because they cannot all be paid in full.
Likewise, once the bailout-insurance, Roman-divestiture, and no-discharge options are
eliminated, the appropriate solution to the problem of overburdened human capital is one
of debt-forgiveness of some kind (as opposed to possible solutions of debt collection or
debt adjustment) because only debt forgiveness is responsive to the problem with these
assumptions in place. As a result, we are now in a position to categorize generally each
of the various problems of insolvency in terms of their basic characteristics and identify
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the general kinds of correlative solutions that are potentially responsive to them (i.e.,
individual solutions of debt collection, debt adjustment, or debt forgiveness).
Of course, in addition to describing in general terms the appropriate categories of
remedies that correlate to specific problems of insolvency, there is also the challenge of
identifying and fleshing out the details of the best solutions among the alternatives within
each category—a question of optimality. For example, in responding to the problem of
overburdened human capital, what specific kind of discharge should the law permit in
combination with what other types of remedies? Should the debtor receive an in
personam discharge of liabilities, but be required to surrender all of his property toward
the in rem satisfaction of claims,401 or should the debtor be able additionally to claim
some property as exempt? Are all liabilities subject to discharge or merely some of
them? Answering these more specific questions requires additional normative guidance,
as well as empirical investigation. Moreover, the choice of norms used in the analysis
matters because different evaluative criteria may point in different directions. For
example, efficiency analysis supports the collectivization of debt-collection remedies in
bankruptcy to reduce deadweight collection costs. In contrast, some other form of
analysis might support maintaining remedial individualization (although that does not
turn out to be true under the particular evaluative standards used here).
Further, because remediating the problems of insolvency unavoidably blends a
number of norms in responding to the various categories of problems outlined above, it is
also important to have a “norm-that-prioritizes-the-norms” to the extent they conflict.
For example, it is critical to decide whether the debt-forgiveness features of bankruptcy
401 See supra note 329 (distinguishing in personam and in rem liability).
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law are more important than its debt-collection mechanisms. This, in turn, takes the
overall analysis into the realm of relative fairness considerations, complex efficiency
evaluations, and relative entitlements.
Along the way, it will also be necessary to consider a number of important
ancillary questions. For example, should bankruptcy law respond to the problems of
insolvency by authorizing their resolution through contracts of some kind, administrative
regulation, or some comprehensive market mechanism? In addition, if a market
mechanism is to be used, what kind? Moreover, if bankruptcy law makes use of courts,
should they be classic dispute-resolution courts or more specialized problem-solving
courts? Finally, it is important to address at the outset a few epistemic challenges that
tend to obscure inquiries into how bankruptcy law should respond to the problems of
insolvency, including those involving questions of morality and cognitive bias, and it is
to those challenges that the discussion now turns.
EPISTEMIC COMPLEXITIES
Suppose hypothetically that the particular problem under study is a specific type
of car crash. In identifying appropriate potential solutions (e.g., fines, driver retraining
requirements, license suspension, etc.), it would be useful to know something about the
nature and details of the crashes in question. For example, suppose it is known that all of
the relevant crashes are caused by young drivers between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-five. Right away one would eliminate from the range of possible solutions any
that would force drivers between the ages of forty-five and fifty to attend driver-
retraining programs because there would be no correlation between the problem and this
particular solution. The same is true for the problems of insolvency—once the nature of
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a particular problem is identified in sufficient detail, it is then possible to begin
categorizing it for purposes of narrowing the range of potentially fruitful solutions, as
illustrated above with respect to the problems of insolvency and their potential remedies.
In doing so, however, it is important to acknowledge that, in considering any
problem with an eye toward selecting a possible solution, things are never quite as
straightforward as they seem. Among other things, the more one knows about the details
of a problem, the more one becomes susceptible to preconceived frames of analysis and
potential biases that can color the evaluation. For example, continuing the hypothetical
above, suppose it is known that the relevant car crashes are all caused by drunks who
intentionally steer their vehicles into walls. Once these additional details are revealed,
the concept of moral fault tends to interject itself and potentially co-opt the analysis
because “drunk” and “intentionally” tend to trigger moral responses such as “fault” and
“blame.” In turn, these responses may trigger preferences for particular solutions, such as
“punishment” rather than “retraining.” Of course, this may or may not be warranted.
The point is that it is important to be conscious of the potential for these kinds of
reactions and examine deliberately whether they are, in fact, appropriate. As we shall see
momentarily, this is particularly important in conducting any inquiry into the nature of
the problems of insolvency and in evaluating their potential resolution.
Before addressing the details of some particularly significant and potentially
distracting epistemic complexities associated with the phenomenon of insolvency,
however, it is first useful to introduce another evaluative concept relevant to categorizing
the problems of insolvency and the relevant types of remedies that appropriately correlate
to each. In attempting to find a solution to any challenging problem of significance, it is
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often helpful to consider whether it is a puzzle or a mystery. Puzzles are
characteristically problems that have already occurred and are solvable once the
necessary pieces have been collected. They turn on what is known at the time a solution
is attempted and, if all the relevant pieces are present, typically require simply an
appropriate puzzle-solving strategy to put them together. Mysteries, on the other hand,
are problems for which solutions must be determined in other ways. They turn on what
the investigator can plausibly discover, deduce, and assume, and they generally require
more skill, nuance, and creativity to identify a plausible, satisfactory resolution.402
We know enough about the law and human behavior in general, and the problems
of insolvency in particular, that we should be able to treat these problems more like
puzzles, at least at a general level for purposes of creating a serviceable evaluative
framework. But returning to the epistemic challenge outlined above, there is a deeper
difficulty involved in working with what we know about insolvency: as a general matter,
there are profound reasons why we are likely to want to believe certain things about
insolvent debtors and their condition and, correspondingly, to disbelieve others, which
may color our preferences for certain solutions at the expense of others. These include
(1) the existence of a peculiar concept of non-reciprocal morality embedded in the idea of
debt, and (2) a particular form of bias arising in connection with bankruptcy’s social
stigma. Both of these threaten to convert the puzzles of insolvency into deep, inscrutable
mysteries.
402 See GREGORY F. TREVERTON, RESHAPING NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR AN AGE OF
INFORMATION 11 (2001).
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For example, regardless of whether one thinks of debtors as generally rational or
not,403 they are susceptible to important behavioral biases that suggest that they are not
optimal cost avoiders when it comes to the problems of insolvency. Specifically, they are
vulnerable to certain cognitive weaknesses that can lead to risk-assessment decision-
making errors that, in turn, can devolve fairly rapidly into insolvency under conditions of
financial stress. A key example is a form of optimism bias that may be referred to as the
“Antonio problem” after the character in Shakespeare’s play, The Merchant of Venice.404
In the play, Antonio was willing to pledge a lethal pound of his flesh in exchange
for a loan from the money lender Shylock because Antonio felt certain he could repay the
403 See, e.g., STUART VYSE, GOING BROKE: WHY AMERICANS CAN’T HOLD ON TO THEIR
MONEY (2008) [hereinafter VYSE, GOING BROKE] (arguing that consumer spending is not
rational); see also DANIEL ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL (2008) (discussing ways in
which human behavior is not rational). It is with no small irony that Hamlet remarks:
“What a piece of work is man!” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 2, sc. 2, ln. 295.
404 See AYRES, CARROTS, supra note 384 at 145-65 (explaining and discussing the
Antonio Problem); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE [hereinafter
SHAKESPEARE, MERCHANT OF VENICE]. Optimism bias is a form of judgment error in
which individuals believe that their own probability of suffering a bad outcome is less
than it actually is. See SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY 21-22 (2013) (noting that
human are “unduly prone to think that we ourselves are less likely than others to suffer
misfortune . . .”); David M. DeJoy, The Optimism Bias and Traffic Accident Risk
Perception, 21 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS AND PREVENTION 333 (1989). Some disagree that
optimism bias is a form of judgment error on the theory that it is simply a “preference” or
“taste” for increased risk taking. See generally Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis
of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311 (1989). One problem with this
perspective, however, is that the “preference” or “taste” is not typically conscious—the
person does not think he is actually taking any increased risk and so acts as though he is
not. Rationally, if the individual understood the actual risk (and with it the likely
consequences of his choice), the individual would not assume the risk unless the potential
payoff was more than he originally thought it would be because he now has an accurate
value for the relevant risk. It is only because the actual risk remains hidden that it is
assumed, and the inability to see actual values in this context is what constitutes a form of
bias. See, e.g., HUME, TREATISE, supra note 14 at book III, part II, section VII (arguing
that individuals irrationally discount the future in order to maximize short-term benefit at
the expense of long-term gain).
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debt and avoid the penalty.405 Like many debtors desirous of a loan, he discounted
heavily the risk of his potential failure to repay his debt on time. In contrast, his creditor
Shylock exhibited the superior skill at more shrewdly assessing the actual risk of
Antonio’s default. As it turned out, Antonio could not repay the loan until at least one of
his three ships returned from sea. During the era, of course, this was hardly a risk-free
contingency, but Antonio brushed it aside. After Antonio predictably defaulted, Shylock
demanded his penalty, and the matter was taken to court. Before recounting how the tale
ends and explaining its significance, however, it is first essential to identify a few crucial
historical features lurking in the background.
When modern credit practices first began to emerge in sixteenth-century England
(at around Shakespeare’s time), credit extensions were (1) common for everyday
necessities, (2) local in nature, and (3) wholly subjective in character.406 They typically
arose between people who knew each other under circumstances in which hard currency
was scarce, credit substituted for currency in ordinary transactions, and creditors lacked
the underwriting tools they have today. Forbearance in collection was a common
405 The term of the debt, evidenced by Antonio’s written and notarized bond, was for
three months. When Antonio’s friend, Bassanio, balked at the stipulated penalty,
Antonio brushed him off: “Why, fear not, man, I will not forfeit it! Within these two
months—that’s a month before this bond expires—I do expect a return of thrice three
times the value of this bond.” SHAKESPEARE, MERCHANT OF VENICE, supra note 404, act
I, sc. III, ln. 168-71. In addition, Antonio took out the loan entirely for emotional
reasons: out of his love for Bassanio, to whom he gave the proceeds. This underscores
another distinguishing feature between debtors and creditors: although debtors often
enough take on indebtedness for emotional reasons, most creditors rarely lend on that
basis (Shylock being somewhat of an exception: he loaned the money to Antonio out of
hatred, not simply for profit, but his hatred arose in part because Antonio frequently lent
money to others without charging interest, which Shylock bemoaned for bringing down
interest rates generally, see id., act I, sc. III, ln. 41-52).
406 See MULDREW, ECONOMY, supra note 371 at 60-119.
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occurrence, often for lengthy periods. In addition, charitable debt forgiveness was a
religious obligation owed and extended to deserving debtors (e.g., those innocent of the
sin of luxury), and informal debt forgiveness was routine even for those who were less
than fully deserving (although perhaps practiced more frequently out of the impracticality
of collection than empathy or conscience).407
Critically, the concept of debt during Shakespeare’s time had a certain moral
value that has endured across the centuries in the idea of a debtor’s moral responsibility
to satisfy his pecuniary obligations.408 What has disappeared, however, is the specific
social context in which that idea arose (e.g., close communities, scarce hard currency,
credit between parties intimately familiar with one another, and a very delicate
407 See id. at 60-119, 302-06 (observing that the annual level of debt-forgiveness by mid-
seventeenth-century England was “20 times the average figure of positive charity and
possibly more” and stating that “however the creditor felt about forgiving such debts,
they were still forgiven, and many contemporary sources described such forgiveness as a
form of charity”).
408 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that, even after a debt has been discharged in
bankruptcy, the debtor still retains a moral obligation to pay it, though not a legal one.
See Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U.S. 625, 630 (1913) (“It is settled . . . that a discharge, while
releasing the bankrupt from legal liability to pay a debt that was provable in the
bankruptcy, leaves him under a moral obligation that is sufficient to support a new
promise to pay the debt.”); see also Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153,
170 (1962) (“This Court has held that a moral obligation to pay the debt survives
discharge”), overruled in part on other grounds, Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
The relevant concept is an old one. See Trueman v. Fenton, 98 Eng. Rep. 1232, 1235-36
(K.B. 1777) (“[A]ll the debts of a bankrupt are due in conscience, notwithstanding he has
obtained his certificate [of discharge]; and there is no honest man who does not [pay]
them, if he afterwards has it in his power to do so. Though all legal remedy may be done,
the debts are clearly not extinguished in conscience.”). One source for this principle is
biblical: “The wicked borrow and do not repay, but the righteous give generously.”
PSALMS 37:21 (King James); see also MULDREW, ECONOMY, supra note 371 at 123-95
(observing various facets of the development of the debtor’s moral obligation to repay
indebtedness in sixteenth-century England).
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interdependence of credit and debt).409 More important, what has also vanished is the
idea of the creditor’s reciprocal moral obligations of forbearance and forgiveness, which
during Shakespeare’s time were just as important as the debtor’s moral obligation to pay
his debts, if not more so.410 After all, that is the ultimate point of Shakespeare’s tale:
because Shylock was not merciful in his dealings with the defaulting Antonio—even after
being warned in court of his moral duties (in some of the most beautiful language ever
written)—Shylock ends up losing everything when he attempts to enforce his claim. In
biblical terms (referenced explicitly in the play), Shylock winds up suffering the fate of
409 During the sixteenth century, for example, a prevailing social norm was that a creditor
should not seek to take advantage of his debtor by sharp practices, including charging
interest on debts, because credit was a vital necessity, excessive charges threatened the
debtor’s viability, and the failure of one debtor threatened others in the community. See
MULDREW, ECONOMY, supra note 371 at 41-51, 95-119, 123-147, 305-07. Among other
things, usury was both a sin and illegal until 1571 (although it was allowed temporarily
by statute between 1545 and 1552), and this ban was traced to biblical proscription. See
LUKE 6:35 (King James) (“lend, hoping for nothing again”); George L. Flint, Jr., Secured
Transactions History: The Fraudulent Myth, 29 N.M. L. REV. 363, 372 (1999). Even
after the legal ban on usury was lifted, however, interest rates were capped by statute and,
from a social and religious perspective, the charging of interest remained a dodgy
commercial pursuit commonly challenged on moral grounds. See MULDREW, ECONOMY,
supra note 371 at 114 (observing among other things that it was not until Elizabethan
times that a charge for lending was termed a rate of interest rather than a practice of
usury). This is illustrated in THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, where Antonio expresses his
disgust for Shylock’s practice of lending on interest. Id., supra note 404, act I, sc. 3, ln.
63-147; see also DANTE ALIGHIERI, INFERNO 171, canto XI, ln. 106-111 (M. Musa trans.
Penguin 1971) (placing usurers in the lower reaches of hell and commenting that “the
usurer . . . scorns Nature in herself and in her pupil, Art—he invests his hope in
something else”).
410 See MULDREW, ECONOMY, supra note 371 at 82, 174, 304-307 (observing average
forbearance periods in excess of eight months and noting similarly a creditor’s obligation
of debt forgiveness as a form of charity practiced in the sixteenth century as a form of
sociability and Christian virtue).
220
the non-reciprocating “unmerciful servant” for violating his paramount moral obligations
of forgiveness and forbearance.411
Today, credit extensions are also common, but no longer characteristically local
or subjective. Rather, they tend to be highly routinized transactions between parties who
are typically strangers to each other and at least one of which is customarily an
institution, such as a bank or finance company. Moreover, financial debts are typically
enforced and collected by credit managers and their agents who do not often find the
411 When Shylock seeks to enforce Antonio’s bond in the Duke’s court, the Duke asks
him directly: “how shalt thou hope for mercy, rend’ring none?” SHAKESPEARE,
MERCHANT OF VENICE, supra note 404, act IV, sc. I, ln. 89. This question is a direct
reference to the biblical parable of the unmerciful servant. MATTHEW 18:21-35 (King
James). In the parable, a servant was brought before the king for his failure to pay a large
debt to the sovereign. When the king threatened punishment, the servant begged for
mercy, which the king granted. Having received the king’s forgiveness, however, the
servant nonetheless refused mercy to his own debtor, instead having the debtor
imprisoned for a sum he could not pay. When the king learned of this, he rescinded his
forgiveness, remarking “[s]houldn’t you have had mercy on your fellow servant just as I
had mercy on you?” In Elizabethan times, virtually everyone was indebted to someone
else, default and insolvency were common and very real possibilities (even for members
of the aristocracy), and forbearance and forgiveness were essentially a form of insurance:
by showing mercy to his debtor, a creditor could later expect mercy from his own
creditor. See MULDREW, ECONOMY, supra note 371 at 95-119; see also JOHN STEINBECK,
THE GRAPES OF WRATH 251 (Penguin 2006) (“And a kind of insurance developed in
these nights. A man with food fed a hungry man, and thus insured himself against
hunger.”). Having failed to show Antonio mercy, Shylock loses everything when the
tables are turned and he becomes the debtor. SHAKESPEARE, MERCHANT OF VENICE,
supra note 404, act IV, sc. I, ln. 361-406. In the end, however, Antonio (now Skylock’s
creditor) shows Skylock mercy by returning to him half of his wealth, provided Shylock
turns over a new leaf—a perfectly moral outcome in Elizabethan terms. As Portia
explains during her oration: “The quality of mercy is not strained, it droppeth as the
gentle rain from heaven upon the place beneath. It is twice blessed: It blesseth him that
gives and him that takes.” Id. ln. 190-93; see also DEUTERONOMY 15:1-2 (King James)
(“At the end of every seventh year you must cancel your debts. This is how it must be
done. Creditors must cancel the loans they have made to their fellow Israelites. They
must not demand payment from their neighbor or relatives, for the Lord’s time of release
has arrived.”); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE, act II, sc. II, ln. 79-83
(“No ceremony that to great ones longs, not the King’s crown, nor the deputed sword, the
marshal’s truncheon, nor the judge’s robe become them with one half so good a grace as
mercy does”).
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words “charity” or “forbearance” in their job descriptions. In other words, they typically
constitute a class of “amoral agents.”412
For our purposes, however, the most relevant thing about the Elizabethan concept
of the debtor’s moral responsibility is that it has endured without any corresponding
moral obligation on the creditor’s part, even though today financial creditors are in a
much better position to prevent over-spending because of their often superior ability to
evaluate how much indebtedness their potential obligors can actually handle.413 The
reasons for this include (1) that creditors do not characteristically suffer from the Antonio
problem in extending credit; (2) they frequently deal with large volumes of repeat
transactions and therefore acquire a comparatively superior experience in evaluating
credit risk; and (3) they have access to sophisticated predictive models, information, and
other underwriting tools to assist them in making credit decisions. Nonetheless, many
financial creditors routinely offer credit to debtors they know (or should know) cannot
tolerate the burden without remarkably enhanced risk of failure. Yet the entirety of the
moral obligation today rests on the debtor, and none on the creditor. As a result, we are
left with a lopsided, one-way moral equation that seems in some respects to point in the
wrong direction.
412 See Ronald D. Milo, Amorality, 92 MIND 481 (1983) (defining an “amoral agent” as
one who is unaware of, or indifferent to, the morality of his actions). The problem of the
amoral agent helps explain the need for discharge relief in bankruptcy as a replacement
for the balancing and reciprocal moral concepts of forbearance and forgiveness. See infra
at 280-85; see also Jacob Nebel, A Counterexample to Parfit’s Rule of Consequentialism,
6 J. ETHICS & SOC. PHIL. 1, 3 (2012) (“Even if amoral agents cannot be morally
blameworthy, it seems clear that they can act wrongfully).
413 I use the term “financial creditors” to include creditors that extend credit
commercially, as opposed to, for example, most tort victims.
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This non-reciprocal moral artifact will always tend to skew the analysis because it
relentlessly casts defaulting debtors in a certain moral light and directs attention away
from the activities of creditors. As a result, it is also likely to color perceptions of other
common credit practices that have the effect of increasing the systemic likelihood of
insolvency. As Ian Ayres has observed: “[c]redit card companies and movie rental
stores exploit cognitive weaknesses when they jack up the price of late fees that
consumers don’t think they are ever going to pay. Why should you worry about the
interest rate on your credit card if you always pay on time?”414 In reality, however, many
consumers occasionally miss a payment or two (and thus incur late fees), and many more
routinely do not pay off their entire balances at the end of each month, ending up saddled
with interest charges that can exceed thirty per cent. Unfortunately, these kinds of rates
can quickly spiral out of control if a debtor experiences financial difficulty, accelerating
the slide into bankruptcy.415 Moreover, it is revealing that, in the vernacular of the credit-
card industry, the term “deadbeat” does not refer to the consumer who fails to pay his
bills. On the contrary, it refers to the consumer who timely pays off his entire credit-card
balance each month, thereby avoiding the lucrative interest that the credit card company
would otherwise demand.416 Although initially the credit card industry got off to a rocky
start, by the mid-1970s the cards had caught on and, over the years, credit card companies
414 AYRES, CARROTS, supra note 384 at 146; see also VYSE, GOING BROKE, supra note
403 at 97-101 (discussing the history of the credit card industry and some of the practices
of credit card issuers).
415 See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE, supra note 200 at 111-40
(chronicling how to go bankrupt with credit cards, particularly given how quickly high
interest rates can mount up).
416 See VYSE, GOING BROKE, supra note 403 at 25 (“The worst customer is one who never
carries a balance on her credit card—commonly known in the industry as a ‘deadbeat.’”).
223
have earned hundreds of billions of dollars as a result of the rates and fees they routinely
charge.417
A second epistemic complexity is perhaps even more daunting than the first.
Bankruptcy has always been perceived as a serious and very public type of social failure,
akin to an acute form of public shaming.418 To the extent most people who have never
gone through it think about it at all, they tend to regard it as something remarkably
unpleasant that happens only to other people. In reality, insolvency is far more likely to
occur to anyone than most perceive,419 and the common perception is simply another
example of optimism bias, only here with a few potentially pernicious twists.
First, perhaps one reason most individuals are likely to think that insolvency only
happens to others is because, in general, they tend to perceive (and overrate) their own
ability to stave off disaster as a consequence of their own consciously deliberative
planning capabilities. How many times have we heard: “Well, I certainly manage to
plan things out in advance, so why can’t so-and-so when it comes to his financial
affairs?” Although no one is perfect, it is tempting to believe that our planning skills are
at least adequate to stave off disaster, if for no other reason than that we have somehow
managed to avoid disaster so far and our planning capabilities seem like the most
417 See id. at 97-101 (discussing the origins of the credit card in 1949, its rise in
popularity, and some industry practices designed to encourage consumers to maintain
high balances).
418 See, e.g., MULDREW, ECONOMY, supra note 371 at 274, 285 (discussing loss of credit
as a “moral failure” in early modern England and the stigma of insolvency and
bankruptcy).
419 See supra notes 95, 202 (discussing bankruptcy filing rates and business failure rates);
SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE, supra note 200 at 6 (2000) (observing that
“even the most secure family may be only a job loss, a medical problem, or an out-of-
control credit card away from financial catastrophe.”).
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plausible explanation—especially for those of us who wish to avoid the unpleasant idea
that financial ruin lurks more or less randomly around the corner in everyone’s lives. By
extension, when evaluating other people and their failed plans, particularly those
resulting in financial distress, it would seem tempting to suspect that there must be
something wrong with their deliberative planning processes because, once again, we like
to think that our own planning ability is what keeps us safe. Such perceptions, however,
tend to overrate our ability to plan and underrate the potential effects of unforeseen
variables.
Perhaps one reason for this is because so much of our planning experience takes
place in the context of short-term activities, such as getting up in the morning when the
alarm goes off, making a cup of coffee using a coffee-maker, ordering a new shirt on-
line, heading home on the train at the end of the day, and so on. When it comes to these
kinds of plans, our conscious deliberations appear to rule the day because so many of
these plans are successful with relatively little deliberative effort—in other words, they
seem easy. What this kind of superficial assessment tends to overlook, however, is the
vast unseen social and technological mechanisms that conspire in favor of the successful
implementation of the average person’s generic short-term plans.
Everything from the website of our favorite on-line store to the predictable pattern
of the local public transportation system are designed to make it relatively easy to execute
routine planning activities, and the trend in technology is only to make this more so and
even less apparent. And it is but a small step from there to conclude that, because the
success of so many of our little plans appears to be the product of our own deliberative
genius, perhaps that is also the case with respect to all of our planning activity. That
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perception, however, would be a classic “illusory correlation.”420 In reality, the more
complex our plans (including, in particular, the longer they take to accomplish), the more
likely they are to outstrip our planning capabilities simply because of the possibility for
so many contingencies to creep into the picture. In addition, because many of the
variables tend to be hidden from view, we will tend to discount them heavily—out of
sight, out of mind.421 Yet these unforeseen events are the ones that are most likely to trip
us up.
Second, when financial disaster strikes others, it is more comforting to view it as
endogenous to its victims, rather than randomly exogenous, especially if we already
happen to subscribe to the view (consciously or not) that bankruptcy is typically a
problem of moral failure that characteristically happens to immoral people—coalescing
into a form of “group-based bias”422 premised on a kind of “fundamental attribution
error” that those who fail have some kind of undesirable fixed disposition that correlates
to financial ruin.423 Because of our susceptibility to group-based bias and fundamental
420 An “illusory correlation” exists when two co-variables actually work together to
produce a result (i.e., our conscious deliberations and facilitating infrastructures and
conventions), but we acknowledge only the one we perceive. See Loren J. Chapman &
Jean P. Chapman, Genesis of Popular But Erroneous Diagnostic Observations, 72 J.
ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 193 (1967) (discussing the problem of “illusory correlation”).
421 See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, ET AL., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES 190-200 (1982) (discussing the “availability heuristic” and the tendency of people
to ignore factors that are not immediately present).
422 See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. LAW
REV. 969 (2006) (discussing the concept of “group-based bias”). This propensity is
supported in the insolvency context by our susceptibility to optimism bias—the belief
that we are less likely than others to suffer misfortune. See supra note 404 (discussing
optimism bias).
423 See VYSE, GOING BROKE, supra note 403 at 38 (discussing the concept of
“fundamental attribution error”) (citing Lee D. Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His
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attribution error, and likewise our propensity to reason superficially on the basis of
“similarity matching,” the explanation for the disaster of bankruptcy we are most likely to
accept is also the one we most want to believe: that financial disaster only happens to
“those other people.”424 In its most benign form, this supports the idea that, unlike the
rest of us, bankrupt debtors simply do not plan well, perhaps because of weaknesses in
their deliberative processes. In its most aggressive form, it supports the idea that
bankrupt debtors characteristically suffer from some moral deficiency that we do not
share, such as profligacy. In addition, consistent with the concept of “hindsight bias,”425
it is then perhaps merely a small additional step to the conclusion that, because a
particular person filed for bankruptcy relief, it was inevitable that he would (confirming
Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (L. Berkowitz ed. 1977)). Vyse explains that “[w]e conclude that
people—other people in particular—do the things they do because of the fixed
dispositions they possess. . . . But when we turn our detective’s eye upon ourselves, the
view is quite different. We are intimately familiar with the details of our past and how
they have shaped us. In addition, we know, in a way outsiders never can, the external
forces that press upon us at the moment we act. The very same behavior viewed from the
inside and from the outside will often be explained in very different terms. The student
understands the late term paper as a natural result of various random and unique
circumstances, but the professor believes she has uncovered a core feature of the
student’s personality.” Id.
424 “Similarity matching” refers to the process of reasoning based on matching
similarities rather than logic. See JAMES REASON, HUMAN ERROR 39 (Cambridge 1990)
[hereinafter REASON, HUMAN ERROR] (discussing “similarity-matching”). For
understandable reasons of cognitive efficiency, we tend to rely on such simplifying
heuristics rather than more laborious forms of analysis. Id. at 40. This is inherent in the
concept of “bounded rationality”—namely, that our ordinary reasoning capabilities
tended to be bounded rather than expansive.
425 See Hal R. Arkes, et al., Eliminating the Hindsight Bias, 73 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 305-
307 (1988) (discussing “hindsight bias” as the tendency to view events as inevitable
simply because they occur, rather than as one of several possible outcomes).
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all suspicions), rather than a probabilistic outcome of no greater likelihood than the risk
of failure most debtors face.
Moreover, once a generalized conclusion of this kind catches on, people will
typically prefer to take notice of information that verifies it over evidence that suggests it
is wrong—a form of “confirmation bias.”426 These tendencies are only exacerbated when
the particular association individuals are trying to avoid is an extreme one, such as
economic ruin. Financial failure and the stigma of bankruptcy are sufficiently unpleasant
to contemplate that they must be the product of other peoples’ moral fault or similar
defects—or so we would like to believe in order to lessen our own anxieties in a stressful
and uncertain world fraught with financial peril. Although the evidence does not back
this notion up—the vast majority of bankruptcy filings appear to be made by ordinary
people who took ordinary risks and failed for perfectly ordinary reasons that virtually
everyone is vulnerable to427—it retains credibility because, at the end of the day, people
tend to believe what they want to believe, particularly when they have a strong
psychological interest in believing it, which is at the heart of the phenomenon of “self-
serving bias.”428
426 See Anthony G. Greenwald, et al., Under What Conditions Does Theory Obstruct
Research Progress? 93 PSYCH. REV. 216 (1986) (discussing the “pervasive phenomenon
of confirmation bias—the tendency for judgments based on new data to be overly
consistent with preliminary hypotheses” as applied in the area of scientific research).
Confirmation bias can be very powerful. See REASON, HUMAN ERROR, supra note 424 at
39 (discussing findings that show “an often overwhelming tendency to verify
generalizations rather than falsify them”).
427 See supra at 223, infra at 261-64 (discussing this point).
428 The concept of “self-serving bias” refers to the tendency of individuals to interpret
information in ways directed by their own self-interest. See, e.g., George Loewenstein, et
al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEG. STUD. 135
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The point at this juncture, however, is not to clinically dissect and debunk these
sorts of perceptions about bankruptcy. It is simply to reveal their potential presence and
then set them aside before proceeding to a hopefully less encumbered evaluation of the
nature of the problems of insolvency and an appropriate set of solutions to remedy the
substantial costs they generate.
RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS OF DEBT COLLECTION
Of the various problems of insolvency discussed in Chapter 2, three fall into the
debt-collection category: (1) deadweight collection and monitoring costs, (2) gratuitous
transfers, and (3) debt-collection free-for-alls. These are each properly debt-collection
problems that correlate to debt-collection solutions because, once the bailout-insurance
and automatic-debt-cancellation options are eliminated, they are subject to amelioration
only through modifications to available debt-collection procedures. They are not
properly debt-forgiveness problems because they have nothing to do with debt
forgiveness and, once the automatic-debt-cancellation option is eliminated, cannot be
resolved through more limited forms of discharge relief.429 Likewise, they are not
problems of debt adjustment because they cannot be resolved simply by the prioritization
(1993) (discussing the phenomenon of “self-serving bias” in the context of pretrial
bargaining).
429 See supra at 208 (discussing the automatic-debt-cancellation option). Until a debt is
actually forgiven and all possibility of payment foreclosed, these costs will typically
endure. Because bankruptcy law properly avoids eliminating all debt-collection rights,
debt-forgiveness mechanisms will not obviate the need for some sort of debt-collection
remedy. See supra at 209.
229
of claims.430 Having categorized these three problems, the question becomes: how might
bankruptcy law beneficially resolve them?
As discussed in Chapter 2, deadweight collection and monitoring costs arise as a
result of characteristically sharp increases in monitoring and debt-collection activities in
the wake of a debtor’s financial distress, generating expenses that usually cannot be
recovered.431 One far-fetched solution to this problem might be to mandate the
collectivization of all debt-collection and monitoring procedures regardless of the
debtor’s solvency—call this the “Stalinization” approach. As discussed previously,
however, this extreme notion is undesirable because it would burden ordinary debt-
collection mechanisms needlessly.432 A far less drastic remedy would be to mandate a set
of procedures that collectivize and streamline the debt-collection process only in the
bankruptcy setting and, unsurprisingly, that is what bankruptcy law actually does.433
As also discussed in Chapter 2, insolvent debtors have a variety of special
incentives to make gratuitous transfers that harm creditors in ways that would not
typically arise if the debtors were solvent.434 Although this problem could be remedied
by simply banning all gift-giving regardless of the debtor’s insolvency—call this the
430 For example, even if the law were to provide that tort claims are more important than
contract claims, creditors holding either type would still seek to enforce them following
the debtor’s default, generating deadweight collection costs. See supra at 180-89.
431 See id.
432 See supra at 184-85.
433 Bankruptcy law has elaborate mechanisms for channeling and collectivizing the
recognition and payment of claims, and also the collection and dissemination of
information regarding the debtor’s assets and finances. See supra notes 16, 241, 363.
434 See supra at 174-79.
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“Scrooge” approach—that solution is also obviously untenable. A less drastic remedy
would be for the law to permit the avoidance and recovery of gratuitous transfers in the
insolvency setting in order to redistribute the value of these transfers to creditors and,
once again, this more surgical cure is what bankruptcy law actually prescribes.435
Finally, as further discussed in Chapter 2, the creditors of insolvent debtors have
incentives to engage in value-destroying, debt-collection free-for-alls.436 As noted, this
problem is central to the collective-action dilemma.437 One extreme way to avoid debt-
collection free-for-alls would be simply to ban all debt-collection activity when a debtor
gets into trouble—call this the “manna-from-heaven” approach. By itself, however, this
idea is also unrealistic. Another solution would be to suspend ordinary non-bankruptcy
debt-collection mechanisms in the insolvency context and replace them with bankruptcy
procedures that collect and dispose of the debtor’s property in ways that are more value
maximizing, which again is what bankruptcy law endeavors to accomplish.438
Having identified these various solutions to the debt-collection problems of
insolvency, the question becomes: setting aside the Stalinization, Scrooge, and manna-
from-heaven approaches, are the particular solutions that bankruptcy law actually
embodies truly beneficial? Although the answer seems rather obviously yes (at least in
instances in which there is sufficient value at stake for a sufficient number of
435 See supra note 345 (discussing fraudulent transfer remedies in bankruptcy).
436 See supra at 162-68.
437 See supra at 24-25.
438 See supra notes 16, 74, 246-47, 299, 325, 363 (discussing the automatic stay
restraining debt-collection activity and bankruptcy law’s various procedures for the
orderly disposition of the debtor’s assets).
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stakeholders to make it worthwhile to initiate some kind of bankruptcy process), the
question is still worth evaluating more rigorously to see exactly why.
As suggested above, outcomes in bankruptcy will be beneficial only to the extent
they represent improvements over outcomes that would be realized through the
application of non-bankruptcy mechanisms.439 (In contrast, a potential solution would be
optimal to the extent it constitutes the best bankruptcy solution among the various
beneficial alternatives.) Although there may be many different ways to evaluate whether
an outcome is beneficial, I use three standards here: (1) equity, (2) efficiency, and (3)
entitlement. Even though each offers a distinct way to consider the desirability of any
particular solution to the debt-collection problems of insolvency, they all point in the
same direction in this instance: the various debt-collection solutions of bankruptcy law
summarized above are, by the collective light of these standards, generally worthwhile.
This conclusion, of course, does not preclude the possibility that these solutions are
subject to improvement, but it does help identify the path forward.
EQUITY
Why equity? First, the principles of equity, and the large body of precedents
applying them, represent a vast experience with human behavior. Second, courts of
equity (including bankruptcy courts) are classic problem-solving courts that have long
been involved in devising strategies to resolve complex social problems like the problems
of insolvency. Third, equity is the life blood of bankruptcy law. Fourth, equity is rich
with norms, particularly those relevant to addressing defects in legal outcomes and filling
the law’s remedial gaps.
439 For example, the Stalinization, Scrooge, and manna-from-heaven approaches are
obviously not beneficial because they would not generate improved overall outcomes.
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In the Anglo-American tradition, bankruptcy law has always been a distinct
branch of equity. Consistent with this tradition, bankruptcy courts have long been
constituted as equitable tribunals, and equitable principles have long governed
proceedings in bankruptcy cases.440 In the United States, Congress has codified the
relevant principles in the various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, which has the effect
of directing their application as a matter of more precise statutory prescription rather than
as a product of the chancellor’s discretion.441 Still, bankruptcy law retains an
unmistakable equitable edge.
440 See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934) (stating that “courts of
bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity, and their proceedings inherently proceedings
in equity.”); see also Young v. United States, 545 U.S. 43, 50 (2002) (recognizing that
bankruptcy courts “are courts of equity and apply the principles and rules of equity
jurisprudence”) (citation and marks omitted); United States v. Energy Resources, 495
U.S. 545, 549 (1990) (stating that “bankruptcy courts, as courts of equity, have broad
authority to modify debtor-creditor relationships”); Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S.
99, 103 (1966) (stating that “[t]here is an overriding consideration that equitable
principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction”); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S.
295, 304 (1939) (observing that “a bankruptcy court is a court of equity at least in the
sense that in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the [Bankruptcy] act, it
applies the principles and rules of equity jurisprudence”); H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 359
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6315 (providing that, under the Bankruptcy
Code, “[t]he bankruptcy court will remain a court of equity” (citing Local Loan Co., 292
U.S. at 240)).
441 See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988) (stating that
“whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be
exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code”); In re Lapiana, 909 F.2d 221, 223
(7th Cir. 1990) (stating that “bankruptcy, despite its equitable pedigree, is a procedure for
enforcing pre-bankruptcy entitlements under specified terms and conditions rather than a
flight of redistributive fancy or a grant of free-wheeling discretion such as the medieval
chancellors enjoyed (equity itself is no longer a discretionary system in that sense).”); In
re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 791 F.2d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 1986)
(stating that “[t]he fact that a proceeding is equitable does not give the judge a free-
floating discretion to redistribute rights in accordance with his personal views of justice
and fairness, however enlightened those views may be.”); United States v. Sutton, 786
F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize
“the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under
applicable law, or constitute a roving commission to do equity”); Stebins v. Crocker
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As an historical matter, Aristotle famously defined equity as “justice that goes
beyond the written law.”442 As applied, however, this sweeping pronouncement cannot
be taken at full face value, at least not in its broadest and most expansive sense.
Bankruptcy law never was, and cannot legitimately claim to be, simply a font of free-
ranging discretion available to rewrite at whim fundamental legal principles of general
applicability in the name of justice simply because a debtor cannot pay his debts and
wishes to invoke the assistance of a court of equity to fend off his creditors.443 The law
generally stipulates liability rules and enforcement mechanisms that are presumably
desirable in the contexts in which they typically apply, and these should not be casually
swept aside. Rather, equity has a narrower and more precise mission, and the key to
understanding the role of bankruptcy law as an equitable device lies in the special nature
of the problems of insolvency and the need for some special set of remedies to address
them because, once again, it would make no sense to burden ordinary non-bankruptcy
legal mechanisms with procedures to address these extraordinary problems that arise only
in the insolvency setting.
Citizens National Bank (In re Ahlswede), 516 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating that
“the chancellor never did, and does not now, exercise unrestricted power to contradict
statutory or common law when he feels a fairer result may be obtained by application of a
different rule”); Guerin v. Weil, Gotschal & Manges, 205 F.2d 302, 304 (2d Cir. 1953)
(stating that “[a]lthough it has been broadly stated that a bankruptcy court is a court of
equity, the exercise of its equitable powers must be strictly confined within the prescribed
limits of the Bankruptcy Act”) (internal citation omitted).
442 ARISTOTLE, THE ART OF RHETORIC 144-45 (J. Freese trans. Harvard 1926).
443 See supra note 441, infra note 453.
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Refining further Aristotle’s definition, Joseph Story conceived of equity as “the
correction of the law, wherein it is defective by reason of its universality.”444 Elaborating
further, Story explained that because “[e]very system of laws must necessarily be
defective; . . . cases must occur, to which the antecedent rules cannot be applied without
injustice, or to which they cannot be applied at all.”445 For the sake of simplicity, we may
refer to Story’s conceptualization of the general need for equity as the “universality”
problem. For our purposes, a debtor’s financial ruin typically gives rise to special
circumstances within the ambit of this problem—those defined by the presence of the
special problems of insolvency that the law, by reason of its universality, should not
undertake to resolve because doing so would burden ordinary legal procedures
needlessly.
As Story also observed, equity operates on the basis of the application of a
collection of fundamental normative precepts.446 These precepts include a general
overarching principle of restraint embodied in the maxim “equity follows the law.”447
This general principle is intended explicitly to confine equity’s scope to matters that
properly fall within the ambit of the universality problem. Equity likewise operates on
444 1 JOSEPH STORY, STORY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 3 (13th ed. 1886) [hereinafter
STORY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE] (paraphrasing Aristotle’s concept of equity in
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 316-317 (H. Rackham trans. Harvard 1934)); see also
FDIC v. Colonial Realty Co., 966 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1992) (recognizing this principle
as underlying the equitable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code).
445 1 STORY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 444 at 6-7.
446 Id. at 17.
447 Id. at 60. This principle is reflected in the concept that equity will intervene only if
the party seeking to invoke it lacks an adequate remedy at law. The key concept is
“adequacy.” As discussed below, bankruptcy law addresses a number of social problems
that non-bankruptcy law addresses inadequately by reason of its universality.
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the basis of a collection of more specific principles designed to guide the resolution of
matters that otherwise satisfy the general principle of restraint. These include the
reciprocity maxim that “he who seeks equity must do equity”;448 the equal-innocence
maxim that “where there is equal equity the law must prevail”;449 the execution maxim
that “equity looks upon that as done which ought to have been done”;450 the distribution
maxim that “equality is equity”;451 and the anti-forfeiture maxim that equity will not
enforce an unjust penalty.452
From the foregoing, we may distill from Story’s observations two classes of
evaluative norms of relevance here, one general and the others specific. First, the general
principle of restraint limits access to equity’s remedial measures by restricting them to
situations in which it can be shown that the law is either defective in its application for
some particular reason or leaves a significant remedial void (which explains the role of
injunctive relief). Thus, the general principle of restraint essentially directs an evaluation
of necessity in the application of equity’s remedial structures. Second, the specific
evaluative concepts, such as “equality is equity,” guide the selection of appropriate
448 1 STORY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 444 at 65; Cherno v. Dutch Am.
Mercantile Corp., 353 F.2d 147, 155 (2d Cir. 1965) (“he who seeks equity must do
equity”); see also Smith v. World Ins. Co., 38 F.3d 1456, 1462 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting
that the requirement that “he who seeks equity must do equity” is part of the doctrine of
unclean hands).
449 1 STORY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 444 at 63.
450 Id. at 68.
451 Id. at 67.
452 2 STORY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 444 at 644-61 (observing that “[t]he
whole system of Equity Jurisprudence proceeds upon the ground that a party having a
legal right shall not be permitted to avail himself of it for the purposes of injustice, or
fraud, or oppression, or harsh and vindictive injury.”).
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remedies to address pertinent defects in legal outcomes. Collectively, it is through the
application of both the general principle of restraint and any relevant specific equity norm
that equity as a whole aims deliberately to be ameliorative in the bankruptcy setting by
correcting deficiencies in legal procedures in response to the problems of insolvency.
There are several reasons, however, why resort to the norms of equity is not
entirely satisfying as an overall evaluative standard and thus should not be the only one
we consider. To begin with, in spite of their surface plausibility, the various principles of
equity can be somewhat vague as reflected in their characteristically aphoristic
formulation.453 Likewise, other than the principle of restraint, equity does not provide a
particularly comprehensive or systematic means to choose between its available doctrinal
options or reconcile them when they conflict. Moreover, although equity attempts
overtly to ferret out and improve defects in legal procedures, it is not particularly self-
453 This is unsurprising given that equity evolved as a tool of judicial discretion. John
Selden (1584-1654) famously complained:
[e]quity is a Roguish Thing, for Law we have a Measure, know what to
trust to, Equity is according to the Conscience of him that is Chancellor,
and as that is larger or narrower, so is Equity. ‘Tis all one as if they
should make the Standard for the Measure, we call a Chancellor’s Foot,
what an uncertain Measure would this be? One Chancellor has a long
Foot, another a short Foot, a Third an indifferent Foot: ‘Tis the same thing
as the Chancellor’s Conscience.
JOHN SELDEN, TABLE-TALK: BEING THE DISCOURSES OF JOHN SELDEN 54-55 (2nd ed.
1696). Story (1799-1845) rejected Selden’s criticism, pointing out equity’s limited role
consistent with the principle of restraint, commenting: “[s]o far however is this from
being true, that one of the most common maxims upon which a Court of Equity daily acts
is, that equity follows the law, and seeks out and guides itself by analogies of the law.” 1
STORY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 444 at 17. In his COMMENTARIES, William
Blackstone (1723-1780) quipped dismissively: “if a Court of Equity in England did
really act, as many ingenious writers have supposed it (from theory) to do, it would rise
above all law, either common or statute, and be a most arbitrary legislator in every
particular case.” 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 433 (1765) [hereinafter
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES].
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reflective in the remedies it deploys. For example, it does not purport to evaluate overtly,
other than on an ad hoc basis, whether its remedies themselves generate significantly
negative ex ante effects in non-bankruptcy settings, although this consideration may be
implied as part of the process of applying the principle of restraint. As a result, although
the general and specific norms of equity can help point us in the right direction in terms
of identifying and evaluating beneficial solutions to insolvency-related defects in the
legal system generally, they should be used with caution and likewise in conjunction with
other evaluative standards.
Taken together, the debt-collection problems of deadweight collection and
monitoring costs, gratuitous transfers, and debt-collection free-for-alls rather obviously
constitute problems that satisfy the principle of restraint. They are special challenges that
arise in the insolvency context in connection with the use of ordinary debt-collection
mechanisms for which those mechanisms do not have an adequate response because it
would be counterproductive to burden them with special procedures needed only in the
insolvency setting. In addition, these debt-collection problems correlate to more specific
equity norms.
First, the problems of debt-collection free-for-alls and deadweight collection and
monitoring costs correlate to the specific norm that equity is available to remedy
“equitable waste,” defined as acts causing needless loss that, although “not inconsistent
with the legal rights of the party committing them,” nonetheless generate inequitable
externalities.454 We may refer to this norm as the “equitable-waste” prohibition.
Historically, the circumstances constituting equitable waste, and triggering the remedy of
454 2 STORY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 444 at 220.
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injunction to prevent it, included those in which the owner of a particular item of
property, including an insolvent individual, no longer had appropriate incentives to
maintain the property for the benefit of others also holding an interest in the same
property.455 From the perspective of the equitable-waste prohibition, bankruptcy law’s
debt-collection solutions to the problems of debt-collection free-for-alls and deadweight
collection and monitoring costs—namely its special procedures that collectivize and
streamline monitoring and debt-enforcement activities—seem obviously beneficial.
These solutions include bankruptcy’s devices for halting debt-enforcement activities
upon the commencement of a bankruptcy case (i.e., the automatic stay), as well as
bankruptcy’s mechanisms for replacing non-bankruptcy debt-collection and information-
gathering procedures with those that aim to facilitate and streamline the recognition and
enforcement of claims and likewise the dissemination of accurate information concerning
the debtor and his property (e.g., provisions regarding the creation of a bankruptcy estate,
the preparation and disclosure of information, the determination of claims, the avoidance
of value-destroying foreclosures, and the preservation of businesses as going concerns to
preserve their value).456 These devices all have their origins in equity,457 and are likewise
reflected in and derived from the earliest English bankruptcy procedures superintended
initially by the Lord Chancellor and other officials of the Crown.458
455 See id. at 220-21.
456 See supra notes 16, 195, 241, 246-47, 299, 325, 363 (discussing these devices).
457 See, e.g., 1 STORY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 444 at 558-62 (discussing a
court’s powers in equity to compel creditors to prove their claims in a collective
proceeding involving the administration of estates).
458 For example, the first English bankruptcy statute enacted in 1542, titled “An Act
Against Such Persons As Do Make Bankrupt,” Bankruptcy Act, 1542, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c.
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In turn, the problem of gratuitous transfers correlates to the specific equity norm
that a debtor must be “just [to his creditors] before he be generous [to his friends].”459
We may refer to this as the “just/generous” principle. From the perspective of the
just/generous principle, bankruptcy law’s solution to the problem of gratuitous
transfers—namely, avoiding and recovering these transfers for the benefit of creditors
under its fraudulent transfer provisions—is also plainly beneficial.460
4 (Eng.), vested the Lord Chancellor and other officials with authority to “take order” of
the debtor’s affairs following the debtor’s commission of an “act of bankruptcy,” such as
the debtor’s defaulting on his obligations and then fleeing to parts unknown. See
Levinthal, Early History, supra note 398 at 15. The Act vested the relevant officials with
the authority to summarily collect and administer the debtor’s assets and then distribute
their value ratably among the debtor’s creditors. See Bankruptcy Act, 1542, 34 & 35
Hen. 8, c. 4, § 1 (Eng.); Levinthal, Early History, supra note 398 at 14. The subsequent
Bankruptcy Act of 1570 vested this authority in a group of bankruptcy commissioners
who likewise possessed the power to assemble, liquidate, and distribute the debtor’s
property in a collective proceeding. See Bankruptcy Act, 1570, 13 Eliz. c. 7 (Eng.);
Charles J. Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 5, 8 (1995) [hereinafter Tabb, History] (discussing the powers of the
commissioners and the proceedings before them under the 1570 Act).
459 Hearn 45 St. Corp. v. Jano, 27 N.E.2d 814, 816 (N.Y. 1940); 1 STORY’S EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 444 at 359; see also supra note 345 (discussing the policy
behind the avoidance and recovery of gratuitous transfers in bankruptcy).
460 See id. (discussing the various fraudulent transfers laws available in bankruptcy to
avoid and recover transfers of the debtor’s property). The just/generous principle appears
to have been conceived specifically in response to the problem of gratuitous transfers.
See 1 STORY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 444 at 359-84 (discussing the concept
and its application). Among other things, fraudulent transfer principles trace their origins
to ecclesiastical proscriptions condemning a transfer by a decedent made in fraud of
creditors, either in the form of an outright gift or a sale without adequate consideration.
See Richard H. Helmholz, Bankruptcy and Probate Jurisdiction Before 1571, 48
MISSOURI L. REV. 415, 421 (1983) [hereinafter Helmholz, Bankruptcy and Probate]
(noting that, under a church provincial constitution made in 1343 and known as the
“Cordis dolore,” the transferee of a fraudulent transfer was required on pain of
excommunication to return the transferred property to the decedent’s estate). As Thomas
Jackson and others have observed, fraudulent transfer laws are also available outside of
bankruptcy as a matter of state law. See JACKSON, LOGIC, supra note 8 at 147. Once a
bankruptcy case is commenced, the state-law mechanisms are incorporated into the
bankruptcy process through section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2000
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This does not mean that there are no challenging difficulties that arise from time
to time in applying these equitable principles in specific settings. For example, it is one
thing for fraudulent conveyance laws to avoid a transfer between a debtor and his relative
where the transfer is for little or no consideration and both the debtor and the relative
conspired together to make the transfer with full knowledge that doing so would frustrate
the debtor’s creditors. To illustrate, suppose the debtor transferred title to a valuable
parcel of real estate worth $1 million to his sister in exchange for $1 under circumstances
in which the sister was aware of the debtor’s insolvency and understood that the debtor
simply wished to shield an asset from the creditor’s reach. Under these circumstances,
the sister should hardly be heard to complain of any inequity in having to disgorge the
property.461
On the other hand, it is another thing for fraudulent transfer law to avoid and
recover property from an innocent transferee under circumstances in which she believed
she received the property in a fair exchange and was not involved in conspiring with the
debtor to deprive the debtor’s creditors of their due. This situation implicates the equal-
& Supp. 2006); see supra note 345. The Code also has its own fraudulent transfer
provision, section 548. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2000 & Supp. 2006); see supra note 345; see
also Baird & Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance, supra note 266 (discussing the avoidance
of fraudulent transfers in bankruptcy). One reason fraudulent transfer law is an option
that is available upon a debtor’s insolvency apart from a full-blown bankruptcy
proceeding is that the avoidance and recovery of a fraudulent transfer may be a complete
remedy in and of itself. If a sufficiently valuable asset is recovered, creditors may be
satisfied in full, or sufficiently satisfied that resort to more extensive bankruptcy
proceedings might not be worth the effort. In this way, fraudulent conveyance laws may
be viewed by themselves as a kind of mini-bankruptcy procedure.
461 See supra at 176 (discussing this kind of situation).
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innocence maxim that “where there is equal equity the law must prevail.”462 For example,
suppose the transferee bought a parcel of real estate through an arms-length foreclosure
sale. Although she may have acquired the property for a low price, that is not unusual
because foreclosure sales characteristically yield low values.463 Should fraudulent
transfer law regularly undo these kinds of sales if the debtor later files for bankruptcy?
That is a much more challenging question, involving as it does a choice between the
competing interests of perhaps equally innocent parties—the transferee who got a good
deal legitimately and the insolvent debtor’s creditors who lose out because the deal was
perhaps too good.464
We need not, however, resolve all the complexities involved in the application of
the various principles of equity outlined above to conclude that, from the perspective of
equity as a general evaluative standard, bankruptcy law’s solutions to the problems of
deadweight collection and monitoring costs, debt-collection free-for-alls, and gratuitous
462 1 STORY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 444 at 63. Story explained that “the
equity is equal between persons who have been equally innocent and diligent.” Id. Thus,
“[i]t is upon this account that a Court of Equity constantly refuses to interfere either for
relief or discovery against a bona fide purchaser of the legal estate for a valuable
consideration without notice of the adverse title . . . .” Id.
463 See supra notes 155, 314 (discussing how state-law foreclosure sales typically realize
depressed prices as compared to other methods of disposition).
464 In BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 539 (1994), the U.S. Supreme Court
determined in a 5-4 decision that fraudulent transfer law is not generally available in
bankruptcy cases to undo non-collusive state-law foreclosure sales conducted in
conformity with applicable foreclosure procedures. Among other things, the majority
reasoned that doing so would place a cloud over the title to every transferred property—
the transferee could not be certain of ownership so long as the debtor could still file for
bankruptcy after the sale and potentially undo the transfer. The Court reasoned that, if
Congress intended that result in enacting the federal bankruptcy law, Congress was
required to make that intent more clear. See also JACKSON, LOGIC, supra note 8 at 148-50
(discussing the application of fraudulent transfer laws in the context of foreclosure sales).
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transfers are generally beneficial. This, of course, should come as no great surprise given
that the relevant equitable concepts that these solutions embody are essentially internal to
bankruptcy law itself. Nonetheless, it is useful to understand why this is so. Moreover,
as discussed below, these solutions are also beneficial under both efficiency and
entitlement analysis.
EFFICIENCY
Why efficiency? To begin with, efficiency analysis seeks to evaluate legal
outcomes from a critical cost/benefit perspective that it distinctly different from equity
analysis. Whereas equity deploys a system of principles of fairness to remediate certain
kinds of problems, efficiency aims to calculate the larger social utility of these remedies.
Similarly, generic concepts of efficiency are typically external to the particular law and
set of legal outcomes at issue. Thus, efficiency analysis is thought to be more objective
in nature. As we shall see, that view is problematic because there is no feasible metric of
absolute social utility that is, in fact, purely objective. And as a consequence, economists
often conduct efficiency evaluations using a narrower standard tailored to the particular
circumstances, for example, by evaluating bankruptcy procedures in terms of how they
reduce the cost of borrowed funds, which sometimes omit from the analysis important
cost considerations that the metric does not capture.465 But in the real world no metric is
flawless and, in conjunction with other standards, efficiency analysis can at least provide
a potentially helpful sense of whether a particular remedial scheme is beneficial.
When economists speak of efficiency, they generally refer to one of two kinds:
Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, and generally the latter far more often than the
465 See supra at 95-101 (discussing the drawbacks of using the cost-of-capital metric to
evaluate bankruptcy rules).
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former.466 An outcome is Pareto superior (and therefore definitely wealth enhancing in
economic terms) to the extent it makes at least one person better off without making
anyone else worse off. In contrast, an outcome is Kaldor-Hicks efficient (and therefore
wealth enhancing, albeit in a different sense from Pareto optimality) to the extent it
makes at least one person better off more than it makes everyone else worse off: the net
benefit must be greater than the net harm, but someone may still suffer uncompensated
loss for the sake of someone else’s gain. Because “the conditions for Pareto superiority
are almost never satisfied in the real world,” economists tend to use Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency as their evaluative standard.467 In other words, because it is so rarely achieved
in the real world, Pareto superiority is essentially utopian. In contrast, because it permits
outcomes that confer benefits on some at the expense of others (with the caveat that the
net gain must simply be greater than the net loss), Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is essentially
utilitarian. As a result, one must be careful using Kaldor-Hick efficiency because of the
possibility for unfairness, perhaps even gross unfairness, inherent in applying the
traditional utilitarian calculus.
For example, imagine a world consisting of two population groups of equal size:
half are happy freeloaders (the grasshoppers), and half are miserable workaholics (the
466 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13-14 (4th ed. 1992)
[hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]; see also Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency,
Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980) (discussing Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency); John R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J.
696 (1939); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions in Economics and Interpersonal
Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939).
467 POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, OF LAW, supra note 466 at 14; see Calabresi &
Melamed, Property Rules, supra note 5 at 1094 n.10 (observing that “in the world in
which lawyers must live, anything close to Pareto efficiency, even if desirable, is not
attainable”).
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ants). Suppose it would make the grasshoppers much happier if the ants were enslaved
and forced to toil for the grasshoppers’ benefit, but would make the ants only marginally
less happy (after all, they are already pretty miserable). The result would be Kaldor-
Hicks efficient on a traditional utilitarian calculus because the gain for the grasshoppers
exceeds the loss to the ants.468 That is so because, under traditional utilitarian theory,
there is no mechanism for making interpersonal comparisons of utility: “push-pin is as
good as poetry.”469 In other words, all that matters in the analysis is the quantity of gain
in happiness for the grasshoppers as compared to the quantity of loss in happiness for the
ants. The relative quality of their experiences from a moral or other perspective is
irrelevant. This potential for “monstrous results,” as well as lesser inequalities, is a
standing criticism of both traditional utilitarianism and standard welfare economics.470
468 Under traditional utilitarian analysis, the moral worth of an action or outcome is to be
evaluated on the basis of whether it produces or lessens happiness, described by Henry
Sedgwick (1851-1957) as “the surplus of pleasure over paid.” HENRY SEDGWICK, THE
METHODS OF ETHICS 413 (7th ed. 1907); see also JEREMY BENTHAM, INTRODUCTION TO
THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1789).
469 1 JOHN S. MILL, DISSERTATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 389 (1859); see JEREMY BENTHAM,
THE RATIONALE OF REWARD, book 1, ch. 1, 206 (1830) (“Prejudice apart, the game of
push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and poetry. If the game of
push-pin furnish more pleasure, it is more valuable than either”).
470 See Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEG. STUD.
103, 105, 116-17, 132 (1979) [hereinafter Posner, Utilitarianism] (observing that many
practitioners of welfare economics “regard their activity as applied utilitarianism;” noting
in particular Bentham’s proposal for eliminating beggars by enslaving them, as well as
other examples of “monstrous” outcomes and inequalities; and observing that “the
utilitarian, despite his professed concern with social welfare, must logically ascribe value
to all sorts of asocial behavior, such as envy and sadism, because these are common
sources of personal satisfaction and hence of utility”); see, e.g., RONALD M. DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) (rejecting utilitarianism as a basis for normative legal
theory); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 41 (1974) (commenting on the
“utility monster”); RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 98 at 27 (rejecting utilitarianism because
it “does not take seriously the distinction between persons”).
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Another problem with the traditional utilitarian calculus is that it is essentially
impossible to conduct. In the traditional analysis, the relevant thing to be maximized—
the “maximand”—is overall happiness. Happiness has the attraction of at least appearing
to be intrinsically valuable and thus worth maximizing for its own sake. At the same
time, however, the psychological concept of happiness is also inherently amorphous.
Among other things, how do we measure relative happiness in order to determine
whether a particular outcome supplies even more of it to some people than it denies to
others?471
In an effort to lessen these problems in conducting Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
evaluations, Richard Posner has suggested that we narrow the maximand to some lesser,
more manageable construct to avoid the flaws of utilitarianism (and also welfare
economics). To that end, he has offered a more refined economic concept of “wealth
maximization” to replace happiness in the equation. Posner explains that “[t]he only kind
of preference that counts in a system of wealth maximization is . . . one that is backed up
by money—in other words, that is registered in a market.”472 Recognizing that many
things are not exchanged explicitly for dollars in traditional markets, Posner next
contends that the relevant market may also be non-explicit in nature, in which case the
471 See Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 470 at 114 (“in the two centuries that have
elapsed since Bentham announced the felicific calculus [of comparing relative levels of
happiness] no progress toward the discovery of such a metric has been made”); see also 2
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY 17-23 (1976) (“the practice of
utilitarianism presupposes omniscience”). This problem is not solved by expanding the
maximand from happiness to the “broadest concept of satisfaction” in the sense that
“people . . . are able to satisfy their preferences . . . to the greatest extent possible”
because, if anything, this would appear only to worsen the quantification problem. See
Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 470 at 111-12.
472 See id. at 119; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).
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particular activity must be monetized in some other way. For example, activities such as
marriage, child-rearing, or tort injury must be converted to their monetary equivalents as
though these things could be bought and sold on an explicit market.473 In this way,
economists might then begin to make overall utility calculations based on the relative
pricing of things (including ourselves) on the assumption that this pricing would serve as
an accurate proxy for individual and societal value (as opposed to the idea that pricing
merely constitutes a purely instrumental means to facilitate exchange for those things that
are tradeable for money).
Unsurprisingly, the Posnerian exercise of commodifying everything in terms of its
price has been sharply criticized on a number of grounds, including that it (1) renders a
rather incomplete and impoverished account of human activity, (2) reflects a rather
cynical understanding of “the price of everything and the value of nothing,”474 and (3)
does not truly escape the flaws of utilitarianism.475 One observation underlying these
criticisms is that switching the maximand from happiness to wealth maximization
replaces something that is arguably inherently valuable (happiness) with something that
is purely instrumental (wealth). By itself, maximizing wealth does not tell us anything
473 See Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 470 at 119-21.
474 OSCAR WILDE, LADY WINDERMERE’S FAN, act. I, sc. 1 (1892).
475 See, e.g., Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 191, 201 (1980)
[hereinafter Dworkin, Wealth] (arguing that the bare improvement in social wealth is not
an improvement in value; that “[m]oney or its equivalent is useful so far as it enables
someone to lead a more valuable, successful, happier, or more moral life”; and that
“[a]nyone who counts it for more than that is a fetishist of little green paper”); Anthony
T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 227, 241
(1980) [hereinafter Kronman, Wealth] (“if wealth maximization is desirable, it is only
because it leads to something else which we value for its own sake, and the suggestion
that we should sacrifice anything (especially respect for individual rights) because more
wealth is good in itself, is absurd”).
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about what to do with the wealth we have maximized or take into account whether along
the way we have actually worsened overall social conditions by creating less opportunity
and inequality or otherwise generally increased overall dissatisfaction. Another problem
is that the preoccupation with wealth accumulation for its own sake is closely associated
with traditional concepts of greed, miserliness, and covetousness. In defining morality as
exclusively the pursuit of wealth enhancement, we are faced with the startling proposition
that, not only are those who are preoccupied with wealth enhancement moral, they are
exclusively paragons of virtue.
A related problem is that the wealth-maximization perspective is otherwise
essentially dehumanizing. For example, as part of the monetization exercise, human
capital becomes a commodity that may be bought and sold, including to the highest
bidder willing to pay the highest price. As Posner concedes, under the wealth-
maximization calculus, those who have accumulated sufficient amounts of money might
legitimately enslave others,476 and likewise permissibly engage in racism.477 These
476 Posner states: “A less welcome implication of the wealth-maximization approach is
that people who are very poor . . . count only if they are part of the utility function of
someone who has wealth.” Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 470 at 128. He observes:
“[f]rom a wealth-maximization standpoint, if A . . . sells himself into slavery to B, or if C
borrows money from D with a penalty clause that provides that in the event of default D
can break C’s knees, there is no economic justification for refusing to enforce either
contract unless some element of fraud or duress is present.” Id. at 134; but see Dworkin,
Wealth, supra note 475 at 204 (“It is implausible to think that a society that seeks wealth
maximization single-mindedly will achieve more total utility than a society what seeks
wealth maximization but puts an upper bound on the level of inequality it will tolerate in
the name of social wealth”); Kronman, Wealth, supra note 475 at 240 (“Even if there is
no justification for making those who are already wealthy share what they have, there is
something offensive in the suggestion that their wealth is a reason for giving them even
more”).
477 Posner states that, where the presence of some ethnic group upsets the neighbors “by
an amount greater than the members of the minority would be willing to pay to remain in
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examples harken back to the “monstrousness” problem of traditional utilitarianism. In
addition, Posner’s conceptualization of wealth maximization suffers from a quantification
problem of its own: it is almost certainly impossible to monetize accurately much, if not
most, of the vast expanse of human activity necessary to make the calculation work.478
Accordingly, like the evaluative norm of equity discussed above, economic
efficiency in the form of wealth maximization—whether of the traditional utilitarian sort
or the Posnerian variant—cannot be our only metric.479 Nonetheless, that does not mean
that conducting an efficiency-type cost/benefit analysis is unhelpful.480 Among other
reasons, it is at least true that “sometimes improvements in social wealth cause
improvements of other sorts,”481 and likewise the cost/benefit conclusion that efficiency
analysis suggests is sometimes sufficiently clear and non-controversial that it also helps
point us in the right direction (for example, when a particular solution to a problem
generates gains to some people that are large and losses to others that are relatively
trivial—although it is important to remain skeptical about claims of triviality).
the neighborhood,” then “some form of segregation would be wealth maximizing.”
Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 470 at 134.
478 Posner suggests as much, contending only that it is “a less serious problem than that of
measuring happiness.” Id. at 130.
479 See, e.g., Dworkin, Wealth, supra note 475 at 212 (“It will not do to say that
distributive justice is whatever state of affairs is produced by wealth maximization”).
480 As Posner points out, although “relatively few of the people in our society who think
about these things consider wealth maximization or some version of efficiency the
paramount social value, few judge it a trivial one.” Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note
470 at 110.
481 Dworkin, Wealth, supra note 475 at 203.
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Evaluated from the perspective of either traditional utilitarian efficiency or
Posnerian wealth maximization, bankruptcy law’s debt-collection solutions in the form of
its special procedures that (1) collectivize and streamline monitoring and debt-
enforcement activities, (2) avoid and recover fraudulent conveyances, and (3) suspend
and replace ordinary non-bankruptcy debt-collection devices (such as foreclosure) with
more value-preserving mechanisms all appear to be rather wealth-enhancing solutions to
the problems of deadweight collection and monitoring costs, gratuitous transfers, and
debt-collection free-for-alls. Bankruptcy law’s debt-collection mechanisms are generally
efficient because they are specifically designed to reduce the costs and improve the
performance of non-bankruptcy devices in the insolvency setting, and they do not appear
to generate significant offsetting costs of their own, at least not those that are greater than
the costs they avoid. Once again, there may be specific challenges that arise in applying
these devices in specific settings that undermine their efficiency and perhaps require
some degree of operational refinement and qualification.482 But we need not resolve the
details of all of these in order to conclude that bankruptcy’s solution mechanisms
outlined above in response to the debt-collection problems of insolvency are generally
desirable from an efficiency standpoint.
ENTITLEMENT
Why entitlement? There are several reasons, but first it is necessary to define the
concept. In general, an entitlement is an interest protected by a legal right of some kind.
For example, a creditor characteristically has an interest in obtaining the satisfaction of
482 See, e.g., JACKSON, LOGIC, supra note 8 at 151-92 (discussing some of the potential
pitfalls of running a collective proceeding in bankruptcy, including some of the costs
arising from delay and strategic behavior).
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debts owed to him, and his interest constitutes an entitlement to the extent it is protected
by a legally cognizable right, such as the right to collect from the debtor in personam or
from the debtor’s property in rem. Not all debts are protected in this way; some are
“moral obligations” only.483 In addition, rights are frequently freighted with conditions
and restrictions, including temporal limitations, recovery parameters, and procedural
requirements, and rights may be lost under a variety of circumstances. Nonetheless, a
creditor’s entitlement to recover claims against others is generally recognized to be
important and valuable.
Similarly, an individual debtor has an interest in his own human capital and the
property he possesses, and these interests also constitute entitlements to the extent they
are also protected by rights. By law, corporate debtors have similar interests and rights.
Unquestionably, the various interests and rights of debtors and creditors interact with
each other in complex ways and they sometimes conflict. Critically, these various
interests and rights reflect fundamental judgments about who persons are, what they truly
own, and what they owe to each other.484 As Paul Kahn has put it, “[t]o be a person is to
have legal rights and responsibilities,”485 and in this way law reflects a fundamental
understanding of our existence without our larger community. In evaluating whether a
particular legal solution to a particular social problem is beneficial, especially one that
483 See supra note 408 (citing cases discussing the distinction between enforceable legal
obligations and moral obligations that are exclusively a matter of conscience).
484 See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, supra note 5 at 1090 (“The first issue
which must be faced by any legal system is one we call the problem of ‘entitlement.’ . . .
[T]he fundamental thing that law does is to decide which of the [persons asserting an
interest in something] will be entitled to prevail.”).
485 KAHN, REIGN, supra note 222 at 35.
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alters in some way a preexisting entitlement, it is useful to consider the nature of the
alteration from the perspective of the entitlement itself. Among other virtues, a
preference for respecting entitlements may help temper both the potential inequities of
efficiency analysis and the potential vagueness of equity.
Analytically, a creditor’s interest in realizing on his claims may be protected by
different categories of rights. First, the interest may be protected by a “property rule” in
the sense that “someone who wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy
it from him in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon
by the seller.”486 For example, a creditor’s interest in realizing on his claims is protected
in this way to the extent he has the right to assign his claims to others in a voluntary
exchange of some kind. Second, a creditor’s interest may be protected by a “liability
rule” in the sense that someone may be able to do something to impair the value of the
interest, but as a result may be required “to pay an objectively determined value” for the
impairment.487 For example, a creditor’s interest is protected in this way to the extent he
has the right to collect damages from someone else for doing something that impairs the
value of his claims.488 Third, a creditor’s interest may be protected by an “inalienability
rule” in the sense that “its transfer is not permitted between a willing buyer and a willing
seller.”489 For example, some claims are not transferrable, such as a claim that an
486 Id. at 1092.
487 Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, supra note 5 at 1092.
488 For example, A may assert a claim for damages against B if B tortiously interferes
with A’s contractual right to the satisfaction of some obligation from C.
489 Id. at 1092.
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individual may have against an insurer or public agency to receive certain forms of
disability income.
From an efficiency perspective, entitlements may come with different bundles of
rights in order to maximize social welfare.490 In addition, certain rights may be assigned
to certain interests in order to achieve various distributional goals as a matter of
distributive justice (i.e., the just distribution of goods and opportunities throughout
society).491 Moreover, they may be assigned for “other justice reasons,”492 which may
include principles of corrective justice (i.e., the idea that individuals are accountable for
the consequences of their actions where those actions cause harm).493
In the first instance, the creditor’s specific rights that define his ability to collect
his claims are fundamentally a concern of non-bankruptcy law.494 What matters for our
purposes is (1) the relative importance of the particular rights a creditor has in connection
with a particular claim, (2) how those rights are impacted by the debt-collection problems
of insolvency, and (3) how they are impacted by the potential debt-collection solutions
outlined above. Among other things, to the extent a creditor holds an entitlement that is
impaired by a particular problem of insolvency, and a particular solution has the effect of
490 Id. at 1093-98.
491 Id. at 1098-1101 (observing, for example, that “[w]henever a society wishes to
maximize the chances that individuals will have at least a minimum endowment of
certain particular goods—education, clothes, bodily integrity—the society is likely to
begin by giving the individuals an entitlement to them”).
492 Id. at 1102-05.
493 See supra note 77 (discussing corrective justice).
494 See supra note 116 (discussing how a creditor’s basic rights of collection are defined
in the first instance under applicable non-bankruptcy law).
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lessening that impairment, then the solution would be beneficial from the perspective of
entitlement analysis.
Bankruptcy law’s debt-collection solutions to the problems of debt-collection
free-for-alls and deadweight monitoring and collection costs readily qualify as beneficial
under this analysis. Indeed, the whole point of the solutions to these problems outlined
above is to lessen the costs of debt-collection activities for the sake of increasing their
efficacy. Bankruptcy law’s remedial provisions in response to the problem of gratuitous
transfers would also seem to qualify, but the analysis is a bit more complicated.
Whenever a fraudulent conveyance is avoided and recovered, two expectations
are defeated in order to vindicate the creditor’s recoveries: the expectation of the debtor
that the transfer would be effective, and the similar expectation of the transferee. In the
circumstances in which fraudulent conveyances are characteristically avoided and
recovered, however, the expectations of the debtor and the transferee are normatively
weak, at best. For example, it is difficult to say that a debtor and a transferee who engage
in what amounts to a type of fraud have a legitimate entitlement to have their fraudulent
conduct respected. There are, of course, circumstances in which the fraudulent nature of
the transfer may be less than clear, such as in the case of the innocent foreclosure
transferee in the hypothetical discussed previously.495 But the necessity of drawing lines
to distinguish truly fraudulent conveyances from those that are not is inevitable, and from
the creditors’ perspective, their enhanced ability to recover their claims as a result of the
remedy is obviously ameliorative.
495 See supra at 240-41.
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In sum, bankruptcy law’s debt-collection solutions to the problems of debt-
collection free-for-alls, deadweight collection and monitoring costs, and gratuitous
transfers would appear to be beneficial from the perspective of entitlement analysis. In
seeking to enhance the creditors’ debt-collection entitlements, they do not trammel the
legitimate protected entitlements of debtors and others, except perhaps on the margins.
Accordingly, entitlement analysis joins with equity and efficiency analysis in
demonstrating the desirability of these solutions. As we shall see, however, things are
not quite as straightforward with bankruptcy law’s debt-forgiveness and debt-adjustment
mechanisms.
RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS OF DEBT FORGIVENESS
Of the various problems of insolvency discussed in Chapter 2, two fall into the
debt-forgiveness category: (1) an insolvent debtor’s incentives to engage in wasteful
debt-collection-avoidance activities, such as delay, deception, and inappropriate risk
taking; and (2) the waste associated with stagnating and overburdened assets, including
an insolvent debtor’s human capital. These are each properly debt-forgiveness problems
that correlate to debt-forgiveness solutions because, once the bailout-insurance and
automatic-debt-cancellation options are eliminated, these problems are subject to
amelioration only through some form of debt-relief mechanism.496 Correspondingly, they
are not debt-collection problems because they have nothing to do with enforcing the
creditors’ claims for the creditors’ benefit and are not resolved merely by tinkering with
496 See supra at 206, 208 (discussing the bailout-insurance and automatic-debt-
cancellation options).
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debt-collection methods.497 Likewise, they are not problems of debt adjustment because
they cannot be resolved simply by the prioritization of obligations. Having categorized
these two problems, the question becomes: how might bankruptcy law beneficially
resolve them?
As discussed in Chapter 2, an insolvent debtor’s incentives to engage in wasteful
collection-avoidance activities, such as delay, deception, and inappropriate risk taking,
arise as a result of the debtor’s perceptions of the consequences of likely and actual debt-
collection activity. A debtor who is about to lose everything will tend to take whatever
steps he believes are expedient to prevent the oncoming disaster. Unfortunately,
insolvent debtors are likely to misperceive the circumstances in the sense of misjudging
how best to extract themselves from their predicament, and several cognitive challenges
will likely conspire to fuel the debtor’s misperceptions and foster unfortunate wasteful
outcomes.
First, as the dark clouds of disaster begin gradually to roll in, the debtor may
nonetheless believe unrealistically that his increasingly desperate efforts will somehow
succeed—a form of optimism bias.498 Second, the debtor may overvalue assets that may
be dragging him down, such as an over-encumbered home accompanied by a mortgage
liability he cannot afford, and the debtor may thus cling to these assets even though he
would be better off giving them up and would not be willing to pay such a steep price to
497 So long as the debtor cannot pay all claims in full, adjusting the various debt-
collection devices that creditors may use to enforce their claims will not eliminate an
insolvent debtor’s incentives to engage in wasteful activities to avoid debt collection and
the resulting loss of property, nor will it eliminate the waste associated with stagnating
and overburdened assets. So long as the debtor remains insolvent, these problems will
endure.
498 See supra note 404 (discussing optimism bias).
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acquire them if they were not already his—an example of the endowment effect.499 Such
misperceptions are only likely to prolong the debtor’s wasteful efforts to stave off the
inevitable.
As also discussed in Chapter 2, insolvency otherwise has the unfortunate effect of
depressing the productive deployment of human capital, as well as the use of other
property the debtor may own. As Richard Posner has observed, “[p]eople have an
incentive to work harder when they work for themselves than when they work for other
people.”500 An insolvent person who must devote the entirety of the fruits of his labor
toward the hopeless chore of paying off his debts is not likely to be as productive as a
solvent person who is able to keep and enjoy for himself at least some of them. We may
call this effect of insolvency and debt-collection the “productivity-depressant” factor.
A further complexity is that, as a debtor sinks deeper into insolvency, he is likely
to try to cut back dramatically on spending. Reductions in spending, however, require
discipline and self-control, and “there is increasing evidence that self-control is a limited
resource that can be depleted if it is overused.”501 Ironically, at the very time when an
insolvent debtor could use extra doses of self-control, he is likely to find it increasingly in
short supply. We may call this the “self-control” paradox. In addition to the insolvent
499 See Thaler, Positive Theory, supra note 250 at 43-47 (discussing the endowment
effect); see also Daniel Kahneman, et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect
and the Coase Theorum, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990) (same); see supra note 250 and
infra at 269-70 (discussing the endowment effect).
500 Richard A. Posner, The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin and Kronman, 9 J.
LEG. STUD. 243, 246 (1980).
501 AYERS, CARROTS, supra note 384 at 56; see also Mark Muraven & Roy Baumeister,
Self-Regulation and Depletion of Limited Resources: Does Self-Control Resemble a
Muscle?, 126 PSYCH. BUL. 247 (2000) (reviewing evidence that self-control may be a
limited resource that can be depleted).
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debtor’s already acute incentives to devote his dwindling energies and resources to
fruitless debt-collection-avoidance activities, deception, and asset gambling, the added
challenges of the productivity-depressant factor and self-control paradox are likely only
to increase wasteful conduct and outcomes.502 In addition, as explained previously, the
debtor’s over-encumbered assets are also likely to stagnate in the sense that, but for the
debtor’s insolvency, they could be put to better use.503
One far-fetched solution to these problems might be to simply excuse all of an
insolvent debtor’s obligations as a matter of law—we may call this the “deliverance”
approach. As discussed previously, however, this extreme automatic-debt-cancellation
option is undesirable because it would go too far.504 A less drastic remedy would be for
the law to permit the release (discharge) of some or all of the debtor’s obligations in
exchange for the debtor’s surrender of some or all of his assets so that these assets might
be disposed of in some way, with the resulting value used toward the full or partial
satisfaction of the creditors’ claims. The discharge would have the effect of liberating the
debtor’s human capital so that it could be devoted to more productive use, while
permitting at least the potential of some recovery for creditors (assuming the debtor had
any non-exempt assets left at the time he commenced his bankruptcy case). Any property
the debtor was able to keep as exempt would help with his fresh start. In addition, the
law might also prescribe some mechanism for the release of encumbrances on
overburdened and stagnating physical assets so that these, too, might be put to more
502 See supra at 138-55 (discussing and illustrating these various incentives).
503 See supra at 169-74 (discussing and illustrating this problem).
504 See supra at 208-09.
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productive use, with the encumbrances shifted to the proceeds. Once again, this is what
bankruptcy law actually does.505 In Chapter 7 cases, for example, debtors must surrender
their non-exempt assets in order to obtain a discharge—the assets are then liquidated for
the creditors’ benefit.506 In Chapter 13 “wage-earner reorganization” cases, debtors may
keep most of their assets, but they must dedicate their earnings for prolonged periods
(between three and five years) toward the payment of the creditors’ claims in order to
keep these assets and receive a discharge of debts they cannot pay.507 In Chapter 11
cases, firms and individuals may retain the assets they need to reorganize, but in order to
do so they must distribute to their creditors payments and/or other interests (such as stock
or other securities) that are collectively worth more than the bare liquidation value of the
assets they propose to keep.508 The question becomes: is this beneficial?
Once more, the answer seems fairly obviously yes—at least from the perspective
of solving the debt-forgiveness problems of insolvency. At the same time, of course,
granting the debtor discharge relief must inevitably conflict with the creditor’s collection
interests, but we may postpone considering that conflict until after we have examined as a
threshold matter whether discharge relief is desirable in its own right in response to the
debt-forgiveness problems of insolvency. It turns out that it is, but in order to understand
why, it is first useful to examine in more detail how insolvency typically unfolds. This is
505 See supra notes 72-76, 334 (discussing the discharge and exemption mechanisms of
bankruptcy law). Like the automatic-debt-cancellation option, the deliverance approach
would obviously be undesirable because it would be too costly. See supra at 208
(discussing the automatic-debt-cancellation option).
506 See supra notes 73, 241, 299, 363.
507 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (2000 & Supp. 2006); supra notes 72, 97.
508 See supra notes 73, 241, infra note 752.
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important because, on the one hand, we naturally would be bearish on discharge if it
turned out that insolvent debtors who seek bankruptcy relief are typically the scheming
architects of their own financial demise through the intentional squandering of their
property. On the other hand, we are more likely to be bullish on discharge if it turned out
that insolvent debtors who seek bankruptcy relief are typically honest but unfortunate
individuals who characteristically find themselves in a jam for relatively sympathetic
reasons. Of course, it is true that there will always be at least some insolvent debtors
whose circumstances align with the former description. The real question is what the
overall picture looks like and who the outliers are so that discharge relief may be tailored
accordingly (e.g., perhaps to excuse the merely negligent, but not the fraudulent). Thus,
before analyzing the debt-forgiveness solutions of bankruptcy law from the distinct
perspectives of equity, efficiency, and entitlement, it is first important to understand
something more about how insolvency and the problems of debt-forgiveness generally
arise.
THE (TYPICALLY) ACCIDENTAL NEED FOR BANKRUPTCY RELIEF
It is a common belief that the need for bankruptcy relief is essentially endogenous
rather than exogenous, and correspondingly, that bankruptcy is a self-inflicted wound
indicative of at least some sort of dereliction of duty, if not outright moral infirmity.509
This belief is also one that has existed for a very long time and has been rationalized and
expressed in a variety of unflattering ways, including through moral, religious, and
punitive exegesis. For example, in 1716, the prominent Boston minister and slave holder
509 See, e.g., Bradley & Rosenzweig, Untenable, supra note 316 (arguing that insolvency
is generally endogenous); see also supra at 162-63, 223-27 (discussing this common
perception and some possible reasons for it).
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Cotton Mather thundered with Calvinistic fury: “People there are, too many, who do
bring Debts upon themselves, in such a manner, and in such a measure, that a Folly
nothing sort of Criminal, is to be charged upon them. And when they have brought such
Debts upon themselves, their Delay to get from under them, is what also amounts to a
Crime, for which they are to be Indicted, as not having the Fear of God before their
Eyes.”510
Certainly many of Mather’s contemporaries shared his view, and undoubtedly
some people still share it today. But regardless of the popularity of this kind of polemics,
on reflection, the idea that bankruptcy is endogenous seems rather odd. Although not
everyone who experiences insolvency ends up filing for bankruptcy, insolvency is very
much the condition of virtually every debtor who does file, and most individuals
experience insolvency at least temporarily at some point in their lives. For example, most
college graduates embarking on their careers with significant student-loan obligations
start out that way, and many elderly persons live out their final years unable to support
themselves financially. Likewise, most firms experience periods of insolvency,
sometimes at their inception and sometimes later in their existence (or both), and most
ultimately collapse at some point, leaving as their final legacy a tattered state of financial
510 Cotton Mather, Fair Dealing Between Debtor and Creditor (Boston 1716). Mather
(1663-1728) brought the same religious fervor to his views on the subject of slavery,
arguing “[i]t is allowed in the Scriptures, to the Gentiles, that they may keep Slaves.”
Cotton Mather, A Good Master Well Served: A Brief Discourse on the Necessary
Properties and Practices of a Good Servant, in Every Kind of Servitude, p. 52 (Green &
Allen 1696); see also 2 KINGS 4:1 (King James) (in the parable of Elijah and the poor
widow, the bible indicates that, like thieves who have failed to provide restitution,
insolvent debtors (or their children) might be delivered to their creditors as slaves);
Mooney, Normative Theory, supra note 30 at 946 (analogizing the failure to respect the
paramount right of creditors to be paid to “prima facie theft”).
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disarray.511 In other words, insolvency is ubiquitous and widespread, and it sometimes
leads to bankruptcy. From this perspective, bankruptcy can be viewed simply as a
common complication of a rather common condition (insolvency) that for some reason
got out of control—and in reality it is both easy for insolvency to get out of control, as
well as for individuals to underestimate how readily this can occur.
It is certainly true that, for some, the path to bankruptcy will be littered with poor
choices, even reckless ones. But the same can be said of the trajectory of many obligors
who never file for bankruptcy relief. Not all solvent debtors are good decision makers.
At the same time, not all debtors in bankruptcy are poor ones. Ultimately, the problem
with most bankrupt debtors is not that they are debtors, or even necessarily that they are
insolvent. The real problem is that they are too insolvent. Admittedly, this
conceptualization runs counter to popular wisdom. Yet there are reasons why the
conventional view of bankrupt debtors as endogenously culpable is largely a myth. In
truth, most bankruptcies are “accidental” in the classic sense of the concept: occurrences
that are neither expected nor intended by debtors at the time they engage in ordinary
activities that give rise to debt obligations.512
True enough, there is ample anecdotal evidence to support the popular view that
bankruptcy is often the result of fraud, greed, or extravagant misbehavior. Revelations of
flagrant corporate mismanagement in the wake of spectacular financial collapse grab the
511 See supra note 202 (discussing the failure rate for firms).
512 The concept is borrowed from insurance law. The classic formulation of an accident
for insurance purposes is an occurrence that is neither expected nor intended from the
standpoint of the insured. See 10 COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D, §§ 139.13 to 139.14, at 139-
32 to 37 (L.F. Russ & T.F. Segalla eds. 1998).
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headlines and stir the public ire.513 In reality, however, these are not the typical cases—
far from it. Much more common are the far more modest failures of ordinary individuals
and business ventures, but their relatively unremarkable tales are not the stuff that sells
newspapers or drives attention to the most popular internet blogs.514 Moreover, nearly
everyone has an unsympathetic relative, colleague, or acquaintance who seems habitually
to live beyond his means and appears destined for the bankruptcy court, somehow
managing to avoid it either through the kindness of others or divine intervention—the
classic bankruptcy archetype. In the common mythology, only rarely is bankruptcy
conceived of as the consequence of purely innocent misfortune, and the notion that
bankruptcy is largely endogenous rather than exogenous thus persists.
Empirically, however, the popular conception simply does not hold. As one
group of scholars has observed based on their extensive investigations, bankruptcy is
typically exogenous: “[t]he debtors in our sample experienced a series of random shocks
and structural shifts: an earthquake in California, Operation Desert Storm in Texas
military towns, corporate downsizing, and a sea change in family structure. Most of
these changes were beyond their control.”515 Conversely, these scholars have observed
513 See, e.g., ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS, supra note 182; SWARTZ & WATKINS, POWER
FAILURE, supra note 182; Geraldine Fabrikant, Global Crossing: 2 Different Worlds,
N.Y. TIMES, February 28, 2002, at C7 (detailing the extravagant spending of Global
Crossing executives while the company foundered in bankruptcy).
514 See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE, supra note 200 (discussing at
length the plight of middle-class debtors, their susceptibility to bankruptcy, and the nature
of their circumstances).
515 Id. at 73.
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that the stereotypes of bankrupt debtors as wanton profligates, lazy deadbeats, and
careless spendthrifts are largely overblown.516
Rejecting popular mythology, modern bankruptcy law in general, and its
discharge provisions in particular, have long embodied the fundamental perspective that
bankruptcy is characteristically the product of largely innocent misfortune arising as the
byproduct of ordinary risk taking. In the vernacular, bankruptcy law has come to be built
around the paradigm of the “honest but unfortunate debtor,”517 and the logical premises
underlying this conception are not difficult to discern.
In any large population (of, say, a hundred million individuals and tens of
thousands of firms), a certain percentage of those who do nothing more than take
perfectly ordinary risks (i.e., risks of the same type as those taken by their peers) will
suffer the adverse consequences of their risk taking for wholly unremarkable reasons.
For example, prior to encountering financial difficulty, most individuals will hold jobs,
have dependents, consume services, borrow money to make purchases, incur tax
516 See id. at 34 (“With greater detail, the bankruptcy stereotype was eventually
elaborated as a twenty-something male, a high school dropout who held an unskilled or,
at best, semiskilled job.”); but see id. at 250 (“We have not listed ‘irresponsibility’ as a
cause of bankruptcy because it is too hard to define or quantify, but we are not unmindful
of its effects.”).
517 See Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367, 374 (2007) (observing
that “[t]he principal purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to grant a fresh start to the honest
but unfortunate debtor” and noting that the “[t]he class of honest but unfortunate debtors”
who file for bankruptcy “includes the vast majority of the hundreds of thousands of
individuals who file Chapter 7 petitions each year”) (emphasis added and internal citation
omitted); see also Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244-45 (1934) (elaborating this
principle at greater length). Although this has changed somewhat in recent years,
particularly with the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code that have made it more
difficult to obtain discharge relief, the general view still holds that most bankrupt debtors
are honest but unfortunate, as illustrated by the U.S. Supreme Court’s observation in
Marrama that most individuals who file for bankruptcy relief are honest but unfortunate,
and those who seek to abuse the bankruptcy system are typically outliers.
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obligations, and, in the process, assume the risk that they may not be able to satisfy all of
these obligations in the event of misfortune. Prior to encountering financial distress,
these individuals will generally behave no differently than others similarly situated.518
Moreover, their conduct will likely be socially appropriate: as a society, we want
individuals to assume the risks associated with normal consumer activities financed
through credit because, among other reasons, if they did not, economic growth would be
curtailed and we would all be worse off.
It is inevitable, however, that some individuals engaged in perfectly ordinary
economic activity will suffer financial reversals that will render them insolvent. They
may lose their jobs, become ill, get divorced, suffer the effects of accidents or criminal
conduct, or otherwise find themselves in the clutches of calamity.519 For most, an
occasional brush with misfortune will not spell financial ruin and bankruptcy. Different
individuals, however, will experience misfortune in different doses and at different points
of vulnerability. Of these, some will become insolvent for a sufficiently lengthy period,
or in a sufficient magnitude, that they will find themselves in need of bankruptcy relief.
518 See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE, supra note 200 at 3 (observing that
“bankrupts do represent a fair cross-section of the American middle class.”); Elizabeth
Warren, Financial Collapse and Class Status: Who Goes Bankrupt?, 41 OSGOODE HALL
LAW. REV. 115 (2003) (reporting that the data demonstrate that families in bankruptcy
represent a broad cross-section of the middle class).
519 One group of investigators explains that the relevant “data permit us to quantify the
stress that arises from five sources: the increased volatility of jobs and income; the
explosion of consumer debt with sky-high interest rates; divorce and changing parenting
patterns that are increasing the number of single-adult households; the astonishing ability
to treat medical problems—at astonishing prices; and the fierce determination that
Americans have to buy and retain a family home at all costs.” SULLIVAN, WARREN &
WESTBROOK, FRAGILE, supra note 200 at 2.
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Similarly, firms within the general population will typically engage in a host of
risk taking incident to ordinary commercial activity. Among other things, they will
borrow money to fund their operations, hire managers and other employees, incur tax
liabilities, obtain goods and services on credit, lease property, enter into long- and short-
term contracts, incur contingent obligations, and make myriad investment choices. In
doing so, these firms assume the risk that, for one reason or another, they may not be able
to meet their obligations in full.
Just as it is desirable for individuals to engage in ordinary risk taking, commercial
growth is also enhanced by firms that assume entrepreneurial risk. The reality of the
commercial world, however, is that—once again—most small firms ultimately fail within
a few years of their inception and eventually most large ones fail as well.520
Significantly, most of these failures are not initiated by fraud or other wrongdoing.
Among other causes, the managers may have simply misperceived the marketplace, made
the wrong investment choices, suffered catastrophic losses from unforeseen calamities,
lost key employees or relationships, found themselves the victims of wrongdoing, run
afoul of competitive pressures, or discovered that the buyers of their goods or services no
longer are able or willing to pay for them. Although many firms encounter setbacks
without collapsing, different firms experience and respond to financial turmoil in
different ways. Of these, some will also become insolvent for a sufficiently lengthy
period, or in a sufficient magnitude, that they find themselves in the throes of economic
chaos.
520 See supra note 202 (discussing data regarding the prevalence of business failures).
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Once again, it is unsettling to think that the world is full of such a broad variety of
personal and commercial perils and that insolvency can arise at any time for any number
of reasons.521 Moreover, it is not necessarily in our collective best interests to dwell
publicly on these perils if doing so would have the effect of dissuading individuals and
firms from engaging in desirable risk taking. But in approaching the subject of
bankruptcy, the failure to grasp the realities of insolvency can lead to unfortunate
choices.
For example, some commentators sympathetic to the view that insolvency is
largely endogenous have marked with alarm the rising incidence of bankruptcy filings
over the last thirty years. Surely, they contend, the rising tide of insolvency is the
product of an increased incidence of debtors who cannot control themselves and of the
lax bankruptcy laws that coddle them.522 There is little reason to believe, however, that
this perspective is substantially justified. On the contrary, a more compelling case can be
made that the rising tide of bankruptcy is not the product of increasing malfeasance, but
521 See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE, supra note 200 at 6 (“[Debtors] are
a silent reminder that even the most secure family may be only a job loss, a medical
problem, or an out-of-control credit card away from financial catastrophe.”)
522 See, e.g., ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA W. TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP 71-72
(2003) [hereinafter WARREN & TYAGI, TWO-INCOME] (summarizing the views of
politicians and commentators who have criticized bankrupt debtors as profligate spenders
and financial manipulators); see also Vern Countryman, Consumers in Bankruptcy Cases,
18 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 1 (1978) (“The basic reason for this burgeoning rate of consumer
bankruptcies is not difficult to discern. . . . Some consumers are no more able to cope
with [the] rush of consumer credit than are some automobile drivers able to cope with the
rush of traffic. The automobile drivers end up in the hospital, the consumers in the
bankruptcy court.”).
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is instead the result of broader economic trends that suggest no criticism of bankruptcy
law’s embedded paradigm of the “honest but unfortunate debtor.”523
Over the last thirty years, income levels for most Americans have either remained
stagnant or have declined, while the availability and use of credit has risen sharply.524
During the same period, health care costs have soared while health insurance has
declined, although recent legislation has been enacted to reverse that trend.525 Education
costs have likewise soared, as have the costs of dependent care.526 In the meantime, as
income growth has shifted away from lower- and middle-class workers, subsidized public
523 See supra notes 72, 104, 517, infra note 717; see generally SULLIVAN, WARREN &
WESTBROOK, FRAGILE, supra note 200 at 238-61 (2000).
524 See VYSE, GOING BROKE, supra note 403 at 51, 171 (observing that real wages for
many have declined, putting more pressure on many individuals); SULLIVAN, WARREN &
WESTBROOK, FRAGILE, supra note 200 at 18 (“Stagnant incomes have affected many
Americans for twenty years. . . . At the same time, the willingness of consumers to
borrow and of lenders to lend has increased dramatically.”); see also, e.g., David C.
Johnston, I.R.S. Says Americans’ Income Shrank for 2 Consecutive Years, N.Y. TIMES,
July 29, 2004, at C1.
525 See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE, supra note 200 at 141 (“Medical
costs have burgeoned, especially in the past decade, at the same time that job security,
including medical insurance benefits, has declined.”); see also, e.g., Hilary Waldman,
Millions More Lack Health Insurance, HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 30, 2003, at A1;
Bernard Wysocki, Jr., At One Hospital, A Stark Solution for Allocating Care, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 23, 2003 (detailing a Galveston hospital’s strict rationing of medical care on
financial grounds); Timothy Aeppel, Skyrocketing Health Costs Start to Pit Worker vs.
Worker, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2003, at A1.
526 See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE, supra note 200 at 251 (“Tuition at
four year colleges doubled at both public and private institutions between 1985 and 1994
. . . . More families are extending themselves to the limit to finance college educations
and more students are leaving school staggering under loans they promised to repay.”);
see also, e.g., John Hechinger, U.S. Gets Tough on Failure to Repay Student Loans,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2005, at A1; Jane J. Kim, Putting a Cap on Tuition Expenses, WALL
ST. J., July 27, 2004, at D2 (describing trend of colleges freezing tuition rates for entering
classes to avoid annual hikes in response to general); Jennifer Washburn, The Tuition
Crunch, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2004, at 140.
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services for these groups have also declined.527 Although divorce rates have remained
largely unchanged, the economic impact of divorce on single, working mothers continues
to be worse than on men, increasing their risk of insolvency.528 Similarly, as the
population has aged, more individuals find themselves faced with the costs of dependent
elder care with fewer resources to respond.529 In addition, as a general trend, individuals
have come to rely more and more on debt financing for many routine purchases,
contributing to an ever-expanding culture of credit.530
In an environment of shrinking or stagnant incomes, rising costs, and increased
reliance on debt, it is wholly unsurprising that there would be a steady increase in the
incidence of insolvency and of bankruptcy filings. It is equally unsurprising that this
increase would accelerate during periods of general economic distress, such as in the
aftermath of the economic downturn of 2007-2008, which are typically characterized by
rising unemployment, credit contraction, and further cuts in social services.
527 See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE, supra note 200 at 169 (discussing
“deep cuts in welfare programs”); see also Sarah Lueck, Facing Crunch, States Drop
Thousands from Medicaid Rolls, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2003, at A1.
528 See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE, supra note 200 at 175 (observing
that “economic hardships following divorce continue to fall disproportionally on
women.”). This has been the case for some time. See, e.g., No-fault Divorce ‘An
Economic Disaster’ for Wives, Children, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 4, 1985, at 63.
529 See, e.g., Jane Gross, Elder-Care Costs Deplete Savings of a Generation, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 30, 2006, at A1 (“[N]ever has old age lasted so long or been so costly.”).
530 See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE, supra note 200 at 111 (noting that,
increasingly, Americans “do not pay—they finance. Quietly, without much fanfare,
Americans have taken to buying school shoes and pizza with debt—and paying for those
items over months or even years.”); see also Jeff Gelles, Credit Cards a Seductive Trap
for Consumers, THE STAR-LEDGER, Nov. 6, 2005, at 4 (“[A] third of the cardholders [in
one study] use credit-card debt for basic living expenses, such as groceries, utilities,
mortgage or rent payments, or insurance—adding interest charges to the ongoing cost of
necessities.”).
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On the other hand, what is somewhat surprising is that, rather than flock to the
bankruptcy courts at the first sign of distress, insolvent debtors actually tend to exhibit
strong reluctance to take advantage of available bankruptcy relief.531 Although
bankruptcy filings have risen steadily over the past three decades, they seem not to have
kept pace with the rising incidence of insolvency. In recent years, debtors have tended to
wait longer after the onset of insolvency to commence their bankruptcy cases and, as a
result, have tended to be in worse shape when they finally do.532 Among other things, it
is again possible to see evidence in these trends of the endowment effect—the idea that
individuals will cling to property they own because they own it, even though they would
be better off if they simply cut it lose, and would not be willing to pay such a steep price
to keep it if it were not already theirs.533 In any event, far from signaling the continued
erosion of the so-called “stigma” of bankruptcy, this may suggest the opposite: as
insolvency cuts deeper into the middle class, debtors are increasingly desperate to avoid
531 See WARREN & TYAGI, TWO-INCOME, supra note 522 at 73 (observing that, although
millions of families in financial difficulty would be better off if they filed for bankruptcy,
only a small percentage of them actually do); SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK,
FRAGILE, supra note 200 at 21 (“Ironically, many debtors wait too long to file for
bankruptcy.”); see generally id. at 31 (“[T]he American middle class is running hard to
stay in place. . . . As good jobs become scarce and wages and benefits erode, workers
act to forestall potential losses by working longer hours and taking second jobs, while
families send more workers into the labor force.”).
532 Id. (“An earlier filing would have stopped the calls and might have saved his job,
giving [the debtor] a better postbankruptcy position and perhaps a chance to attempt
some repayment.”).
533 See supra note 250 (discussing the endowment effect).
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the humiliation of bankruptcy and file only when their circumstances become particularly
dire.534
In addition, of the individuals who do file for bankruptcy relief, only a small
fraction appear capable of paying any significant portion of their debts.535 Further, those
who file typically do so in the wake of some combination of lost employment,
catastrophic illness, or divorce (sometimes all three).536 It is true, of course, that many
individual debtors who file for bankruptcy have significant credit card debt—an aspect of
insolvency that is often cited uncritically as evidence of malfeasance.537 But the same
can be said of many millions of others who are solvent and will never file for bankruptcy:
credit card debt has become an every-day feature of modern American life, and the fact
that bankrupt debtors have this form of indebtedness is simply a reflection of the reality
of how the consumer economy functions. Of course most bankrupt debtors have
significant credit card debt. With characteristically indiscriminate availability and
extraordinarily high rates of interest, it is one of the most common reasons for the need
for bankruptcy relief.
534 See WARREN & TYAGI, TWO-INCOME, supra note 522 at 72-75 (making this point); see
generally SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE, supra note 200 at 32
(“Arguments that the stigma attached to bankruptcy has declined are typically made by
journalists who are unable to find any bankrupt debtors willing to be interviewed for the
record and by prosperous economists who see bankruptcy as a great bargain.”).
535 See id. at 204 (“More than two out of three debtors who file for Chapter 13 are unable
to continue their payments through to a successful conclusion.”)
536 See id. at 15-18, 19-21.
537 See id. at 129 (“Debtors have taken on higher and higher consumer debt relative to
their incomes, and they have fallen in greater numbers into bankruptcy.”); but see id. at
22 (“[T]he proportion of people who have filed for bankruptcy because they have run up
consumer debt to unmanageable levels is somewhat more modest than many might
guess—perhaps about one in ten.”)
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In evaluating the causes of individual insolvencies, it is certainly true that some
debtors end up filing for bankruptcy because they have engaged in fraudulent or
foolhardy behavior far outside the norm, and these include some famous examples.
Stories of the musician who could not get by on $140 million, the scam artist guilty of
spectacular fraud, and the sports star who lost it all at the gaming tables linger in the
collective consciousness and contribute to the stereotype of the abusive debtor.538 But the
insolvencies of many other famous individuals, including Abraham Lincoln in 1833 and
Rembrandt Van Rijn in 1656, are not particularly dramatic or culpable.539 In truth, the
reality of bankruptcy is that the typical filing is simply an outgrowth of the consequences
of ordinary risk taking that did not happen to pan out as expected.
In contrast to individual bankruptcy filings, the growth in business filings has
been far less dramatic, suggesting even less reason to believe that business failures are
538 See, e.g., Richard Sandomir, Tyson’s Bankruptcy Is a Lesson in Ways to Squander a
Fortune, N.Y. TIMES, August 5, 2003, at A1 (discussing how boxing legend Mike Tyson
managed to squander nearly $400 million made over the course of his career); Carol M.
Cropper, The Basinger Bankruptcy Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, January 1, 1995, at A1 (describing
the circumstances of the bankruptcy of the celebrity Kim Basinger).
539 See DAVID H. DONALD, LINCOLN 47-65 (1995) (chronicling how Abraham Lincoln
became destitute from business losses in 1833); PAUL CRENSHAW, REMBRANDT’S
BANKRUPTCY (2006) (exploring Rembrandt’s life, his 1656 bankruptcy, and the
subsequent auctioning of his assets in 1657 and 1658). Bankruptcy filings by popular
music entertainers include those of Toni Braxton (twice), Jerry Lee Lewis, Willie Nelson,
Wayne Newton, Cyndi Lauper, Tom Petty, Marvin Gaye, Natalie Cole, MC Hammer,
Meatloaf, Tammy Wynette, and Michael Jackson. Walt Disney put his first movie
company (called “Laugh-O-Gram”) into bankruptcy, and Henry Ford filed for bankruptcy
two years before he founded the Ford Motor Company. TV and movie personalities who
have filed for bankruptcy include Debbie Reynolds, Gary Coleman, Zsa Zsa Gabor, Burt
Reynolds, Ed McMahon, and Larry King. Athletes who have filed for bankruptcy
include Jose Conseco and Johnny Unitas. Oscar Wilde was forced into bankruptcy in
1895. Henry Heinz, the condiment manufacturer, lost his business to bankruptcy in 1875,
but succeeded later. Each of the first four candy companies that Milton Hershey founded
failed—only the fifth was a success.
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increasingly the product of malfeasance. Nevertheless, in characterizing the forces at
work behind these filings, some commentators have again embraced the perception that
business bankruptcy, like individual bankruptcy, is fundamentally an endogenous
event.540 It is certainly true, of course, that some business failures fit this paradigm.
Enron, Worldcom, and several other spectacular examples come to mind.541 The far
more typical business bankruptcy case, however, is considerably less colorful or culpable.
In general, firms that file for bankruptcy relief do so for any number of relatively
mundane reasons. The local hardware store may have found itself unable to compete
with the newly opened branch of a national chain. A large clothing retailer may have
miscalculated prevailing fashion trends. A real estate investment firm may have suffered
the unexpected loss of an anchor tenant at its major property. A storied airline with an
illustrious history may have been unable to compete effectively in the rough and tumble
of a deregulated market.542 In varying degrees, these examples reflect the unfortunate
consequences of the assumption of, for the most part, purely ordinary business risks.
It is a truism that business is risky, especially for small enterprises. Indeed, when
the sobering likelihood of failure is taken into account, it is difficult to accept as fully
rational the average entrepreneurial decision to start a firm. Yet it would hardly be in our
540 See supra note 509.
541 See ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS, supra note 182 (discussing examples of spectacular
corporate disasters); SWARTZ & WATKINS, POWER FAILURE; supra note 182; Simon
Romero & Alex Berenson, Worldcom Says It Hid Expenses, Inflating Cash Flow $3.8
Billion, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2002, at A1.
542 See, e.g., Stanley Ziemba, Pan Am Fails, Closes Aviation Chapter; Another Step
Toward Big 3 Domination, CHICAGO TRIB., December 5, 1991, at Business 1; Agis
Salpukas, Eastern Airlines Is Shutting Down and Plans to Liquidate Its Assets, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 19, 1991, at A1.
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collective best interests to discourage this from occurring. In the aggregate, the
inevitable companion of desirable commercial activity (like the shadow to the body) is
the risk of insolvency and, inevitably for some debtors, bankruptcy.
With this overall perspective in mind, the relevant question at hand becomes: are
the debt-forgiveness mechanisms that bankruptcy law prescribes beneficial responses to
the debt-forgiveness problems of insolvency?543 In order to answer that question, the
discussion returns to consideration of our standards of equity, efficiency, and entitlement.
EQUITY AND DISCHARGE RELIEF
From an historical perspective, exhuming the equitable norms underlying
bankruptcy law’s debt-forgiveness mechanisms is a somewhat complex affair.
Consistent with the principle of restraint—that equity follows the law—if a creditor
possessed a legal right to collect from his debtor, an English court of equity sitting during
the sixteenth century might well have thought it an odd notion to intervene and release
him from all liability simply because he was insolvent. After all, existing debt-collection
procedures were not particularly solicitous of defaulting obligors and included such
devices as imprisonment for debt.544
543 If so, we can then proceed subsequently to address how to resolve the inevitable
conflict between these mechanisms and bankruptcy law’s debt-collection devices.
544 See Jay Cohen, The History of Imprisonment for Debt and Its Relation to the
Development of Discharge in Bankruptcy, 3 J. LEG. HIST. 153, 154-55 (1982) (discussing
the practice of imprisonment for debt); see also MANN, REPUBLIC, supra note 371 at 78-
108 (discussing imprisonment for debt during the early years of the republic); MULDREW,
ECONOMY, supra note 371 at 274-98 (discussing debt-collection practices and procedures
in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England, including imprisonment for debt);
COLEMAN, DEBTORS, supra note 258 at 9 (describing imprisonment for debt in colonial
America); NOEL, HISTORY, supra note 258 at 70-72 (describing conditions in American
debtors’ prisons). As fans of Charles Dickens may recall, imprisonment for debt was the
fate of Mr. Micawber, who was taken off to the local goal for unpaid debts. See
CHARLES DICKENS, DAVID COPPERFIELD 152-54 (Bantam 1981). Mr. Micawber’s
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On the other hand, during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the Privy
Council (consisting of certain senior advisers, ministers, and other officials of the Crown)
entertained and granted a number of the petitions of insolvent debtors seeking relief from
creditors on equitable grounds—essentially administering bankruptcy remedies, including
those that effectively discharged the debtor’s obligations. Perhaps over time Chancery
(the central English court of equity in London) or some other tribunal spun off from the
Privy Council (each of the major centralized English courts evolved in this way) might
have developed fixed doctrines and regularized procedures that allowed for different
forms of discharge relief for insolvent obligors, perhaps on the equitable theory that the
repeated attempt to collect debts from a hopelessly insolvent debtor effectively
constituted an inequitable form of waste or amounted to a form of unjust penalty. After
1623, however, Parliament set the essential development of bankruptcy protocols
(including discharge relief) on a decidedly different path. In particular, it enacted a
succession of bankruptcy statutes that gradually evolved to include a formal discharge
mechanism, but as the result of legislative experimentation rather than the incremental
processes of the common law or discretionary proceedings in Chancery or the Privy
experience mirrored that of Dickens’s own father, John, who was imprisoned for debt in
Marshalsea Prison in London. See PETER AKROYD, DICKENS 69 (1990). The character
Little Dorrit was also born there. See CHARLES DICKENS, LITTLE DORRIT (Wordsworth
1992).
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Council.545 Still, existing equitable procedures had a clear impact on the development of
the early law and, as noted, bankruptcy law today remains a branch of equity.546
Most historical accounts locate the first English bankruptcy procedure in a statute
enacted in 1542 during the reign of Henry VIII,547 but significant aspects of bankruptcy
practice can be traced to earlier experiences in the context of handling the estates of
insolvent decedents. As Richard Helmholz has explained, the records of the English
ecclesiastical courts exercising probate jurisdiction “show conclusively that English
bankruptcy practice has antecedents and perhaps even roots in the canon law
administered by the Church courts.”548 On reflection, this seems unsurprising. Many
individuals at the time died with unsettled claims and debts, and often enough (which is
to say very often indeed), a decedent’s debts to others exceeded the value of the
decedent’s tangible property together with his collectible claims against third persons,
leaving an insolvent estate.549 Naturally, the ecclesiastical courts and their successors in
545 See Charles J. Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 325, 329-44 (1991) [hereinafter Tabb, Historical Evolution] (discussing the
history of English bankruptcy laws); see also W. J. JONES, THE FOUNDATIONS OF ENGLISH
BANKRUPTCY: STATUTES & COMMISSIONS IN THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD 18 (Am. Phil.
Soc. 1979) [hereinafter JONES, FOUNDATIONS].
546 See supra note 440.
547 Bankruptcy Act, 1542, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 4 (Eng.); see, e.g., Tabb, Historical
Evolution, supra note 545 at 329 (citing to this statute); see also EDWARD CHRISTIAN,
THE ORIGIN, PROGRESS AND PRESENT PRACTICE OF THE BANKRUPT LAW 1 n.2 (Clarke &
Sons 1812) (discussing this statute); Levinthal, Early History, supra note 398 at 15
(same).
548 Helmholz, Bankruptcy and Probate, supra note 460 at 416.
549 See MULDREW, ECONOMY, supra note 371 at 30-34, 173-95, 272-312 (discussing rise
in inventories taken upon the death of an individual, and high rates of indebtedness,
default, and insolvency).
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equity developed mechanisms to administer the collection of the decedent’s claims
against others, liquidate the decedent’s property, and apportion the estate in partial
satisfaction of the insolvent decedent’s debts. Characteristically, they did so using the
tools of equity.550
In the case of a deceased individual, of course, there was generally no need to
provide an in personam discharge to liberate his human capital from the burden of
oppressive obligations. Mortem obit omnia debita—death already accomplished that.551
Living flesh-and-blood individuals, however, were a different story. The Bankruptcy Act
of 1542 provided no statutory discharge mechanism; it was exclusively a debt-collection
device designed to assist in collecting debts from insolvent merchants.552 Nonetheless,
on numerous occasions in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the Privy
Council intervened and essentially coerced equitable bankruptcy relief from frequently
unwilling creditors for the benefit of petitioning insolvent debtors.553
550 See, e.g., Helmholz, Bankruptcy and Probate, supra note 460. The defects in
ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the administration of decedents’ estates, and the role of the
English courts of equity assuming a broader and more comprehensive jurisdiction, is
discussed in 1 STORY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 444 at 551-55.
551 But see CHANCELLOR, DEVIL, supra note 261 at 163-64 (offering the example of a
creditor’s refusal in 1865 to release the corpse of a debtor before his debts were paid).
552 See supra note 547.
553 JONES, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 545 at 36. For a detailed discussion of the many
interventions of the Privy Council on behalf of distressed debtors, see Israel Treiman,
Majority Control in Compositions: Its Historical Origins and Development, 24 VA. L.
REV. 507 (1938) [hereinafter Treiman, Majority Control]; see also David A. Smith, The
Error of Young Cyrus: The Bill of Conformity and Jacobean Kingship, 1603-24, 28 L. &
HIST. REV. 307 (2010) (discussing the “bill of conformity” filed by some insolvent
debtors to achieve coerced compositions); Ian P.H. Duffy, English Bankrupts 1571-1861,
24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 283, 284 (1980) [hereinafter Duffy, English Bankrupts]
(discussing interventions by the Privy Council).
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In some of these cases, relief from the Privy Council arrived in the form of a grant
of additional time for the repayment of debts,554 sometimes in the form of a stay of
proceedings,555 and sometimes for periods that could range from six months to “5 or 6
yeeres,” depending on the debtor’s particular circumstances.556 In some of these matters
the Council “seems to have acted without paying any attention at all to the wishes or the
interests of the creditors.”557 Instead, the Council’s decision turned on whether the debtor
deserved “pitie or commiseracion” owing to unfortunate circumstances.558
In other cases, the Council sought to persuade the creditors to enter into
consensual composition arrangements with their debtors, in which they would agree to
reduce their debts in exchange for fractional recoveries from the debtor’s assets—in
essence, permitting the debtor to pay what he could from his property in exchange for a
release of liabilities.559 In order to accomplish a composition, the Council would appoint
554 Treiman, Majority Control, supra note 553 at 512.
555 See 9 JOHN R. DASENT, ACTS OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF ENGLAND 81 (1890)
[hereinafter DASENT, PRIVY COUNCIL].
556 See, e.g., 10 DASENT, PRIVY COUNCIL, supra note 555 at 315; id. Vol. 11, at 171, 427;
id. Vol. 13, at 420; id. Vol. 14, at 251; id. Vol. 22, at 252; id. Vol. 26, at 118-119.
557 Treiman, Majority Control, supra note 553 at 512-13.
558 9 DASENT, PRIVY COUNCIL, supra note 555 at 224-25 (staying proceedings of debtor
who suffered “grete losses . . . and other casualties in the seas . . . [so that] by tyme and
by sale of suche merchaundizes as he hath remayninge . . . he maketh accompt to be able
to make full satisfaction of his said debtes”); see also id. Vol. 14, at 269-70 (releasing a
“poore man . . . so as thereby he might provyde the sooner to paie his credytors by suche
porcions as they should finde his habilitie hable to afforde.”); id. Vol. 10, at 93 (debtor
“alleageth to have been verie uncharitablye handeled by his said creditours”); id. Vol. 13,
at 420 (debtor “had verie hard penyworthes of his creditours”). Among other things, the
Privy Council appears to have been motivated by the biblical proscription: “Do not
withhold good from those who deserve it, when it is in your power to act.” PROVERBS
3:27 (King James).
559 Treiman, Majority Control, supra note 553 at 513.
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special commissioners (sometimes with particular political or ecclesiastical clout)560 and
then instruct these commissioners to gather the particular debtor’s creditors together and
persuade them to agree to a consensual arrangement.561 If the commissioners were
unsuccessful because of one or two “obstinate creditors,” the Council “would order these
dissenting creditors either to submit an explanation of their conduct in writing, or to
appear in person before the Council Board.”562 Creditors who continued to “persist in
their extremitie” were committed to prison.563
Unsurprisingly, creditors incarcerated in this fashion were not pleased, and some
brought suit challenging the practice.564 As a consequence, the Council switched its
method to indirect pressure on dissenting creditors, directing the commissioners to
instruct holdouts that, if they did not play ball, they could expect no relief in the future
from the strictness of the law in her majesty’s courts if ever they should find themselves
560 Id.
561 See, e.g., 12 DASENT, PRIVY COUNCIL, supra note 555 at 40-41) (directing appointed
commissioner “to call before him the creditours of [the debtor] and to deale with them to
forbeare to sue or moleste him in anie sorte for anie suche debte as is due unto them from
him until the retorne of [another man who was indebteded to the debtor] . . . and if the
said creditours shall refuse to forbeare to moleste him then to comaunde them to appere
before their Lordships”).
562 Treiman, Majority Control, supra note 553 at 513-14 (internal quotations omitted).
563 See, e.g., 17 DASENT, PRIVY COUNCIL, supra note 555 at 6-7 (writing to the
commissioner that if he “shall perceive that [the creditor] continue his wonted
perversenes, and not shewe him selfe redy to be conformable to your direction and
accomplish the contentes of the said order, to comitt him to prison, ther to remaine until
he shall shewe th’effectes of more obedience and charitye, and consente to the
enlargement of the said Androwes in such sorte as hath been heretofore by your
endeavors and travel accorded and agreed upon.”); id. Vol. 18, at 91 (“if Rawlyns shall
refuse, then shall they commit him to prisone”).
564 See id. Vol. 19, at 441; id. Vol. 20, at 41; see also Miller v. Seare, 2 Bl. 1141; 96 Eng.
Rep. 673 (K.B. 1773) (determining that an action would lie against the commissioners of
a bankrupt debtor if the commissioners exceeded or abused their authority conferred by
bankruptcy statute).
279
in need of it.565 On the whole, the efforts of the Council to persuade obstinate creditors to
agree to compositions approved by a majority appear to have been largely successful.566
Unfortunately, debtors sometimes abused the procedure, such as by making false
allegations solely to hinder their creditors,567 and other defects arose in its application.568
In 1623, Parliament effectively ended the practice of coercive Privy Council intervention
by channeling insolvency matters to the statutorily prescribed bankruptcy procedures.
Specifically, Parliament enacted a provision that mandated that any debtor who brought a
petition against his creditors (e.g., a petition in the Privy Council) seeking a stay of debt-
collection activity or a coerced composition would be deemed to be a bankrupt and thus
forced into a formal bankruptcy proceeding subject to the potentially harsh penalties of
the bankruptcy law.569 This effectively overrode the Council’s ability to intercede.570
Parliament subsequently enacted the first statutory discharge mechanism as part
of the Bankruptcy Act of 1705, “enabling an honest and cooperative bankrupt to obtain a
discharge from prebankruptcy debts.”571 Specifically, the statute provided in relevant
565 22 DASENT, PRIVY COUNCIL, supra note 555 at 384 (instructing the commissioners to
inform dissenting creditors that if “anye informacion shalbe broughte at anye tyme
against them upon aye penall statute or other advantage taken againste them in any matter
by stricktness of law, they are to looke for noe favor but all extreamitie that maie be used,
in respecte of the contempt they shewe to her Majestie’s authoritie and harde disposicion
to theis poor men oppressed by their rigorous dealing.”).
566 Treiman, Majority Control, supra note 553 at 514.
567 Id. at 515.
568 Id. at 516 (such as the ability of a relatively large number of creditors holding small
claims to effectively outvote a relatively small number of creditors holding large claims).
569 Bankruptcy Act, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 19, § 2 (Eng.).
570 JONES, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 545 at 40; see also id. at 37 (cautioning that “one
must be careful not to exaggerate the extent of Privy Council activity”).
571 Tabb, Historical Evolution, supra note 545 at 33; see Bankruptcy Act, 1705, 4 & 5
Anne, c. 17, § 7 (Eng.).
280
part that “all and every person and persons so becoming bankrupt . . . who shall . . . in all
things conform . . . shall be discharged from all debts by him, her, or thems due and
owing at the time that he, she, or they did become bankrupt.”572 Although other
provisions of the 1705 bankruptcy statute treated certain fraudulent bankrupts extremely
harshly,573 the discharge provision introduced a formal statutory mechanism for the
release of the honest but unfortunate debtor from the grip of oppressive indebtedness and
thus marked a milestone in the Anglo-American history of bankruptcy law.
From the perspective of equity’s traditional role as a vehicle to ameliorate
deficiencies in legal processes and outcomes, as well as its particular impulse to avoid
circumstances giving rise to equitable waste, the discharge of insolvent debtors as a
means to address the debt-forgiveness problems of insolvency—namely, an insolvent
debtor’s incentives to engage in wasteful delay, deception, and inappropriate risk taking,
and the waste associated with stagnating and overburdened assets, including an insolvent
debtor’s human capital—is consistent with equity’s traditional normative values and is
likewise beneficial as applied in the bankruptcy context. As William Blackstone
acknowledged in his Commentaries, “at present the laws of bankruptcy are considered as
laws calculated for the benefit of trade, and founded on the principles of humanity as well
as justice: and to that end they confer some privileges, not only on the creditors, but also
572 Id.
573 For example, capital punishment was introduced for bankrupts who failed to surrender
to the bankruptcy commissioners, refused to be examined, fraudulently disposed of
goods, or concealed or embezzled property worth more than twenty pounds or withheld
books. Bankruptcy Act, 1705, 4 & 5 Anne, c. 17, §§ 1, 18 (Eng.) (providing that such
debtors could be made to “suffer as a felon, without benefit of clergy”—meaning in the
terminology of the time put to death); see also Bankruptcy Act, 1706, 6 Anne, c. 22, § 1
(Eng.); Bankruptcy Act, 1732, 5 Geo. 2, c. 30, § 1 (Eng.).
281
on the debtor or bankrupt himself.”574 In addition, the “humanity” of the discharge was
also consistent with important religious values and other norms of sociability. As one
scholar has emphasized,
[t]here was also much religious stress on forgiveness in this period. The
Lord’s Prayer, as it was translated in the King James and earlier versions,
is the most obvious example, with its emphasis on forgiveness rather than
giving:
Give us this day our daily bread.
And forgive us our debts,
as we forgive our debtors.
And lead us not into temptation.
These lines express the morality of credit in early modern England
because they assume that transgression was inevitable and needed
forgiveness. Forgiveness was a universal virtue because anyone might
eventually fall into straightened circumstances and might need to be
forgiven . . . .575
Of course, it is important to avoid both over- and understating the significance of
the statutory discharge introduced in the 1705 Bankruptcy Act, as well as its value. It is
certainly true, as one commentator has stated, that “the discharge provision . . . ranks
ahead in importance of all others in Anglo-American bankruptcy history.”576 At the same
time, the details of appropriate discharge relief would take centuries to work out and
remain controversial to this day. Key issues include the reconciliation of discharge relief
with the needs and realities of a credit-based economy and also other equitable limits on
its scope to avoid misuse. Consistent with commercial reality, discharge relief ultimately
cannot be of the freely-available “deliverance” variety—a complete washing away of all
574 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 453 at 471.
575 MULDREW, ECONOMY, supra note 371 at 306.
576 McCoid, Discharge, supra note 76 at 164.
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liabilities regardless of their nature and regardless of the debtor’s circumstances. Doing
so would itself be inequitable because such expansive relief would go too far. The
question arises: from an equitable perspective, where should the line be drawn in order to
maintain the overall beneficial nature of discharge relief?
Although it may be fair as a general matter for insolvent individuals to receive
some form of in personam release of indebtedness, the concept is tempered in equity by
the reciprocity maxim that “he who seeks equity must do equity.” For example, a debtor
who has committed fraud or some other form of serious malfeasance should not be able
to look to bankruptcy law to escape his resulting liabilities.577 The reciprocity maxim
animates the principle that bankruptcy relief is for the “honest but unfortunate debtor,”
and consistent with this concept, discharge relief is only available to release the debtor
from the kinds of liabilities that honest but unfortunate debtors typically incur (e.g., those
that that do not demonstrate that the debtor is, in fact, a dishonest schemer). Thus, an
insolvent debtor may be discharged from liabilities arising from his negligence, but not
those arising from his intentional fraud.578
Further consistent with the paradigm of the honest but unfortunate debtor, it is
also generally equitable for individual debtors to receive some form of in rem release
with respect to a modest amount of their property necessary for their support and to
577 JONES, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 545 at 9 (explaining that “there was always a sense
that some distinction should be made between debtors whose inability was due to
misfortune or chance, and those whose circumstances were the consequence of
dishonesty, fraud, or reckless behavior.”).
578 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (prescribing exceptions to discharge
in bankruptcy, including those arising from certain kinds of intentional fraud); Kelly v.
Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 47-48 (1986) (holding that the Bankruptcy Code does not affect
or discharge criminal restitution obligations).
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enable them to start anew following bankruptcy.579 Accordingly, bankruptcy law permits
debtors to claim certain assets as exempt from the reach of creditors, such as certain
categories of personal items and possibly a homestead allotment.580 It would be
fundamentally inequitable, however, for an insolvent debtor to file for bankruptcy relief
in order to receive a discharge of his debts, but retain a vast wealth free from the claims
of unpaid creditors—once again, “he who seeks equity must do equity.”
Significantly, these general principles apply not only to insolvent individuals, but
also insolvent business enterprises. It bears emphasis that the particular debtors
benefiting from the earliest forms of discharge relief—whether dispensed by the Privy
Council or later under the Bankruptcy Act of 1705—were characteristically merchant
579 The first U.S. bankruptcy statute enacted in 1800 permitted the debtor to retain
“necessary wearing apparel, and the necessary wearing apparel of his wife and children,
and necessary beds and bedding of such bankrupt,” to receive an additional percentage of
the value of his estate based on creditor recoveries, and, during the course of the
proceeding, “such allowance out of the bankruptcy estate . . . as [the commissioners] in
their opinion may [think] requisite for the necessary support of the said bankrupt and his
family.” Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, §§ 5, 34, 35, 53, 2 Stat. 19 (1800) (repealed
1803); see William J. Woodward, Jr., Exemptions, Opting Out, and Bankruptcy Reform,
43 Ohio State L.J. 335, 336-42 (1982) (discussing the history of exemption laws); see
also Bankruptcy Act, 1732, 5 Geo. 2, c. 30 (Eng.). With amendments, the Act of 1732
was the English bankruptcy law in effect at the time of the ratification of the U.S.
Constitution and the passage of the first U.S. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, and it served in
many respects as the model for the Act of 1800. See Tabb, History, supra note 458 at 12
(discussing how the 1732 English statute served as a model for the Act of 1800). The Act
of 1732 exempted from surrender to the commissioners the bankrupt’s “necessary
Wearing Apparel and the necessary Wearing Apparel of the Wife and Children of such
Bankrupt,” and exempted from the reach of creditors on future execution “the Tools of
Trade, the necessary Household Goods and Furniture, and necessary Wearing Apparel of
such Bankrupt and his Wife and Children.” Bankruptcy Act, 1732, 5 Geo. 2, c. 30, § 9
(Eng.). It likewise provided for certain allowances out of the debtor’s estate under certain
conditions. See id. §§ 7, 8.
580 See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing that an individual debtor may
exempt various items from property, and providing that exempt property is not liable for
most kinds of debts); see supra notes 16, 73 (discussing bankruptcy law’s exemption
provisions).
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traders. Because business activities at the time were conducted in the usual course by
individuals or partnerships, and because bankruptcy was available only for merchant
traders under the Act of 1705,581 it follows that the discharge provision in the Act was
essentially an entrepreneurial rehabilitation measure. As Lord Hardwicke explained in
Ex Parte Burton, the Act of 1705 “was made in consideration of two long wars which
had been very detrimental to traders, and rendered them incapable of paying their
creditors.”582 More specifically, although when first introduced in Parliament the 1705
Act was largely “in response to the notorious frauds of Thomas Pitkyn in 1704” and was
initially “intended simply to increase the penalties for dishonesty,” subsequently “several
M.P.s, influenced by the heavy losses recently sustained by traders as a result of the
French wars and storms, proposed additional clauses for the relief of honest
bankrupts.”583
In this way, merchant traders were able to obtain release from their commercial
liabilities in order to reorganize their affairs and continue in business. In the same way
today, insolvent firms that are worth salvaging are able to obtain a discharge from their
581 See Tabb, Historical Evolution, supra note 545 at 334-35 (noting that only traders
were eligible for bankruptcy under the early bankruptcy statutes). In England, the
restriction limiting bankruptcy to traders was not eliminated until 1861. See Bankruptcy
Act of 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 134, §§ 69, 86 (Eng.); 15 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 98 (A. Goodhart & H. Hanbury eds. 1965); Duffy, English
Bankrupts, supra note 553 at 291-92. In the United States, the first Bankruptcy Act—the
Act of 1800—was also limited to merchant traders. See Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19,
§ 1, 2 Stat. 19 (1800) (repealed 1803). Bankruptcy relief was made available to other
debtors in the second U.S. bankruptcy statute enacted in 1841. See Bankruptcy Act of
1841, ch. 9, § 1, 5 Stat. 440 (1841) (repealed 1843).
582 26 Eng. Rep. 163; 1 Atk. 155 (Ch. 1744).
583 Duffy, English Bankrupts, supra note 553 at 286 (citing Daniel Defoe, Remarks on the
Bill to Prevent Frauds Committed by Bankrupts 1-7, 19-20 (1706)). For a discussion of
the Pitkin affair, see Emily Kadens, The Last Bankrupt Hanged: Balancing Incentives in
the Development of Bankruptcy Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1255-60 (2010).
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unmanageable obligations.584 Although firms today may not claim property as “exempt”
in the same manner as individuals, they may effectively do so by retaining the assets they
need to operate in exchange for agreeing to distribute to creditors a recovery greater than
the assets’ liquidation value.585 Any excess indebtedness beyond the amount the debtor
agrees to pay under a Chapter 11 plan is discharged.586
Consistent with the equitable notion that discharge relief is available only to
honest but unfortunate debtors, and in order to further prevent bankruptcy from becoming
an attractive nuisance, the debt-forgiveness remedies of bankruptcy law are properly
limited in other respects. For example, there is a periodicity restriction—a debtor who
obtains bankruptcy relief is not eligible for additional relief for a number of years.587
Collectively these limitations flesh out the equitable parameters of the debt-forgiveness
aspects of bankruptcy law in order to avoid problems that would diminish their
desirability.
Finally, the debt-forgiveness aspects of bankruptcy law address the problem of
stagnating physical assets by making available certain mechanisms (applicable to
584 See supra at 38-40; supra notes 72, 76, 85, 87-89 (discussing the discharge available
to insolvent firms in Chapter 11 cases).
585 See supra notes 72, 241, infra note 752.
586 See supra at 38-40; supra note 73.
587 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(8) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing that a debtor may
not receive a discharge in a Chapter 7 case if the debtor “has been granted a discharge
under this section, [or] under section 1141 . . . in a case commenced within 8 years before
the date of the filing of the petition”), 1328(f) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing that, in a
Chapter 13 case, the court may not grant a discharge “if the debtor has received a
discharge . . . in a case filed under chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this title during the 4-year
period preceding the date of the order for relief under this chapter, or . . . in a case filed
under chapter 13 of this title during the 2-year period preceding the date of such order”).
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individuals and firms) that strip a variety of property free of encumbrances, such as liens
and the like, so these assets may be more readily deployed in some fashion, including in
the hands of a purchaser.588 This is consistent with the rule that “[t]he usual course of
enforcing a lien in equity, if not discharged, is by the sale of the property to which it is
attached.”589
As the foregoing illustrates, already embedded in the equitable concept of a
discharge is some consideration of the interests of creditors. The interests of creditors are
addressed further below as part of the discussion of how best to reconcile the various
debt-collection, debt-forgiveness, and debt-adjustment remedies of bankruptcy law. For
present purposes, it is sufficient to observe that, from an equitable perspective,
bankruptcy law’s debt-forgiveness solutions to the debt-forgiveness problems of
insolvency are generally beneficial because they are fully consistent with its evolved
principles of forgiveness and the avoidance of waste. At the same time, the debt-
forgiveness features of bankruptcy law cannot be unlimited; they are necessarily
tempered to avoid unfairness.
THE EFFICIENCY OF DISCHARGE RELIEF
The debt-forgiveness features of bankruptcy law may be equitable, but are they
also efficient? Once again, the answer is generally yes. The problems that the debt-
588 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(f) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing for the sale of property free
and clear of interests), 522(f) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing for the avoidance of
certain liens that impair certain claimed exemptions), 1123(a)(5)(D) (2000 & Supp. 2006)
(providing that a Chapter 11 plan may provide for the sale of the debtor’s assets free of
any lien), 1129(b)(2)(A)(II) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing protections for secured
creditors in Chapter 11 cases where assets encumbered by the secured creditors’ liens are
to be sold under the terms of a confirmed plan).
589 2 STORY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 444 at 560.
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forgiveness features of bankruptcy law address—namely, an insolvent debtor’s incentives
to engage in wasteful delay, deception, and inappropriate risk taking, and the waste
associated with stagnating and overburdened assets—are themselves inefficient drags on
our larger economic system. Accordingly, the debt-forgiveness mechanisms of
bankruptcy law are beneficial from an efficiency standpoint so long as the costs
associated with these mechanisms are not greater than the costs they avoid, and it seems
fairly clear that, in this sense, the benefits outweigh the burdens.
As noted, the various limits that bankruptcy law imposes on the availability and
scope of its debt-forgiveness devices—for example, denying discharge relief in the case
of willful malfeasance and requiring the surrender of non-exempt assets to be used
toward the payment of claims—are designed specifically to reduce the potential costs of
these devices in two major ways: (1) by avoiding having bankruptcy become a shelter
for fraud and other serious types of wrongdoing, and (2) by avoiding the potentially
negative ex ante effects associated with an overly generous bankruptcy procedure. On
balance, these kinds of limits appear to be at least adequate to ensure that the benefits of
bankruptcy law’s discharge remedies outweigh their costs. That, of course, does not
mean that bankruptcy law’s discharge devices cannot be improved. It simply means that,
from an efficiency standpoint, they appear to generate beneficial results when compared
to outcomes under non-bankruptcy regimes.
In the case of insolvent individuals, the key virtue of bankruptcy’s discharge
mechanism is that, by restoring the debtor to a solvent state, it effectively normalizes the
debtor’s incentives to make productive use of his assets, including his human capital, by
neutralizing his insolvency-related incentives to engage in wasteful activities. As a
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result, the formerly insolvent debtor will have the same general incentives that solvent
individuals typically have to make use of their assets productively. In other words, the
debt-forgiveness aspects of bankruptcy law restore productive autonomy. As argued
earlier, the mere fact that an individual has become insolvent and in need of bankruptcy
relief does not mean that he is necessarily a hopeless case unable in the future to make
appropriate decisions regarding the use of his human capital—at least in the sense of
being no better or worse on average than others who sometimes exercise questionable
judgment yet remain solvent.590 In any event, even if it did mean that he is hopeless in
some sense, an individual cannot be separated from his human capital and, absent some
kind of medical impairment, will remain in control of it even though he may be
susceptible to bouts of poor judgment.591
In the case of insolvent firms that are worth salvaging (i.e., those suffering from
financial distress as opposed to economic distress), the key virtue of bankruptcy law’s
discharge mechanism is essentially the same.592 By restoring the firm to a solvent state,
the discharge effectively normalizes the incentives of the various stakeholders to make
the most productive use of the firm’s assets by neutralizing their incentives to engage in
wasteful activities. As with individuals, the mere fact that a firm has become insolvent
and in need of bankruptcy relief does not mean that the firm cannot succeed in the future.
Many firms that have gone through bankruptcy—including most domestic air carriers,
many domestic car manufacturers, numerous energy companies, and many large
590 See supra at 260-64.
591 See supra notes 44, 68.
592 See supra notes 1, 136, 141, 372 (discussing the concepts of “financial distress” and
“economic distress”).
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retailers—have prospered afterwards. Although a firm suffering from economic distress
should be liquidated in some fashion, financial distress is by definition remediable by
deleveraging the debtor’s balance sheet, which is what discharge relief accomplishes.
One criticism of the discharge is that granting it on an ex post basis (i.e., after
creditors have extended credit) creates an ex ante incentive for debtors to take
improvident risks on the theory that they are effectively shielded from the consequences
of their risk taking.593 This criticism assumes, however, that debtors generally take into
account the effects of a discharge when they engage in ex ante risk taking and, more
important, that they are not only aware of, but are encouraged by, the possibility of
obtaining bankruptcy relief. This seems quite implausible. Even though bankruptcy
relief includes the possibility of a discharge, the prospect of a bankruptcy filing is not
encouraging. On the contrary, it is by design essentially discouraging. Bankruptcy is no
picnic and debtors do not happily flock to its particular brand of humiliation.594
As discussed previously, individuals tend systematically to discount the
possibility of future financial failure.595 In fact, they tend to do so to such a great extent
593 See supra notes 20, 69, 261, 396 (discussing such kinds of possible incentive effects);
see also Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law, supra note 264 (arguing that debtors are in a better
position to assess the risks of their financial activities than creditors, and that there should
be a presumption of non-dischargeability of obligations).
594 As noted above, debtors in Chapter 7 cases must surrender their non-exempt assets for
liquidation, and debtors in Chapter 13 cases must commit to extended repayment plans.
See supra at 258. In addition to the burdens these procedures impose, under the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq., the filing of a bankruptcy petition leaves
a black mark on the debtor’s credit report for an extended period: typically ten years
from the date of the filing of a Chapter 7 petition and seven years from the date of the
filing of a petition under Chapter 13. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681c (setting general limit
of ten years).
595 See supra note 404 (discussing optimism bias).
290
that they generally tend to avoid thinking about it at all in any great depth unless and until
they have to. For this additional reason, it seems unlikely individuals would
systematically contemplate and calculate the availability of bankruptcy relief as a means
to lessen the consequences of their risk taking, and thus take more risks than they would
otherwise take if completely unaware of the possibility of a bankruptcy discharge. For
example, when debtors borrow to purchase a home, they are often nervous about their
ability to repay the loan, in part because mortgage loans typically involve significant
sums, potentially uncertain values, and a commitment to make payments for a long
period of time. It seems implausible, however, that these borrowers would somehow feel
less nervous, and thus more prone to taking risks, by contemplating deliberatively that
bankruptcy awaits them if things go badly. If anything, this would seem only likely to
increase their anxiety because bankruptcy is not typically viewed as an attractive option,
thus lessening their willingness to take risks. On the whole, it seems more realistic to
assume that, because the prospect of bankruptcy is generally discouraging rather than
encouraging, and people tend not to think about it at all in any great detail unless and
until they have to, the availability of a discharge has little or no effect on ex ante risk
taking in the typical case—financially healthy individuals will take roughly the same
financial risks with or without the possibility that they might someday have a need for
discharge relief.596 Things might be different, of course, if the law made bankruptcy
much more attractive than it does—in other words, the law made it generously
encouraging rather than discouraging. But that is not the case.
596 This is perhaps best illustrated by how strenuously debtors seek to avoid bankruptcy
even when they would clearly benefit from it. See supra at 269-70.
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Another criticism of the discharge is that, by reducing the value of the creditors’
collection rights, it increases the cost of capital overall.597 Though perhaps true to some
extent, the real question is whether the benefits of the discharge outweigh its plausible
impact on borrowing costs. Among other things, if a discharge were not available, it is
doubtful that, in most instances, a creditor’s right to pursue an insolvent debtor endlessly
would result in much of a meaningful recovery. As noted, insolvent debtors who file for
bankruptcy typically lack much of an ability to satisfy any significant portion of their
debts.598 This helps explain why, following default, most creditors routinely write off
accounts with insolvent individuals within a relatively short period of time and take no
further action to collect.599
In contrast, granting a discharge has numerous benefits. As discussed above, it
has the effect of restoring productive autonomy.600 Further, by helping place the cost of
lending on creditors, it may have the effect of discouraging improvident lending
practices.601 In addition, Thomas Jackson has argued that granting discharge relief may
597 See supra at 70-71.
598 See supra at 270; infra note 718.
599 Cf. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, INDUSTRY SOUND PRACTICES FOR
FINANCIAL AND ACCOUNTING CONTROLS AT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 11 (2006)
(“Charge-offs are usually required within 90 to 180 days unless documentation is
provided as to why the account should not be charged-off (i.e., why the balance is still
collectible).”).
600 See supra at 287-88.
601 Improvident lending includes indiscriminate lending with little or no regard to the
riskiness of the loan, and lending otherwise unaccompanied by the exercise of credit
judgment. An example of lending without the exercise of credit judgment is most
lending in the credit card industry. See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE,
supra note 200 at 246-47 (describing extensions of credit in the credit card industry, and
explaining “[m]ost issuers, it appears, make little or no attempt to review the borrower’s
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be beneficial for other reasons, including that it may (1) help individual debtors
compensate for the risks associated with their inability to diversify the investment of their
human capital (i.e., although debtors may well understand that the loss of employment
can be devastating financially, they typically are unable to take on multiple jobs at the
same time to hedge against this possible loss); (2) lessen dependence on other forms of
public assistance that may be less efficient, such as welfare benefits; and (3) help
safeguard the interests of those who may rely on the debtor for their support and well-
being.602 Although there is certainly more that could be said about the efficiency of
bankruptcy law’s existing system of discharge relief, and likewise further specific
investigations that bear on the general analysis offered here, the available evidence
suggests that traditional discharge remedies are essentially beneficial from an efficiency
standpoint when compared to outcomes under non-bankruptcy law.603
financial status after the initial issuance of the credit card except to raise the limit. The
result is an absence of the credit judgment we have traditionally associated with lending,
an almost complete disconnection between the circumstances of the borrower and the
granting of the credit at the time it is granted.”). While highly profitable for creditors,
this type of lending, with its high interest rates and charges, can easily spiral out of
control and spell financial disaster for debtors. See id. at 111-40. Improvident lending is
not limited to the consumer finance arena. See id. at 211 (describing bank failures during
the twelve-year period between 1980 and 1992 from bad commercial and consumer
loans); see also JACKSON, LOGIC, supra note 8 at 229-30, 249 (creditors may be better
able than debtors to assess the risks of extending credit, and discharge relief gives them
an incentive to conduct such assessments).
602 See id. at 225-52.
603 See also Easterbrook, Corporate Bankruptcy, supra note 146 (arguing that business
reorganizations in Chapter 11 are generally efficient because of their ability to preserve
values at costs that are comparable to other types of major corporate transactions).
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DISCHARGE AND ENTITLEMENT
Regardless of whether discharge relief is efficient, however, it may still be worth
having as a matter of right to protect important interests. Chief among these is an
individual debtor’s interest in his own human capital and, to a lesser extent, the property
he possesses. As suggested, these interests are not the same. An individual’s interest in
his own human capital is much more important than his interest in whatever property he
may possess and, unsurprisingly, these interests are protected in different ways.
Nonetheless, an individual’s interest in both his own human capital and at least some
quantum of the property he possesses is sufficiently important that discharge relief has
long sought to protect them as part of the larger bundle of rights that protect these
interests generally.
To begin with, an individual’s interest in his own human capital is protected by a
strong inalienability rule. Although a person may be incarcerated if duly convicted of a
felony, and thus in that way deprived of the free use of his own human capital, he may
not be imprisoned as a means to compel him to work or collect an ordinary civil debt, he
may not be sold into slavery, and he may not himself voluntarily alienate his human
capital through indentured servitude or peonage.604
604 See Clyatt v. U.S., 197 U.S. 207, 215 (1907) (defining “peonage” as “a status or
condition of compulsory service, based on indebtedness” and observing that it is
proscribed by the Thirteenth Amendment); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911)
(stating that the Thirteenth Amendment is “a charter of universal civil freedom for all
persons” and that its purpose is “to render impossible any state of bondage; to make labor
free, by prohibiting that control by which the personal service of one man is disposed of
or coerced for another’s benefit, which is the essence of involuntary servitude”); The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (the Thirteenth Amendment is “an absolute
declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United
States”). During the colonial era, imprisonment for debt was a common debt-collection
practice borrowed from England. See COLEMAN, DEBTORS, supra note 258 at 9 (noting
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An individual’s interest in his own human capital is also protected by a strong
property right. For example, anyone who wishes to make use of an individual’s human
capital by hiring his labor must pay him for his services in a transaction in which the
individual has the right to decline if he does not like the price. In addition, minimum
wage laws and the like assist the individual by ensuring that he does not rent out his
human capital too cheaply.605
Finally, an individual’s interest in his own human capital is protected by a variety
of liability rules. For example, an employer’s failure to pay an employee his wages for
the labor he has performed is, in most instances, a crime.606 Laborers likewise benefit
from a variety of legal rules designed to compensate them for harm to their ability to
work or otherwise engage in productive activities. These include a variety of tort laws
the common practice of imprisonment for debt during the colonial era). The first State to
abolish the practice was Kentucky, which did so by statute in 1821. By the time
Massachusetts abolished the practice in 1857 (other than in cases of fraud), most other
states had done so. In 1839, Congress abolished the practice in federal courts sitting in
states that had also abandoned it. See WARREN, BANKRUPTCY HISTORY, supra note 370
at 52 (discussing the gradual abolition of the practice of imprisonment for debt in the
United States during the nineteenth century); Edwards v. Kearzy, 96 U.S. 595, 602
(1877) (observing that imprisonment for debt “is a relic of ancient barbarism” and that
“[e]very right-minded man must rejoice when such a blot is removed from the statute-
book”). As noted previously, Warren estimates that, at late as 1833, 75,000 persons
annually were sent to jail for debt in the United States. See id. at 52 n.8; supra note 371.
605 See, e.g., David Neumark & William Wascher, Minimum Wage and Low-Wage
Workers: How Well Does Reality Match the Rhetoric, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1296 (2008)
(discussing state and federal minimum-wage laws, beginning with the first such law
enacted in Massachusetts in 1912).
606 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 109-110 (1989) (discussing state
wage-collection statutes and citing laws from 48 states). Under New York law, the ten
largest shareholders of a closely-held corporation may be liable for unpaid wages and
benefits. See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 630 (McKinney 1983).
295
and tort-law substitutes designed to compensate individuals for injury to their productive
capabilities.607
Regardless of whether these rules are individually efficient, they reflect
exceptionally strong societal preferences for certain distributional arrangements that
express cherished principles of distributional justice. Although one might imagine a
society that did not place such emphasis on individual autonomy, integrity, and self-
direction, our society plainly valorizes these fundamental concepts. Unsurprisingly, they
find both expression and protection in a variety of legal structures, including the
discharge features of bankruptcy law.
Regardless of exactly how or when normative values enter into the picture in the
creation, application, and evaluation of rules of law, they inevitably do. In this regard,
we ask a lot of law because our collective understanding of its normative underpinnings
is bound to be varied and disputed in many respects. It may well be that, in our
individual conceptions of justice and morality, something is either just and moral or it is
not, but justice and morality are themselves highly contested concepts. In the meantime,
problems need to be addressed. Law is always something of an uncomfortable
compromise between (1) our disparate ideals of justice and morality, including concepts
607 See, e.g., Price V. Fishback & Shawn E. Kantor, The Adoption of Workers’
Compensation in the United States, 1900-1930, 41 J.L. & ECON. 305 (1998) (discussing
the origins and rationales of workers’ compensation statutes in the United States); see
also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS xxx (1999) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, TORTS] (arguing that,
“at its core,” tort law fundamentally protects an individual’s “right to use and dispose of
his own labor and the further right to exclude others from the use of their property” and is
based on the “bedrock proposition” that “each person owns his or her own body and has
the exclusive right to use his or her talents as he or she sees fit,” which concept he refers
to as the “basic autonomy assumption” of tort law); see generally JULES L. COLEMAN,
RISKS AND WRONGS 326 (1992) (discussing how rights protect particularly important
legitimate interests).
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of distributive justice, and (2) our demands for expediency in addressing the
circumstances of the here and now.
This is not to say that law is hopelessly indeterminate any more than it is to say
that we are. As Scott Shapiro suggests, law includes a process that actually settles things
in the form of rules that permit us to engage in social planning,608 even if only
temporarily. But because law derives from us in such fundamental and closely connected
ways, it cannot be purely instrumental unless we are prepared to say that we are purely
instrumental. And if we are not purely instrumental (and, by extension, neither is the
law), then both we and it must have some inherent value and it becomes impossible to
conclude that there are a great many among us who are inherently worthless as a matter
of legal status. Perhaps more than any other, bankruptcy law expresses that value in the
way in which it preserves and protects through its discharge mechanisms an individual’s
interest in his own human capital.
In any event, as a matter of law and legal tradition, an individual debtor’s interest
in his own human capital is clearly of exceptional importance. The remaining questions
become (1) how the problems of debt-forgiveness impact this interest, and (2) how this
interest is affected by bankruptcy law’s solutions to these debt-forgiveness problems. To
the extent an individual debtor’s interest in his human capital is impaired by a particular
problem of insolvency, and a particular solution has the effect of lessening that
impairment, then the solution would be beneficial from the perspective of entitlement
analysis.
608See SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 37 at 177.
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An insolvent debtor’s incentives to engage in wasteful debt-collection avoidance
activities, such as delay, deception, and inappropriate risk taking, and likewise the
productivity-depressant factor that arises from an insolvent debtor having to devote the
fruits of his labor exclusively to the satisfaction of his debts, all burden a debtor’s human
capital in ways that fundamentally impair its value, and likewise by extension the
principles of individual autonomy, integrity, and self-direction that underlie the rights
that protect it. Conversely, the bankruptcy remedy of discharge obviously relieves this
burden and promotes these principles. Accordingly, from the perspective of entitlement
analysis, the remedy is beneficial as compared to outcomes under non-bankruptcy law
systems.
In contrast with an individual debtor’s interest in his own human capital, the
debtor’s interest in the property he possesses is not typically protected by an
inalienability rule. In general, property is freely transferrable from one person to the
next, but there are important exceptions. For example, some forms of property
essentially “substitute” for an individual debtor’s human capital and the debtor’s interest
in these forms may also be protected by an inalienability rule. In particular, if the debtor
is disabled or of an advanced age, he may not be able to rely on his own labor to maintain
self-supporting autonomy. In such circumstances, the debtor’s interest in such things as
pension benefits, insurance or other disability payments, and social security income may
constitute the equivalent of wages the debtor might otherwise have earned through the
employment of his human capital. At law, the debtor’s interests in these types of
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property are characteristically placed beyond the reach of creditors.609 In addition, a
debtor may also have an interest in certain other items of personal property that creditors
may not reach under the laws of the particular state where the debtor lives.610
Although as a general matter an individual debtor’s interest in much of the
property he may possess may not be protected by inalienability rules (other than the
special kinds of property noted above), his interest typically will be protected by a variety
of property rules. As a consequence, anyone wishing to purchase an item must pay him
an agreed price. Similarly, the debtor’s interest in the property he possesses will
characteristically be protected by a variety of liability rules. If someone damages his
property, they may be called upon to account for the harm they have caused and
compensate the debtor as a result.611
These interests in physical assets are less protected than an individual debtor’s
interest in his own human capital. Nonetheless they are valuable, and the relevant
questions become (1) how the problems of debt-forgiveness impact the debtor’s interest,
and (2) how this interest is affected by bankruptcy law’s solutions to these problems. An
609 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 407, 1383 (1983 & Supp. 1991) (exempting social security
benefits from seizure by creditors); 38 U.S.C. § 3101 (1979 & Supp. 1991) (exempting
veterans’ benefits from seizure by creditors); Patricia E. Dilley, Hidden in Plain View:
The Pension Shield Against Creditors, 74 IND. L.J. 355 (1999) (discussing laws that
protect pension rights from creditors); Daniel L. Skoler, The Status and Protection of
Social Security Benefits in Bankruptcy Cases, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 585 (1993) (discussing
the protected status of social security benefits).
610 See, e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
603, 630-32 (2006) (discussing and citing examples of state exemption laws); see also
Lea Shepard, Creditors’ Contempt, 2011 BRIG. YOUNG U.L. REV. 1509, 1536-38
[hereinafter Shepard, Contempt] (discussing various state exemption laws and the ways in
which creditors may coerce debtors into forfeiting their exemption rights).
611 See, e.g., EPSTEIN, TORTS, supra note 607 at xxx (observing as one of the functions of
tort law how it protects a person’s interest in property).
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insolvent debtor’s incentives to engage in wasteful debt-collection avoidance activities,
such as delay, deception, and inappropriate risk taking, and likewise the productivity-
depressant factor, all burden a debtor’s interest in the property he possesses by
undermining his decision making over their productive use and by otherwise impairing
their value. Conversely, the bankruptcy remedy of discharge obviously relieves this
burden, as does bankruptcy law’s exemption provisions.612 Accordingly, from the
perspective of entitlement analysis, these remedies are also beneficial. Similarly,
bankruptcy law’s procedures for disencumbering stagnating physical assets are also
beneficial because they also empower productive decision making over the use of these
assets.
There is, of course, more to be said about this analysis. In particular, bankruptcy
law could do more to improve the value of the debtor’s entitlements, including expanding
its discharge and exemption mechanisms. But as discussed above and taken up again
below in the context of examining further how best to prioritize bankruptcy law’s various
debt-collection, debt-forgiveness, and debt-adjustment functions, enhancing the value of
612 See supra at 32-34 (discussing bankruptcy law’s discharge and exemption features);
see also Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320 (2005) (explaining that funds in an individual
retirement account are exempt under the Bankruptcy Code and considering the purposes
of the exemption provisions); Lawrence R. Ahern, III, Homestead and Other Exemptions
under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act: An Observation
on ‘Asset Protection’ After 2005, 13 AM. BANKR. L. REV. 585 (2005) (discussing
exemptions in bankruptcy). Although non-bankruptcy law typically supplies significant
exemption protections, the recognition and enforcement of the debtor’s exemption rights
outside of bankruptcy is often difficult and sporadic, owing in part to the debtor’s
frequent unfamiliarity with his rights and relevant debt-collection procedures (in
comparison with creditors’ general familiarity with the relevant rights and procedures).
As a result, exemption rights are frequently overlooked or forfeited inadvertently. See
Shepard, Contempt, supra note 610 at 1522-38 (discussing this problem). By
streamlining the process and enforcing more systematically the debtor’s exemption
rights, bankruptcy law offers greater protection for these rights.
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the debtor’s entitlements is not the only consideration. At this point, however, it is
sufficient to conclude that, from an entitlement perspective, the outcomes that bankruptcy
law’s debt-forgiveness mechanisms generate are generally beneficial in resolving the
debt-forgiveness problems of insolvency as compared to outcomes generated under non-
bankruptcy systems.
RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS OF DEBT ADJUSTMENT
Of the various problems of insolvency discussed in Chapter 2, two fall into the
debt-adjustment category: (1) claims mediation, and (2) payment discrimination. These
are each properly debt-adjustment problems that correlate to debt-adjustment solutions
because, once the bailout-insurance and automatic-debt-cancellation options are
eliminated, these problems are subject to amelioration only through the application of
some form of debt-adjustment mechanism.613 Correspondingly, they are not debt-
collection problems because they cannot be resolved by resort to devices designed simply
to enforce the creditors’ claims in some way.614 Likewise, they are not problems of debt
forgiveness because, so long as bankruptcy law recognizes some kind of claims-
enforcement procedure, they cannot be resolved by debt-forgiveness solutions, such as by
granting the debtor a discharge or permitting the debtor to retain exempt assets. Having
613 See supra at 206, 208 (discussing the bailout-insurance and automatic-debt-
cancellation options). Although the automatic-debt-cancellation option would resolve the
problem of claims mediation, as noted previously, it would not resolve the payment
discrimination problem. In fact, it would likely make it worse as creditors scrambled for
payment before the remedy took effect. See supra at 209.
614 So long as the debtor cannot pay all claims in full, tinkering with the debt-collection
devices that creditors may use to enforce their claims in bankruptcy will not eliminate the
need for some kind of mechanism to prioritize the various conflicting obligations and will
not address the problem of the debtor’s preferred payment to some creditors over others.
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categorized these two problems, the question becomes: how might bankruptcy law
beneficially resolve them?
As discussed in Chapter 2, the problem of claims mediation arises in the
insolvency context by virtue of the debtor’s inability to satisfy all claims in full. Some
mechanism is needed to sort and prioritize the conflicting obligations. One far-fetched
solution might be that, after a debtor files for bankruptcy, claims would be prioritized on
a first-come, first-served basis—we may call this the “race-to-the-courthouse” approach.
Specifically, the first creditor to appear in bankruptcy court and file a claim would be
paid first, the second creditor to appear and file would be paid second, and so on, until
there was nothing left to distribute. This kind of approach, however, would only
exacerbate the other problems of insolvency. For example, creditors anxious about
recovering their claims would be even more likely to attempt to rip the debtor apart at the
first sign of trouble, generating even more frenetic and precipitous debt-collection free-
for-alls. They would also likely increase their monitoring activities so that, once the
debtor files for bankruptcy, they could rush to be the first to file a claim, even though
their increased monitoring activity to detect the debtor’s bankruptcy filing would likely
simply add to the problem of deadweight monitoring expenses. This solution would also
be susceptible to unfair manipulation in the form of the debtor tipping off a favored
creditor, perhaps in exchange for some form of illicit accommodation. A less drastic
solution to the problem of claims mediation would be for the law to adopt a general
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share-and-share-alike approach, with provision for some form of priority for certain kinds
of debts, such as secured claims. This is what bankruptcy law actually does.615
As also discussed in Chapter 2, insolvent debtors tend to engage in payment
discrimination in the form of paying some creditors ahead of others before they file for
bankruptcy. One potential solution to this problem might be that, once a debtor began
defaulting on his obligations, the payment of all claims would be banned until the debtor
commenced a bankruptcy case. Thereafter, payments to creditors would be made only in
accordance with bankruptcy law’s distribution scheme—we may call this the “no-
payment-til-Christmas” option. This kind of solution, however, would also be
unworkable. Among other things, triggering the ban based on the debtor’s default would
often be too drastic. Many debtors default and then recover without any real need for
bankruptcy relief. In addition, without the ability to pay at least some claims following
default, such as those of employees and necessary suppliers in the case of firms, the
debtor would not be able to continue to operate. Further, the insolvent debtor would
likely take advantage of the ban to gamble with his assets and engage in other wasteful
activities. A less drastic solution to the problem of payment discrimination would be to
discourage insolvent debtors and their creditors from engaging in preferential payment
transactions by providing that, if the debtor files for bankruptcy within a certain amount
of time after they are made, the payments may be recovered and redistributed through the
bankruptcy process. Once again, that is the remedy that bankruptcy law actually
615 See supra notes 75, 247, 258 (discussing the debt-adjustment mechanisms of
bankruptcy law that provide for general equality of distribution with exceptions for
certain categories of claims).
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supplies.616 The question becomes: are these remedies to the problems of claims
mediation and payment discrimination beneficial?
Once more, the answer would seem to be yes—at least from the perspective of
resolving the debt-adjustment problems of insolvency. At the same time, of course,
adjusting the collection rights of creditors must inevitably conflict with the creditor’s
individual collection interests, but we may postpone considering that conflict until after
we have examined as a threshold matter whether bankruptcy law’s debt-adjustment
devices are desirable in their own right in response to the debt-adjustment problems of
insolvency. It turns out that they are, but in order to help understand why, we may again
revisit the evaluative standards of equity, efficiency, and entitlement.
EQUITY AND RELATIVE PAYMENT PRIORITIES
The use of equitable devices to resolve the debt-adjustment problems of claims
mediation and payment discrimination is consistent with the principle of restraint that
“equity follows the law.”617 Like the other problems of insolvency, they arise in
connection with the operation of ordinary debt-collection mechanisms for which those
mechanisms lack an adequate response because it would be counterproductive to burden
them with special procedures needed only in the insolvency setting. In addition, the
problems of claims mediation and payment discrimination readily correlate to several
specific equity norms, including the equality norm that “equality is equity.”618
616 See supra notes 158, 260 (discussing the debt-adjustment mechanisms of bankruptcy
law that provide for the avoidance and recovery of preferential payments).
617 See supra at 234-35 (discussing the principle of restraint).
618 See supra at 235-36 (discussing the norm of “equality is equity”).
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Historically, equity recognized a particular form of distributional relief in cases
involving the administration of insolvent estates premised on the filing of a creditors’ bill
seeking the equal treatment of claims. As Story explained, “[b]ills of this sort have been
allowed upon the mere principle that, as executors and administrators have vast powers of
preference at law, Courts of Equity ought, upon the principle that equality is equity, to
interpose upon the application of any creditor by such bill to secure a distribution of the
assets without preference to any one or more creditors.”619 In other words, the bill was
designed specifically to prevent unwarranted preferences—the unjustified payment of
some creditors ahead of others. But regardless of equity’s preference for “equality is
equity,” the practice in early ecclesiastical administration was not one of strict equality.
Moreover, although the early English bankruptcy statutes championed the equality norm,
bankruptcy procedure, like procedure in administration generally, eventually evolved to
incorporate a system of priorities that reflects a richer and more complex equitable
landscape.
As Richard Helmholz has explained, although the general distributional rule in the
ecclesiastic administration of insolvent decedents’ estates in early modern England was
that of “a ratable award, called a rata bonorum or defalctio,” the reality was that “not all
creditors were invariably treated alike.”620 For example, the expenses of administering
the estate, including the court’s fees, the costs of calling together the creditors, the
making of an inventory of the debtor’s assets, and the decedent’s funeral expenses, were
619 1 STORY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 444 at 558.
620 Helmholz, Bankruptcy and Probate, supra note 460 at 425-26.
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typically paid ahead of other claims.621 Similarly, debts evidenced by a writing of some
kind were preferred over those without any such “specialty.”622 Moreover, sometimes the
widow’s portion of her husband’s estate would be given priority over the claims of
creditors, and sometimes the claim of the decedent’s landlord would be preferred.623
In its own way, equity also came to recognize the general priority of liens and
other charges upon collateral. Applying the principle of restraint, Story observed that
“[i]n the course of the administration of assets[,] Courts of Equity follow the same rules
in regard to legal assets which are adopted by Courts of Law” and thus “recognize and
enforce all antecedent liens, claims, and charges, in rem, existing upon the property,
according to their priorities, whether these charges are of a legal or of an equitable nature,
and whether the assets are legal or equitable.”624 On the other hand, with respect to
“equitable assets” not liable for specific charges, a court of equity would “regard all debts
in conscience as equal . . . and equally entitled to be paid; and here they follow their own
favorite maxim that equality is equity” such that “if the funds fall short, all the creditors
are required to abate in proportion.”625 Significantly, courts applied this concept in the
621 See id. at 424.
622 See id. at 423. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, most debts were informal in
nature and not memorialized in a written instrument of some kind, such as a formal bond
or a note. Debts that were reduced to a formal writing were referred to as debts with
“specialty.” See MULDREW, ECONOMY, supra note 371 at 60-69, 95-98, 103-19
(explaining the informal nature of most credit arrangements during the early modern
period and the limited use of “specialty” to evidence indebtedness in the case of formal
instruments such as sealed bonds and the like).
623 Helmholz, Bankruptcy and Probate, supra note 460 at 424-25.
624 1 STORY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 444 at 567.
625 Id.
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administration context to reconcile the competing claims of the creditors, but not as
between the creditors and legatees. For the latter kind of interest, equity came to
recognize a variant of the principle of absolute priority: creditors were entitled to be paid
ahead of legatees because, consistent with the just/generous principle, the creditors “have
a priority right to satisfaction out of the assets” that must in equity come ahead of the
interests of the beneficiaries of the debtor’s largesse.626
Adopting a robust version of the equality maxim, the first English bankruptcy
statute, the Act of 1542, provided for a pro-rata distribution to creditors “rate and rate
alike according to the quantity of their debts.”627 Likewise, the second bankruptcy
statute, the Act of 1570, also provided for a similar “rate and rate alike” distributional
scheme.628 In 1584, Edward Coke elaborated the equitable nature of this distributional
scheme in The Case of Bankrupts, in which a debtor transferred goods to a particular
preferred creditor at the expense of others after bankruptcy had ensued.629 The court
observed that the purpose of the Act of 1570 “was to relieve the creditors of the bankrupt
equally, and that there should be an equal and rateable proportion observed in the
626 Id. at 99; see also id. at 568 (“After some struggle in the Courts of Equity upon this
point, it is at length settled, that although as between themselves in regard to equitable
assets the creditors are all equal, and are to share in proportion pari passu, yet as between
them and legatees the creditors are entitled to a priority and preference, and that legatees
are to take nothing until the debts are all paid.”). As noted, this adheres to the
just/generous principle. See id. at 569 (“The ground of this decision is that it is the duty
of every man to be just before he is generous; and no one can well doubt the moral
obligation of every man to provide for the payment all his debts.”); see also supra notes
119 (discussing the concept of absolute priority in bankruptcy), 460 (discussing the
just/generous principle).
627 Bankruptcy Act, 1542, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 4, § 1 (Eng.).
628 Bankruptcy Act, 1570, 13 Eliz. c. 7, § 2 (Eng.).
629 76 Eng. Rep. 458; 2 Co. Rep. 25a (K.B. 1584).
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distribution of the bankrupt’s goods against the creditors.”630 Applying this concept, the
court invalidated the preferential transfer as against the bankrupt’s commissioners, by
reason that if a bankrupt debtor “may prefer one (who per adventure hath least need) and
defeat and defraud many other poor men of their true debts, it would be unequal and
unconscionable, and a great defect in the law . . . if the law should credit him to make
distribution of his goods to whom he pleased . . . .”631
It is worth emphasizing that the court objected to the preferential transfer on the
theory that, if the debtor could favor one creditor over others in this way, this might well
result in the payment of a creditor who “hath least need.” As we shall see, this concept is
important, but also must be placed in context. The Bankruptcy Act of 1570 applied only
to merchant traders during an era in which, as discussed previously, credit markets were
fragile and the failure of one merchant could easily spell disaster for others who
depended on the debtor’s payment of his debts in order to pay their own.632 The major
creditors of a merchant trader were likely to be other merchant traders, and generally all
of relatively equal “need” for some recovery to help settle their own accounts,
particularly during times of economic constraint when bankruptcy was especially likely
to occur. In this sense, the Act of 1570 supplied a debt-collection mechanism to help
keep other merchants afloat, and the concept of “need” as used in The Case of Bankrupts
should be understood in context to refer to the interests of other merchants seeking to
avoid their own failure.
630 Id., 76 Eng. Rep. at 465-467; 2 Co. Rep. at 26a.
631 Id. at 473.
632 See supra at 218-19; supra notes 409, 411, 458, 581.
308
The subsequent English Bankruptcy Act of 1623 took this concept much further,
providing that, even though a creditor held a debt evidenced by some form of specialty or
secured by some kind of attachment or lien, the creditor was entitled to no greater share
of the debtor’s estate than others unless the creditor had actually executed on his lien or
attachment prior to the debtor’s bankruptcy and thereby obtained possession of his
collateral.633 Likewise, through the Act’s “reputed ownership clause,” the law also
avoided non-possessory interests in the debtor’s property, such as unexecuted liens and
the like, permitting the commissioners to sell the property free and clear of such
interests.634 Once again, the basic idea embedded in these provisions was to maintain
equality of distribution.635 Subsequently, in Worseley v. Demattos, William Mansfield
633 Bankruptcy Act, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 19, § 8 (Eng.).
634 Id. § 10. A “non-possessory” interest refers to the interest of a creditor that does not
have possession of the relevant collateral, such as an unexecuted attachment or judgment
lien.
635 Hostility toward non-possessory interests appeared with a particular vengeance in the
decision of the Court of Star Chamber in Twyne’s Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809; 3 Co. Rep.
80b (Star Ch. 1601), in which a creditor sought a judgment to enforce a claim against the
assets of the debtor, Pierce, that has been transferred previously to another creditor,
Twyne. Prior to the suit, Twyne and Pierce had negotiated an absolute deed of gift to
Twyne of all of Pierce’s goods in return for the cancellation of Pierce’s indebtedness to
Twyne. Under their arrangement, however, Twyne permitted Pierce to retain possession
of his sheep, which represented the majority of Pierce’s assets. Pierce sold some of the
sheep, sheared some, and marked them with his mark, suggesting to the world that he still
owned them notwithstanding the deed of gift. When the sheriff tried to seize the sheep to
satisfy Pierce’s obligation to the first creditor, Twyne (through his agents) resisted the
sheriff by force, claiming he actually owned the sheep. The court concluded that
Twyne’s deed of gift constituted a fraud because, among other things, Pierce retained
possession of the sheep even though the deed of gift imposed no conditions qualifying
Twyne’s ostensible ownership. In other words, Twyne was convicted of criminal fraud
essentially because the transaction documents did not evidence the actual arrangement
between the parties. See id., 76 Eng. Rep. at 810-813; 3 Co. Rep. at 81a-81b. Notably,
because Pierce actually owed a debt to Twyne, Pierce’s transfer of his sheep in
satisfaction of the debt was not technically a fraudulent conveyance, but rather a
preference. See Clark, Duties, supra note 336 at 513 (making this point). What appeared
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applied this principle in voiding the transfer of an insolvent debtor’s assets made with
intent to defeat equality of distribution, reasoning in particular that the debtor’s
preferential intent would be inferred where (1) the transaction took place close in time to
a traditional “act of bankruptcy” (such as defaulting and then fleeing to parts unknown),
and (2) the transaction encumbered most or all of the debtor’s assets in favor of a
particular creditor.636
In the United States, the same concept of equality of distribution, and likewise a
profound distaste for preferences, found their way into the Bankruptcy Act of 1800,
which like its English predecessors also applied only to merchant traders.637 First, the
Act provided expressly for the recovery and redistribution of the debtor’s preferential
payments made after the debtor became bankrupt.638 Second, it provided generally for
ratable distribution to creditors based on the same concept of equality of distribution that
animated the earlier English statutes, also ignoring non-possessory interests in the
debtor’s property arising from unexecuted attachments and the like.639 On the other
to particularly offend the court was the secret nature of the transaction. The court
commented that those seeking to undertake a transaction of the kind must make it “in a
public manner, and before the neighbours, and not in private, for secrecy is a mark of
fraud.” Twyne’s Case, 76 Eng. Rep. at 814; 3 Co. Rep. at 80a.
636 96 Eng. Rep. 1160, 1168; 2 Keny. 218, 238 (K.B. 1758); see also id. 96 Eng. Rep. at
1165; 2 Keny. at 231 (“There is a great difference between conveyances of all, and of
part only[.] [T]he latter may be public, fair and honest . . . but a conveyance of all must
be either fraudulent . . . or an immediate bankruptcy must ensue.”).
637 See supra note 581.
638 See Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, § 28, 2 Stat. 19 (1800) (repealed 1803).
639 See id., §§ 27, 29, 30, 31 (section 27 followed the “reputed ownership” clause of the
prior English statute; section 29 provided for an interim dividend to be paid to creditors
“in proportion to their several and respective debts”; section 30 provided for a second and
final distribution, also on a pro rata basis; and section 31 directed pro rata distribution
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hand, the Act of 1800 also set up three types of priorities permitting certain claims to be
paid ahead of others, specifically (1) debts owed to the United States,640 (2) debts owed to
any of the States,641 and (3) the administrative expenses of the commissioners who
supervised the process and the assignees responsible for liquidating the debtor’s
property.642 In addition, the Act provided for the non-impairment of liens on the debtor’s
real estate or chattels if those liens were “existing at the date of this act.”643 Liens
arising after the date of enactment, however, were disregarded and the claims of creditors
holding them were subject to the provisions directing pro rata distributions—an early
form of “lien-stripping.”644
Subsequent U.S. Bankruptcy Acts expanded the preference provisions, and
likewise added to the list of priorities, creating further exceptions to the concept of strict
without regard to attachments and the like); see Harrison v. Sterry, 9 U.S. 289, 301
(1809) (explaining that “[b]y the bankrupt law of the United States, [the attaching
creditors’] priority, as to the funds of the bankrupt, is lost” and that [t]hey can only claim
a dividend with other creditors”); Harmon v. Jamesson, 11 F. Cas. 555 (C.C.D.C. 1806)
(No. 6079) (avoiding attachment lien).
640 See id., § 62. The Supreme Court has explained the rationale for this priority in the
following terms: “[t]he importance of securing adequate revenues to discharge national
obligations justifies the extraordinary priority accorded federal tax liens . . . .” United
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 734 (1979); see Barbara K. Morgan, Should
the Sovereign Be Paid First? A Comparative International Analysis of the Priority for
Tax Claims, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 461, 463 (2000) (discussing the priority for debts owed
to the United States in the Act of 1800).
641 See Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, § 62, 2 Stat. 19 (1800) (repealed 1803).
642 See id., §§ 29, 46.
643 See id., § 63. This savings provision was added apparently out of concern for the Fifth
Amendment’s prohibition against uncompensated retrospective takings of property.
644 See supra note 639. The concept of “lien-stripping” in bankruptcy refers to the
removal of liens from collateral. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1991) (discussing
lien-stripping in bankruptcy).
311
equality of distribution. In particular, the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 provided expansively
for the avoidance of any conveyance made by a debtor “in contemplation of bankruptcy
and for the purpose of giving any creditor . . . any preference or priority over the general
creditors,” and stipulated further that any debtor making “such unlawful preferences . . .
shall receive no discharge under the provisions of this act.”645 Transactions occurring
more than two months prior to the debtor’s bankruptcy, however, were excluded from
avoidance, so long as the recipient had no notice of any act of bankruptcy by the debtor
or knowledge of the debtor’s intention to “take the benefit of this act.”646 Thus, for the
first time, the Act of 1841 expressly extended the avoidance of preferences to the pre-
bankruptcy period—previously the bankruptcy statutes had only expressly avoided post-
bankruptcy preferences.
In turn, the Act of 1841 expanded the list of debts entitled to priority ahead of
other claims to include (1) obligations owed to the United States, (2) debts owed to
sureties of the debtor entitled to priority under other federal laws, and (3) wages due to
persons who performed services for the debtor within six months prior to the debtor’s
bankruptcy, not exceeding twenty-five dollars in amount.647 Notably, the Act was not
645 Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 2, 5 Stat. 440 (1841) (repealed 1843); see also 32 &
33 Vict., ch. 71, § 92 (1869) (Eng.) (providing that any payment by a debtor to a creditor
within three months of the bankruptcy “with a view of giving such creditor a preference
over the other creditors shall . . . be . . . void as against the trustee of the bankrupt”).
646 Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 2, 5 Stat. 440 (1841) (repealed 1843).
647 See id., § 5; see also C. Scott Pryor, The Missing Piece of the Puzzle: Perspectives on
the Wage Priority in Bankruptcy, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 121, 127-28 (2008)
(discussing the addition of the wage priority in the Act of 1841). The priority for debts
owed to sureties was apparently to induce sureties to continue to bond various individuals
liable to the United States for such things as the collection and remittance of customs
duties and the like.
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limited to merchant traders, but applied more broadly to all kinds of individual debtors
(with some limitations).648 In addition, the Act introduced for the first time the idea of a
debtor’s voluntary bankruptcy filing—bankruptcy relief previously had been available
only on an involuntary basis through the filing of a petition by creditors.649 Given the
expanded class of debtors eligible for bankruptcy relief, and the prospect that a debtor
might file for bankruptcy to avoid certain kinds of obligations, the Act’s distribution
scheme could no longer focus exclusively on equality of distribution to facilitate loss-
sharing among the commercial creditors of merchant traders. Instead, it established a
new tradition of distinguishing and prioritizing different kinds of claims based on
differences in the circumstances of the claimants—in essence, their relative “needs.”
The current Bankruptcy Code likewise provides for the avoidance and recovery of
preferential payments.650 It also prescribes a list of priorities that is considerably broader
than under the Act of 1841.651 In particular, the Code provides for the priority treatment
of (1) most secured claims, (2) unpaid domestic support obligations, (3) administrative
648 See supra note 581. Some persons were excluded from becoming a bankrupt under
the Act, such as those who owed debts as a result of defalcation as a public officer. See
Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 1, 5 Stat. 440 (1841) (repealed 1843).
649 See id.
650 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing for the avoidance of certain
preferential payments), 550 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing for the recovery of
preferential payments); Central Virginia Comm. College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 372
(2006) (discussing the history of the preference provisions of the Bankruptcy Code);
Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 154-55 (1991) (discussing preference law); Begier
v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 58 (1990) (same); see also Countryman, Concept, supra note 258 at
714-25 (discussing the history of preference law); see also Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (as
amended by the Chandler Act), ch. 575, § 60(b), 52 Stat. 870 (providing for the
avoidance of preferential payments).
651 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 507 (2000 & Supp. 2006), 725 (2000 & Supp. 2006), 726
(2000 & Supp. 2006).
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expenses, (4) certain wage and benefit claims, (5) certain contribution obligations to
employee benefit plans, (6) certain claims of farmers against debtors operating certain
storage or processing facilities, (7) certain consumer deposit claims, (8) certain taxes, (9)
certain capital-maintenance claims asserted by federal depository institutions, and (10)
certain tort claims arising from the debtor’s operation of a motor vehicle or other vessel
while intoxicated.652 The larger question becomes: from the perspective of equity, are
these priority and preference-avoidance provisions beneficial?
Consistent with the principle of restraint—equity follows the law—the Code’s
statutory priority for secured claims aligns with the general practice in traditional
equitable administration that equity will respect the priority of enforceable liens and other
encumbrances. As Story explained, the equality norm comes into play only after legally
valid liens and other encumbrances are accounted for, at least with respect to specifically
encumbered collateral.653 The basic idea is that legally enforceable liens and other
encumbrances have a usefulness outside the insolvency setting, and legal regulation
modifying their priority in bankruptcy, or eliminating them altogether, is a step equity
should take only with the greatest reluctance and caution.654
On the issue of administrative expenses, equity has long recognized the priority
for the necessary costs incurred in running an administration, and bankruptcy law has
652 See id. §§ 507, 725, 726.
653 See supra at 305-06; see also Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. v. Kheel, 369 F.2d
845, 848 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J., concurring) (“Equality among creditors who have
lawfully bargained for different treatment is not equity but its opposite”).
654 See also JACKSON, LOGIC, supra note 8 at 59-65 (arguing that eliminating a secured
creditor’s priority in bankruptcy would create a variety of undesirable problems).
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likewise long adopted the same concept.655 If a priority for administrative expenses were
not recognized, no one would be willing to take on the assignment of gathering,
liquidating, and distributing the debtor’s assets.656 The payment of administrative
expenses is thus a necessary and unavoidable cost of the process itself.
Turning to the priority for certain governmental claims, it is the sovereign that
makes the process of bankruptcy relief available, and thus facilitates the benefits that
bankruptcy law confers. In this light, it would hardly seem inequitable for the sovereign
to prefer the payment of its own claims in order to enjoy at least some of the benefits of
its own procedures. This at least helps explain the priority of tax obligations, and
likewise the priority for certain capital-maintenance claims asserted by a federal
depository institution that the government typically insures.657
With respect to the Code’s other basic priorities, as suggested above, each
involves a type of claim that carries with it a certain kind of “need” in the general sense
of vulnerability to financial loss as recognized implicitly in The Case of Bankrupts. As
noted, the impetus behind the Act of 1570 that the court construed in that case was the
protection of the collective interests of the creditors of bankrupt merchant traders, who
were typically merchant traders themselves. During the sixteenth century, hard currency
was scarce, and there were no established banks of the kind that exist today, no insurance
companies, and no other similar financial institutions that could stabilize and facilitate
655 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 503 (2000 & Supp. 2006), 507 (2000 & Supp. 2006).
656 See, e.g., JACKSON, LOGIC, supra note 8 at 153 (observing that the “rationale for
administrative expense priority derives from the realities of getting suppliers (and others)
to deal with an insolvent enterprise”).
657 See also supra note 640 (discussing the government’s priority for obligations owed to
it).
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credit or the diversification of commercial risk. Creditors large and small were
vulnerable in relatively equal measure. Failure was also common and distributed among
all classes of society.658 In such a setting, strict equality of distribution among a
relatively homogeneous group of creditors was understandably thought to be equitable in
response to their collective “need.”
In contrast, with the expansion of eligibility for bankruptcy relief in the Act of
1841, together with the emergence of a vastly different economic system, the concept of
“need” in the sense of vulnerability to financial loss had a fundamentally different
meaning. Many financial creditors of the era could and did take advantage of a variety of
commercial strategies designed to diversify their risk taking. By definition, however,
many other creditors could not, including employees who are characteristically unable to
hedge against their employer’s potential default by simultaneously pursuing multiple
forms of employment. Hence the priority for wage claims in the 1841 Act and likewise
the current Code.
Even more so than laborers, dependents holding claims for unpaid domestic
support obligations are also particularly vulnerable: they cannot readily diversify their
exposure to the risk of the debtor’s nonpayment. Just as the ecclesiastic procedure in
administration proceedings might prefer the claim of the widow to her settlement from
the decedent’s estate over the claims of unpaid creditors, bankruptcy law today grants
priority for unpaid alimony and child support liabilities. The remaining basic Code
priorities recited above are of a similar character.
658 See supra note 411.
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A particular priority worth special mention is the one for certain tort claims
arising from the debtor’s operation of a motor vehicle or other vessel while intoxicated.
The priority bears special comment not only for its inclusion on the statutory list, but also
because it highlights the absence from the same list of tort liabilities generally. From an
equitable perspective, the explanation lies in the concept of “marshalling” and the
availability of insurance as an alternative means of recovery.
In equity, the doctrine of marshalling permits a court to direct a claimant with two
potential sources of recovery—one exclusive to the claimant and the other common with
other claimants—to look first to the exclusive source.659 In the case of tort claims
generally, the debtor’s available liability insurance often represents an exclusive fund to
satisfy the claims of the debtor’s tort victims, but not other kinds of obligations. In the
special case of a debtor’s tort liability for operating a vehicle or vessel while intoxicated,
however, the debtor may not have insurance. In enacting the priority, Congress may well
have had reason to fear that debtors who engage in such reckless conduct will fail to
maintain appropriate coverage, or that it might not be available at all. Because the
victims of these kinds of torts are particularly vulnerable, they are protected by the
Bankruptcy Code’s priority regime.
As formulated, the Bankruptcy Code’s system of priorities cannot be expected to
work perfectly in all cases. For example, in any given matter, a debtor’s liability
insurance may be woefully inadequate to pay the claims of all general tort creditors,
659 See 1 STORY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 444 at 570. As Story explained,
“where there exist two or more funds, and there are several claimants against them, and at
law one of the parties may resort to either fund for its satisfaction, but the others can
come upon only one, there Courts of Equity exercise the authority to marshal (as it is
called) the funds, and by this means enable the parties whose remedy at law is confined
to one fund only to receive due satisfaction.” Id.
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either because their claims exceed the available coverage or insurance is otherwise
unavailable. Yet there is no general priority to protect them in the absence of insurance.
The priority scheme is based on general assumptions regarding the typical case, and there
is always the possibility that the scheme could be improved through more rigorous
calibration. This perhaps suggests the possibility of permitting judges who administer the
Code some leeway in applying its priority provisions. One historic weakness of
traditional mechanisms of equity, however, is that they have tended to vest too much
discretion in the judges applying them, giving some cause to Selden’s famous
criticism.660 The cure in bankruptcy has been to codify the relevant equitable principles
to make their application more certain and predictable and, correspondingly, less
arbitrary.661 Doing so must inevitably sacrifice the kind of flexibility that might
otherwise generate results that are more closely tailored to fit the circumstances. This
concern aside, however, the priorities of bankruptcy would seem to be generally
beneficial from an equitable perspective in addressing the problem of claims mediation.
This leaves the question of the desirability of the Code’s preference provisions as
a means to address the problem of payment discriminations. Like the rules governing the
avoidance and recovery of fraudulent transfers, the preference rules must distinguish
different factual situations to avoid inequitable outcomes. For example, it is one thing for
preference law to avoid and recover a preferential transfer between an insolvent firm and
one of its creditors made shortly before the firm filed for bankruptcy where (1) the
manager of the firm responsible for making the payment also personally guaranteed the
660 See generally supra note 453.
661 See supra at 232.
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firm’s obligation to the creditor, (2) the creditor hounded the manager to make the
transfer, and (3) the manager did so to avoid personal liability under his guaranty. Under
such circumstances, the creditor should hardly be heard to complain of any inequity in
having to disgorge the payment so that the funds might be distributed more equitably
among the firm’s other creditors, including perhaps the victims of its torts.662
On the other hand, it would be another thing for preference law to avoid a
preferential transfer between an insolvent individual and one of his creditors where (1)
662 See supra at 130-31 (discussing this kind of situation). It is sometimes argued that
there is a virtue in permitting an insolvent firm making a preferential payment to stay
afloat. See Schwartz, Normative Theory, supra note 9 at 1230 (arguing that assuring the
payment of preexisting unsecured debts through a preferential transfer may be beneficial
“so that financially distressed firms could borrow more easily”); supra note3 253, 256
(discussing Schwartz’s argument). A similar argument was made by the debtor’s lawyers
in Harman v. Fishar, 98 Eng. Rep. 998; 1 Cowp. 117 (K.B. 1774). Before absconding,
the debtor in Harman instructed his agent to prefer one creditor out of gratitude and
loyalty. In the subsequent suit, William Mansfield (1705-1793) held the transfer void.
Mansfield established the principle that, in order to be a preference, the debtor was
required to have had the intent to prefer the particular creditor for some inappropriate
reason, such as merely to defeat the claims of other creditors. Thus, where the creditor
actually pressed for payment, and the debtor obliged, the payment would not be wrongful
and therefore not preferential. In Mansfield’s words, “if a creditor threatens legal
diligence, and there is no collusion, or begins to sue a debtor, and he makes an
assignment of part of his goods, it is a fair transaction . . . .” Alderson v. Temple, 96 Eng.
Rep. 384, 385 (K.B. 1768). In Harman, the debtor’s conduct was wrongful because he
intended to prefer one creditor over others out of personal affection and loyalty, rather
than commercial necessity. See also Fidgeon v. Sharpe, 128 Eng. Rep. 800; 5 Taunt. 539
(K.B. 1814) (no preference where the debtors did not intend to commit a fraud on the
bankruptcy process). Mansfield’s conception of a preference was rejected in the United
States, and the chief architect for its repudiation was Joseph Story. See Arnold v.
Maynard, 1 F. Cas. 1181 (C.C.D. Mass. 1842) (No. 561) (reasoning that, so long as the
debtor knew he was insolvent when he paid the creditor, the law would infer the
preferential intent). The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently adopted Story’s approach.
See Toof v. Martin, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 40, 48 (1871) (“The transfer, in any case, by a
debtor, of a large portion of his property, while he is insolvent, to one creditor, without
making provision for an equal distribution of its proceeds to all his creditors, necessarily
operates as a preference to him, and must be taken as conclusive evidence that a
preference was intended, unless the debtor can show that he was at the time ignorant of
his insolvency”).
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the debtor made the payment on time in the ordinary course just as he had in prior years,
(2) the creditor exerted no unusual pressure on the debtor to obtain the payment, and (3)
the creditor was not even aware that the debtor was in any kind of financial straits.
Unsurprisingly, preference law generally provides for the recovery of the transfer in the
first scenario outlined above, but not in the second.663
As one court has observed, the general purposes of the preference provisions are
twofold: “to discourage creditors from racing to the courthouse to dismember the debtor
during its slide into bankruptcy and to further the prime bankruptcy policy of equal
distribution among similarly situated creditors.”664 But there is another, deeper purpose
also at work here. By discouraging preferences that a debtor might make as part of his
plan to avoid debt-collection activities (e.g., appeasing creditors by stringing them along
with just enough payments to keep himself afloat), bankruptcy law encourages deeply
insolvent obligors to seek bankruptcy relief sooner rather than later. In other words,
preference law helps with the initiation problem by discouraging creditors from seeking
and accepting out-of-the-ordinary course payments that play along with the insolvent
debtor’s game.665 As noted previously, insolvent debtors (including firms) tend to wait
663 See, e.g., Charles J. Tabb, Panglossian Preference Paradigm?, 5 AM. BANKR. L. REV.
407, 410, 412 (1997) [hereinafter Tabb, Panglossian] (observing that “[f]or centuries, a
creditor who simply got paid for an outstanding debt did nothing wrong, and in the
interest of repose and justice, was allowed to keep the payment” and that “[t]he idea that
only abnormal prebankruptcy grabs should be avoidable, entrenched for several hundred
years, apparently is here to stay”).
664 In re Bullion Reserve of North America, 836 F.2d 1214, 1217 (9th Cir. 1988); see also
Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 154-55 (1991) (discussing the policies of the
preference law).
665 See supra at 87-90 (discussing the initiation problem). This was Senator Daniel
Webster’s point in 1840 made during the debates prior to the passage of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1841. He complained that “[w]e hear daily of honorary debts, and we hear
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far too long to file for bankruptcy relief.666 By discouraging unusual payment and debt-
collection activities on the part of insolvent debtors and their creditors, preference law
prompts resort to earlier relief to avoid and remediate the problems of insolvency more
efficaciously.
As the foregoing suggests, preference law is not an end unto itself. It descends
from the statutory prohibition against the making of post-bankruptcy transfers that violate
the equality norm as extended into the immediate pre-bankruptcy period, during which
time insolvent debtors are likely to engage in all kinds of wasteful machinations to avoid
the inevitable, including making preferential payments to hounding creditors who
nonetheless play along for their own advantage. By discouraging these kinds of
transactions, preference law encourages resort to the bankruptcy process as part of a
larger, highly-calibrated system that aims to make bankruptcy attractive enough so that it
can be effective in addressing the problems of insolvency, but not so attractive that it
generates significantly deleterious ex ante effects.
reproaches against those who, being insolvent, have yet pushed on, in the hope of
retrieving their affairs, until, when failure does come . . . they have not enough left to
discharge these honorary obligations. Now, at the bottom of all this is preference. The
preference of one creditor to another, both debts being honest, is allowed by the general
rules of law; but it is not allowed by bankrupt laws.” CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st
Sess. 814 (1840). One scholar has argued, however, that the sanctions that bankruptcy
law imposes for the payment and acceptance of preferential payments are not significant
enough to deter the debtor from making them. See John C. McCoid, II, Bankruptcy,
Preferences, and Efficiency: An Expression of Doubt, 67 VA. L. REV. 249, 263-65 (1981).
But as discussed above, this criticism seems to miss the larger point of preference law as
part of a complex and coordinated response to the problems of insolvency. Preference
law should not be viewed in isolation. It generates merely one of several different kinds
of incentives designed to facilitate effective resolution of the problems of insolvency.
Thus, although preference law by itself may not be sufficient to deter the debtor from
preferring one creditor over another, the real question is whether, in combination with the
other features of bankruptcy law, it is helpful in ameliorating the problems of insolvency.
666 See supra at 87-90, 144-45; supra note 275.
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Certainly there are other complexities and challenges in connection with the
formulation and application of preference law. We need not, however, resolve all of
these at this juncture to conclude that, from the general perspective of equity, bankruptcy
law’s solutions to the problems of claims mediation and payment discrimination are
generally beneficial as compared to outcomes under non-bankruptcy law. Of course, this
should come as no great surprise given that the relevant equitable concepts that these
solutions embody are essentially internal to bankruptcy law itself.
EFFICIENCY AND PAYMENT PRIORITIZATION
Once again: although the debt-adjustment features of bankruptcy law may be
equitable, are they also efficient? Once more, the answer is generally yes. The problems
that the debt-adjustment features of bankruptcy law address—namely, claims mediation
and payment discrimination—are unavoidable challenges that arise as a consequence of a
debtor’s insolvency owing to the reality that not all claims may be paid in full and losses
must be allocated in some way. As explained above, bankruptcy law responds to this
challenge with remedies that (1) prioritize claims in certain ways and (2) avoid and
recover certain transfers so these may be redistributed in accordance with bankruptcy
law’s priority scheme. The question becomes: from an efficiency standpoint, are these
distributional remedies worth having? The answer is that the debt-adjustment
mechanisms of bankruptcy law are beneficial so long as the costs of these mechanisms
are less than the costs they avoid, and it seems generally true that this requirement is
satisfied.
From the perspective of efficiency, the key virtue of bankruptcy law’s system of
priorities is that it seeks to channel losses toward creditors who are the cheapest avoiders
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of the problems of insolvency, and away from creditors who are poor loss spreaders.667
The key benefit of placing a loss on the cheapest cost avoider is that it creates an
incentive to avoid the loss on the party best suited to do so.668 It likewise helps prevent
someone responsible in some way for a loss from “externalizing” the costs onto someone
else who is not.669 In addition, one of the key benefits of loss spreading is that it helps
those who must bear a particular loss to avoid their own bankruptcies.670 On the whole,
bankruptcy law’s debt-adjustment mechanisms take beneficial advantage of these
principles.
In turn, the key virtues of bankruptcy law’s preference rules are that, by avoiding
and recovering preferential transfers for distribution in accordance with bankruptcy’s
system of payment priorities, these rules promote the process of channeling losses toward
creditors who are the cheapest cost avoiders and away from those who are poor loss
667 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 4.1, 4.5 (2d ed. 1977)
(arguing that, in order to facilitate an efficient allocation of resources, contract law should
place the risk of loss arising from some event on the party best able to protect against the
loss); Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81
YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972) (in the context of conducting a “cost-benefit analysis,” it is
necessary to make “a decision as to which of the parties to the accident is in the best
position to make the cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and accident avoidance
costs and to act on that decision once it is made”); see also Guido Calabresi, Concerning
Cause and the Law of Torts: an Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 73-
76 (1975) [hereinafter Calabresi, Concerning Cause] (discussing loss spreading).
668 See Ronen Perry, Relational Economic Loss: An Integrated Economic Justification for
the Exclusionary Rule, 56 RUTG. L. REV. 711, 745 (2004) (discussing how “[t]ort law
provides incentives for behavioral change that may reduce the loss of social welfare
caused by human interactions”).
669 See CALABRESI, COSTS, supra note 53 at 73-74 (discussing this function of accident
law).
670 See Calabresi, Concerning Cause, supra note 667 at 75 (observing that limiting
damages through calibrated proximate cause evaluations is linked to lessening the burden
on a potentially liable party “in order to avoid being bankrupt by a large liability”).
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spreaders. They also generally help avoid certain of the other problems of insolvency,
such as the debtor’s incentives to engage in wasteful debt-collection avoidance activities
and the creditors’ incentives to engage in debt-collection free-for-alls, by discouraging
unusual debt-collection efforts and encouraging resort to bankruptcy relief. Certainly
preference law is not perfect, and likewise generates costs of its own in terms of its
administration and other effects.671 Nonetheless, it appears on balance to be efficient.
In particular, bankruptcy law seeks to lessen the costs of its several debt-
adjustment remedies in two significant ways: (1) by prioritizing secured claims to
preserve their non-bankruptcy utility and avoid having bankruptcy relief become a means
to ignore otherwise beneficial liens, and (2) by calibrating its preference rules to avoid
the potentially negative ex ante effects associated with an overly invasive preference law.
On balance, these limits appear to be generally adequate. This does not mean, of course,
that bankruptcy law’s debt-adjustment devices cannot be improved. It simply means that,
from an efficiency standpoint, they generate beneficial results when compared to
outcomes under non-bankruptcy regimes.672
671 See, e.g., Tabb, Panglossian, supra note 663 at 410 (offering some criticisms and
suggestions for reform).
672 As noted previously, the desirability of recognizing the priority of secured claims in
bankruptcy is highly contested. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Fried, Uneasy Case, supra note
210 at 921-26 (1996) (arguing that permitting secured creditors fully priority in
bankruptcy may be inefficient in some cases and offering a proposal for reform);
LoPucki, Unsecured, supra note 210 at 1920-24 (challenging the efficiency of the
secured creditor’s priority); Jackson & Schwartz, Vacuum, supra note 238 (arguing that
the efficiency of security interests has not been demonstrated); White, Efficiency, supra
note 238 (arguing that security interests are generally efficient); Schwartz, Continuing
Puzzle, supra note 238 (disputing White’s account); Vern Countryman, Code Security
Interests in Bankruptcy, 75 COM. L.J. 269 (1970) (criticizing the secured creditor’s
priority in bankruptcy); see also Warren, Making Policy, supra note 210 at 1379-83
(arguing for the reformation of Article 9 and the treatment of a secured creditor’s
priority); Klee, Barbarians, supra note 210 at 1467 (arguing that the case for full priority
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The cheapest cost avoiders of the problems of insolvency typically include in
significant measure a debtor’s financial creditors. Because of the Antonio problem and
other biases and deficiencies in the planning capabilities of debtors, financial creditors
are often in a much better position to prevent over-spending because of their often
superior ability to evaluate how much indebtedness their potential obligors can actually
handle. As noted previously, the reasons for this include (1) that creditors do not
characteristically suffer from the Antonio problem in extending credit; (2) they frequently
deal with large volumes of repeat transactions and therefore acquire a comparatively
superior experience in evaluating credit risk; and (3) they have access to sophisticated
predictive models, information, and other underwriting tools to assist them in making
credit decisions.673 Nonetheless, many financial creditors routinely increase their
debtors’ risk of insolvency, or deepen their debtors’ already existing insolvent states, by
offering credit they know (or should know) their debtors cannot tolerate without
materially enhanced risk of failure, and likewise on terms that often accelerate serious
financial crisis upon default. A credit card company that issues credit indiscriminately
and charges a standard interest rate of eighteen percent—and then on top of that stipulates
a default interest rate of thirty-percent or more—not only frequently imperils from the
outset the financial health of many of its borrowers, but also exacerbates the problems of
remains unproven); supra notes 210,238 (citing other criticisms and defenses). But given
that the secured lending market represents a multi-trillion-dollar juggernaut, it seems
unlikely that security interests and mortgage liens will be eliminated as structural
financing options in the near term.
673 See supra at 221.
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insolvency when trouble comes.674 To be sure, debtors play a vitally cooperative role in
incurring these kinds of obligations, for which they bear some of the blame. But in
addressing the problem of claims mediation, the question is whether other creditors—
such as the debtor’s employees or tort victims—should pay for this, or whether the loss
should be channeled toward creditors who are more likely to be complicit in the debtor’s
downfall and in a better position to help avoid it through more provident lending
practices. In other words, the question becomes: should the debtor’s non-financial
creditors bear the externalized cost of the poor lending practices of certain of the debtor’s
financial creditors?
Because financial creditors are often the cheapest cost avoiders, it is efficient for
bankruptcy law to prioritize the claims of non-financial creditors, such as certain tort
victims, employees, taxing authorities, and dependents to whom the debtor owes
674 As a partial means of avoiding the impact of excessive rates of interest in the
bankruptcy setting, bankruptcy law characteristically provides that the accrual of interest
generally ceases upon the debtor’s commencement of a bankruptcy case. See, e.g.,
Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 160, 163 (1946)
(observing that “[a] purpose of bankruptcy is to administer an estate as to bring about a
ratable distribution of assets among the bankrupt’s creditors” and that “[t]he general rule
in bankruptcy and in equity receivership has been that interest on the debtor’s obligations
ceases to accrue at the beginning of the proceedings”). Historically, the continued
accrual of interest in bankruptcy was thought to be a form of penalty and was prohibited
as inequitable because creditors asserting higher rates that continued to accrue would
thereby hold larger and larger claims, and receive greater dividends in bankruptcy, at the
expense of other creditors. In addition, the prohibition avoided “the administrative
inconvenience of continuous recomputation of interest causing recomputation of claims.”
Id. at 163-64. A statutory exception is made for certain “over-secured” claims, meaning
claims secured by collateral that has a value in excess of the amount of the debt owed to
the secured party. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (2000 & Supp. 2006); Craig H. Averch, et al.,
The Right of Oversecured Creditors to Default Rates of Interest from a Debtor in
Bankruptcy, 47 BUS LAW. 961 (1992) (discussing the right of an over-secured creditor to
recover interest on its claim in bankruptcy); Walter J. Blum, Treatment of Interest on
Debtor Obligations in Reorganizations under the Bankruptcy Code, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
430 (1983) (discussing the treatment of interest rates in business reorganization cases).
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domestic support obligations. In addition, some of the reasons for prioritizing these
claims align with the arguments in favor of granting the debtor a discharge, including that
prioritization may (1) help certain individual creditors compensate for the risks associated
with their inability to diversify their own investment of their human capital (e.g.,
employees who are typically unable to take on multiple jobs simultaneously to hedge
against a loss of wages); (2) lessen dependence on other forms of public assistance that
may be less efficient, such as welfare benefits; and (3) help safeguard the interests of
those who may rely on the debtor for their support and well-being.675
But what if the debtor’s financial creditors are secured? As discussed below in
the context of the relative entitlements of secured and unsecured claims, the virtue of
most secured lending is that it is typically offered on terms that are much cheaper than
unsecured credit, and therefore relatively favorable to the debtor and less likely to foment
financial ruin. This generalization, however, is not universally true, and it may well be
that some forms of secured lending should be scrutinized rigorously in bankruptcy and
excepted from the general rule that favors the priority of secured claims. In the typical
case, however, secured claims will not fall into this suspect category.
In sum, when evaluated from the perspective of efficiency, bankruptcy law’s
debt-adjustment solutions in the form of its special procedures that prioritize claims and
avoid and recover preferential transfers appear to be wealth-enhancing solutions to the
problems of claims mediation and payment discrimination. Bankruptcy law’s debt-
adjustment mechanisms are generally efficient because they are specifically designed to
address these problems without generating offsetting costs that are greater than the costs
675 See JACKSON, LOGIC, supra note 8 at 225-52 (making these arguments in favor of the
debtor’s discharge); supra at 291-92.
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they avoid. Once again, there may be specific challenges that arise in applying these
devices in specific settings that undermine their efficiency and perhaps require some
degree of operational refinement and qualification. But we need not resolve the details of
all of these issues in order to conclude that bankruptcy’s debt-adjustment mechanisms
outlined above are generally desirable from an efficiency standpoint.
ENTITLEMENT AND THE PRIORITY OF PAYMENT RIGHTS
Because all creditors hold legally valid entitlements in the form of their respective
claims against the debtor and the debtor’s property, crafting and applying the debt-
adjustment mechanisms of bankruptcy law entail an unavoidable clash of interests. In
sorting out the relative priority of these interests from an entitlement perspective, the
question becomes: who has the greater rights? As noted previously, to be a person is not
only to have rights, but also to have legal responsibilities,676 and in prioritizing rights we
may consider not only the nature of the interests they protect, but also the manner in
which they are used (or abused).
In general, a creditor’s interest in recovering a debt will be protected by a package
of rights that will typically include an assortment of property and liability rules, and it
may also be protected by an inalienability rule in some cases. In turn, certain interests
are more protected at law than others, such as the interests of creditors holding claims for
wages, domestic support obligations, and tax liabilities.677 We may gather from this that,
on the whole, those who possess such highly protected interests have greater rights that
676 See KAHN, REIGN, supra note 222 at 35 (“[t]o be a person is to have legal rights and
responsibilities”).
677 See supra at 312-13, infra at 339-40 (discussing these claims and the ways in which
they are protected).
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should be respected in any priority scheme in bankruptcy. After all, regardless of
whether doing so would be efficient, these creditors have strong claims as a matter of
basic principles of distributive justice.678 In this sense, it is unsurprising that the current
Bankruptcy Code includes on its list of priorities claims of this kind.
But what of secured claims? For example, it is hard to argue that secured claims
are more important than, say, domestic support obligations—at least from a perspective
of distributive justice. Yet bankruptcy law affords secured claims a higher priority, at
least with respect to the secured party’s collateral. How is this consistent with the
relative importance of the interests at stake?
In equity, non-possessory encumbrances on collateral such as liens, attachments,
and the like, were not treated as property per se. As Story explained, “[a] lien . . . is not,
strictly speaking, . . . a property in the thing itself, nor does it constitute a right of action
for the thing.”679 Rather, a lien “more properly constitutes a charge upon the thing.”680
There are, of course, many ways to impose a “charge” upon a debtor’s property,
including through the imposition of judicial liens obtained in the process of execution. In
this way, virtually any debt can ripen into a secured claim. It is all only a matter of
timing, and bankruptcy law has traditionally eschewed preferring creditors on a first-
come, first-served basis. But there is more to the analysis.
In general, secured creditors pay for their priority by charging reduced rates of
interest, and some scholars have contended that protecting their priority is not only their
678 See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, supra note 5 at 1098-1101 (discussing the
assignment of rights based on principles of distributive justice).
6792 STORY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 444 at 554.
680 Id.
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just desserts, but also confers significant micro- and macroeconomic benefits. For
example, Homer Kripke has offered an interpretative historical analysis making such
claims. To begin with, he has explained that advances in manufacturing following the
Industrial Revolution gave rise to the widespread availability of relatively expensive
durable goods, such as cars, appliances, and the like, and a corresponding need for
purchasers to pay for them over time:
[a] decision to purchase such goods involves a commitment to purchase
several years of satisfactions in advance. For example, purchase of an
automobile may be compared to the purchase of a bus ticket good for five
years, or the purchase of a washing machine may be likened to contracting
for a person’s laundry service for five years. There would be relatively
few instances in which a buyer could afford to buy this long-lasting
package of satisfactions at once. The installment payment contract is a
device for permitting the user to pay for the satisfactions more closely to
when they are realized.681
Kripke observed, however, that, for a variety of reasons, most consumer debtors
are relatively bad credit risks:
[i]n the case of consumer credit, the consumer is seldom a good balance-
sheet risk. Her principal assets are household goods, which would be
almost worthless on an execution sale and in many states are exempt from
execution sale except in purchase money situations. The consumer’s
principal other ‘asset’ is her job. One can check on the existence and
duration of the job by telephone, but this gives no assurance that the job
will continue. The lender places additional reliance on the salvage value
of the goods sold subject to the security interest.682
One way to compensate for the risk of the purchaser’s default would be for the
seller or lender who financed the purchaser’s acquisition of the goods to charge a
relatively high rate of interest. Kripke maintained, however, that doing so encounters at
least three problems. First, it increases the transaction costs for the buyer, making the
681 Kripke, Law, supra note 238 at 941.
682 Id. at 947.
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purchase much more expensive, often prohibitively so: “[t]here are limits to the amount
of interest that a debtor can pay before a loan arrangement becomes impractical both for
financial reasons and for legal reasons such as usury laws.”683 Second, it is costly to set a
rate that appropriately compensates the lender for the risk of default associated with any
particular debtor because of the amount of information and analysis required in the
underwriting process: “passing credit in the absence of security would be a time-
consuming and expensive job.”684 Third, in the absence of security, the time it would
take to underwrite the extension of credit would delay the transaction: “Our enormous
manufacturing system for equipment and consumer goods depends on a distribution
system that permits rapid sales on credit at the point of distribution without extended
delays involved in the passing of credit and incidental legal matters.”685 By using cheap
and certain forms of security devices, such as a lien on the item to secure the purchaser’s
obligation to pay for it, the seller or lender could more easily make a rapid credit
decision, reduce the parties’ transaction costs, and charge a lower rate of interest:
[t]he lender’s risk is reduced by the taking of security. If the loan is
properly structured with a down payment adequate to overcome the
depreciation that occurs when a new object becomes used and to keep
ahead of future wear and tear, the risks to the seller or lender on most
items of durable goods will be relatively small, given the resale value that
can be realized readily on repossession. This reduced risk is taken into
account in determining whether to make the loan and in establishing the
amount of the down payment, the length of the period of credit, and the
extent of the credit investigation.686
683 Id. at 954-55.
684 Id. at 947.
685 Id. at 946.
686 Id.
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In conjunction with the rise of secured consumer debt financing of the kind
described above, small businesses also found themselves in need of financing to facilitate
their acquisitions of inventory—for example, the goods they sold to consumers on
installment payment plans. According to Kripke, secured lending (or its economic
equivalent) also facilitated this financing. For example, suppose an automobile dealer
sold a car to a consumer under a five-year installment plan with the seller retaining a
security interest in the car to secure the customer’s payments under the plan. Under this
arrangement, the customer typically would not finish paying for the car for five years. In
order to purchase new inventory to replace the car he had sold, the dealer usually needed
a way to convert the consumer’s five-year installment contract into immediate dollars,
and for this he basically had two options: (1) sell the customer’s installment contract to a
factor at a discount for cash (say, 95% of the face amount of the contract), or (2) borrow
funds from a bank or finance company using the customer’s installment contract as
collateral.687 Under either scenario, what made the installment contract attractive to the
financing entity (either to purchase or to lend against) was the fact that it was secured by
a lien on the automobile such that, if the customer defaulted, the car could be repossessed
and sold to cover the unpaid debt.
For large businesses, secured lending also facilitated an expansion of the
distribution of goods. Kripke observed that, as a general rule of discretion, “[a]
manufacturing company should appropriately borrow not more than thirty-five to fifty
percent of its capitalization.”688 Accepted leverage ratios, however, are much higher for
687 Id. at 944.
688 Id. at 945.
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certain kinds of assets, particularly accounts: “[b]y segregating the [accounts] into a
separate subsidiary, thus giving lenders the first claim to them, manufacturers can obtain
vastly greater sums.”689 Once again, according to Kripke, secured lending supported the
growth of the durable goods distribution system by making more capital available to fuel
its expansion.
Kripke observed that all of this depended on the willingness of those with capital
in the marketplace to invest it in the ways described above.690 Financial capital, Kripke
argued, will go where it will: “it need not necessarily be engaged in loans to finance the
distribution of goods” but rather “can be invested in the securities or commodities
markets, used to develop real estate, or used to engage in any other business activity.”691
Kripke contended that, where capital is used “in financing the distribution of goods,
lenders can largely dictate the terms to which both debtors (manufactures or dealers) and
suppliers, who are the bulk of unsecured creditors, have to agree.”692 And, Kripke
claimed, the terms the lenders often demanded included the provision of security.
For a number of reasons, scholars have contested whether Kripke’s historical
account demonstrates the efficiency of security interests,693 but they do not generally
contest the historical accuracy of the account itself. Kripke’s argument supports the
notion that secured creditors have particularly strong entitlements because recognizing
689 Id.
690 Id. at 944.
691 Id.
692 Id.
693 See, e.g., Jackson & Schwartz, Vacuum, supra note 238 (arguing that Kripke has not
shown the efficiency of security interests).
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the rights they hold maximizes social welfare.694 But what of the rights of other creditors
who have strong claims in distributive justice, such as those holding domestic support
obligations? Does economic efficiency in the form of wealth-maximization trump the
concerns of social justice? Under traditional equity analysis, the just/generous principle
would supply an answer, at least to the relative priority of domestic support obligations as
compared to secured claims: “if a man indebted were allowed to divest himself of his
property in favor of his wife or children, his creditors would be defrauded.”695 But this
answer is unsatisfying, and the conflict is taken up again in further detail below in the
discussion on prioritizing the various debt-collection, debt-forgiveness, and debt-
adjustment remedies of bankruptcy law.
In the meantime, regardless of whether security interests and mortgage liens are
efficient or their priority comports with principles of distributive justice, and irrespective
of such concerns as whether the debtor’s other creditors benefit from the lower interest
rates that secured parties charge (thus perhaps justifying imposing some of the costs of
secured credit on these other creditors), security interests and mortgage liens occupy a
priority status from an entitlement perspective both inside and outside of bankruptcy. Of
course, as noted previously, not all secured lenders pay for their priority by charging
reduced rates of interest, and perhaps liens of this kind should be scrutinized more
rigorously in bankruptcy and excepted from priority treatment. Overall, however, the
priority treatment of secured claims would appear to be beneficial from an entitlement
694 See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, supra note 5 at 1093-98 (discussing the
assignment of rights based on efficiency considerations).
695 1 STORY’S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 444 at 363.
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perspective, at least as compared to outcomes under non-bankruptcy regimes in which
security interests are also given priority.
From an entitlement perspective, the preference law is also beneficial. As in the
case of fraudulent conveyances, whenever a preferential transfer is avoided and
recovered, two expectations are defeated in order to vindicate the creditor’s recoveries:
the expectation of the debtor that the transfer would be effective, and the similar
expectation of the transferee of the preference. In the circumstances in which preferential
transfers are characteristically avoided and recovered, however, the expectations of the
debtor and the transferee tend to be normatively weak. For example, it is difficult to say
that a creditor who extracts payment from an insolvent firm by threatening to sue the
firm’s manager on his personal guaranty has a particularly strong right to retain the
payment it has extracted on the eve of bankruptcy. There are, of course, circumstances in
which the normative merits of avoidance will be far less clear.696 But once again, the
necessity of drawing lines to distinguish preferential transfers that are properly avoidable
from those that are not is inevitable. From the perspective of the creditors who receive
enhanced recoveries in bankruptcy in accordance with their normatively superior
priorities, and likewise to the extent that preference law has the effect of avoiding at least
some of the problems of insolvency by encouraging debtors to file for bankruptcy sooner
rather than later, the remedy appears to be ameliorative.
In sum, bankruptcy law’s debt-adjustment solutions to the problems of claims
mediation and payment discrimination would appear to be beneficial from the perspective
696 See supra at 317-19.
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of entitlement analysis. Accordingly, entitlement analysis joins with equity and efficiency
analysis in demonstrating the desirability of these solutions.
PRIORITIZING THE FUNCTIONS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
The discussion so far has focused primarily on evaluating the individual merits of
bankruptcy law’s distinct debt-collection, debt-forgiveness, and debt-adjustment
mechanisms in terms of whether each resolves in beneficial ways the various debt-
collection, debt-forgiveness, and debt-adjustment problems of insolvency to which they
correlate and respond. As we have seen, bankruptcy law’s debt-collection solutions are
generally beneficial in addressing the debt-collection problems of (1) deadweight
collection and monitoring costs, (2) gratuitous transfers, and (3) debt-collection free-for-
alls because bankruptcy’s solutions make use of procedures that reduce or avoid the costs
of these problems, such as mechanisms for the collectivization of enforcement activities,
the more orderly disposition of the debtor’s property, and the recovery of fraudulent
transfers. In addition, although perhaps not perfect, these mechanisms incorporate
generally adequate safeguards to reduce the costs of their own implementation, such as
by limiting the reach of the fraudulent transfer provisions to avoid intruding
unnecessarily on legitimate commercial expectations.
Similarly, bankruptcy law’s debt-forgiveness solutions are generally beneficial in
addressing the debt-forgiveness problems of (1) an insolvent debtor’s incentives to
engage in wasteful debt-collection-avoidance activities, such as delay, deception, and
inappropriate risk taking, and (2) the waste associated with stagnating and overburdened
assets, including an insolvent debtor’s human capital, because these solutions, too, make
use of procedures that reduce or avoid the costs of these problems, in particular
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bankruptcy’s discharge and exemption features. Moreover, although they also might be
improved, these mechanisms likewise incorporate generally adequate limitations
designed to reduce the costs of their implementation, such as by restricting the scope of
discharge and exemption relief to avoid making bankruptcy an attractive nuisance.
Finally, bankruptcy law’s debt-adjustment solutions are generally beneficial in
addressing the debt-adjustment problems of (1) claims mediation, and (2) payment
discrimination because these solutions likewise make use of procedures that reduce or
avoid the costs of these problems, in particular bankruptcy’s prioritization and preference
provisions. Although these procedures are also imperfect, they nonetheless incorporate
generally adequate limitations to reduce the costs of their implementation, such as by
preserving the priority of secured claims and restricting the reach of the preference-
avoidance provisions. On the whole, these various debt-collection, debt-forgiveness, and
debt-adjustment solutions produce outcomes superior to those generated by non-
bankruptcy systems—although again that hopefully should not be too surprising because
that is what these solutions are for.
Putting aside the question of how well the different mechanisms of bankruptcy
law address the particular problems of insolvency to which they correlate as compared to
non-bankruptcy outcomes, the next challenge is to analyze more closely how these
various mechanisms appropriately interrelate with each other as an organic whole—if for
no other reason than to support (or undermine) the analysis so far. The consolidated
deployment of bankruptcy law’s debt-collection, debt-forgiveness, and debt-adjustment
mechanisms engenders two major conflicts: (1) a creditor-versus-debtor conflict arising
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between the solutions of debt-enforcement and debt-forgiveness, and (2) a creditor-
versus-creditor conflict arising out of the prioritization of claims.
In evaluating these conflicts, equitable concepts take us only so far. The principle
of restraint directs that legally enforceable obligations should be recognized and enforced
in equity. But as we have seen, that is only the starting point. Even before Parliament
effectively channeled bankruptcy procedures to available statutory mechanisms in 1623,
the Privy Council supplied formidable equitable bankruptcy relief that had the effect of
suspending, modifying, or reducing the petitioning debtor’s obligations, depending on the
case. Thereafter, bankruptcy law evolved to incorporate procedures that permitted a
discharge of obligations. As noted previously, consideration of the relevant procedures
from an equitable perspective helps illuminate the issues and norms that animate
bankruptcy law. But equity is only of limited use in prioritizing these norms as a matter
of internal relations. For example, the relevant maxims that steer its application often
point in different directions and there is no overarching principle to instruct which maxim
to select in a particular situation, requiring reliance instead on tradition, conscience,
practical expediency, and legislative intervention.
Efficiency analysis can take us at least a bit further. As we have seen, it is
generally efficient to provide an insolvent debtor with a discharge of most kinds of debts,
as well as some modest amount of exempt property.697 Doing so, however, necessarily
and unavoidably competes with the creditors’ interests in the enforcement of their claims.
What is particularly relevant in evaluating this conflict from an efficiency perspective is
that, in the insolvency setting, the benefits of enforcement are typically low, while the
697 See supra at 286-92; supra notes 72, 73, 76, 334 (discussing the discharge and
exemption features of bankruptcy law).
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costs are typically high. 698 As a result, the unbridled enforcement of claims against
insolvent debtors begins to look like merely a form of wealth transfer rather than an
exercise in wealth-maximization.
This conclusion is bolstered considerably by the fact that debtors typically pay for
the benefits of discharge and exemption relief, in part by the interest and other charges
that creditors collect. When financial creditors and commercial sellers calculate the price
of the credit they offer (whether in the form of a loan of funds or an agreement that goods
sold may be paid for over time), they understand that at least some of their debtors will
become insolvent and unable to pay their debts, and that some of these will, in turn, seek
bankruptcy relief. As a result, these creditors build into their prices the anticipated costs
associated with the uncollectability of some portion of their claims, and they thus
effectively spread their losses in this way. Because in general these creditors do not
know for sure who will default at some point in the future and be unable to pay, the
additional charges they add to the price of credit can be thought of as a type of
insurance—essentially a fund these creditors create for themselves to compensate for
anticipated losses.699 Because in this way debtors essentially pay for the benefits of
discharge and exemption relief, it is generally efficient that they receive what they pay
for.
698 See supra at 137-55, 162-74, 286-92.
699 See, e.g., Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice, supra note 9 at 82. As Robert Rasmussen has
explained in the context of business reorganization proceedings, “[t]he less that creditors
expect to receive in the event that a firm ends up in a bankruptcy proceeding, the more
they will charge for the loan in the first instance by increasing the interest rate. Looked at
in these terms, bankruptcy redistribution is a type of insurance . . . .” Id.; see also
Jackson & Scott, Nature of Bankruptcy, supra note 23 at 168 (drawing the same
analogy).
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It is certainly true that the greater the number of debtors who file for bankruptcy
relief, the more financial creditors will charge to cover their anticipated losses, thus
increasing the costs of credit. But creditors have themselves to blame to the extent they
lend indiscriminately or on terms that exacerbate the likelihood of default and insolvency.
Correspondingly, to the extent bankruptcy law forces creditors to internalize the costs of
improvident lending, this may result in more efficient extensions of credit and an overall
reduction in prices. In addition, as discussed previously, it is unlikely that debtors will
increase their risk taking based on the prospect of discharge and exemption relief in
bankruptcy. So long as bankruptcy remains generally discouraging and debtors continue
to underestimate their risk of default and insolvency (which seems likely), these forms of
relief are unlikely to have much of an impact on general risk taking habits.700
Of course, not all creditors are able to spread their losses in this way. For
example, those who hold claims for domestic support obligations are not generally able to
diversify their risk of nonpayment across multiple domestic partners or collect interest
and other charges from multiple sources to compensate for losses they may sustain. As a
result, these creditors do not benefit from the kind of collection “insurance” that financial
creditors may establish for themselves. Taking this into account, it should come as no
surprise that domestic support obligations are excepted from discharge in bankruptcy.701
Also excepted from discharge are a variety of other kinds of similarly situated claims,
including those for (1) death or personal injury caused by the debtor’s operation of a
700 As Rasmussen has put it, there is a very large “copayment” required with a debtor’s
collection of bankruptcy “insurance” because the debtor bears a significant portion of the
loss. Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice, supra note 9 at 114.
701 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (excepting from discharge “a
domestic support obligation”).
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motor vehicle while intoxicated, (2) willful and malicious injury, and (3) a variety of
intentional frauds.702
From an efficiency perspective, the debt-forgiveness mechanisms of bankruptcy
law would appear to be more important as a general matter than its debt-collection
devices, with the kinds of exceptions noted above for certain nondischargeable
obligations. The relative efficiency, however, of enforcing domestic support obligations
as compared to protecting an individual debtor’s use of his own human capital (i.e.,
protecting his productive autonomy) is harder to evaluate. But that is because the value
of these competing interest is inherently difficult to quantify for purposes of efficiency
analysis.703 As discussed below, however, entitlement analysis suggests that domestic
support obligations are of exceptional importance, and sufficiently so to justify the
burden on individual human capital.
But what of secured claims? In general, the priority of secured claims is
recognized in bankruptcy, but a secured creditor may not hold a lien on an individual
debtor’s human capital. A secured creditor may only hold a lien on certain of the
702 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(9) (2000 & Supp. 2006), 523(a)(6) (2000 & Supp.
2006), 523(a)(4) (2000 & Supp. 2006). Among other reasons, these types of claims also
may not be covered by insurance. In addition, their avoidance would tend to trigger
moral condemnation. As a general matter, in order for society at large to accept
bankruptcy law as just, bankruptcy law must maintain a certain degree of sensitivity to
the vindication of particularly compelling legal norms. See CALABRESI, COSTS, supra
note 53 at 294-300 (offering a moral framework for evaluating accident law, including
the extent to which it may offend general concepts of fairness). At the very least, to the
extent bankruptcy law promotes outcomes that may be perceived as unjust on a
comparative basis, its advocates must explain persuasively why these outcomes are
justified for bankruptcy reasons.
703 See supra at 242-48 (discussing some of the weaknesses of efficiency analysis).
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debtor’s personal and real property.704 Although the secured creditor may retain its
interest in the relevant property through bankrutpcy, the debtor’s personal liability is
generally discharged through bankruptcy law’s debt-forgiveness mechanisms.705
Turning to the creditor-versus-creditor conflict that arises in the prioritization
process, efficiency analysis once again supports channeling losses toward creditors who
are the cheapest cost avoiders and away from those who are poor loss spreaders. Because
unsecured financial creditors are typically cheap cost avoiders and good loss spreaders,
while creditors holding domestic support obligations are neither, it makes sense that
bankruptcy law would prioritize the latter over the former. Moreover, given that
financial creditors may take advantage of a type of “insurance” that creditors holding
claims for domestic support obligations do not usually have access to, this further
supports elevating the latter’s priority in bankruptcy.
704 Outside of bankruptcy, a creditor may in some jurisdictions obtain a writ of
garnishment attaching an individual’s wages—perhaps the nearest thing to a lien on
human capital. There are various state and federal protections that limit the effect of
garnishment in those jurisdictions that still permit it. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1671, et seq.
(setting forth federal garnishment restrictions); Long Island Trust Co. v. U.S. Postal
Service, 647 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1981) (discussing statute and its purpose); Irwin M.
Fletcher, I Can’t Have My Wages Garnished!, 50 S. CAROLINA L. REV. 525 (1999)
(discussing federal and other limits on garnishment). Once a debtor files for bankruptcy,
garnishment typically does not reach wages earned after the commencement of the
bankruptcy case. See 11 U.S.C. § 552(b); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 243-45
(1934); In re Mirando Soto, 667 F.2d 235, 237 (1st Cir. 1981) (“The question of whether
a wage assignment gives rise to a continuing lien is well settled. The accepted rule is that
the assignment of future wages as security for a present debt does not constitute a lien
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code”) (citing cases); In re Rumker, 184 B.R. 621,
627-28 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1995) (citing cases). Thereafter, if the underlying liability is
discharged, the creditor cannot use garnishment to collect it. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,
292 U.S. 234, 243-45 (1934) (observing that garnishment is not available to recover
discharged debt).
705 See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing that a discharge in
bankruptcy operates to relieve the debtor of personal liability for an obligation).
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The analysis becomes more challenging, however, when the claims of financial
creditors are secured. Because secured financial creditors are also much better cost
avoiders and loss spreaders than creditors holding domestic support obligations, and
likewise may benefit from a type of “insurance” funded by the interest they charge, this
suggests that they, too, should be subordinated to domestic support obligations and
similar claims. One problem with this idea, however, is that doing so might create a
remedy susceptible to systemic manipulation and abuse.
For example, suppose a woman borrows funds on a secured basis to purchase a
home and likewise borrows on a secured basis to purchase her car. Suppose also that the
house and car are titled in her name. Suppose that the woman’s husband loses his job and
the couple fall far behind financially. If domestic support obligations had priority in
bankruptcy over secured claims, the couple could divorce, enter into a settlement
agreement requiring the wife to pay a large sum to the husband and then, after filing for
bankruptcy, claim that the unpaid support obligations had priority over the mortgage and
secured car loan. In other words, the couple might essentially manipulate the domestic
support obligation priority to convert their equity status into a priority creditor position.
This concern aside, it must be conceded that there may well be situations in which
it would be efficient to grant priority to some obligations over secured claims in
bankruptcy. On the other hand, secured financing is a multi-trillion-dollar industry that
arguably benefits society as a whole in a number of ways and tampering with the secured
creditor’s priority is something to be approached with caution.
From an entitlement perspective, the debt-forgiveness mechanisms of bankruptcy
law would also appear to be more important as a general matter than its debt-collection
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devices, again with the kinds of exceptions noted above for certain nondischargeable
obligations. At this point, however, financial creditors (who have taken something of a
beating so far) might interrupt and complain loudly that, as a matter of entitlement, (1)
their rights to payment are not less important than those of any other creditor; (2) lending
facilitates commerce, which provides significant benefits; and (3) a debtor’s obligation to
pay a financial debt is no less a duty than any other freely entered into. They might
continue that, to the extent debtors are able to dishonor their obligations to financial
creditors, this will tend to erode trust and confidence in commercial markets and only
make financing more expensive, generating significant social costs. Such was certainly
the view of Thomas Hobbes.
With his highly pessimistic view of human nature, Hobbes stated the arguments in
favor of the enforcement of contracts in an extreme form, using the utility of vindicating
the creditor’s expectation of trust in extending credit as the central justification for his
grand conception of social and political authority. The coercive power of the state, he
contended, was needed to “compel men equally to the performance of their Covenants,
by the terror of some punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of
their Covenant.”706
In understanding Hobbes’s argument, it is important to note that he distinguished
“contract” from “covenant” in a manner uncharacteristic of modern usage. In Hobbes’s
conception, a “contract” typically involved a simultaneous exchange that did not require
any meaningful extension of trust, such as the sale and immediate delivery of a tangible
item for cash. In contrast, trust was central to the idea of a “covenant,” which Hobbes
706 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 202-03 (C.B. MacPherson ed. 1968) [hereinafter
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN].
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defined as “where there is a credit given either to one or both” based on an obligation or
obligations yet to be performed in the future, such as a loan or an agreement for the sale
of an item that required future payment, future delivery, or both.707 Hobbes’s view of a
covenant is thus aligned with the modern conception of most kinds of executory
contracts—those contemplating future performance of some kind at the time of
contracting. In Hobbes’s view, the terror of punishment was necessary to facilitate the
kind of trust necessary for these contracts to be viable.708
For our purposes, Hobbes’s view has a number of weaknesses. To begin with, in
claiming that debtors and creditors need to be forced to trust each other, he offered a
rather unusual notion of the concept of trust. As Immanuel Kant observed, one of the
general challenges of living in modern society is dealing with its general climate of
“unsocial sociability.”709 From this perspective, Hobbes’s view on the need to coerce
trust seems equivalent to the cynically humorous slogan: “the beatings will continue
until morale improves.” At least from a Kantian standpoint, the real issue is not how to
compel “trust” any more than it is how to compel “love,” but rather how best to deal with
707 THOMAS HOBBES, DE CIVE 126 (B. Gert ed. 1972); see also HOBBES, LEVIATHAN,
supra note 706 at 193 (with a covenant, “he that is to performe in time to come, being
trusted, his performance is called Keeping of Promise, or Faith”).
708 Hobbes (1588-1679) thus held a relatively uncompromising view of authority. His
view was unpopular with many of his era precisely because he emphasized it at the
expense of more cooperative models of sociability. See supra at 281; supra notes 409-
11.
709 Immanuel Kant, Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View
(1784) reprinted in ON HISTORY 15 (L. Beck trans. 1963). Kant (1724-1804) argued that
“[t]he character of the species, as is well known from the experience of all times and all
nations, is as follows[: human beings] cannot be without peaceful coexistence, and yet
they cannot avoid continuous disagreement with one another.” IMMANUEL KANT,
ANTHROPOLOGY FROM A PRAGMATIC POINT OF VIEW 249 (V. Dowdell trans. Illinois
1978).
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the problems of unsociability that interfere significantly with productive social activities.
In this sense, to the extent the lending practices of financial creditors contribute to the
problems of insolvency, they should be discouraged, not promoted through coercive
vindication in a context in which doing so would only exacerbate the costs of these
practices.
More important, the concept of duty underlying contractual obligations is not
monolithic. As Holmes explained, the law does not typically call upon the coercive
power of the state to compel a debtor to perform a breached contractual promise. Rather,
most civil obligations are properly understood to require either the performance of the
relevant duty or, failing that, the payment of some monetary equivalent.710 Some
liabilities, of course, are sufficiently important that they are, in fact, backed rigorously by
the coercive power of the state. These include domestic support obligations. Notably,
although courts will not throw a debtor in jail for breaching an ordinary contract, they
will throw a debtor in jail for failure to pay child support, which further supports the
relative priority of this kind of liability in bankruptcy. But in general, most civil debts are
simply reducible to money damages, and the ability to collect money damages from a
debtor is typically freighted with many conditions, protections, obstacles, and restraints
designed to preserve norms of social existence that compete with the creditor’s interest in
recovering a debt. Simply put, the Hobbesian perspective is not the law’s perspective;
710 See HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 5 at 236; see also Warren, Bankruptcy
Policy, supra note 10 at 778 (making this point). An exception is the remedy of specific
performance available in certain circumstances. See Schwartz, Specific Performance,
supra note 335 at 275-78 (arguing that the difficulty in placing a value on certain
obligations is one justification for the doctrine of specific performance).
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the reality is far more complex and not beneficially susceptible in most cases to narrow,
coercive resolution.
Even from an entitlement perspective that takes into account the importance of
enforcing claims as a matter of corrective justice, the collection of claims must give way
to solutions designed to address the problems of insolvency, including those of debt-
forgiveness designed to vindicate important considerations of distributive justice, such as
those that find expression in cherished principles of autonomy and self-direction.711
Likewise, similar concerns underlie recognition of the greater “need” of some creditors
over others in the prioritization of claims—again, a concept of distributive justice.712
Ultimately, the beneficial allocation of scarce resources—including the assets of an
insolvent debtor—is more important than the bare payment of claims. It requires sorting
the claims to ensure that assets are allocated among claimants in the most beneficial way.
THE BANKRUPTCY MARKET
Up to this point, this chapter has been devoted to explaining the desirability of the
various debt-collection, debt-forgiveness, and debt-adjustment mechanisms of
bankruptcy law. Collectively, it seems fairly obvious that these mechanisms require
coordination and administration. The initial question arises: for purposes of organizing
them, what conceptual framework best captures an appropriate organizational structure?
As summarized in Chapter 1, the Bankruptcy Code coordinates bankruptcy law’s
various debt-collection, debt-forgiveness, and debt-adjustment devices by providing that,
upon the commencement of a bankruptcy case, the debtor’s property is vested in a special




bankruptcy estate; the claims of creditors are exchanged for equitable shares in the estate
(and are sometimes traded in a unique distressed-debt submarket); most debt-collection
activity is curtailed in favor of court-supervised oversight of the debtor’s affairs; and the
debtor’s liabilities are thereafter sorted, altered, negotiated, and extinguished under the
auspices of a special regulatory system that effectively supplants non-bankruptcy
mechanisms.713 As a positive matter, these various mechanisms work together in a way
best described as a special “bankruptcy market” designed to address what is to be done
with the person, property, and liabilities of insolvent debtors. In addition, the bankruptcy
market is essentially “corrective” in nature because, as explored previously, its purpose is
to remediate the problems of insolvency so that, among other goals, insolvent debtors and
their property may once again return to, and participate fully in, ordinary non-bankruptcy
markets unburdened by the waste, inefficiency, and distorted decision-making incentives
that insolvency generates.
This particular conceptualization of bankruptcy law as creating a corrective
market is also normatively vital because it best describes what bankruptcy law should be
doing. Bankruptcy law should be functioning as a corrective market because, as a tool
for resolving the problems of insolvency, only a corrective market is sophisticated
enough to orchestrate all of the desirable functions of bankruptcy law. Settling on this
713 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 541 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing for the creation of a
bankruptcy estate), 362 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing for the automatic stay), 501
(2000 & Supp. 2006) (permitting creditors to file proofs of claim), 502 (providing for the
allowance and disallowance of claims), 510(c) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing for the
equitable subordination of certain claims), 524(c) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing for
reaffirmation), 727 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing for the discharge of claims in
Chapter 7 cases), 1123(b) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing for the classification of
claims in Chapter 11 cases in a plan of reorganization); see also supra notes 72-76, 171,
240-41, 244 (discussing these and other aspects of the bankruptcy process).
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label, however, does not end the matter, and in fleshing out more precisely the beneficial
contours of the bankruptcy market, a number of additional issues arise.
First, there is a question of access. Among other things, should solvent debtors be
entitled to take advantage of the remedies of bankruptcy law? Second, there is a question
of procedural economy. Which is more important: accuracy in resolving the various
problems that bankruptcy law addresses, or speed? Third, if bankruptcy law makes use
of courts, should they be traditional dispute-resolution courts or problem-solving courts?
Fourth, in the case of an insolvent firm, what procedure should bankruptcy law recognize
for determining whether the firm should be liquidated or reorganized? Finally, if the
assets of a bankrupt firm are not to be sold, how should value be distributed among
creditors where there are no cash proceeds from an actual sale? The details of the
answers to these questions are important.714 Although the list of questions explored here
is not exhaustive, it is representative of those that are the most significant.
ACCESS
Because the purpose of bankruptcy law is to respond to the problems of
insolvency, it seems rather obvious that bankruptcy relief should be limited to insolvent
individuals, firms, and other kinds of debtors, such as municipalities. Bankruptcy relief
is powerful medicine. Recognizing this, most judges unceremoniously eject solvent
debtors from the bankruptcy forum, and this is entirely appropriate.715
714 In order to avoid outright rejection by society, bankruptcy law must, among other
things, take care to avoid abuse of its mechanisms and likewise avoid procedures that
offend general principles of responsibility, cause and effect, individualized treatment, and
the like. See CALABRESI, COSTS, supra note 53 at 294-300 (arguing that any system of
law must pay attention to such concerns if it is going to be accepted as fair).
715 See supra note 105 (citing cases).
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Bankruptcy law must also be scrupulous in avoiding the use of its procedures for
fraudulent purposes and otherwise to prevent bankruptcy relief from sheltering abusive
misconduct.716 This does not mean, however, that our bankruptcy law should adopt
extensive screening mechanisms that attempt routinely to scrutinize minutely the causes
of a debtor’s financial ruin. As the Supreme Court has noted, the “vast majority” of
debtors who file for bankruptcy relief fit the “honest but unfortunate” paradigm.717
Burdening the system with complicated tools of inquisition designed to ferret out such
things as the moral dimensions of an insolvent debtor’s financial downfall would be
simply a waste of time. Moreover, except in cases of outright fraud or other egregious
misconduct, it is often difficult (i.e., costly) to determine the causes of insolvency in any
particular case.718 This difficulty is often exacerbated in the context of insolvent firms.
A firm’s insolvency often presents a complex pattern of causation, and one might well
ask whether the cost of the inquiry is worth the expense when the debtor’s resources
716 See Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966) (bankruptcy law must be
exercised in a way that avoids inequity); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304-05 (1939)
(recognizing the responsibility of a bankruptcy court to exercise its jurisdiction so that
“fraud will not prevail, that substance will not give way to form, that technical
considerations will not prevent substantial justice from being done”).
717 See Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 374 (2007) (observing that
“[t]he class of honest but unfortunate debtors” who file for bankruptcy “includes the vast
majority of the hundreds of thousands of individuals who file Chapter 7 petitions each
year”); see also supra at 267.
718 In the case of most individuals, inquiry into the relative culpability of the debtor is
almost certainly not worth the cost. Even assuming that one might conclude that the
debtor’s insolvency is the result of excessive risk taking, typically the most important
question (given that most insolvency cases are of the no-asset variety) is what should be
done with the debtor’s human capital. Even assuming the debtor’s responsibility for his
or her condition, continuing the debtor’s debt burden is at once likely to be both a pyrrhic
victory for creditors and excessively costly to the debtor (as well as others). Moreover,
since the costs of the inquiry regarding the debtor’s culpability are likely to be
unrecoverable, the analysis is simply likely to generate further deadweight costs.
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might be directed more fruitfully elsewhere.719 Although bankruptcy law should guard
jealously the gates of the bankruptcy market, it should not inflict additional wounds on
those who approach them for essential relief.720
ACCURACY VERSUS SPEED
In administering bankruptcy relief, bankruptcy law must also take account of
procedural economy—i.e., how best to balance accuracy versus speed. Specifically, it
must balance (1) concluding bankruptcy proceedings as expeditiously as possible in order
to, among other things, reduce its costs; and (2) ensuring the fairness of the proceedings,
719 By analogy, one would not routinely envision the need for a formal judicial inquiry
into the abilities of the managers of a solvent firm just because the firm was faring
poorly. Typically, the equity holders would simply decide to continue the retention of the
managers or not. Managers are sacked every day in a variety of contexts and no one
argues that every sacking should be preceded by a formal judicial inquisition to
determine the cause of the firm’s poor performance.
720 In some rare cases, of course, it may be important to identify in detail the cause of the
debtor’s demise. For example, if the debtor’s management has engaged in massive fraud,
it will often be important to identify the fraud in order to replace the management as
quickly as possible. In the overwhelming majority of cases, however, it will be pointless
to attempt to prove that poor decision making is to blame for the debtor’s demise for the
purpose of attempting to “prove” that management is incompetent to make decisions. For
example, the debtor’s financial demise may be the result of management’s decision to
invest in a particular project that turns out poorly. In the typical case, however, there is
little utility in engaging in an expensive fact-finding and causation inquiry simply for the
purpose of documenting each misstep. Time and resources will often be better spent in
attempting to salvage the debtor and decide what is to be done with the assets. Among
other reasons, a bankruptcy system that systematically devotes resources to investigating
management under a presumption that financial demise is typically the result of
wrongdoing will discourage management from seeking bankruptcy protection when
bankruptcy protection might do the most good. Instead, management will move likely
engage in avoidance strategies if for no other reason than to avoid an investigation of
their conduct. The question when and how to replace management should be left to
procedures akin to those employed in replacing management outside the bankruptcy
context. It is a decision best left for those with the best incentives to make it
appropriately, rather than courtroom drama.
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including the accurate determination of claims, and otherwise the prevention of abuse and
unfairness.721
For example, creditors holding claims against the debtor’s bankruptcy estate
prefer to recover whatever they can as quickly as possible. Unlike fine wine, delinquent
debts do not tend to improve with age, and delay typically reduces the value of any
eventual recovery. At the same time, however, it is important to have a fair procedure
that separates meritorious claims from those that are not (e.g., claims that are inflated or
altogether fraudulent).722 In addition, at the time of the commencement of the debtor’s
bankruptcy case, the amount of many claims may be unknown. For example, a victim of
the debtor’s wrongdoing may not yet have commenced a lawsuit asserting his claim, and
it may take years to either settle or liquidate the controversy. Until the amount of the
claim is known and the debtor’s liability fixed, it may be impossible to allocate the
debtor’s resources among all claimants with complete accuracy.723 The question
becomes: to what extent should speed give way to accuracy.
Although accuracy and speed are both important, accuracy is more important than
speed so long as the pursuit of accuracy does not impinge unduly on the more important
question of deciding what is to be done with the person and property of the debtor. For
example, until the claims of creditors are tallied, it may not be known for sure whether a
721 See FINNIS, NATURAL LAW, supra note 77 at 188-93 (examining the procedural
aspects of a just bankruptcy law).
722 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 501 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (permitting creditors to file proofs of
claim), 502 (providing for the allowance and disallowance of claims); see generally
supra notes 16, 241 (discussing the claims-allowance process).
723 The problem of unmanifested tort claims arises frequently in the bankruptcy context.
See, e.g., In re UNR Indus., Inc., 725 F.2d 1111, 1118-21 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussing
difficulties in handling such claims); supra note 257.
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particular creditor is entitled to a voice in the process. In the meantime, decisions may
have to be made, including whether to sell the debtor’s assets. In such circumstances,
speed is often more important.724
TRADITIONAL OR PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS
Given that the mechanisms of bankruptcy law address a great number of disputes,
it seems logical that the bankruptcy market would make use of a court system. The
question arises: what kind?
The traditional judicial archetype is the classic dispute-resolution court. Courts
within this genre have traditionally “functioned as neutral arbitrators, resolving issues of
historical facts or supervising juries engaged in the adjudicatory process.”725 Problem-
solving courts, on the other hand, are characteristically “specialized tribunals established
to deal with specific problems,” including problems of rehabilitation of varying kinds.726
They have generally arisen in response to the failure of traditional court systems to
address significant problems, including lack of judicial expertise in handling particular
challenges in need of specialized solutions.727 The success of certain problem-solving
courts has led in recent years to their proliferation in some jurisdictions.728 Without a
724 See supra notes 74, 92, 588, infra note 739 (discussing sales process in bankruptcy).
725 Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving Courts, 30
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1055 (2002) [hereinafter Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence].
726 Id.
727 See id. at 1060; see also Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104,
107 (1909) (discussing the establishment of the first juvenile court in Chicago in 1899).
728 See Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 725 at 1057 (discussing the
success of certain problem-solving courts in helping addicts end their addictions); see
also Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent
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doubt, bankruptcy courts, as specialized tribunals that handle only proceedings in
bankruptcy and that are responsible for supervising such complex matters as the
reorganization of business enterprises, are specialized problem-solving courts.729
This is appropriate. Bankruptcy cases involve special problems and sometimes
require innovative answers. Many bankruptcy cases are unique, particularly large ones.
For example, with over $18 billion in debt and innumerable problems that will likely take
years to resolve, it is difficult to imagine how bankruptcy law might handle effectively
the City of Detroit’s recent bankruptcy filing if the presiding bankruptcy court were not a
specialized problem-solving court.730 This role is consistent with bankruptcy’s origins in
equity and the constitution of bankruptcy courts as equitable tribunals.731
LIQUIDATION OR REORGANIZATION
Who should decide the fate of a firm in bankruptcy? Creditors in their role as
creditors will typically possess skill at setting and monitoring benchmarks for a debtor’s
payment performance. For example, secured creditors may have elaborate covenants
embedded in their loan documents requiring defined levels of financial achievement to
avoid default. Breach of any of these covenants will almost certainly invite greater
Experimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REV. 831, 832 (2000) (discussing
rehabilitation ambitions of specialized drug treatment courts).
729 See, e.g., Harvey R. Miller, The Changing Face of Chapter 11: A Reemergence of the
Bankruptcy Judge as Producer, Director, and Sometimes Star of the Reorganization
Passion Play, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 431 (1995) (discussing the role of bankruptcy judges
in business reorganization cases).
730 See In re City of Detroit, no. 13-53846 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
731 See supra notes 440-41.
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scrutiny of the debtor’s activities and possibly trigger debt-collection activity.732 But
skill at setting and monitoring benchmarks for the debtor’s payment performance does
not necessarily encompass competence in actually running the debtor’s business,
especially where the debtor is insolvent. Nor does a creditor’s skill in managing its own
commercial affairs necessarily fit the bill.
For example, in the case of a creditor that is an individual, the creditor may have
considerable skill and expertise in managing his own business affairs. But that does not
necessarily translate into the skill, resources, or expertise necessary to manage
successfully the business affairs of the debtor, particularly the debtor in crisis. Similarly,
in the case of a creditor that is a firm, the creditor may likewise have employees who are
skilled at running the creditor’s business. But these employees are also presumably
occupied with that task, and the credit manager in charge of the defaulting debtor’s
account hardly seems a likely candidate to take charge of the debtor’s operations.
In the insolvency context, the preeminent challenge is promoting the intelligent
investment of the debtor’s resources given the problems of insolvency, not establishing
and monitoring benchmarks for that performance based on preexisting loan covenants.
By analogy, the fact that a timekeeper stands ready with a watch in hand will be
meaningless if there is no one to actually run the race. This is not to say that monitoring
and benchmarks are inappropriate or unimportant. Rather, it is to say that they should be
kept in proper perspective.
In matching decision-making needs and skills in the insolvency context, what
matters is ensuring that those who will make determinations over the disposition of the
732 See supra at 162-68; supra note 283.
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debtor’s property will have the appropriate incentives and competence to do so.
Although creditors may have a stake in the outcome, their role in the process should be
matched to what, practically speaking, they have to offer toward its resolution, not merely
what they hope to receive.
In the case of most insolvent individuals, the key consideration is, once again, the
future deployment of the debtor’s human capital. That is so because, in most individual
bankruptcy cases, the debtor’s human capital is likely to be the debtor’s most significant
asset. In deciding how best to dispose of this asset, creditors are not likely to have much
meaningful direct input. Because an individual debtor’s human capital cannot be
separated from the person of the debtor, it is not something that creditors can direct or
dispose of independently. Perhaps one creditor may believe that the debtor should
change jobs to earn more money (ostensibly to better satisfy the creditor’s claim).
Perhaps another creditor might believe that the debtor should go back to school and earn
a degree to increase his earnings potential (for the same reason). Still another creditor
might conclude that the debtor should not have children on the ground that doing so
would be costly.733 But there is more than an air of unreality to creditors making these
kinds of investment decisions.
Similarly, in cases involving small businesses, the value of the firm may be
inextricably bound up with the personal skill, expertise, or reputation of the firm’s
733 See David Rowan, Life After Debt, EVENING STANDARD, Aug. 17, 2001, available at
2001 WLNR 2667667 (Kim Basinger’s bankruptcy “case was of Hollywood proportions,
with the producers’ lawyers even trying to stop Basinger having children—as this would
diminish the sum they might reclaim.”).
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individual owner-manager.734 In these instances, divesting the firm of its assets and
dividing the resulting value among the creditors encounters many of the same difficulties
that arise in the case of handling the human capital of insolvent individuals.
With other kinds of insolvent firms, particularly those that are larger, the
considerations are often differently aligned. Here, the interests of creditors are typically
more like those of passive investors where the firm itself, its managers, and its owners are
functionally separate and distinct (and also separable). The creditors hold claims against
the debtor, which entitle them to certain rights. Although the creditors’ rights are
typically distinct from the rights of equity holders, insolvency changes the equation
(discussed previously). Specifically, once the firm becomes insolvent, the duties of the
firm’s managers shift to encompass the creditors’ interests in new ways, and the creditors
become the “residual claimants” of the firm.735 But just as one would not typically view
passive equity investors as necessarily the best decision makers to manage a solvent
enterprise, one would probably not view the creditors of an insolvent firm to fulfill this
function either. This is likely to be especially true given the generally heterogenous
nature of the creditors’ rights, interests, and perspectives.736 Instead, one might well
envision retaining managerial responsibilities for the firm with some group of
professional managers. Because the firm is in crisis, however, the managers will likely
benefit from the assistance of those who are skilled in crisis management, not only to
734 Cf. Baird, Uncontested Axioms, supra note 27 at 583 n.34 (observing in the case of a
closely-held and managed firm dependent on its owner’s human capital that “[t]he
problems of this failed firm cannot be separated from the financial or other difficulties of
its owner.”).
735 See supra notes 119, 280-81.
736 See supra at 156-62.
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stabilize the business, but also help evaluate whether it should be liquidated or
reorganized.
By analogy, outside the bankruptcy context there are legions of experienced
professionals who advise managers every day on choices over asset retentions and sales.
The major difference is that the lines of authority are typically clearer outside the
bankruptcy setting—the outside professionals answer to the managers, and the managers
to the shareholders. Within bankruptcy, the lines of authority tend to be more fluid and
nuanced owing to the inherent uncertainty in many instances over who has a voice in
selecting the firm’s direction based on such questions as the debtor’s value.
For example, equity holders might argue that they have a right to a voice in the
process on the theory that the debtor is not actually insolvent and they therefore remain
the residual claimants. In contrast, unsecured creditors might argue that they are the
residual claimants on the theory that there is enough value to pay secured claims in full,
but not enough to cover their unsecured claims, rendering equity holders “out of the
money.” In further contrast, secured creditors might argue that they are the true and
exclusive residual claimants on the theory that there is not enough value to pay their
claims in full, leaving nothing for either unsecured creditors or existing equity holders.
Of course, while these parties squabble, the patient (debtor) may well be bleeding to
death. Although it is normatively more important for bankruptcy law to ensure the
optimal allocation of the debtor’s assets than it is to preserve payment entitlements,
creditors involved in any particular case will not necessarily see it that way. And those
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who know that they are “out-of-the-money” can be expected to engage in all kinds of
strategic behavior to attempt to extract at least something for their claims.737
What is necessary is for bankruptcy law to impose a structure that can produce a
meaningful decision in spite of these problems and conditions. One alternative might be
for the process to employ an autocratic and coercive judge to keep the parties on the
“right” decision-making track. But a judge is not typically well-suited to make the actual
decisions that will be called for—he is generally well-suited only to supervise the
process. The question persists: who should evaluate and decide whether to sell the assets
or not?
The best response is that, absent unusual circumstances, the debtor’s managers,
acting in concert with appropriate outside professionals, should evaluate the question and
present their recommendation for the creditors’ consideration.738 In this way, the
managers are answerable to the creditors (who will almost always be the residual
claimants, notwithstanding the protestations of the existing equity holders based on
trumped-up values), and if the creditors cannot agree amongst themselves on a particular
course of conduct or managerial direction, they may be compelled to negotiate the
resolution of key issues through a form of compulsory mediation designed to achieve a
negotiated resolution of the debtor’s fate (ideally, in the form of a consensual plan). Here
the bankruptcy judge has a particularly important “problem-solving” role to play as
737 See, e.g., supra at 81-82, supra notes 170, 183, 482 (discussing the complexity and
uncertainty of some instances of insolvency and the opportunities for exploitation that
these create).
738 There is always the risk that, to keep their jobs, managers will seek to delay
liquidation even when a debtor’s prospects are hopeless. But that is why, under the
current law, creditors typically employ professionals to advise them on the debtor’s
prospects and the managers’ proposals.
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essentially the lumberjack who breaks up the log jams. If unusual circumstances are
present (e.g., the assets must be sold quickly because they are deteriorating rapidly in the
hands of the debtor), then the managers, again acting in concert with appropriate
professionals, should decide whether to sell them or not. As a check, it is for the court to
evaluate whether unusual circumstances exist to alter the relevant decision-making
authority (such as the managers seeking to cut self-serving deals for themselves in
violation of their duties). But absent proof of malfeasance, the managers’ choice should
control.739
For example, suppose the debtor is a large airline with a complicated asset and
operational structure. Once again, the fact that the debtor becomes insolvent does not
mean that the debtor (or rather its management) is necessarily incompetent. More
commonly, the root of the debtor’s financial demise will involve misfortune of one kind
or another (and, in any event, the cost of attempting to figure out whether the debtor’s
financial demise stems from something other than misfortune will usually not be worth
the effort). On the other hand, although it is possible in some cases that the effects of
739 This is essentially how the law currently deals with these issues. In general, the goal
of every business reorganization case is the confirmation of a plan that the creditors have
negotiated, voted on, and accepted (or been compelled to accept through “cramdown”)
that provides for the disposition of the debtor’s assets. See Bank of America Nat’l Trust
& Sav. Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 U.S. 434, 440-42 (1999) (discussing
plan confirmation process and cramdown requirements). If there is insufficient time to
engage in this process, the debtor’s assets may be disposed of without the creditors’
formal vote, but the debtor’s managers must demonstrate that there is good reason to
depart from the process of confirming a plan providing for the disposition of the debtor’s
assets that has been accepted by creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2000 & Supp. 2006)
(providing for the sale of the debtor’s property other than in the ordinary course of
business with approval by the bankruptcy court); In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063 (2d
Cir. 1983) (in a chapter 11 case, the sale of the debtor’s assets outside a plan must be
based upon a good business reason). The bankruptcy judge determines whether special
circumstances exist sufficient to warrant departure from the normal course.
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insolvency may be overcome simply by releasing the debtor from the burden of excessive
debt (i.e., the debtor is suffering merely from financial distress), this may be difficult to
assess. Sometimes it will be obvious, as in the case of the restaurant that cannot produce
edible food. Other times it will not be, as in the case of an airline that has suffered
extraordinary losses from unusual events, such as the 9/11 tragedy.
Because optimal asset allocations are more important than preserving payment
entitlements, the debtor may retain its assets if that would be the optimal use under the
circumstances, or the assets may be transferred in some way to some new owner if that
would be optimal.740 If the best choice is to leave the assets with the debtor, this should
be done and the relevant debts discharged in a manner sufficient to negate the problems
that excessive indebtedness have with respect to decision making over the use of the
assets (i.e., the debt-forgiveness problems of insolvency). Again, as with corporate
governance and investment decisions generally, determining which option is in fact
optimal should be for the managers to decide in the manner outlined above.
The issues are somewhat differently aligned, however, in so-called “single asset
cases,” involving typically a special purpose debtor (such as a firm organized as a limited
partnership or special purpose trust) that owns a single physical asset (such as a hotel,
apartment building, office building, or shopping mall).741 Once again, the fact that the
740 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Control Rights, Priority Rights, and
the Conceptual Foundations of Corporate Reorganizations, 87 VA. L. REV. 921, 922
(2001) (“the central focus of corporate reorganization should not be on priority rights.
Instead, as in corporate law generally, it should remain upon how the firm’s assets are
used and who controls them”); see also Baird & Bernstein, Absolute Priority, supra note
190 at 1936 (further critiquing traditional focus on absolute priority).
741 See Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle St. P’ship, 526
U.S. 434 (1999) (involving a single-asset case).
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debtor becomes insolvent does not typically demonstrate that the debtor (or, more
particularly, its manager) is a poor decision maker over the use of the single asset—say,
an apartment building. Further, although insolvent debtors have incentives to use their
assets improvidently (such as by gambling with them), the effects of insolvency may be
eliminated by releasing the debtor from the grip of excessive debt. At the same time,
however, there are many solvent firms skilled in operating apartment buildings, and the
operation of a building may not require much asset-specific knowledge. Further, unlike
human capital in individual cases or complex combinations of assets in the form of a
large business enterprise, a single building is more readily transferable from one owner to
the next.
Because optimal asset allocations are more important than preserving payment
entitlements, the debtor may retain the asset if that would be its optimal use, or the asset
may be transferred to some new owner if that would be optimal under the circumstances
of the particular case. Once again, the real question is whether leaving the asset with the
debtor is in fact optimal and, more particularly, who should decide that question. In
single-asset cases, the best decision maker is typically going to be someone who is
willing to inject capital into the debtor (such as by making an infusion of cash) in an
amount that, in combination with the elimination of indebtedness that exceeds the
debtor’s value, is sufficient to recapitalize the debtor as a financially sound entity.742 If
742 In a rough sense, this is similar to the general test that the law currently endorses. See
In re Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the new
value doctrine survived the passage of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 and explaining that
under the doctrine “a plan that allowed stockholders in the business that had filed for
bankruptcy protection (old equity) to receive stock in the reorganized debtor in exchange
for contributions of added capital (new value) could under certain conditions satisfy the
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no one is willing to make that contribution in order to reorganize the debtor in its existing
ownership configuration, then the asset should be sold to someone other than the debtor,
and the proceeds distributed among creditors.
To assist with the reorganization of salvageable business enterprises (such as
viable airlines and the like), the reorganization procedures of current bankruptcy law
compel a system of controlled negotiations with the expectation that the parties will
produce a negotiated plan that resolves the proper disposition of the debtor and its
property. Bankruptcy law generally keeps managers in control of the process in most
reorganization cases,743 provides for the appointment of committees to represent different
stakeholder constituencies,744 and authorizes the retention of skilled professionals to
guide the process and advise the parties and the court.745 Secured creditors are generally
prevented from foreclosing, while the value of their rights is ostensibly protected by
complex rules.746 All of this sounds costly, but the evidence suggests that it is no more so
than other major corporate transactions, such as major mergers.747
absolute priority rule and be considered ‘fair and equitable’ even though a senior class
was not paid in full”).
743 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101(1) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (defining “debtor in possession”),
1107 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (defining the rights, powers, and duties of a debtor in
possession).
744 See 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing for the appointment of
creditors’ and equity security holders’ committees).
745 See 11 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (providing for the employment
“attorneys, accountants, and other agents” by creditors’ and equity security holders’
committees).
746 See supra notes 16, 74-75, 119, 244, 305, 325.
747 See supra note 154.
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One criticism of the current law is that it coddles incompetent management.
Ousting management automatically upon the commencement of a bankruptcy case,
however, is only likely to be counterproductive. Once again, it does not necessarily
follow that, just because a debtor files for bankruptcy, management is incompetent. More
important, a rule that automatically ousts management would create a powerful incentive
for managers to avoid bankruptcy even if the firm sorely needs it—exacerbating the
initiation problem.748 Further, if management of the firm is incompetent, it may be
replaced after the bankruptcy filing has occurred, and the available evidence suggests
that, at least in the case of large firms, this often happens.749 Keeping existing managers
at the helm, at least initially, may not be ideal in every sense, but it is better than the
alternatives.
DISTRIBUTING VALUE
Finally, there are two other procedural problems that arise routinely as a result of
a firm insolvency: (1) determining the value of the firm’s assets if the assets are not
reduced to readily distributable cash through a sale, and (2) allocating this value among
the competing claimants. In the case of a solvent debtor, the managers typically do not
need to value the debtor’s assets in order to pay claims or make distributions to
shareholders, and the task of determining entitlements and allocating value among the
creditors and shareholders is generally straightforward. First, creditors simply receive
payment of their claims in accordance with their payment entitlements under applicable
748 See supra at 87-90; supra note 184.
749 See supra note 185; see also LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION
FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 156 (2005) (observing that data
indicate that companies in bankruptcy that replace old management fare better in
bankruptcy than companies that do not).
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non-bankruptcy law. Second, shareholders receive dividends as and when determined by
the firm’s directors.750 Third, the shareholders’ entitlements are generally the same: the
members of each class of shareholders have the same rights based on their individual
shares, and they each share equally on a per-share basis (unless they agree otherwise). In
other words, the rights of the residual claimants of a solvent firm (i.e., the shareholders)
are relatively homogeneous and easily determined.
In the case of insolvency, however, the creditors become the residual claimants,
and their diverse rights and interests generate unique problems in the allocation of the
firm’s value. First, allocation problems arise because the claims of creditors are not
seamlessly convertible into residual ownership interests. Second, valuation problems
arise (often in combination with allocation difficulties) if the debtor’s assets are not
reduced to readily distributable cash.
Just as it is sometimes useful to sell some of the assets of a thriving business (e.g.,
those that are not needed for profitable operations) so that their value may be redeployed
in other ways, it is often useful to liquidate some or all of the assets of an insolvent
debtor.751 Because under principles of absolute priority the creditors of an insolvent firm
are generally entitled to payment of their claims before distributions may be made to
750 See Gabelli & Co. Profit Sharing Plan v. Ligget Group, Inc., 444 A.2d 261, 264 (Del.
Ch. 1982) (stating that “[a] decision to declare a dividend is a matter ordinarily addressed
to the discretion of the Board of Directors invoking, as it does, important business
considerations”). A hybrid situation may arise in the case of preferred shares, which may
have certain features that resemble equity interests, and others that resemble debt
instruments.
751 See supra notes 74, 92, 739.
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equity holders, the proceeds of any liquidation are generally allocated to creditors first.752
One question that arises is how to allocate the proceeds among competing claimants who
bargained originally for payment of their claims in full, but who must now accept less
than what they bargained for, owing to the debtor’s insolvency. This is a manifestation
of the problem of claims mediation that can become quite complicated in its particulars.
To begin with, the amount of each claim is often different and may not be readily
discernible (as in the case of contingent claims).753 Accordingly, it may be difficult to
determine the total amount of the firm’s obligations and the precise interest of each
creditor. In addition, creditors typically hold different payment priorities (e.g., secured
creditors are paid from their collateral before others, and some creditors may be
752 See supra note 119 (discussing the absolute priority rule). Notably, current Chapter
11 reorganization law does not require the distribution to preexisting creditors of all
surplus generated from the preservation of the firm as a going concern. All that it
requires is that, unless a creditor consents otherwise, each creditor receive not less than
what it would receive if the assets were liquidated. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2000 &
Supp. 2006) (prescribing the “best interest of creditors test” in Chapter 11 cases); see also
H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 224 (1977) (stating that “[t]he bill does not impose a rigid
financial rule . . . . The bill only sets the outer limits on the outcome [for preexisting
creditors]: it must be somewhere between the going-concern value and the liquidation
value.”). The current law also directs that certain claimants who might receive nothing
outside of bankruptcy must have their claims paid on a priority basis. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 507 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (prescribing general priority rules).
753 In general, a contingent claim is one as to which the debtor’s liability turns upon the
occurrence of some extrinsic event, such as a tort claim based on the claimant’s exposure
to a harmful product but for which the claimant has not yet suffered any damages and
may not yet even know of the existence of the claim. See In re All Media Properties,
Inc., 5 B.R. 126, 133 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (reciting that “claims are contingent . . . if the debt
is one which the debtor will be called upon to pay only upon the occurrence or happening
of an extrinsic event”), aff’d, 646 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1981). Hence, at any particular point
in time, the debtor’s obligation to pay any amount on the claim may be in question.
Similarly, claims may be unliquidated, meaning that the amount of the claim has not yet
been ascertained, as in the case of a tort claim that has not yet been reduced to judgment.
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contractually subordinated to certain other claims).754 Thus, in contrast to the interests of
the residual claimants of a solvent firm, the rights and interests of an insolvent debtor’s
creditors are often heterogeneous and may be difficult to fix.755
Moreover, in the absence of a sale of the debtor’s assets, determining the value of
these assets can be problematic because, as one commentator has explained, “[a]ll
estimates of value are noisy,”756 and uncertainty over value can easily lead to disputes
over payment entitlements. For example, the inability to fix definitively the value of the
debtor’s assets (sometimes exacerbated by the inability to determine the aggregate
amount of all claims) may call into doubt whether the debtor is truly insolvent. This, in
turn, may call into question the identity of the firm’s residual claimants and whether the
754 See supra notes 171, 234, 244.
755 Mechanically, the Bankruptcy Code defines the term “claim” broadly to include any
“right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2000 & Supp. 2006); see In re
Udell, 18 F.3d 403, 406 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that “[b]y fashioning a single definition
of ‘claim’ for the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, Congress intended to adopt the broadest
available definition of that term”) (citations omitted). As a result, claims in bankruptcy
include a broad spectrum of tort, environmental, labor, and other types of obligations.
See Pennsylvania Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 555 (1990)
(discussing the breadth of the concept of a claim in bankruptcy in a case involving a
criminal restitution obligation); Southeastern Sprinkler Co. v. Meyertech Corp. (In re
Meyertech Corp.), 831 F.2d 410, 412 (3d Cir. 1987) (breach of warranty claim); In re
Altair Airlines, Inc., 727 F.2d 88, 89 (3d Cir. 1984) (claim by a collective bargaining
representative for unpaid wages of union members); Newton v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In
re Johns-Manville Corp.), 45 B.R. 827, 828 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (claims brought by
individuals injured by the asbestos produced by the debtor).
756 Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 533 (1986); see also Baird & Bernstein, Absolute
Priority, supra note 190 at 1942-43 (discussing inherent uncertainties in the valuation
process).
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managers’ fiduciary duties also encompass the interests of creditors.757 Moreover,
disputes over value can call into question whether and to what extent some claims should
be eliminated (because there is not enough value to reach them after more senior claims
are paid), or reduced (because, although they are entitled to receive some value, there is
not enough to pay them in full), and whether they should be converted into equity
interests in the reorganized debtor or given other kinds of rights. Obviously, this kind of
uncertainty creates opportunities for strategic behavior that may add to the overall cost of
resolving a firm’s insolvency.758
757 See Baird & Jackson, Bargaining, supra note 60 at 763 (observing that, in some cases,
“the value of the firm may not be clear and we may not know who the residual claimant
is”).
758 For example, if there is any room for doubt regarding a firm’s solvency, equity
holders may be expected to challenge any alleged forfeiture of their status as the firm’s
residual claimants. In the insolvency context, shareholders may be able to do this in one
of several ways. See Committee of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel
Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1072 (2d Cir. 1983) (Winter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
challenge by the equity security holders’ committee to the sale in bankruptcy of a
particular asset was simply a delaying tactic designed to extract value from creditors);
Skeel, Nature, supra note 158 at 508 (observing that the equity holders may use their
ability to call a shareholder meeting and oust existing management strategically as a
bargaining tool to extract value from creditors); J. Ronald Trost, Corporate Bankruptcy
Reorganizations: For the Benefit of Creditors or Stockholders?, 21 UCLA L. Rev. 540,
545 (1973) (explaining that “[t]he participation of junior creditors and shareholder
interests depends upon a finding of value in the business over and above that of the
claims of the senior interests. This is where the battle is fought between the stockholders
and the creditors.”); cf. Miller, Wealth Transfers, supra note 181 at 40-41 (stating that
“[c]ourt protection that permits stockholders to work their way out of difficulties and
repay their obligations in full . . . gives the stockholders a valuable call option at the
expense of creditors, who in effect are compelled to put up the [funds] on terms they
would otherwise never accept”).
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Like a variety of other administrative problems, however, bankruptcy law has
evolved to deal with these kinds of issues.759 In Chapter 7 liquidation cases, value is
allocated in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code’s prioritized payment allocation
rules.760 In Chapter 11 reorganization cases, value is allocated under the terms of the
debtor’s confirmed Chapter 11 plan, which accommodates elaborate rules for value
distributions combined with flexibility to respond to particular situations.761 In Chapter
11 liquidation cases, the value of an asset is typically determined by its sale.762 Although
perhaps not perfect, these mechanisms are nonetheless serviceable and help illustrate the
necessary complexity of the bankruptcy market.
CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy law responds robustly and beneficially to the problems of insolvency.
Its various debt-collection, debt-forgiveness, and debt-adjustment mechanisms are geared
to address these problems in fairly complex ways because the problems themselves are
complex. The fact that bankruptcy law operates beneficially does not mean, of course,
that its mechanisms cannot be improved. It does mean, however, that bankruptcy law is
worth having, notwithstanding its itinerant vices. This should come as no surprise—
bankruptcy law has been in the making for many centuries and draws together many
759 See Baird & Bernstein, Absolute Priority, supra note 190 (discussing how modern
reorganization practice under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code has evolved to resolve
valuation and allocation difficulties).
760 See supra note 75-76, 241, 247 (discussing payment rules in liquidation cases).
761 See supra notes 73-74, 119, 241, 299, 588, 752 (discussing plans of reorganization).
762 See supra note 74, 92, 739 (discussing sales).
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traditions and experiences from many legal sources. It is thus the product of a rich
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